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ABSTRACT
CITIZENSHIP, MINORITIES AND IMMIGRANTS:
A COMPARISON OF TURKEY'S JEWISH MINORITY 
AND TURKISH-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL
Toktaş, Şule
Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor; Assoc. Professor Ahmet İçduygu 
July 2004
This study investigated the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of 
citizenship and the interaction between them on the layers of international 
migration and minority issues with use of a comparative case. A research on the 
perceptions and experiences of Turkey’s Jewish minority and Turkish-Jewish 
immigrants in Israel regarding citizenship was conducted. The field research 
which was carried out in both countries - Turkey and Israel -  consisted of key 
informant interviews, participant observation in commimity institutions and in- 
depth interviews with a total of 65 respondents from the sample group. The results 
were analyzed using qualitative data analysis technique.
On the layer of minority, research results illustrated that in a society where 
the population is overwhelmingly Muslim, being a non-Muslim minority played 
roles in: a) the appropriation of the monist and universal conceptualization of 
citizenship in the legal status aspect; b) the endeavor to maintain Jewish identity 
despite the inevitable consequences of integration and assimilation in the identity 
aspect; and c) the discrepancy between values and actions in the civic virtue 
aspect. On the layer of international migration, the research pointed out that 
despite long years of residence in Israel, first generation of Turkish-Jewish 
immigrants in Israel preseryed their political culture that they cultivated when 
they were in Turkey. However, experience of international migration as a process 
seemed to impact on citizenship and played roles in; a) the appropriation of 
democratic norms defined by majoritarian terms in the legal status aspect; b) 
efforts to maintain their Turkish identity in the identity aspect; and c) the 
preference for complying with the general norms of Jewish-Israeli society and 
conversely excluding a proactive understanding of virtuous citizenship.
Keywords: Citizenship, Minority, Immigrant, Jew, Turkey, Israel
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ÖZET
VATANDAŞLIK, AZINLIKLAR VE GÖÇMENLER: 
TÜRKİYE’DEKİ YAHUDİ AZINLIK VE İSRAİL’DEKİ TÜRK-YAHUDİ 
GÖÇMENLER ÜZERİNE BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA
Toktaş, Şule
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu 
Temmuz 2004
Bu çalışma vatandaşlığın yasal statü, kimlik ve erdem boyutlannı ve 
aralarındaki etkileşimi uluslararası göç ve azınlık katmanlannda incelemiştir. 
Türkiye’deki Yahudi azınlığın ve İsrail’deki Türk-Yahudi göçmenlerin 
vatandaşlığı nasıl algıladığı ve tecrübe ettiği üzerine bir araştırma yapılmıştır. 
Türkiye ve İsrail’de gerçekleştirilen alan araştırması çerçeve mülakatlan, cemaat 
kurumlannda katılımcı gözlem ve ömeklem grubundan 65 kişiyle yapılan 
derinlemesine mülakatlardan oluşmuştur. Sonuçlar niteliksel veri analizi tekniği 
kullanılarak değerlendirilmiştir.
Azınlık katmanında, araştırma sonuçlan çoğunluğun Müslüman olduğu bir 
ülkede gayri-Müslim azınlık olmanın a) yasal statü boyutunda tekçi ve evrensel 
bir vatandaşlık anlayışının sahiplenilmesinde; b) kimlik boyutunda entegrasyon ve 
asimilasyonun kaçınılmaz sonuçlanna rağmen Yahudi kimliğinin korunmaya 
çalışılmasında; ve c) sivil erdem boyutunda değerlerle uygulama arasındaki 
uyumsuzlukta etken olduğuna işaret etmiştir. Uluslararası göç katmanında ise 
araştırma birinci nesil göçmenlerin uzun yıllardır İsrail’de yaşamalanna rağmen 
Türkiye’de edinilen politik kültürü koruduklannı göstermiştir. Fakat, uluslararası 
göç deneyimi bir süreç olarak vatandaşlığı doğrudan etkiliyor görünmektedir. 
Nitekim yapılan araştırma, göç sürecinin a) yasal statü açısından çoğunluğun 
tapımı esasında gelişen demokratik normlann benimsenmesinde; b) kimlik 
boyutunda kozmopolit Yahudi-îsrail toplumunda Türk kimliğinin korunmaya 
çalışılmasında; ve c) sivil erdem boyutunda ise Yahudi-îsrail toplumunun genel 
kurallanna uyum sağlama ve aktif erdemli vatandaşlığa mesafeli kalmada etkili 
olduğunu göstermiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Vatandaşlık, Azınlık, Göçmen, Yahudi, Türkiye, İsrail
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: FOCUS AND APPROACH
1.1 Laying Down Aspects to Citizenship: Legal Status, Identity and Civic 
Virtue
Contemporary liberal democracies confront governance problems elicited 
by the discord between the principles of equality and difference, and between the 
concepts of majority and minority (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). The pressure 
on democracies urged scholars of political theory to focus on the resolution of 
these pressures and in recent years, there has been growing theoretical and 
empirical interest in the concept of citizenship. Either from the perspective of 
formal democracy (focusing on formal and institutional aspects of democracy i.e. 
rule of law, separation of powers, multi-party system and elections that make a 
democracy viable) or of substantial democracy (concerning the deepening of 
democracy), citizenship is one of the key components of the state-society 
relationship. Formal democracy theoreticians tend to be content with universal 
citizenship rights whereas substantial democracy theoreticians emphasize the 
constitutive elements of the citizen such as gender, race, culture, class and identity 
in a multicultural and plural framework.
Democracies, no matter the model that they opt for, confront the 
challenges imposed by citizenship. There are mainly two models of citizenship
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prevalent in political theory- individual rights based citizenship and citizenship 
based on groups rights. In the former model, rights of citizens regardless of 
differences in ethnic origin, race, language, gender, sexual orientation, social 
status, etc. stem from the general doctrine of imiversal human rights. On the other 
hand, in the latter model, citizens are conceived with their group membership and 
hence granted rights accordingly (Üstel, 1999). Despite dissimilar roots to 
citizenship, advocates for the adoption of universal citizenship in a homogeneous 
framework or for the implementation of fragmented citizenships in 
correspondence with the differences and diversities existing in a society, all 
presume a correlation between citizenship and democracy (Cohen, 1999; 
Kymlicka and Norman, 1994). In this sense, it is significant that citizenship 
discussions fall within the domain of quality of democracy at the national and 
international levels which point to the need of approaching citizenship in some 
way or another.
The basic precept that citizenship refers to is a constitutionality based 
relationship between the individual and the state (Delanty, 1997). Citizenship 
signifies also membership in a political community. Since antiquity, citizenship 
has been defined as the legal status of equal membership in a political community 
with regard to the rights and duties (Shachar, 2000: 65), which implies a unique, 
reciprocal and unmediated relationship between the individual and the political 
community (Brubaker, 1992). In a similar vein, early studies on citizenship have 
primarily focused on the legal status aspect of citizenship and on the “rights” 
model of state-citizen relationship. In correspondence to the historical formulation 
of T.H. Marshall who historicized the development of citizenship with the
introduction of civil rights in the 18th century, political rights in the 19th century 
and social rights in the 20*'’ century (Marshall, 1965), studies on citizenship in the 
post-World War II era have been an arena where the rights of the citizens vis-à-vis 
the state were vindicated. The main focus of these studies until 1980s was 
constitutional rights, social institutions and the welfare state which problematized 
citizenship as legal status (Kadioglu, 1996b).
Rights model of citizenship introduced by T.H. Marshall has not been left 
without criticism mainly with the argument that the deduction of citizenship only 
as legal status hindered the identity aspect (Erol, 1997: 120). For instance, 
Hammar (2000) points out that Marshall’s formulation concerns the rights of the 
citizens and ignores the issue of international migration and therefore omits the 
right to reside, to reunite the family and to work. Turner (1992), on the other 
hand, questions the linear modeling of citizenship and introduces
conceptualization of citizenship in public and private spheres with passive and
)
active dimensions. In a similar vein, Delanty (1997) reveals that rights model 
relates equality more than participation and points to the significance of 
substantive dimension of citizenship which regards citizenship not only in terms 
of rights but also in terms of action and participation in the political community. 
All these challenges reflected on the development of identity politics after the 
1980s when citizenship came to be accepted as an identity that equates to 
membership to one or more political communities based on race, class, ethnicity, 
religion, gender, profession and sexuality (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 369; 
2000: 30). Accordingly, separation of identity firom the traditional definition of 
citizenship as rights was witnessed (Delanty, 1997). Identity is also considered an
important aspect of citizenship for it serves both multicultural integration and 
assimilation. As Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 37) put forth:
Minorities who have secured public recognition and support for their ethnic 
identity have the confidence to interact with others in an open way; whereas 
those groups whose identities lack public recognition tend to be more 
defensive about their culture and more fearful about the consequences of 
cultural interchange.
Having accumulated the legal status and identity aspects of citizenship, the 
studies started to shift their analytic category fi'om the state to the society and to 
citizens. The debates on citizenship accepted that the functioning of society not 
only depended on justice of its institutions or constitution but also on virtues, 
identities and practices of its citizens. Simultaneously, it has been increasingly 
acknowledged that the health and stability of a democracy is correlated to the 
capacities, responsibilities and willingness to cooperate of the citizens, shortly the 
civic virtue that the citizens possess and perform (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 
352). In other words, modem citizenship is perceived as the combination of legal 
status, social roles and moral attributes that necessitate for “good citizenry” (Erol, 
1997: 120).
As a requisite for the quality of democracy, responsible citizenship entails 
foiu· types of virtues all of which constitute various components of civic virtue 
(Galston, 1991): general virtues (courage, law-abidingness, loyalty), social virtues 
(independence, open-mindedness), economic virtues (work ethic, capacity to 
delay self gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change) and 
political virtues (capacity to respect others’ rights, willingness to demand what
can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness 
to engage in public discourse). The sense of identity that citizens have, their 
maneuvers to deal with competing identities, their willingness to participate in 
collective decisions and access to political processes, their sense of belonging to 
the social, political and economic order and their initiative potency all refer to 
different features of civic virtue (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 352). In this 
regard, civic virtue appears as the relational bond between the responsibilities that 
the citizens feel and the actions that the citizens perform accordingly.
In sum, citizenship is argued to have three main aspects (Kymlicka and 
Norman, 2000). First is the legal status which enfolds citizenship in terms of civil, 
political and social rights plus duties like to obey laws, to pay taxes and military 
service. The second aspect is the identity dimension of citizenship which 
fi’agments citizenship into multiple categories that arise fi'om membership to 
different social and political groups. Identity as a member of one or more 
communities based on race, class, ethnicity, religion, gender, profession, age, 
sexuality and etc. construes an essential aspect of citizenship. The third aspect is 
the virtue that the citizens feel and execute in terms of their loyalties, 
responsibilities and roles. It has been suggested that these three aspects of 
citizenship - legal status, identity and civic virtue- are interrelated to one another; 
as the sensitivity to identities increase, demands for legal rights increase 
correspondingly (K)Tnlicka and Norman, 2000). It is also claimed that identity 
affects the way people perform their duty of civic participation and their 
conception of responsibility (Waldron, 2000: 156). From another point of view, it 
is also argued that the three components of citizenship conflict with each other
under certain circumstances (Cohen, 1999). For instance, Kymlicka and Norman 
(2000: 32-33) argue that claims for cultural recognition may conflict with equal 
citizenship status. As they put forth:
...minority claims to cultural recognition threaten equal citizenship status 
when the costs and benefits of minority protection are unfairly distributed -  
i.e. when one subgroup within the minority (e.g. women), or when selected 
non-members (e.g. Anglophones in Quebec), are asked to bear most or all of 
the costs of cultural reproduction, while others enjoy the benefits.
Still, the dynamics of interaction between the three aspects are rather 
ambiguous and need further empirical data. In this regard, an empirical 
investigation of citizenship is necessary to shed light on the correlations and 
divergences existing in the interaction between three aspects.
1.2 Challenges to Citizenship: International Migration and Minority Issues
Under the impact o f globalization, although the nation-state functions as 
the territorial unit of citizenship (Delanty, 1997; Cohen, 1999), the nation-state, 
which rests, on the myth of one nation and one state, is becoming obsolete (Held, 
1995). Furthermore, citizenship which also refers to belonging to a nation or state 
is also becoming intricate (Hammar, 1986). As the claims for substantive aspects 
of citizenship like ethnicity, gender, class, cultiure gained weight in response to the 
uncertainty and insecurity that globalization brings about (Giddens, 1991), 
citizenship became more firagmented (Delanty, 1997). As claims that call for 
diversity to be recognized increase, universal citizenship rights that safeguard 
individual rights and fi'eedoms fall short of grasping diversity.
International migration and minority issues are contributory facets of this 
process. Even political theory has started to focus more on minorities and 
immigrants due to the increasing nationalist and secessionist tendencies after the 
collapse of the Soviet Block as well as increasing international flow of immigrants 
and refugees in the 1990s. Due to challenges on nation-state directed by 
globalization, citizenship extends beyond the concept of nationality which is 
linked to territoriality (Delanty, 1997). As citizenship becomes susceptible to 
international migration and minority issues, the relationship established with the 
nation-state in the form of membership or belonging gets disrupted. It has been 
argued that a sense of belonging together is required for the citizens to trust each 
other which may avoid alienation from political institutions and support the 
stability and the endurance of polities (Mason, 1999: 263). In this regard, states 
are compelled to develop new policies to deal with the consequences of 
international migration and the challenge of minority groups (l9duygu, 1996a: 
153). Citizenship, which is an operative arena of these new policies, is functional 
to counter the challenges posed by globalization and the incorporation of 
individuals and groups, including immigrants and minorities, into the society.
Minority issues and the status of minority groups impose constraint on 
citizenship. Even, the use of the majority/minority terminology is itself a question 
relevant for the nation-state (Rodrigue, 1995: 83). Despite the lack of consensus 
on the definition of minority, there is a growing categorical use of the term to 
refer to the ones who “are residing on the territory of that state”, “are the citizens 
of that state”, “have distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic traits”, “are 
representative but smaller in number than majority” and “have the aim to conserve
their identity” (Karimova and Deverell, 2001: 6). These criteria are also used by 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. It must be also noted 
that refugees and non-citizen immigrants do not fall in the category of minorities 
according to norms of international law (Cavu^oglu, 2001: 43). Furthermore, all 
minority rights go beyond common set of civil and political rights of individual 
citizenship. Apart from universal rights that call for the same set of rights for 
every person, minority rights are used to refer to the wide range of public policies, 
legal rights and constitutional provisions which are adopted to recognize and 
accommodate distinctive identities and needs of ethnic, cultural and religious 
groups (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 2-3).
Minority issues appear in international law not as a collective set of 
principles that were historically accumulated but rather similar to the movement 
of pendulum determined by the socio-political conjecture of certain historical
t
periods (Hadden, 1998). The initial legislation on minorities is rooted in universal 
human rights in 19*^  century which focused mainly on individual rights. It was 
only with Wilsonian principles in World War I that nations were recognized to 
determine their future and under conditions that do not permit, minorities were 
granted certain rights. However, since minority issues served as justification for 
conquest during World War n, in the Post-war period, there was a return to 
individual rights discourse and minority rights retreated. Minority rights were 
limited only to the independence movements in the Third World during 1950s and 
1960s. Group rights were recognized first time in 1966 International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights. They gained weight in 1990s with 1993 United
Nations Declaration on Individuals’ Rights Who Belong to National, Ethnic, 
Religious and Lingual Minorities, and 1994 Council of Europe Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In the current situation, 
international organization are reluctant to take decisions on ethnic conflicts or to 
recogmze regional autonomy but forced assimilation, forced migration and 
genocide are prohibited whereas policies or incentives that encourage integration 
of minorities are considered legitimate (Hadden, 1998).
International migration, as one of the constructive elements of 
globalization, contributes to cultural diversity and supports the fragmentation of 
both citizenship and the nation-state. It is even suggested that international 
migration is a test arena of citizenship that raises questions of membership to, or 
exclusion from, the nation, the state, the political community and the rights to 
which they pertain (Castles and Davidson, 2000). In addition, international 
migration can be perceived to be problematizing citizenship in the medium of
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membership, belonging or attachment to the nation-state (îçduygu, 2004). As 
Hammar (2000) sets forth, naturalization of immigrants is a transfer of legal status 
to a new citizenship but not a change of national origin, nationality, identification 
and belonging (Hammar, 2000).
There are three important actors in international immigration and 
citizenship which are the réceiving countries, the immigrants and the sending 
coxmtries (îçduygu, 1996a). After World War H, international immigration 
changed phase which pushed nation-states to recognize the implications of 
cultural diversity and to develop new policies to deal with them. There is 
recognition of significance of citizenship policies in integrating immigrants into
receiving societies. The meaning of citizenship for the immigrants is closely 
related to “life strategies” like sequential plans and actions in the process of 
migration. There are several factors at play in determining the nature of life 
strategies which include whether the receiving society is for permanent or 
temporary settlement, duration of stay, kinship ties with countries of origin, 
documented or undocumented status of immigrants and their qualifications and 
positions in the labor market (l9duygu, 1996a). Most sending states today prefer 
the blood principle in citizenship. However, there is increasing tendency for dual 
citizenship to encourage emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer it to their 
children (Hammar, 1989).
1.3 Setting Citizenship in a Context: Turkey’s Jewish Minority and Turkish- 
Jewish Immigrants in Israel
As discussed above, citizenship is a problematic concept. On the one side, 
it is accepted that every individual should have the same rights and 
responsibilities under the principle of equality, but on the other side, due to 
cultural diversity and membership to different groups within societies, individuals 
are left with specific needs to be fulfilled under the principle of difference. In this 
regard, there is a tension between differentiated citizenship that appeals to 
difference in the context of distinctive identities and needs of ethno-cultural 
minorities in multi-ethnic societies and democratic citizenship that appeals to 
equality with universal rights and responsibilities (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 
1-2). In addition, the artificial link between the nation and state is breaking down;
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definitions of community based on blood and soil are getting ineffectual and there 
is a crisis of the nation-state (l9duygu et al. 1999: 203). The phenomena of 
minorities and international migration contribute to this trend bringing by multiple 
membership and multiple loyalties which lead to confusion between rights and 
identity, culture and politics, states and nations- in short in citizenship 
(Kastoryano, 2000).
The Turkish state, having a republican tradition and carrying a certain 
level of cultural diversity, cannot escape from this tension. On the one hand, 
having roots in the Ottoman Empire Millet system, there are legally recognized 
non-Muslim minorities in Turkey like the Armenians, Greeks and the Jews as well 
as other sociologically recognized ethnic/cultural groups like Alawites, Kurds, 
Lazs, Circassians, Georgians, etc. some of whom are deemed specific rights 
pertaining to their groups. On the other hand, due to a strong state tradition 
(Heper, 1985), citizenship in Turkey refers more to equal rights and 
responsibilities like paying taxes, performing military service and voting, entitled 
as positive freedoms in republicanism. Thus, we can speak about the dominancy 
of the rhetoric of equality concept in Turkey underlined by the unitary, republican 
state structure and uniform society despite religious, ethnic and cultural diversities 
and differences in the society.
The status of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey is worthy of special 
contemplation with regards to citizenship. The Greeks, the Armenians and the 
Jews are the only groups that have acquired the status of minority who were also 
acknowledged as “Millets” previously in the Ottoman period. Albeit on religious 
basis, they are the only groups in Turkey recognized as minorities by the 1923
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Lausanne Treaty and have been granted special rights accordingly. These rights 
incorporate the freedoms of living, religious beliefs and migration, the rights of 
legal and political equality, using their mother tongue in the courts, opening their 
own schools or similar institutions and the holding of religious ceremonies 
(Karimova and Deverell, 2001: 7). Other non-Muslim religious groups, e.g, 
Assyrians, who had not been included in the Ottoman Millet system, were denied 
any distinct minority status.
The non-Muslim minorities in Turkey also point up fruitful exploration 
sites of citizenship not only on the layer minority but also on the layer of 
international migration. There is lack of statistical information in Turkish 
censuses regarding non-Muslim population but it is estimated that out of a total 
population of 70 million in Turkey, today there are around 50,000-93,000 
Armenians, 3,000-3,500 Greeks and 20,000-25,000 Jews (Karimova and Deverell, 
2001). It must also be noted that all the non-Mushm minorities, including those 
who were not granted official recognition, construe a specific segment in total 
population that illustrate one of the major sources of emigration. In other words, 
traditionally, Turkey has been an immigrant sending country with respect to its 
non-Muslim population. Most of the non-Muslim minority has migrated to other 
countries since the foundation of modem Turkey. Even some of the minority 
groups like the Greeks have been subject to international exchange agreements 
especially in the early years of the Republic. In contrast to emigration of non- 
Muslim minorities from Turkey, there has been immigration of Muslims to the 
country. In light of such a predominant tendency in Turkey with respect to 
international migration, the non-Muslim minorities can be considered to be the
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crystallization point of citizenship by which the impacts of minority and 
migration on the three aspects- the legal status, identity and civic virtue- can be 
traced and investigated.
The status of recognized non-Muslims with respect to citizenship in 
Turkey reveals certain tensions in social cohesion and paradoxical points inherent 
in the historical development of citizenship. First, one of the layers of the Turkish 
nation-state was equal citizenship that based itself on secularism, rule of law, 
constitutionalism and positive rights. This equal citizenship in a way rested on the 
denial of the Ottoman past and the Millet system per se. However, in the 
Lausanne Treaty, the non-Muslim minorities who were officially recognized were 
granted separate community rights. This in a way conflicted with the principle of 
equal citizenship. Therefore, minority both as a category and in substance caused 
a threat to the formdations of the nation-state.
Second, there is the dilemma of the identity of Turkishness and that of 
citizenship. It is suggested that in the formation of Turkey, Turkishness was 
perceived to be an identity which needed to be constructed rather than inherited 
(Keyman and l9duygu, 1998: 176); and the basic question of official Turkish 
nationalism was not who were the Turks but who should be the Turks (Kadioglu, 
1998). “Turk” as a term was used to refer to peasants in the Ottoman context 
carrying notions of denigration. The new nation-state stipulated the identity of 
“Turk” as a superior construction but the definition of the Turk was rather 
ambiguous and its contents were subject to a broad yet vague set of social, legal, 
economic and cultural parameters. From time to time, the term ‘Turk” has been 
used to define the Turkish citizens who contain the legal aspects of citizenship
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and within a broader viewpoint to the citizens of Turkey who have identified 
willingly with the Turkish language, culture and state. Conversely, Islam was 
perceived occasionally to be construing an essential element of being Turk as well 
as membership to Tmkish nation. Despite strong determination for secularism, 
Islam served to imify ethno-linguistic groups and was still dominant in the culture 
(Yavuz, 2000).
In a similar vein, being Turk was equated with being Muslim which in 
return excluded non-Muslims from the definition of the Turkish nation (Yumul, 
1998). Accordingly, although the non-Muslim minorities were the citizens of the 
Republic whose group rights were recognized and protected by the Treaty of 
Lausanne at the international level, they were neither included in the project of the 
construction of the Turkish identity nor accepted as natural members of the 
Turkish nation (Keyman and l9duygu, 1998: 177). In this regard, the situation of 
the non-Mixslims posed a complexity to the Turkish nation-state.
Third, citizenship in Turkey refers more to the belonging to a national 
community based on loyalty to the state (l9duygu et al. 1999: 197). Even subjects’ 
loyalty to the state is considered one of the legitimacy regarding citizenship that 
Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Unsal, 1998a: 15). The notion of 
loyalty to the state instigated several “others” to come into sight who had been 
unfaithful to the state and therefore were regarded as “unreliable elements” within 
the society. Within this discourse, certain groups in the society such as the Greeks, 
the Armenians, and the Jews, some of whom allied with invading powers during 
the Independence War (1919-1922), were pinpointed as having been disloyal to
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the state and in this regard their equal citizenship became susceptible.' Their 
citizenship in terms of loyalty to the state has always been questioned and they 
were expected to illustrate and prove their loyalty to the Turkish State (Bali, 2000; 
53). By the same token, their membership to the national community was under 
strain.
Although the Armenians, the Greeks and the Jews are categorized as 
recognized minorities, there are significant historical differences between them 
that quiver the simplification inherent in the dichotomy of Muslim/non-Muslim. 
For example, Jews in Turkey traditionally had been a less politicized group. Since 
the late Ottoman period when they were smaller in number in comparison to 
Armenians and Greeks, had better relations Avith the Turkish State (Levi, 1998: 
31). The Turkish State had been in a longstanding struggle with the various 
national/territorial claims of Armenians and the Greeks. With respect to Jews, 
there had been no similar kind of unrest. Besides, the Jewish community in 
Turkey serves as an active lobbying group against the ethnic discrimination or 
genocide claims raised by the Armenians at the international level and advocated 
the official state position (Bali 2001b: 120).
A further difference between the Jews and the other non-Muslim 
minorities is that the Jews had not been a homogeneous group historically as had 
been the Armenians and the Greeks (Karimova and Deverell, 2001). The Jews had 
had different ethnic origins (Sephardic, Ashkenazic, Romaniyot and Karaite) and 
consequently there had been different languages i.e. Ladino, Yiddish or Greek
' The Jews who were known as loyal to the state were put on equal footing with the other minority 
groups and were included in the same rhetoric, too (Levi, 1998: 8).
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within the community.^ In addition, the urban outlook of Jewish minority has 
older roots than that of other minority groups. Even in the Ottoman period, most 
of the Jews used to live in their closed neighborhoods in relatively more urban 
towns in contrast to Greek and Armenian Millets who were dispersed over rural 
regions as well. Therefore, although the rural population of the Armenians and the 
Greeks were frequently involved in agriculture and peasantry, the Jews’ 
involvement had been traditionally very limited.
Today, most of the Jews are mainly concentrated in Istanbul and İzmir as 
part of the overall trend towards urbanization and metropolitanization in Turkey 
(Liberies, 1984: 139). The biggest community exists in Istanbul with around 
17,500 Jews followed by around 2,500 Jews in Izmir. There are also very small 
communities in Ankara, Adana, Antakya, Bursa, Çanakkale and Şanhurfa. All of 
the Jews in Tmkey are represented by the Chief Rabbinate in Istanbul. There are 
two councils imder the Chief Rabbinate. The coimcil Bet-Din deals mainly with 
religious matters related to Judaism. Elections are held for synagogue councils, 
general communal council, for the boards of directors of the various communal 
institutions and the Chief Rabbi (Liberies, 1984: 166). The secular council on the 
other hand is mainly composed of community’s respectable figures and generally
 ^Most of the Jews in Turkey had come from Spain to the Ottoman Empire in 1492 when they were 
expelled from the Spanish lands. These Jews were known as Sephardic Jews who spoke Ladino 
(also called Judeo-Spanish) which is a dialect of Castilian Spanish. There were also Ashkenazic 
Jews who have migrated from central and northern Einope. They spoke Yiddish, a language 
having Germanic roots. Romaniyots are the Greek speaking Jews who hade been living in Anatolia 
since the Byzantine Empire. There were also Karaites, the smallest in number, who can be 
considered as a different sect in Judaism because they recognize only the written scriptures and 
reject Talmudic oral tradition.
 ^ Ottoman Jews illustrated mainly an urban outlook with the exception of Jews in south-east 
Anatolia (McCarthy, 1998: 105).
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deals with the societal affairs. 96% of the Jews in Turkey are Sephardic and the 
rest is Ashkenazic (Franz, 1994: 330). Almost all of the Jews speak Turkish. 
Ladino is currently spoken mainly by the older generations (Franz, 1994: 330). 
The community is one of the most westernized and modernized segments of the 
Turkish population. Education level is higher than the rest of the population 
(Liberies, 1984). Knowledge of foreign language is widely spread among the 
community with English replacing the dominancy of French especially after the 
1980s. Most of the Jews are concentrated in private sector and are mainly 
involved in merchandising, retail, marketing and international trade.
Jews in Turkey tried to get integrated into the Turkish society (Yumul, 
2001: 112). Yet, at the same time they were able to keep their cultural, ethnic and 
religious identities without restrictions from the Turkish State. The tolerance 
towards the Jewish community is argued to be one of the reasons of the 
underdevelopment of Zionism among the Jews living in Turkey (Benbassa and
7
Rodrigue, 1995), the first Zionist association being foimded only in 1934 (Bali, 
2000). They have not experienced overt racism, anti-Semitism or Holocaust as did 
their counterparts in Europe especially during World War U. However, anti- 
Semitic discourse is frequently utilized by political wings and movements of 
either extreme rightist or leftist.
The Jewish community of Turkey corresponds not only to a minority 
group but also to an immigrant group as most of its members have immigrated, 
primarily to Israel after its establishment in 1948. The number of the Jews in 
Turkey diminished from an estimated 1927 census figure of 81,400 to 20,000-
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25,000 Jews in 2003 (Dündar, 2000: 154; Karimova and Deverell, 2001).'* The 
Jewish emigration to Israel is one of the major mass movements out of Turkey, 
the largest being the labor migration to Germany and other Western European 
countries (Geray, 1970). The reasons for emigration changed from time to time. 
For some of the immigrants, ideological (Zionist) reasons like contributing to the 
establishment of a Jewish state played role in their decision to emigrate while 
some others mainly had economic concerns such as establishing a higher standard
of living in Israel. It is estimated that around 100,000-150,000 Turkish Jews live
-■
in Israel today (Yetkin, 1996: 56).^
Due to restrictions in the legal framework in Turkey, these emigrants could 
not hold dual citizenship prior to 1981 after" when Turkey allowed multiple 
citizenship with a new regulation on citizenship that affected the status of all 
Turkish immigrants in foreign countries. In 1995, Turkey allowed ex-Turkish 
citizens who converted to another citizenship (i.e. Israeli citizenship) to keep their 
rights in Turkey, such as inheritance, settlement and travel. Similar to the 
practices in other immigrant sending countries, Turkey prefers blood principle of 
citizenship and tends to stress the legal aspect that permit emigrants to qualify for
In this study, the members of the Jewish minority in Turkey are generally referred as “Jews in 
Turkey” or “Turkey’s Jews”, Such a terminology is preferred in order to avoid repetition of 
“Turkish Jews in Turkey” and confusion with the Turkish Jews in Israel. Other than that there is 
not any ideological preposition in not labeling them as Turkish Jews even though some of the Jews 
themselves may prefer not to be called Turkish Jews but merely Jews while some others may 
prefer to be called Turkish only. Whatever the preferences may be, in this study, the category 
“Jews in Turkey” simply addresses Turkey’s Jews.
 ^ For the first generation of Jewish immigrants who moved from Turkey and currently living in 
Israel, generally the term “Turkish Jews in Israel” is used simply because of the fact that they were 
bom in Turkey. Such a label does not entail any ethnic or subjective meaning. What’s more, it 
does not mean that these immigrants only had Turkish citizenship nor they affiliated themselves 
solely with Turkish culture.
18
naturalization without giving up their original citizenship (i^duygu, 2004). Dual 
citizenship generally implies membership in more than one state and as a concept 
it presupposes loyalty to the state rather than the nation (Hammar, 1989). The 
changes in Turkish citizenship witnessed after 1980s brought by new citizenship 
debate centered on the forces of migration, ethnicity and religion. In other words, 
emigration and dual citizenship are the two layers that changed the conventional 
understanding of the nation-state which is under the challenge of globalization 
(i9duygu et al. 1999: 187).
The Jewish emigration to Israel has had implications for Israel as well. As 
one of the new states established in late 1940s, Israel also construes an imperative 
illustration of the development of citizenship. Generally, citizenship in Israel is 
arranged by the Nationality Law which set forth the conditions to earn Israeli 
citizenship. The Law of Return is the major legislation regarding the citizenship 
of the Jews. Upon the claim of Palestine to be the historical homeland of the Jews
i
before their expulsion in the Roman Empire, it refers to the “return rights” of the 
Jews dispersed all over the world to their homeland in Israel. As the Law of 
Return certifies, most of the citizens of Israel have earned their citizenship status 
due to immigration to Israel from other countries like Turkey. In the case of 
emigration fi-om countries that did not allow dual citizenship, Israel granted the 
Jewish migrants permanent residence so that the migrants would not lose its rights 
such as property rights in the sending country.
Immigration to Israel is considered unique because it is the immigration of 
the Jews; it is not restricted; and Israel’s commitment to immigration is based on 
ideological considerations rather than economic ones (Ichilov, 2002: 5). The state
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subsidizes Jewish immigrants by providing housing, employment, healthcare 
entitlements, taxation concessions and language training. Still, the integration of 
immigrants to the Israeli society is a question of citizenship and Israel witnesses 
the discussions on membership. Israel has been experiencing the tension between 
secular norms of nation-building and religiously grounded definition of 
membership (Baubock, 2001). The debate over “Who is a Jew?” in Israel is a 
reflection of this tension. There are controversies whether Jewishness is race, 
nation or religion. The debate created opposing positions between secular and 
religious definitions as well as objective and subjective criteria of membership 
(Joppke and Roshenhek, 2001).
1.4 Statement of Problem and Aim of the Study
This study is an attempt to understand how Turkey’s Jewish minority and 
Turkish Jewish immigrants in Israel perceive citizenship. There are two 
components to the study; one is the investigation of the three aspects of 
citizenship -  legal status, identity and civic virtue -  and their interaction with each 
other; and the other is investigation of citizenship on the layers of international 
migration and minority issues. These two components are unified in one research 
skeleton and the task of the exploration of citizenship spotlights the nature and the 
variance of the impact of being immigrant and being minority on the intercourse 
between legal status, identity and civic virtue elements in citizenship.
Such an investigation dwells on citizen-centric approach that reflects on 
personal accounts of Jews in Turkey and in Israel and focuses on their perceptions
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and experiences on citizenship. Although earlier studies citizenship pinpoint legal 
structures and policies of the states by utilizing a state-centric approach, recently, 
putting citizens into the center of the analytic framework and setting citizens as 
the main category of analysis have started to be spread (îçduygu, 2004). The 
issues of how citizens identify with their rights, roles and responsibilities; how 
they perform their citizenship as legal status, identity and virtue; how they are 
situated in the politics of membership, and belonging; imder which motivations 
they participate in the political community as well as the public sphere; and how 
they negotiate with what they perceive and experience as unequal and injustice all 
refer to a framework where citizens are central both in the examination and in the 
policy making of citizenship. In light of thèse points, this study aims to 
understand citizenship from the perspectives of citizens themselves and to give an 
account of their experiences.
The Jewish minority living in Turkey and the Turkish Jews who migrated 
from Turkey to Israel and currently living in Israel construe the empirical case for 
the comparative investigation. Jews of Turkey do not only refer to a distinct 
minority group granted official recognition in a country where majority of its 
population is Muslim but also to an immigrant group most of whom have 
migrated to Israel and became Israeli citizens. Research on this specific group of 
minorities and immigrants assures insights for both Turkey and Israel, as states 
founded in the first half of the 20* century in the Middle East. By use of this case 
study, the role of citizenship in state formations comes into view, too.
The comparative case of Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel serves 
elaboration of the discourses and practices of citizenship in both coimtries. The
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field research in Turkey aims to discover how members of the Jewish minority 
perceive and perform Turkish citizenship with its aspects of legal status, identity 
and civic virtue. In a similar vein, the field research in Israel aims to shed light on 
the impact of the process of migration on citizenship from the perspectives of the 
citizens/migrants themselves. Since Turkish Jews in Israel have the options of 
having Israeli, Turkish or multiple citizenships, the field research spotlights 
varieties of citizenship status among the immigrants.
This study is the first one in the field of studies on citizenship in Turkey in 
several respects. It construes one of the first examples of empirical research. Most 
studies prevalent in social sciences generally highlight on the theory of the 
development of citizenship in Turkey. But this 'current study provides empirical 
evidence. For instance major studies on Turkish citizenship e.g. by İçduygu 
(1996a; 1996b), Kirişçi (2000) and Soyank (2000) focus on state policies with 
respect to citizenship matters. The books 75 Yılda Tebaa ‘dan Yurttaş ‘a Doğru^
■i
and Challenges to Citizenship in a Globalizing World: European Questions and 
Turkish Experiences^ compile various articles by different scholars but tend to 
focus on macro issues of citizenship rather than concerning the interplay of 
citizenship on the individual level
 ^ The reference information for the book is: Ünsal, Artım (ed.) 1998b. 7 5  Y ı l d a  T e b a a m d a n  
Y u r t t a ş  *a  D o ğ r u  (From Subject to Citizen in 75 Years). Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal 
Tarih Vakfı, îş Bankası Ya>anlan.
 ^ The reference of the book is: Keyman, E. Fuat, and Ahmet İçduygu (eds.) 2004. C h a l l e n g e s  t o  
C i t i z e n s h i p  i n  a  G l o b a l i z i n g  W o r l d :  E u r o p e a n  Q u e s t i o n s  a n d  T u r k i s h  E x p e r i e n c e s ,  London: 
Routledge.
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Another contribution of this study is that it combines Jewish minority and 
immigrants in one research framework, an incorporation which has not been 
employed before. Furthermore, it takes into account the contemporary 
circumstances and the present day Jewish minority/immigrant communities. There 
have been several studies on the Jewish minority in Turkey primarily in the 
discipline of history. The historians explored the Jews by and large in the Ottoman 
Empire. These studies focused primarily on the structure of the Millet system as 
part of the Ottoman state administration and the status of the Jewish Millet vis-à- 
vis other non-Muslim Millets. The most common argument made in the studies on 
Ottoman Jewry is that the Jews had not experienced the oppression in the 
Ottoman Empire as they had witnessed in Europe and their difference had been 
tolerated which caused the Empire to attract Jewish migratory flows.
Regarding the status of the Jews in Republican Turkey, the existing studies 
mainly concentrated in the Early Republican Period between the years 1923-1945,
4
a time when the seeds of nation-building and modem state formation were 
rooted.^ They explored various dynamics of the transformation of the former non- 
Muslim Millets of the Ottoman Empire into officially recognized minorities and 
reflected on the pressures of the nation-state formation on the Jews as well as *
* To exemplify, some of the essential literature on Ottoman Jewry as well as other non-Muslims 
include those of Alkan (2000), Baer (2000), Benbassa and Rodrigue (2001), Besalel (1999), 
Davison (1954), Emecen (1997), Eroglu (2000), Galanti (1995), Groepler (1999), Güleryüz 
(1993), Gülsoy (2000), Karpat (1985; 1988), Levy (1994), Lewis (1996), Molho (1999), Nahum 
(2000), Van Bekkum (2001) and Sharon (1993).
’ Some of the studies that focus on the Early Republican Period are those of Ridvan Akar, Rıfat 
Bali, Moşe Grosman, Haluk Karabatak, Avner Levi, Laurent Mallet and Çetin Yetkin. For 
references of these works, see Select Bibliography.
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other non-Muslims. They brought into light previously omitted historical accounts 
that influenced the non-Muslims in Turkey to a great extent. Despite the fruitful 
variety of inquiry on the Ottoman Period and the Early Republican Period, the 
years after 1945 are not often covered and empirical investigations on 
contemporary Jewish community in Turkey are very rare. Yet, recently there has 
been growing concern on the current situation evidenced by rising number of 
work, either published or unpublished, on the Jews in Turkey.’*^ These studies, 
most of which emanate from the field within the vein of sociological or 
ethnographic inquiry, give voice to the personal accounts of the Jews in Turkey. 
However, none of them entail the view of political science and put the status of 
the Jews as a question of citizenship in Turkey. Therefore, this current study 
contributes to preceding literahire by dealing with the task of bringing the voices 
of the Jews into the interplay of state-society relations and hence citizenship.
Despite the richness of the literature on the Jews in Turkey including the 
Ottoman Empire, the literature on the migration of Jews from Turkey to Israel or 
on the Turkish-Jewish community in Israel is scarce. The major studies focusing 
specifically on migration from Turkey to Israel are those of Bali (2003) and 
Weiker (1988). Bali’s study centers on migration to Israel in the years 1946-49 
generally using secondary documents such as memoirs, newspapers, books and 
archival documents, though the migration flows prior to and after his focus period 
are given some coverage. In addition, the study generally focuses on Jewish 
migrants with their former minority group status within Turkey in the 1930s and
Some of these inquiries on the contemporary era are those of Kaya (1999), Koçoğlu (2001; 
2003), Liberies (1984), Yuna (1999) and Tuval (1999).
24
‘40s and therefore concentrates more on issues related to the conditions, policies, 
discourses and actors of migration. In other words, it builds up a direct correlation 
between the Turkification policies of the Early Republican Era towards the Jews 
and mass migration to Israel and therefore illustrates a thematic viewpoint from 
the sending side of emigration.
On the other hand, Weiker’s study is an empirical one spotlighting 
individual narratives of emigrants from Tmkey who reside in 1980s Israel. The 
study generally explores the identity dimension of Jewish émigrés from Turkey to 
Israel, showing them as full-fledged Israelis. The main point of the study refers to 
the “invisibility” of Israelis who have come from Turkey -  that is, that Turkish 
Jews have been well integrated into conditions inside Israel and so have not 
emerged as an outcast group within Israeli society. These two important studies 
on migration from Turkey to Israel, from both the perspective of the sending 
country and the recipient, highlight the triangle of international migration, Israel 
and Turkey which so far has received scant attention. The current study 
contributes to the existing ones by attaching a comparative view on the above 
mentioned triangle and by exploring the transformations in citizenship of the 
present-day Turkish Jewish community in Israel.
1.5 Methodology of the Study
In order to investigate hew citizenship is perceived and experienced on the 
individual level, research was conducted by constructing a comparative case study 
of Turkey’s Jewish minority and Turkish-Jewish immigrants in Israel. The
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research drew on information mainly from primary sources obtained in the field 
studies both in Turkey and in Israel that made individual level of analysis 
possible. The field studies were launched in March 2002 and ended in September 
2003 making up 19 months of empirical work.
The research combined various qualitative research techniques all of 
which combined into a semi-anthropological approach. The minority and 
immigrant commiuiities both in Turkey and in Israel were contacted. 
Unstructured interviews were conducted with various key informants in both 
countries. These informants were generally people who fell outside the sample 
group but who had substantial information on Jewish minority/immigrant 
communities in both coimtries. Among them,'there were community leaders, 
association representatives, school teachers, journalists, editors of publications 
addressing Jewish minority in Turkey and Turkish-Jewish inunigrant conununity 
in Israel, ambassadors, state officials, specialists on Turkish Jewry and etc. all of 
whom provided substantial information for the study. Each key informant was 
addressed different questions varying according to specificity of the information 
to be provided by the informants. Participant observation complemented the 
information gathered in these interviews which mainly took place during the visits 
to foundations, associations and other institutional settings related to immigrant 
and minority communities in Israel and in Turkey. Field notes were taken during 
key informant respondents and participant observation.
Apart from the interviews with key informants, a survey with a semi- 
structured interviewing technique, which includes structured questionnaire plus 
in-depth questioning, was conducted with the members of the Jewish minority in
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Turkey and Turkish Jewish community in Israel. Since it was important to 
understand the operative dynamics and mechanisms of citizenship, non­
probability sampling that enabled purposive quota sampling was used. Of course, 
what were used as samples of Jews in both countries is far from being fully 
representative of the communities, but it attempted to catch diversities of the 
people so that it provided something close to a representative type. In total 65 
interviews were made with the sample group in Turkey and in Israel." The 
respondents were ordinary members of the minority and immigrant groups with or 
without membership bond, belonging sentiment or identity. All of the interviews 
were made face-to-face and the involvement of third parties to the interviews was 
eliminated. Again, all of them were recorded with a digital recorder and 
transcribed personally by the researcher. Transcription was one-to-one- that is 
everything that was recorded was put into written form word-by-word. Then, the 
interviews were analyzed by using methods of qualitative research analysis. 
Therefore, rather than the quantification of the ideas mentioned in the interviews, 
focus was centered on the diversity as well as the articulation of the opinions.
All the interviews, key informant interviews as well as interviews with 
sample group, were conducted in Turkish. The interviewees were fluent in 
Turkish and therefore knowledge of Ladino or Hebrew was not a requirement of 
the methodology. Even the key informants like ambassadors of Israel in Turkey 
were former immigrants from Turkey who knew and spoke Turkish very well. 
Having set these brief points regarding research, below there is a detailed review
Further mformation on details of sample selection is given in the following parts of this chapter.
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of methodology. Since the layers of international migration and minority issues in 
the comparative case of Jews in Turkey and in Israel point out to the need of 
conducting research as separate research schemes in two countries, the research 
conducted is discussed separately according to countries in focus.
1.5.1 The Field Study in Turkey
Presently, almost all of the Jews in Turkey live in urban areas. Istanbul is 
the major site in Turkey where the Jewish population is concentrated. Massive 
majority of the community associations, foimdations, publications, synagogues, 
and museums are also in Istanbul. Owing to this'fact, Istanbul composed the main 
setting of the field research in Turkey. However, a few of the interviews- both 
with the members of the Jewish minority and with the key informants- took place 
in Ankara. Some of the key informant interviews took place in Ankara, the capital
■i
of Turkey where the central state offices and so the key informants working at 
these offices were located. In addition, some of the sample group interviews were 
conducted in Ankara because these interviewees were temporarily located in 
Ankara, though they were living in Istanbul. The field study took place between 
March 2002 and September 2003.
The interviews with the key informants and participant observation in 
various communal institutions did not compose the major source of research data 
to be analyzed. Rather they se^ed to provide background information about the 
general characteristics of Jewish minority in Turkey and to illiuninate and clarify 
the data obtained in the sample group questionnaire interviews. In this regard.
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they shed light on the discussions that arose during the in-depth interviews with 
the ordinary members of the Jewish minority. Accordingly, several community 
places and key informants were contacted with. In addition to participant 
observation of the facilities that occurred in those places, interviews were 
conducted with key informants which covered a wide range of issues. Notes were 
taken during the interviews.
In order to obtain information about the general structure of the 
community newspaper, Şalom weekly, two visits were paid to the central office of 
the publishing company Gözlem Gazetecilik Basın ve Yayın A.Ş. in Nişantaşı, 
İstanbul. Some of the people working at the office either professionally or as 
volimteers were interviewed.*^ Şalom weekly was also subscribed so that the news 
related to the community were attained periodically.*^
A visit to the Quincentennial Foundation Jewish Museum o f Turkey in 
Karaköy, Istanbul was made.*'* The representatives of the Foundation were 
interviewed during that visit. *^  Schneidertempel Sanat Merkezi (Schneidertempel
The interviews were conducted on April 19, 2002 and on May 16,2003.
§alom weekly was founded by Avram Leon in 1948. It was published in Judeo-Spanish until 
1984 but changed to Turkish when a new editorial team took over the newspaper. Currently, only 
one page of the newspaper is allocated to Ladino. The newspaper is sold only in a few bookstores 
and is generally distributed by subscription. There are around 4,000-4,500 subscribers. §alom 
circulates not only in Turkey but also in Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Denmark, Nicaragua, Italy and 
the U.S.A.
The Museum was visited on April 21, 2002.
The Quincentennial Foundation was fotmded in 1992 as part of the celebratory activities of the 
500* year of the reception of the Jewish refugees in the Ottoman En5)ire who were expelled from 
Spain and Portugal in 1492. It organizes various conferences about the Jews in Tiukey and the 
Jewish culture. The Foxmdation also led the foundation of Jewish Museum of Turkey in 2001. In 
the museum, history of the Jews in Turkey is presented with various illustrative objects.
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Art Center) in Galata which serves as one of the major locations where Jewish art 
and culture facilities take place was also explored.’^  The Princes’ Islands in 
Maiinara Sea are notorious with their non-Muslim population. Burgazada and 
Büyükada aie popular sites for summers among the Istanbulite Jews. There are 
synagogues, vacation houses, sports club on the islands. Both of the islands were 
visited and representatives of Yildinmspor Gençlik ve Kültür Demeği 
(Yıldmmspor Youth and Culture Association) in Büyükada told of the sports 
activities, cultural events and generally the summer life on the islands.*^
Visits were also made to the Chief Rabbinate o f Turkey. Some of the 
officials working were interviewed.** These informants delivered crucial 
information about the legal status of the Chief Rabbinate and the general 
characteristics of the Jewish community. They also helped to establish contacts 
with other communal institutions. The civic leader of the Jewish community was 
also visited who delivered knowledge about the community structure and the 
division of labor between the secular and religious councils.'^ Neva Şalom 
Synagogue^ the largest in Istanbul was explored as well.^° Some of the communal
European Day of Jewish Culture was held on September 7, 2003. The concert of Klezmer 
Melodies was given in the Center as part of festival activities.
17 Burgazada was visited on May 17, 2003 and Büyükada on July 26, 2003.
The Chief Rabbinate of Turkey was visited on November 21, 2002 and on July 22, 2003.
”  The community leader was met on i^ovember 21,2002.
There are 20 synagogues in Istanbul and three of them are on the Princes’ Islands. Each 
synagogue is registered as a foundation of the community and administered by an executive 
committee.
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institutions in Istanbul were also visited. These included nursing homes of 
İhtiyarlara Yardım Derneği (Aid Association for the Elderly) in Hasköy, 
Bannyurt Matan Baseter (Bannyurt Assisted Care Home) in Kuledibi and Or- 
Ahayim Hastanesi (Or-Ahayim Hospital) in Balat.^  ^ All of these key informants 
from the Jewish community made a concise siraimary on the communal 
institutions.^^
Some of the prominent scholars who work on Jews in Turkey were also 
interviewed. With Rifat Bali, I made two interviews. He provided essential 
knowledge about relations within the community and the integration of Jews into 
general society .I  interviewed Moşe Grosman as well. He is affiliated to studies 
on Ashkenazic Jewry in Turkey and publishes Tiryaki, a journal for and about 
Jews in Turkey.^^
Apart from these interviews in Istanbul with key informants who were 
generally from the conununity, I also contacted with the Bureau for Minorities at
They were visited on November 29, 2002, on January 7, 2003 and on May 16, 2003 
respectively.
^  Some of the communal institutions were not visited personally but the key informants 
substantiated information about them. Most prominent ones in Istanbul are F a k i r l e r e  Y a r d ı m  
D e m e ğ i  (Society for the Support of the Poor), D o s t l u k  Y u r d u  D e m e ğ i  (Friendship Association), 
G ö z t e p e  K ü l t ü r  D e m e ğ i  (Göztepe Culture Association), Neve Şalom Kültür Merkezi (Neva Şalom 
Culture Center) and M i ş n e  T o r a  (Machazike Torah). In Izmir, there is İ z m i r  K ü l t ü r  D e m e ğ i  (Izmir 
Culture Association). News about the activities in these institutions frequently appears in Şalom. 
For further information about communal institutions, see Liberies (1984).
23 He was interviewed twice; one on April 22,2002 and the other on March 18, 2003.
Tiryaki has started to be published in 1994 but has not appeared periodically.
25 He was interviewed on November 22,2002.
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the Directorate o f General Security o f the Ministry of Interior in Ankara. The 
Bureau is founded according to the provisions in the Lausanne Treaty for the 
purpose of watching over law and order during the elections of foundations of the 
non-Muslims. The police officers at the Bureau told of the articles of the 
Lausanne Treaty and its implementations in the domestic law. The interviews 
with them also covered the recent amendments upon European Union 
requirements.
In addition to key informant interviews and participant observation, survey 
interviews were conducted with individual members of the community in order to 
investigate perception on citizenship of the Jewish minority in Turkey. In total, 31 
interviews were conducted in Turkey.^^ Initial contact with the interviewees was 
made by phone calls and appointments were taken. The interviews were in-depth 
in focus and semi-structured in technique. Three sets o f questions were 
addressed.^® The first set of questions was asked at the start of the interviews.
t
These questions aimed to imderstand the individual characteristics of the 
respondents such as age, gender, place of birth, place of settlement, class 
characteristics, education level, marital status, family structure, languages used, 
citizenship status and ethno-religious (Sephardim or Ashkenazim) origin. The
26 The interviews were conducted on September 10, 2003.
27 Each interviewee is given a code, i.e. FRIT 19, that starts with FRIT referring to the abbreviation 
for “Field Research in Turkey” and ends with a number referring to that specific interviewee.
28 The first and second sets of questions were structured and conposed the questionnaire part of 
the interviews. The third set of questions which were in-depth in focus con^limented the 
questionnaire. See Appendix A in the Appendices for the structured set of the questions asked in 
the interviews.
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second set of questions addressed more the investigation of citizenship with its 
aspects of legal status, identity and civic virtue. In addition, they aimed to 
understand how the respondents perceive and experience their membership and 
belonging to the Turkish nation-state when at the same time they were members 
of a non-Muslim minority group in a Muslim majority society. In addition to 
questionnaire, some ad-hoc questions were addressed to the respondents which 
make up the third group of questions. They helped to clarify the ideas, values and 
experiences that each respondent disclose during the interviews. These questions 
were related to the specific and personal histories and positions of the 
respondents. The questionnaire covered 57 questions but with the addition of ad- 
hoc questions went up to around 80 questions depending on the flow of the 
interviewing. The duration of the interviews varied, minimum taking 40 minutes 
and maximum taking 230 minutes, with a total average of 90 minutes.
The respondents were contacted by a combination of various means. In the 
snowball technique, the respondents referred to their family members, relatives, 
workmates or fiiends as the next possible interviewee candidates. But, in order to 
avoid the risk of interviewing people in the same network, attempts were made 
not to interview people who were close to each other as relatives or fiiends. In 
addition, the people who stay at the nursing homes, Bannyurt and İhtiyarlara 
Yardım Demeği, were also contacted. Volunteers working at communal 
institutions were also contacted. Furthermore, personal relations of the researcher 
with her Jewish fiiends helped finding new respondents. Some of the members 
Debarkader which is an electronic group on the internet for the Jews in Turkey 
and Turkish Jews in Israel also gave consent for the interviews. The intellectuals
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of the Jewish community or the academicians at various universities in Turkey 
who work on the Jews in Turkey or who have Jewish students also provided the 
names of respondents for the interviews. The Jews who appeared in §alom weekly 
as writers or in relation to community events were also interviewed.
In the selection of the possible respondents, three criteria played crucial 
roles. First, only the ones who fall within the sample group categories were 
chosen. That is, the interviewees were to consider themselves as belonging to the 
Jewish community in Turkey or perceive themselves as Jewish minority in 
Turkey. Self perceptions on Jewishness and/or formal membership to the Jewish 
community in Turkey were considered important in the selection of the 
respondents. This, however, was not in terms' of the level of their religious 
practices as there could have been atheists in the sample group.^^ Rather, the 
sample group covered the Jews in Turkey who had Turkish citizenship by birth 
and who lived in Turkey for many years and who had families of Jewish origin. 
The sample group representative of the Jewish community in Turkey was 
categorized in three age groups; between 20-40 years of age, between 40-60 years 
of age and above 60 years of age. Therefore, the ones who were below the age 
group 20 were not chosen. Additionally, only the ones who were in good mental 
and physical condition were selected as some of the elderly could have been 
exposed to illnesses due to their old ages. Since equal munbers of women and
Sabbataites were excluded from the sanqjling as neither they nor Jews in Turkey consider 
Sabbataites Jewish. Sabbataites are merely the followers of Sabbatai Zvi who formed messianic 
sect converged from Judaism in 16* century.
34
men were aimed to be interviewed according to the research methodology, 
balance in terms of gender was tried to be sustained in the selection process.
Second, only the ones who gave consent to be interviewed were selected. 
The interviewees were ensured that their names would not be publicized and the 
data obtained in the interviews would be used only for scientific purposes. The 
aims, the scope and the procedures of the research as well as points on 
confidentiality were expressed in the protocol which was read vocally to the 
respondents by the researcher before the interview started.^ ® The third criterion for 
selecting the respondents who belong to the Jewish community in Turkey was 
upholding diversity as much as possible. The diversity among the respondents was 
built upon the basis of differences in age, gender, marital status, citizenship status, 
place of birth, place of settlement, occupation, education, socio-economic 
background and ethno-religious origin (Sephardim or Ashkenazim) of the 
respondents. For instance, when it was realized that generally educated Jews were 
interviewed, the consequent interviews were made with the Jews who had lesser 
education levels or no education at all. Similarly, when at a point in the research, 
the interviews with the Jews from the young generation was completed, the 
interviewee selection process for following interviews switched to the respondents 
from older generations.
Most of the interviews took place in Istanbul in various places such as 
houses of the respondents, work offices, university classrooms, libraries, nursing 
homes, art exhibition halls, dressing rooms a theater, meeting rooms of the Chief
30 See Appendix B for the full text of the protocol read to the respondents at the beginning of the 
interviews.
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Rabbinate, hospital belonging to the Jewish community in Turkey, coffee bars or 
restaurants. Only one of the interviews took place in Ankara.
There were some shortcomings of the research. Since the researcher was 
located in Ankara and the research mainly took place in Istanbul, visits to research 
site remained limited to the appointments taken before hand. It would have been 
more convenient if the researcher had the opportunity to stay in Istanbul for 
longer periods. Additionally, some of the respondents seemed to have been in a 
defensive position with the questions related to their minority and/or religious 
identity. From time to time, the research needed to kindly attract the motivation of 
the respondent when answering the questions. These efforts included in-depth 
explanation of the aim of the research, the questions asked in the interviews and 
the relevance and significance of the information provided by the respondents’ 
answers.
1.5.2 The Field Study in Israel
It is estimated that there are around 100,000- 150,000 Turkish Jews 
including first generation of immigrants and their offspring living in Israel. 
Although they are dispersed throughout the country, Bat-Yam, Ramat-Aviv, 
Rishon Lezziyon, Ramat Gan, Herzeliya, central Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Yahud are 
the main places of concentration. In the field research in Israel, there was no main 
research setting and according Jo the appointments, several towns were visited. 
Similar to the field research in Turkey, the study in Israel was composed of key 
informant interviews and participant observation, and survey interviews. I visited
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Israel in June and July of 2003. However, all the phases of the research including 
the preparation and aftermath were carried out between March 2002 and 
September 2003.
The associations, organizations or foundations established by the Turkish 
Jews in Israel are less in number and in variety than those founded by the Jewish 
community in Turkey. Yet, there are some which aim at preserving Turkish 
culture among the Jews fi'om Turkey in Israel and establishing a network between 
them. The leading organization in Israel founded by Turkish Jews is Itahdut 
Yotsei Turkia (Association of People Coming from Turkey). The central office of 
the organization is located in Bat-Yam but there are branches in central Tel-Aviv, 
Yahud, Natanya and Haifa. Individual interviews were conducted with various 
members of the organization. Among them, there were chair, vice chair, secretary, 
editor of Türkiyeliler Birliği Bülteni (Bulletin of the Association)^\ accountant, 
head of the youth branch and head of the branch in Yahud. The key informants 
told of the general characteristics of Turkish Jews in Israel and of the distinctions 
between first generation of immigrants and their Israel-born children. They helped 
the research to outline a picture of the community and its difference with other 
Jewish Israelis who came from other countries. These members of Itahdut also 
gave information about Nur Masonic Lodge and B ’nai B ’rith Yosef Niyego Lodge 
most of whose members are Turkish Jews.
The Bulletin is a journal of Itahdut Yotsei Turkia published six times a year.
12 members of the organization were interviewed as key informants during June 2003. The 
interviews mainly took place in the central office of the Itahdut. However, some of the interviews 
were conducted at the houses of the interviewees located in various districts.
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Moadon Tarbut Yotsei Turkia (Bat-Yam Culture Club) is another 
organization founded by Turkish Jews. The municipality of Bat-Yam allocated an 
apartment for Turkish Jews to perform art facilities. Several visits were paid to the 
club and the chorus as well as theater play rehearsals were watched. Former 
members of the Herzeliya Culture Club which was founded in 1985 but closed in 
1990 were also interviewed in the interviewees’ houses in the Herzeliya region.^  ^
One of the former members of the association Morit (Foundation for a Center of 
Turkish Judaism in Israel) founded in 1986 but ended activities by mid-1990s was 
also met. '^* Amutat Yotsei Hatnua Hatziyonit Be Turkiya (Association of Activists 
for the Zionist Movement in Turkey) which is the organization foimded by 
Turkish Zionists was also interviewed. A representative of Bat-Yam Lions ’ Club 
was also met who told of the joint activities with some of the Lions Clubs in 
Turkey.^^ Merkaz Yom L ’Kashish (Retirees’ Center) in Yahud was also visited.^® 
This is a social center for old men and women and generally Sephardim Jews 
attend. It is administered by Yahud Municipality. During an afternoon, the 
activities held at the center were obseiTed. A similar center for the elderly 
Moadon Zahav (Old Age Club) was also seen in Bat-Yam. It is administered by 
Bat-Yam Municipality. Sephardim Jews who came mainly fi-om Bulgaria, former
The interviews were conducted on June 17 and 18, 2003.
The interview with the representative of Morit was done on June 18, 2003.
35 The interview was held on June 16, 2003.
36 The visit took place on Jime 23, 2003.
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Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey generally go to this center to play cards or drink 
tea. An afternoon was spent on the street Rehov Levinsky. Most of the stores and 
shops on the street are owned by Turkish Jews. I made ad-hoc interviews were 
with some of the store keepers.
The archives at the central office of Itahdut Yotsei Turkia in Bat-Yam 
were also investigated. Various issues of the newspapers, the journals and the 
bulletins addressing Turkish Jews in Israel like La Vera Luz, Haber, Dostluk, 
Gelişim, Sesimiz, Bülten and Türkiyeliler Birliği Bülteni were collected from the 
archive. These were not used directly in the dissertation but helped me to 
understand the immigrant community more. The statistics regarding immigration 
numbers from Turkey to Israel were collected at Israel’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics. Regarding official proceedings of citizenship, immigration from Turkey 
to Israel and relations with the Jews in Turkey as well as the Turkish Jews in 
Israel, the Turkish embassies in Tel-Aviv and in Jerusalem were visited. These 
interviews complemented the previous ones which were conducted with the 
personnel from Israel’s Consulate and Embassy in Istanbul and in Ankara.
In addition to the key informant interviews and participant observation in 
various associations and centers which provided general information on the 
characteristics of Turkish Jews in Israel, simultaneously, survey interviews were 
conducted to investigate citizenship on the layer of international migration. 34
The personnel from Turkey’s Embassy in Tel-Aviv were interviewed on June 18, 2003 and from 
Turkey’s Embassy in Jerusalem on Juiie 30, 2003.
Interviews at Israel’s Embassy in Ankara were conducted on May 9, 2002 and one year later on 
May 22, 2003. Interview at Israel’s Embassy in Istanbul was conducted on May 16, 2003.
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respondents who migrated from Turkey to Israel in various years after 1948 until 
1980 and currently living in Israel were interviewed.^^ The interviews were semi- 
structured and contributory questions were addressed to the respondents in 
addition to questionnaire.'*® The questions asked to the Jewish immigrants from 
Turkey in Israel were similar to the ones addressed to the Jewish minority group 
in Turkey. In other words, in order to be able to make a comparison between the 
two groups, parallel questions were addressed that investigated the relation 
between kgal status, identity and civic virtue. However, these interviews with the 
Jews from Turkey in Israel tended more to cover the migration history and the 
changing perceptions on citizenship in result of migration to Israel.
There were three sets o f questions in survey interviews in Israel as had 
been the case with the survey interviews in Turkey. These questions were similar 
in context with those in Turkey as discussed previously. The first set addressed to 
the general characteristics of the immigrants such as age, gender, class, ethnicity, 
education level, marital status, family structure, changes in the languages used 
after migration, change in citizenship status, ethno-religious (Sephardim or 
Ashkenazim) origin, date of migration, age at the time of migration and changes 
in work and settlement after migration. The second set of questions addressed 
more the investigation of citizenship both before and after migration. Since the 
respondents were former members of the Jewish minority in Turkey before
Each interviewee is given a code, e.g. FRIS21, that starts with FRIS referring to the abbreviation 
for “Field Research in Israel” and ends with a number referring to that specific interviewee.
40 See Appendix C for the questionnaire used in the field research in Israel.
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emigration, some of the questions focused on the relationship between Turkish 
citizenship and minority status. Some other questions focused on the history of 
migration and the changes in the citizenship status and the perception of 
citizenship in due course. All the questions in the second set followed a 
chorological order. The third group of questions was addressed to the 
respondents spontaneously. They helped the researcher to clarify the ideas, values, 
perceptions and experiences that each respondent mentioned during the interviews
in relation to his or her personal life history. The questioimaire included 70
^  —-
questions, yet with ad-hoc questions interviews covered around 100 questions 
depending on the flow of interviewing. The duration of the interviews varied, 
minimum taking 40 minutes and maximum t^dng 120 minutes, with a total 
average of 70 minutes.
The 34 respondents were contacted by a combination of various means. As 
had been the case with the interviews in Turkey, snowball technique was also
J
used in Israel. Each respondent referred to their family members, relatives,
neighbors or friends as the next possible interviewee candidates. However,
/
interviewing people only within these circles was tried to be avoided by 
supplementary means. Having finished the field research in Turkey, the 
interviewees in Turkey provided contact names of their friends and relatives in 
Israel which helped the researcher with the field research in Israel. In addition to 
these respondents, several other people in Turkey who were not Jewish 
themselves but had some affiliafion with Israel -  by reasons of work, education, 
tourism, etc. - provided contact information for interviewing in Israel. The people 
working at immigrant organizations founded by the Jews emigrated fi'om Turkey
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were also contacted for interviewing. The major immigrant association of the 
Jews from Turkey in Israel is Itahdut Yotsei Turkia and its active members 
provided the membership list of the Association. Some of the names which were 
covered in the list accepted to give interviews. The members of the Bat-Yam 
Culture Club were also contacted during theater play rehearsal. Some of the 
members of the e-group Debarkader accepted to give interviews. The researcher 
had friends and colleagues in Israel who provided contact names in Israel. Last
but not least, several people who had migrated from Turkey or had Turkish
^  —
origins were met spontaneously, e.g. cashier at supermarket; taxi driver, bakery, 
etc. They provided some names for interviewing.
In the selection of the possible respondents, there were three criteria that 
the researcher considered important. First, only the ones who migrated from 
Turkey to Israel in the mass migration between 1948 and 1951 and who migrated 
after 1951 until 1980 were selected. The Jews who migrated before 1948 and after
i
1980 were eliminated in the sample group. The sample groups covered only the 
immigrants whose country of origin was Turkey. It was also important that the 
immigrants were the first generation of immigrants; hence the second or third 
generation of immigrants who are the offspring of adult immigrants were ignored 
in the sample group.'** Furthermore, the first generation of immigrants was to be 
in their adult or juvenile ages at the time of migration. In other words, if the 
immigrants were not mature enough for the decision to emigrate from Turkey to
“  It is also acknowledged in previous studies that the immigrating adults and the immigrant­
offspring communities in Israel experience sharp generation gaps since the offspring cannot 
duplicate the sociali2ation, life course, language and cultural features and socio-geographic 
constraints that the adult immigrating group experienced (Matras, 1985: 3).
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Israel, they were excluded from the sample group. Consequently, the sample 
group referred to an age group above middle ages. Only the immigrants who were 
in good mental and physical condition were preferred as some of the elderly could 
have been exposed to illnesses due to their old ages. Since equal numbers of 
women and men were aimed to be interviewed according to the research 
methodology, balance in terms of gender was tried to be sustained in the selection 
process.
Second, only the ones who gave consent to be interviewed were selected.
^  —-
The interviewees were ensured that their names would not be publicized and the 
data obtained in the interviews would be used only for scientific purposes. The 
aims, the scope and the procedures of the research as well as points on 
confidentiality were expressed in the protocol which was read vocally to the 
respondents by the researcher at the start of the interviews.'*  ^ The third criterion 
for selecting the respondents who belong to the Jewish community in Turkey was 
upholding diversity as much as possible. The diversity among the respondents was 
built upon the basis of differences in age, gender, marital status, citizenship status, 
place of birth, place of settlement in Turkey before emigration, date of arrival in 
Israel, place of settlement in Israel, occupation, education, socio-economic 
background and ethno-religious origin (Sephardim or Ashkenazim). For instance, 
when it was realized that generally the Jews who migrated in the early 1970s were 
interviewed, the consequent interviews were made with the Jews who migrated in 
the late 1970s. Similarly, when, at ^  point in the field research, it was realized that
42 See Appendix B for the full text of the protocol guideline.
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only middle-class Jews from Turkey in Israel were interviewed, the interviewee 
selection process for consequent interviews switched to the lower-class or upper 
class immigrants.
The interviews took place mainly in the houses of the respondents though 
work offices, meeting rooms of the Itahdut, rehearsal room of the Bat-Yam 
Culture Club and the play room of Merkaz Yom L’Kashish (Retirees’ Center) in 
Yahud were also used. They were mainly in districts like Herzeliya, Ramat-Aviv,
Bat-Yam, Rishon Lezziyon, central Tel-Aviv and Yahud. None of the interviews
~~~
were made in coffee bars for security reasons. It must be noted that conducting a 
research in another country brought by certain technical problems, foremost those 
of timing. Israel was visited once. If more visits' were paid, interaction with the 
immigrants would have been more intense and profound.
1.6 Organization of the Study
As has been described in the present chapter, this study aims to analyze 
citizenship on the layers of international migration and minority issues in the 
comparative case of the Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel. This analysis 
is organized in six additional chapters. A brief synopsis of each follows.
Chapter II presents a historical overview of the Jews in Turkey intersected 
within the general phenomenon of citizenship and minority issues as a whole. The 
chapter discusses citizenship of^Jewish minority in Turkey in four periods; the 
Ottoman Period, the Early Republican Period (1923-1945), the Multi-Party
44
Democracy Period (1945-1980) and the Post-1980 Period covering more recent 
developments.
Chapter HI deals with citizenship on the layer of international migration 
and generally discusses Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel. After a brief 
historical overview of Israel as a nation of immigrants founded in Palestine, 
background information is presented on Jewish emigration from Turkey to 
Palestine prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. The core of this chapter,
which is Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel, is examined in-depth in two
—-
periods; the mass migration of 1948-51 and subsequent migrations up through 
today.
Chapter IV is an analytical chapter based on data collected in the field 
study and focuses on the results of the survey interviews conducted with the Jews 
in Turkey. After a theoretical overview of Turkish citizenship and the status of 
non-Muslim minorities per se are put forth, a detailed profile of background
t
characteristics of the sampled Jews in Turkey and their perceptions of the legal 
status, identity and civic virtue aspects of Turkish citizenship are presented.
Chapter V is also an analytical chapter but which gives a detailed 
interpretative account of Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel. It focuses on 
research results obtained in the field work in Israel. After a theoretical overview 
on citizenship and international migration in Turkey and in Israel is given, a 
detailed profile of background characteristics of the sampled Turkish Jews in 
Israel and their perceptions of the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of 
Turkish/Israeli citizenship are discussed.
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Chapter VI highlights on the points made in Chapters IV and V and links 
the layers of international migration and minority issues to each other in a 
discussion that utilizes the elements of legal status, identity and legal status 
aspects of citizenship. The cases of minority and immigrant groups are analyzed 
with a comparative perspective and the similarities plus the differences between 
the two groups in terms of experiences and perceptions on citizenship are set 
forth. Furthermore, the discussion puts the immigrant and minority groups under 
the same rubric of citizenship and links the empirical framework to the theoretical 
one.
Chapter Vn concludes the discussion with a review of the results of the 
study. The strengths as well as the weaknesses of the study are evaluated with 
possible prospects for future studies.
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CHAPTER II
CITIZENSHIP AND MINORITIES:
A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH MINORITY IN TURKEY
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to revisit the history of Jews in Turkey starting 
from Ottoman times with a special focus on citizenship as a concept and a 
construction. Therefore, rather than utilizing a general framework of the Jewish 
presence during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, here we will 
employ a structure designed to portray the specific history of a specific group. In 
this regard, the history of the Jews as a minority group and as citizens is illustrated 
by way of a chronological methodology encompassing a broad range of events, 
laws, ideas and movements spanning Ottoman times up to present-day Turkey. In 
line with the conventional classification utilized by many studies of Turkish 
politics, the historical projection developed on the citizenship and minority status 
of Jews in Turkey is categorized into four periods: the Ottoman Period, the Early 
Republican Period (1923-1945), the Multi-Party Democracy Period (1945-1980) 
and the Post-1980 Period covering more recent developments.*
' For a similar breakdown of Turkish politics into eras, see Ahmad (1995), Barkey (2000) and 
Ozbudun (1988).
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The history of Jews during the Ottoman Empire era focuses mainly on the 
Millet system. Since “minority” as a term was alien to the imperial structure of the 
Ottoman state and since society was generally organized into ethno-religious 
communities called Millets, in this part of the chapter, Ottoman Jews are analyzed 
analytically as one of the major non-Muslim Millets. Additionally, in view of the 
fact that citizenship is a modem concept whose development overlaps with the 
development of the modem state, the discussion of Jews as citizens of the 
Ottoman state mainly refers to the 19**' century, especially after the Tanzimat 
Reforms in 1839, when the Ottoman state adopted several administrative 
modernization measures. On the other hand, the history of the Jews during the 
Turkish Republic suggests a more articulate projection of a minority group and of 
modem citizenship.
The Early Republican Period (1923-1945) is generally marked with the 
foimdation of the Turkish Republic and the taking root of Republican norms and 
values such as secularism, nationalism and unitary state stmcture. This period is 
also known as the Single-Party Period since the Republican People’s Party (RPP) 
was the sole party dominating the political agenda until the transition to multi­
party democracy in 1945. The specific relevance of this period with respect to the 
Jewish minority is that its policies for building a Turkish nation-state and creating 
a Turkish citizenry were characterized largely by the homogenization of society 
under the term “Turk.” Therefore, this period is generally marked with the tension 
that arose during the inclusion of non-Muslim groups, and hence the Jews, imder 
the definition of supra-Turk and a supra-Turkish citizenry.
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The Multi-Party Period (1945-1980), however, indicates a more tolerant 
period in comparison to the Single-Party Period with respect to religious identities 
and its understanding of citizenship. It is a period dimng which the citizenship 
project entailed a broader range of civic rights under the 1961 Constitution. 
However, during its later stages, especially in the 1970s, these rights were 
curtailed by additional legislation in response to rising violence between leftist 
and rightist groups. The pressure of ‘Turkification” on the Jewish minority was 
reduced in the Multi-Party Period, but the social unrest of the 1970s impinged 
upon emigration to Israel, which did not take a mass form as it did post-1948, 
after the establishment of Israel.
The Post-1980 Period was significant for the Jews in terms of the impact 
of globalization and neo-liberal policies. The 1982 Constitution, one greatly 
influenced by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, brought restrictions to basic rights 
and liberties. However, several trends -  the development of civil society, the rise
I
of identity politics, liberalization of the economy and the accession process to the 
European Union -  all provided challenges concerning the minority issues and the 
concept of citizenship.
2.2 The Jewish Millet in the Ottoman Empire
The Jewish presence in Ottoman lands has a long history dating back to 
the era of the Byzantine Empire, when Jews lived in communities in regions as 
diverse as the Middle East, Anatolia, Thrace and the Balkans (Galanti, 1995: 16). 
However, the roots of the Jewish population living in the Ottoman Empire and
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later in the Turkish Republic lie mainly in mass migrations from the Iberian 
Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) starting in the late 15‘*’ century. Sephardic Jews 
experiencing violent religious oppression under the Catholic Inquisition were 
expelled from Spain in 1492 and from Portugal in 1497. The Ottoman state 
accepted the Jewish refugees in lands of the Empire, and so around 100,000- 
150,000 Jews immigrated to Ottoman territory (Emecen, 1997: 19).
The religious tolerance enjoyed by the Jews under the Ottoman Millet 
system and the Ottoman Empire’s immigration policies enabling the reception and 
naturalization of many immigrants and refugees spurred several waves of Jewish 
migration from European countries (Kirişçi, 2000: 3). The reason behind this 
reception of the Jews was the economic, technical and cultural services and 
interests that they could contribute to the empire (Lewis, 1996: 159). The 
migration of Sephardic Jews to the Ottoman Empire continued in the centuries 
following, and many Ashkenazic Jews from various central and Eastern European 
countries, including Russia, came to join their brethren in the Ottoman Empire. 
Until its collapse in the early 20‘* century, the empire maintained its status as a 
destination country for Jewish migrants and refugees who had lived under 
religious discrimination and oppression in their home countries.^ The oppressions 
that Jewry faced in most European coimtries gave rise to the belief that Jews 
would be loyal to the Ottoman state. This seems to be the reason why the Jewish
 ^ However, there were times that the Ottoman government put restrictions on Jewish migration 
into the en5)ire’s lands. For instance, the Ottoman state tried to limit Jewish migration to Palestine 
after the first World Zionist Conference of 1897, and prohibited it completely in 1906 (Tekeli, 
1990: 58).
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Millet came to be called “the Millet that came by itself’ {kendi gelen Millet) or 
“’’the loyal Millet” (Millet-i sadika) (Alkan, 2000: 182).
The Jewish immigrants settled in various towns and provinces -  most 
prominently in Safad, Salonika, İzmir and Istanbul -  and established Jewish 
neighborhoods in these settlements. Salonika became such a center for Jewish 
culture that eventually its population was majority Jew, a rare characteristic for 
settlements not only then but also throughout world history (Baer, 2000: 205). 
Furthermore, Istanbul’s Jews made up one of the world’s largest Jewish 
communities (Sharon, 1993: 41). The immigrants brought with them a language 
which had the basic features of early 16* century Spanish dialects called Ladino 
or Judeo-Spanish(Şaul, 2001: 130).
The Ottoman Jews contained several sub-groups. There were the Ladino- 
speaking Sephardic Jews who ultimately originated in the Iberian Peninsula but, 
due to varying patterns of migration, came proximally from several western and 
southern European coimtries; the Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazic Jews who 
immigrated from central and eastern Europe; the Greek-speaking Romaniots who 
originated in the Byzantine Empire; the Arabic-speaking Jews (Miista’rib or 
Mizrahim Jews) living in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Iraq; the Kurdish-speaking 
Jews present throughout the Middle East; and the Karaites who reject the oral 
tradition and believe only in scriptural Judaism.
These Jews enjoyed religious and social liberties in the Ottoman Empire, 
free from the oppression and discrimination that their brethren faced in most 
European countries. Although there were some incidents such as small-scale 
attacks on Jewish neighborhoods, these incidents did not escalate into pogroms or
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other acts of fatal violence. Furthermore, Ottoman rule served as a constant guard 
against Christian “blood libel” attacks on the Jews (Groepler, 1999).
The religious tolerance shown the Jews and the peaceful co-existence of 
various religions in the Ottoman Empire were the result of two key elements of 
the Ottoman administrative structure (Karpat, 1988: 36-39). The first was the faith 
which served the legitimacy of the state. Under the Islamic decree of dhimmi 
(zimmi), Christians and Jews were acknowledged as “people of the book” (ehl-i 
kitap) and hence were granted protection, security, religious autonomy and 
cultural independence.^ Non-Muslims were given dhimmi status in return for a 
special poll tax called “jizya” {cizye)!^ Only non-Muslim men of arms-bearing age 
paid the jizya and by so doing, they obtained exemption from military service. 
The jizya functioned as a kind of social contract ensuring the maintenance of 
security for non-Muslims in exchange for a fee. In addition to the jizya, every year 
the Jewish community also paid a special tax called the “rabbi’s tax” {cizye-i ray). 
In exchange for this tax, Jewish conununities scattered among several 
neighborhoods -  unlike the well-known ghettos of Europe -  gained the right to 
have their religious leader known as the rabbi {Rav ha-Kolel) (Levy, 1994).
 ^ Religious freedom based on the principle of faith was only granted to monotheistic religions, 
more specifically to believers in the Zebur (the Psalms of David), Torah, Bible and Koran. 
Furthermore, apostasy was punishable by death; hence it was not easy for Christians or Jews to 
make converts among Muslims, though conversion to Islam itself was not discomraged (Davison, 
1954: 845).
^  Dhimmi status could be obtained in three ways: by accepting Ottoman rule without war or before 
an Ottoman conquest; by submitting to Ottoman rule after defeat in battle; or by immigrating to 
the Ottoman Empire.
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The second element had to do with community, which in addition to the 
principle of faith formed the core of the Millet system. In the Millet system, which 
formed the basis of the Ottoman administrative structure, individuals were not 
recognized, and subjects were defined according to their religions and only within 
the religious groups to which they belonged. The Millet system illustrated the 
significance of “difference,” rather than homogeneity, as a norm in Ottoman 
administration (Rodrigue, 1995: 82-83). It helped to preserve and emphasize the
religious distinctions among the subjects, yet at the same time as an administrative
^  —-
tool gave non-Muslims a certain level of cultural and religious autonomy and 
local self-rule (Karpat, 1985: 95). The Millet system was also reflected in the 
empire’s class structure. Ottoman class structure'was determined by religious and 
ethnic differences, and for several centuries, the Ottoman bourgeoisie was made 
up of non-Muslim traders, bankers and commissioners (Keyder, 1989). Jews, for 
instance, made up a Millet which was not very much involved in agricultural
j
production or peasant labor.
There were several Millets in the Ottoman Empire and the three major 
non-Muslim Millets were the Greeks (Orthodox Christians all, including Arab, 
Albanian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Serbian Orthodox Christians), the Armenians 
(non-orthodox Christians such as eastern Armenians, Georgians, Assyrians, 
Protestants and Catholics) and the Jews. Millets had separate administrative rules 
for marriage, divorce, inheritance and tax collection. The non-Muslim Millets 
were allowed to administer thfir communal affairs under the authority of their 
own ecclesiastical leaders who also represented the commimity in the Ottoman 
Palace and had important administrative, judicial and financial responsibilities.
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This in a way bureaucratized religious structures within the Ottoman state and 
served to integrate ethno-religious communities, a need which surfaced only after 
the Ottoman state became an empire with its territorial gains in the Balkans 
(Karpat, 1988: 39-40).
However the integration of the Millets was achieved only within the 
limitations imposed by the doctrine of difference. First, although the Millets were 
recognized officially as separate units, among the various millets, the Muslim 
Millet was the dominant one, and the dhimmi status granted to non-Muslims 
marked an inequality of status between themselves and Muslims (Davison, 1954: 
845). The doctrine of difference functioned as “the difference from Muslims.” For 
instance, non-Muslims were forbidden to carry arms, ride horses, reside next to 
mosques, or build houses above six meters, and their testimony was inadmissible 
in Muslim courts of law. Moreover, non-Muslims were made to dress in different
colors than Muslims. Second, the three major non-Muslim Millets -  the Greeks,
)
the Armenians and the Jews -  were engaged in constant power struggles with one 
another (Baer, 2000: 203). For instance, since Jews tended to know several 
languages and had ties with European powers due to their path of immigration, in 
the 16**’ century they were recruited to high administrative positions in diplomacy, 
the economy, and the financial, medical and trade sectors, in an era known as the 
golden age of the Jews. However, as the empire started to decline, after the 16**’ 
century the Jewish elite gradually lost their contacts with Western powers and 
hence their enviable position. Consequently, Armenians and Greeks started to 
obtain positions vacated by the Jews (Şeni and Le Tamec, 2000: 16, 18). The 
division of labor was ethnic; ethic competition was high, and reactions against the
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growth of any given group developed along the lines of group membership. Since, 
however, the doctrine of difference was supported through the general acceptance 
of social hierarchy as inevitable (Mardin, 1980), the practices of the Millet system 
did not provoke deep or festering societal tensions.
The doctrine of difference as a cornerstone of the Millet system 
maintained its dominance in the administrative structure until the 19*^  century. 
However, due to territorial losses in a series of wars as well as the new post- 
French Revolution political atmosphere marked by the emergence of nation-states, 
along with the rise of the public/private distinction and territorial statehood, there 
appeared the need to make certain changes to the Millet system. The core ideas of 
the French Revolution such as liberty, equality afld nationality stood in opposition 
to the fundamentals of the multi-Millet Ottoman Empire, yet they had an immense 
and prolonged influence on the administrative structure throughout the 19* 
century. The foremost change to the Millet system was the introduction of the 
concept of citizenship, a Western phenomenon the empire adopted out of the need 
to protect the state’s integrity in response to rising separatist movements. At the 
same time, the doctrine of difference was replaced by the doctrine of equality, 
which abandoned the differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslim subjects 
and began a new but equal form of subjecthood.
Essentially equality was used to refer to the equality of classes in the 
French Revolution, but in the Ottoman context, it referred to the equality of 
nationalities leading to the spread of nationalist ideology and the transformation 
of the non-Muslim Millets into minorities (Kedourie, 1998: 27; Lewis, 1965: 33). 
The empire lacked the modem tools to deal with nationalist uprisings by non-
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Muslims and so became susceptible to pressures from European powers. The 
Ottoman ruling elite believed that a new egalitarian citizenship was necessary to 
prevent secessionist nationalist turmoil from wearing the empire down. 
Furthermore, they were of the idea that putting non-Muslims on the same footing 
as Muslims in an equal framework would frustrate Western interference in the 
Ottoman state’s internal affairs, since European powers frequently used a strategy 
of manipulating non-Muslims to their advantage in international relations. In this 
regard, the utilization of equal citizenship within the broader framework of 
westernization appeared as a means of governance. Accordingly, the doctrine of 
equality became official policy in the 19 century, and it was instrumentalized 
through various reforms including declarations, decrees and laws to regulate 
relations between the different Millets and to establish a new framework of 
subjecthood (Nisan, 1991:21).
The wave of reforms aimed at reorganizing the Millet system was 
launched in 1839 with the Tanzimat Declaration {Giilhane Hatt-i Hiimayunu), the 
first legislative attempt in Ottoman history granting non-Muslims the same rights 
as Muslims. These reforms, in a broad sense, brought a new framework of 
administrative, legal and educational policies. All the subjects of the sultan, both 
Muslim and not, were made equal before the law and accorded the rights to life, 
property and safety regardless of their Millet membership. The Tanzimat Reforms 
also established a level, equal playing field in recruitment to state offices and 
introduced fair public court trials for non-Muslims. The death penalty for apostasy 
from Islam was also abolished. The Tanzimat Reforms signified the entry of the
56
individual onto the public agenda as a subject construing society irrespective of 
ethno-religious background.
With Tanzimat, non-Muslims began to be covered by not only the same set 
of rights but also by the same obligations, the foremost being universal 
conscription. Although the Tanzimat Declaration contained no special clause on 
the conscription of non-Muslims, military service came to be seen by the 
government as an obligation of all citizens due to be paid to the state. Thus, with a 
new 1855 law, the jizya tax was abolished and military service became obligatory 
for non-Muslims. Furthermore, the professional ranks of the military were opened 
up to non-Muslims. However, due to treasury deficits and the reluctance of non- 
Muslims to serve in the military, exemption fi'om military service reemerged 
under a new tax called the “military charge” (bedel-i askeriye). The conscription 
of non-Muslims remained negligible until the early 20* century.^
The reforms paving the path for the construction of a modem form of 
subjecthood continued with the Reform Edict (Islahat Fermani) of 1856. This 
edict denounced discrimination on the grounds of religious beliefs or practice and 
emphasized the equality of all Ottoman subjects in terms of educational 
opportunity and eligibility for government posts. Accordingly, the administration 
of justice, taxation and the military service were all reorganized. Non-Muslims 
began to receive appointments and were later elected to provincial advisory 
councils and to the Grand Council of State. With the Reform Edict, the non-
’ It was only in 1909 with a special law enacted by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 
that the conscription of non-Muslims, including Jews, was made obligatory, a measure which 
enjoyed almost full cortq)liance.
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Muslim Millets prepared regulations for their internal administration and the Jews 
prepared their “Regulation for the Chief Rabbinate.” Along the lines of the 
doctrine of equality among subjects regardless of religious affiliation, the Millet 
system became a purely religious structure and started to lose its administrative 
function. Correspondingly, as new educational, legal and judicial institutions were 
developed to administer and govern subjects on the basis of the equality of the 
Millets, the patriarchs and the rabbinates started to lose institutional control over 
their followers.
1869 saw the enactment of the Ottoman Nationality Law {Tabiiyet-i 
Osmaniye Kanunnamesi), which delineated Ottoman nationality on a territorial 
basis. The law introduced a territorial concept of citizenship under which all 
subjects living within the territory of the Ottoman Empire as Ottoman nationals 
were subject to Ottoman authority regardless of religious or sectarian affiliation. 
Children whose parents were not of Ottoman nationality were entitled to Ottoman 
nationality on the condition that they were bom in empire territory and that they 
maintained their nationality until adulthood. The burden of proving claims of 
having nationality fi:om another coimtry rested upon the claimant. The law’s 
primary aim was to discourage minorities from claiming foreign nationality. In 
view of the fact that some Greeks acquired Greek citizenship and some 
Armenians Russian citizenship in order to get access to benefits springing from 
the Capitulations as well as the protection of Christian states, the Ottoman 
government thought that a territorial basis for nationality would reduce the level 
of Western interference in its internal affairs. Some Jews also changed their
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citizenship, for example to French, Italian, Greek or British, but not at the mass 
level seen with other minority groups (Yetkin, 1996: 110).
The 1876 Constitution declared all peoples of the empire as Ottoman and 
underlined that their primary allegiance was to the state, with other affiliations 
such as religion or ethnicity relegated to secondary status. Continuing the reforms 
taken previously by Tanzimat, the 1876 Constitution regarded subjects living 
within the territories of the Ottoman Empire as individuals making up society and 
not simply as parts of different religious-ethnic communities. Regarding political 
rights, the Constitution granted property-owning males the right to stand for the 
Legislative Assembly, the first time the empire had seen such an institution. 
Consequently, many property-owning Jewish and other non-Muslim men won 
seats in the assembly. Non-Muslims held over one-third of the total number.^ 
Even the issue of Jewish settlers in Palestine was discussed in the assembly, 
though the settlement movement met serious criticism fi*om its Arab members. 
The Constitution and the assembly were suspended in 1878 by Sultan 
Abdulhamid H, but reappeared in 1908 to usher in the second constitutional 
period, which lasted until the empire’s collapse.
Despite the legal, social and administrative reforms taken throughout the 
19*'’ century to save the empire fi"om fi'agmentation, the political milieu was 
marked by nationalism both as an ideology and a mass movement. In addition to 
the reforms, the Ottoman government brought into play first patriotism for 
Ottomanism to recover the loyalty of non-Muslims to the state, then for Pan-
* In the 1877-78 Legislative Assembly, there were 115 representatives composed of 67 Muslims 
and 48 non-Muslims, five of whom were Jewish (Giileryuz, 1993: 201).
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Islamism and, as a last try, Pan-Turkism in order to sustain the empire’s integrity 
and head off secession. However, all these measures proved unable to forestall the 
revolt of non-Muslim minorities supported by European powers such as Britain, 
France and Russia. In due course the Greek Orthodox community supported the 
foundation of Greece, and the Bulgarian Orthodox community, after a rivalry with 
the Orthodox Church in Istanbul, went for the foundation of Bulgaria. On the 
other hand, the Armenian Millet, with the help of the Russians during wars on the 
eastern frontier, revolted many times for secession, but the integrity of the 
Anatolian lands was maintained. By the second half of the 19* century, the only 
non-Muslim subject group which had not rebelled against the empire and was 
perceived to be loyal was the Jewish Millet (Poulton, 1997: 54). Nationalism did 
not spread among the Jews, and even the political Zionism that emerged in Europe 
in the 1890s had limited influence on Ottoman Jewry in comparison to the 
inspiration that nationalism gave rise to in the Christian Millets (Bali, 2001a: 71, 
80).’
The reasons for the failure of nationalism and Zionism to take root among 
Ottoman Jews were several. First, the Jews lacked a nation-state to which to show 
allegiance. Jews were scattered all over the world, lacking any mutual bond in 
terms of nationality, language or culture. Although there were Jews concentrated 
in Palestine due to faith-inspired immigration, the idea of an Israeli nation-state 
was still nascent.
’ According to the online Jewish Virtual Library, Zionism stands for “the national movement for 
the return of the Jewish people to their homeland and the resunption of Jewish sovereignty in the 
Land of Israel, advocated, from its inception, tangible as well as spiritual aims.” For forther 
information on Zionism, see httD://www.us-israel.org/isource/Zionism/zionism.html.
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Second, Ottoman Jews did not face discrimination against the free practice 
of their religion or preservation of their culture. In contrast to the violent 
oppression faced by Jews living in other countries, which in turn fed there the 
emergence and spread of political Zionism, the Ottoman Jews were able to 
maintain their identity in a more liberal atmosphere. Fearing that they would lose 
their religious freedom and live in fear, the Jews took sides with the Ottoman 
government against secessionist movements. In line with their loyalty to the 
Ottoman state, patriotic Ottomanism was very strong among the Jews (Nahum, 
2000: 79). Even when Theodore Herzl, the leader of the World Zionist 
Organization, asked Sultan Abdulhamid II to open up Palestine for Jewish 
settlement in return for financial support to the Ottoman Treasury, the elites of the 
Jewish Millet did not work with him, though they were not opposed to the idea of 
a safe haven for the world’s Jews. The Ottoman Jewish elite tolerated Zionism 
only to the extent that it would not threaten the integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
and hence the peaceful survival of the empire’s Jews. If the Jews had joined the 
secessionist wave like other non-Muslim groups, they would, they feared, lose 
their reputation for loyalty. As a community with a history of being expelled from 
a host of countries for century after century, the Jewish elite in the 1870s thought 
that a homeland in Palestine proposing an unrealistic ideal would draw a severe 
backlash from the Ottoman government and could even threaten their expulsion 
from the empire. Therefore they had no wish to damage the Jews’ reputation as 
the only non-Muslim group loyal to the Ottoman state, that is, the only one not 
seeking secession or territorial demands from the Ottoman government. When 
Abdulhamid II rejected Herlz’s offer and restricted the selling of lands to Jews in
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Palestine, the Jewish elite made donations to the Ottoman Navy as a gesture of 
their loyalty to the state (Nahum, 2000: 77,143).*
Third, the influence of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, an organization 
founded in Paris in 1860 with the aim of modernizing contemporary Jewry and 
assisting the integration of Jews into the societies they lived in, was stronger 
among the Ottoman Jews than was Zionism.^ The alliance considered the idea of 
establishing a nation made up of Jews speaking different tongues and coming 
from different cultural and social backgrounds to be unrealistic. In a similar vein, 
it rejected the ideology of Zionism and Zionist activities, both of which they 
thought hindered the assimilation and acculturation of Jews into the nations they 
lived in. Regarding the Jews of the Ottoman' Empire, the Alliance Israelite 
Universelle advocated their integration into Tinkish culture and promoted the idea 
of Jewish military conscription (Nah\im, 2000: 82,152).
The main tool that the alliance used to support the economic, social and 
cultural development of the Oriental Jews was education. In the Ottoman Empire, 
the group established several Alliance Israelite schools at the secondary education 
level for the Jewry.'° The Alliance Israelite schools not only taught technical
* Notwithstanding the general lack of support for Zionism among the empire’s Jewry, some Jews, 
more specifically ones firom the yoimger generations, flirted with the idea of Zion, but this failed to 
lead to any strong Zionist activism (Haker, 2002: 318; Rodrigue, 1997: 208).
’ The Ashkenazim gave priority to education in German and established Goldschmidt Schools, in 
contrast to the Sephardim who opted for the French alliance schools (Frayman et al. 2000: 15). 
However, the Sephardic Jews were the dominant group within the Jewish community, both in 
numbers and influence.
In 1912, there were 1,155 Alliance Israelite Universelle schools in the en5)ire (Molho, 1999: 
85).
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skills to students to boost Jewish employment but also aimed to promote Jewish 
culture and ethics. The alliance considered Ladino an archaic language which ill- 
served the needs of contemporary Jewry and saw Hebrew as a tool of Zionism, an 
ideology rejected by the group. Therefore, French, a language which signified 
modernization and westernization for the alliance, was preferred in education in 
Alliance Israelite schools (Rodrigue, 1997).** In line with its integrationist 
policies, the group did not challenge the spread of Turkish, as at the turn of the 
20*** century some Jews ideologically close to the alliance foimded an institution 
called the Ottoman Organization for Language Training (Lisan-i Tamimi-i 
Osmani Cemiyeti) specifically in order to make Turkish the national language of 
Ottoman Jewry (§aul, 2001: 153). The alliance, with its efforts against traditional 
Judaism and religious dogmatism, contributed to the secularization of the 
Ottoman Jews (Rodrigue, 1997: 179).
Although the alliance prepared the Ottoman Jews for modernization and 
integration into mass Turkish culture, it was unable to avoid the emergence of two 
paradoxical outcomes that Jews had to encounter even in the Republic of Turkey. 
First, by forging bonds between Western and Eastern Jews, the alliance and hence 
its schools aided the formation of a ixniversal Jewish identity and therefore 
cultivated the seeds of Zionism among Turkey’s Jews. Religion had always 
comprised the essential element of the Ottoman Jews’ commimal identity, though 
Judaism was more an identity than a religion, but the alliance lifted Jewish 
identity to a universal level (Nahum, 2000: 43, 140). And second, the
*' Due to the influence from the alliance, French became a everyday language used prominently 
among upper-class Jews (Allcan, 2000: 170).
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modernization that the organization brought about followed an uneven course. 
The Alliance Israelite schools in the Ottoman Empire created a wide gap between 
the socio-economically middle- and upper-class French-speaking westernized 
elites on the one hand and the lower- class Ladino-speaking, underdeveloped, 
semi-educated, conservative Jewish masses on the o t h e r .B y  the end of the 
Ottoman Empire, the lower-class Jews were characterized by a position which 
was largely poor, imeducated, low profile, and fragmented into groups and 
synagogues based on place of origin. Social mobility (i.e. by marriage) and 
contact between these groups was minimal (Weiker, 1988: 9, 107). The 
dichotomy that appeared among the Jewish community at the end of the 19* 
century also carried into modem Turkey in the 20* century (Rodrigue, 1997: 180).
As the Jews were facing these changes, the Ottoman state, which had tried 
to take precautionary measures such as modernizing the state military and 
administrative sfructure, was proving unsuccessful in maintaining its own 
integrity. In the Balkan Wars and later in World War I, the Ottoman Empire lost 
major territories on both its western and eastern frontiers. The Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) that mled the state during these wars was imable to 
head off separatist movements. In response to universal conscription being made 
obligatory in 1909, non-Muslims, especially younger ones who did not want to be 
drafted, began to migrate to foreign countries. Although the migration of the non- 
Muslim bourgeoisie after World War I served the CUP’s aim of establishing a
12 It should be noted that the Jewish Millet in general illustrated a more urban outlook than other 
minority groups. This was also significant in the professions held by Jews. Though there were 
Jewish artisans and tradesmen, we cannot speak of a Jewish peasant class in the Ottoman Empire.
64
national bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1989), it also reinforced the view that non-Muslims 
were untrustworthy during times of national crisis. With the 1918 signing of the 
Treaty of Sevres, laying out the master plan for the dismemberment of Anatolian 
lands after the Ottomans’ defeat in World War I, this prejudice that non-Muslims 
were untrustworthy was reinforced.
2.3 The Early Republican Period (1923-1945): Jews vis-à-vis Nation-Building 
Process
During the War of Independence, some non-Muslims -  more often among 
the Greek and Armenian communities -  collaborated with Allied forces in the 
invasion of Istanbul and İzmir, and failed to support Muslim groups fighting 
against the invasion of Anatolia. The Jews, on the other hand, took no active part 
in the war, notwithstanding the damaging consequences that they faced during 
those years .The  Jews supported the War of Independence and Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk had always been a respected national figure in the eyes of the Jewish 
community in general (Galanti, 1995: 212). They saw Atatürk as an enlightened 
leader who would raise Txnkey to the level of civilized culture and a just figure 
who would defuse threats against the Jews.''*
During the War of Independence, the Greek troops left western Anatolia in ruins, which in turn 
disrupted the scattered Jewish communities in the region and led them to migrate to Izmir. The war 
devastated the Jews, destroying families in some cases, and spurring some survivors to emigrate 
abroad (Levi, 1998: 15).
Although the Jews retained their respect for Atatürk and his policies, they blamed other national 
leaders such as Atatürk’s successor İsmet İnönü for the Turkification policies of the Early 
Republican Period.
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The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was founded in 1920 and two 
years later, Turkish passports for the first time included the insignia of the Turkish 
government. The republic was proclaimed in 1923. After Turkey’s foundation, the 
recent separatist history of Greeks and Armenians before and during the War of 
Independence came to dominate the general perception towards all non-Muslim 
groups.’  ^In a sense, the public refused to forget the collaboration of non-Muslims 
with Allied forces in invading and carving up Anatolia during the War of 
Independence, and this betrayal was burned into the public’s collective memory.“^  
In general, society regarded non-Muslims as foreign elements in its midst and so 
repeatedly questioned their loyalty and reliability (Bali, 1998a: 171).
Hence, all non-Muslims who continued to live in Turkey were expected to 
demonstrate and prove their loyalty to the Turkish state. In this expectation, there 
was no distinction made between the various groups of non-Muslims. All non-
Muslims, no matter whether they supported the independence movement or joined
}
the resistance in line with their group affiliation, were put into the same basket as 
separatist groups. Likewise, though the Jews were traditionally known as loyal to 
the state, during the Early Republican Period they were lumped in with other non-
When new Turkish identity cards were issued, some Jews faced difficulties obtaining theirs in 
state offices. Similar problems arose in trying to obtain return visas for trips abroad. The 1924 Law 
on Free Travel allowed individuals who traveled abroad with Turkish passports during times of the 
war or armistice to return to Turkey. Procedures for Jews who were considered covered under this 
law were carried out swiftly and easily, but not so for Armenians and Greeks (Levi, 1998: 38, 54). 
In 1927, the Law on Revoking Turkish Citizenship from Former Ottoman Subjects was passed. 
Under the law, former Ottoman subjects who had failed to return to Turkey before that year could 
lose their citizenship only with a Council of Ministers decision.
What's more, the spirit of the War of Independence -  meaning sensitivity towards keeping a 
watchful eye on Anatolia’s indivisibility -  continued in the following decades even up to today 
and constituted the most vigorous aspect of Turkey’s national security policies (Ahmad, 1995; 
Hale, 1996; Akçam, 1995).
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Muslim groups. This bias towards Jews was also the consequence of the general 
enmity against both foreigners and minorities who were seen as part of foreign 
classes (Sharon, 1993: 102). The elites of the Jewish minority, moreover, failed to 
combat the common view that minorities were foreign elements within the 
Turkish population (Bali, 1998a: 175-176).
One of the major consequences of the War of Independence was a sharp 
fall in the population of non-Muslims living within the borders of the just-founded 
Turkish state. It should be pointed out that the decrease in the general non-Muslim 
population, which is mainly attributed to mass emigrations out of Turkey, 
reflected an imeven rate amongst the various non-Muslim groups. The drops in 
the Armenian and Greek populations were greater than that in the Jewish 
population. The Armenian population had already fallen during World War I due 
to the forced migration of 1915. However, during the War of Independence, the 
emigration of Armenians continued, mainly to Armenia, Russia, Iran and France. 
In the case of the Greeks, although Greece’s 1829 independence had a huge 
impact on the population of this minority, it also dropped sharply after the defeat 
of Greek forces in western Anatolia in the War of Independence. The emigration 
of Greeks was carried through at the state level with the 1923 Convention and 
Protocol Concerning the Exchange of Greek-Turkish Populations signed by 
Ankara and Athens. As for the Jews, unlike the Armenian and Greek populations, 
they had never seen a mass emigration. During World War I and the War of 
Independence, some Jews did move to European coimtries such as France, Italy
•j»
and Spain or to Latin American countries such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina or 
to Palestine, but this emigration was never at the mass level seen with the
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Armenians and Greeks. For instance, in 1914 there were an estimated 1.55 million 
Greeks, 1.2 million Armenians and 128,000 Jews living in the Ottoman Empire. 
By 1927, however, these figures had fallen to 110,000 Greeks, 77,000 Armenians 
and 82,000 Jews (Courbage and Fargues, 1998: 128).'^ The change in minorities’ 
populations was also reflected in the ethnic composition of Turkey’s economy. 
After the mass emigrations of Armenians and Greeks living in Turkey, domestic 
sectors dominated by these minorities such as trade and finance began to be 
overtaken by Jewish tradesmen.
The foremost change after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
establishment of Turkey with regards to non-Muslim groups took place in the 
legal framework. The Republican People’s Party (RPP), which until 1946 
dominated Turkey as its sole political party, not only set the fundamentals of 
modem Turkey during the Early Republican Period but also established the initial 
legislation on non-Muslim minorities. The Millet system was abandoned; the 
Turkish nation emerged as an extension of the Muslim Millet in the Ottoman 
Empire; and non-Muslims -  meaning only the Greeks, Armenians and Jews -  
were granted minority status under a new minority regime whose ftmdamental 
principles were set by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Since that time, there have 
been few revisions or additional pacts challenging the minority regime laid out by 
Lausanne, and even today, the treaty is considered the legal cornerstone
Other sources also confirm the general downward population spiral of Armenian, Greek and 
Jewish nationals as well as the relatively lower falls in the Jewish population in comparison to the 
other non-Muslim groups, yet the estimates vary. For the non-Muslim population and/or 
emigration estimates, see Dündar (2000), Benbasse and Rodrigue (2001), Geray (1970), Karpat 
(1985) and Soner (2001).
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structuring the general framework of issues related to non-Muslim minorities 
(Soner, 2004).
The Treaty of Lausanne was signed by Turkey and Allied forces such as 
France, Britain, Italy, and Greece and was put under the guarantee of the League 
of Nations. The treaty covered a broad range of general issues, but Articles 37-45 
specifically regulated the status and rights of non-Muslims living in Turkey. 
Accordingly, only three non-Muslim groups -  the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, 
who made up the Ottoman Empire’s major non-Muslim Millets -  were recognized 
as minorities, and therefore were granted the same freedoms as other Turkish 
nationals of life, religious belief and migration, plus the rights of legal and 
political equality and to use their mother tongue in courts, found schools or 
Similar institutions, and hold religious ceremonies. The articles granted these 
three non-Muslim groups the right to use their own language, the right of political 
and civic equality, the right to establish religious, educational and social welfare 
institutions, and the freedom of religion, travel and migration. Under Article 42,
Article 38 of the Treaty of Lausanne states: “All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free 
exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which 
shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy 
full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on 
part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government 
for national defense, or for the maintenance of public order.” Article 39 of the treaty states: 
“Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political 
rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal 
before the law.. .Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be 
given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the 
Courts” (Hurewitz, 1956: 122).
Article 40 of the treaty states: “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall 
enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, 
they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any 
charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction 
and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely 
therein” (Hurewitz, 1956: 122-123).
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the family laws and customs of minorities were protected. Furthermore, for every 
minority group, a committee was formed with an equal number of representatives 
from the group and the Turkish govemment.^^ Lausanne also stipulated that the 
minority rights covered under Articles 37-44 were to be reciprocated by Greece 
and would be granted to the ethnic Turks living in western Thrace.
Although the Treaty of Lausanne granted non-Muslim minority groups the 
right to education in their own schools as well as in their own languages and gave 
the Turkish government the responsibility to give financial assistance to minority 
schools, such a reciprocated rights-responsibilities structure proved ineffective 
when particularized in educational policies.^  ^ First, under Lausanne, the 
communal language of the Jews was accepted as Hebrew. In practice, however, 
Ladino was frequently used as a spoken language, and French was generally the
Article 42 of the treaty states: “The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non- 
Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting 
the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities. These 
measures will be elaborated by special Commissions conposed of representatives of the Turkish 
Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of 
divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in 
agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. The Turkish Government 
undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious 
establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted 
to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at 
present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new 
religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other 
private institutions of that nature” (Hurewitz, 1956: 123).
Article 41 of the Treaty of Lausanne declared: “As regards public instruction, the Turkish 
Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non- 
Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensxiring that in the primary schools the 
instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their 
own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching 
of the Turkish language obligatory ifi the said schools. In towns and districts where there is a 
considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities 
shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be 
provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or odier budgets for educational, religious, 
or charitable purposes. The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the 
establishments and institutions concerned” (Hurewitz, 1956: 123).
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language used in Alliance Israelite and other community schools. Hebrew was 
only used for religious purposes such as prayer in synagogues led by rabbis. When 
the Ministry of Education demanded in 1924 that the community make either 
Hebrew or Turkish its official educational tongue in Jewish schools, the Jews had 
little choice but to choose Turkish. French became only an elective language. 
Second, under the 1924 Law on the Unification of Education, all schools -  
including Jewish ones -  were ruled to fall under the purview and administration of 
the Ministry of Education. Consequently, the Alliance Israelite schools previously 
administered by France’s Alliance Israelite Universelle were made into Jewish 
schools, thus ending the formal bond between the alliance headquarters and the 
local alliance schools in Turkey. The Turkish government had already restricted 
the foimding of new Alliance Israelite schools in 1922, and the new Law on the 
Unification of Education put further impediments on them. Third, imder a 
regulation issued by the Ministry of Education in 1923, only teachers holding 
Turkish citizenship were allowed to work in community schools. Since the 
teachers at alliance schools were generally foreign nationals, largely French, they 
had to quit their jobs and leave Turkey. New Turkish teachers were appointed to 
the Jewish schools, but their salaries were not always paid by the Turkish 
government but rather by the Jewish community. Fourth, the principle of 
secularism set out in 1928 restricted religious boards from intervening in minority 
schools.^^ By the same token, religious education started to be given at religious 
institutions, which for the Jews meant at synagogues.
22 In 1928, the article specifying Islam as the religion of the Turkish state was revoked.
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During the 1924 negotiations in Lausanne, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly debated the first Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and it was 
enacted the very same year. With respect to citizenship. Article 88 of the 
Constitution stated (Gozubuyuk, 1995: 76): “The people of Turkey regardless of 
their religion and race are Turkish in terms of citizenship.” Article 12 banned the 
nomination of people to the Grand National Assembly who during the War of 
National Independence had claimed to be citizens of foreign countries. This article 
was mainly concerned with non-Muslims, since some of them had previously 
asserted their allegiance to foreign states such as Greece and Italy so as to end any 
obligations towards the Turkish authorities.
The Treaty of Lausaime not only failed to provide full rights to minority 
groups but also gave rise to enmity against minorities in the eyes of the public. 
Despite national legislation such as the adoption of the Constitution in 1924 and 
the Civic Code in 1926, minority issues were regulated by special clauses in 
Lausanne, which was conceived as a handicap to the social homogenization and 
nation-building aims of the new state (Bali, 2000: 62). The dominant ideology at 
the time was national interest supplemented by unity and collective purpose 
(Ayata, 1992). Alliances based on class, religion, or ethnic group were viewed as 
attempts at disunity, and a national interest that served unity and collective 
purpose was considered more important than the reconciliation of various interest 
groups (Heper, 1990a; Toprak, 1988). Since Jews had better relations with the 
Muslim Turks than other minority groups, they were expected to willingly opt out 
of the articles on minorities in Lausanne. The Greeks and Armenians, it was 
thought, would follow the Jews’ lead and forsake their minority status as well.
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Consequently, on September 15, 1925 the committee of the Jewish minority 
declared that it had opted out of Lausanne’s Article 42 (Galanti, 1995: 73). To 
obtain this chain of assent, the Turkish government allowed the press to put 
pressure on the Jews by stressing the differences of the Jewish community from 
other minority groups in terms of loyalty and solidarity (Levi, 1998: 31).
The mainstream press at the time specifically used two incidents related to 
Turkish Jewry as propaganda against the Jewish community. The first was a letter 
allegedly sent by the Jewish community in Turkey to Spanish authorities 
celebrating the discovery of the American continent. The press condemned the 
letter and questioned the Jews’ loyalty to the Turkish state. The Jewish elite also 
denounced the letter and paid visits to state officials to repudiate and refute the 
claims of disloyalty. This letter incident was one of the major factors behind 
Jews’ opting out of Lausanne as a show of loyalty to the republic (Bali, 2000: 77).
The second incident that sped the campaign against the Jewish minority 
was the 1927 case of Elza Niyego, an Istanbulite Jewish girl murdered by a 
Muslim man whose advances she rejected (Levi, 1996a: 75). Niyego’s funeral 
was accompanied by crowd of Jews protesting the circumstances of her death. 
The coverage of popular newspapers at the time portrayed the funeral as a protest 
demonstration by the Jewish community against Turkish authorities. The public 
prosecutor filed charges against some of the Jews who attended the funeral. 
Furthermore,imder a special provincial regulation, Jews were barred from moving
^  In addition to these visits, former Ottoman Jewish citizens living in Italy, Switzerland and 
Palestine sent letters to the Turkish authorities stressing that although they resided abroad, they 
remained loyal to Turkey (Levi, 1998: 72).
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out of Istanbul. The travel restriction ended several months later after Jewish 
community leaders visited the minister of the interior (Bali, 2000:127).^'^
In response to the press pressure of 1923-27, Jewish leaders felt the need 
to demonstrate their loyalty to the Turkish state by making donations to Türk 
Hava Kurumu (Institute for Turkish Aviation) and Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent) 
(Levi, 1998: 41, 63). They also frequently emphasized that the recently adopted 
Turkish Civil Code would suffice to serve the Jewry’s needs and that this broad 
legislation covered all citizens, regardless of religious backgroimd, and so 
nullified Lausanne’s specific articles on minorities. Jewish leaders also declared 
that the Jews were equal to other Turkish citizens in terms of rights and 
responsibilities and also had religious freedom, and hence had no need for any 
distinctive status that privileged them as a minority. After the Jews withdrew in 
1925 from these articles of Lausanne, the Greek and the Armenian minorities 
followed their lead and opted out of Article 42 in 1926. The minorities’ 
withdrawal from Lausanne had no legal standing in terms of international norms 
since the treaties’ signatory parties were the states, not the minorities. The 
representative committees for each minority group were also abolished. The 
campaign against special community rights ended in 1926 with the decision of 
each minority group to opt out of Lausaime (Levi, 1998: 73).
The opting out hastened the retreat of the authority of the Chief Rabbinate 
over the Jewish community and its representative power in relations with the 
Turkish government. The Chief Rabbinate was already pacified due to the 1925
Travel restrictions on non-Muslims continued periodically until 1932 with shorter periods, the 
maximum being some two months (Nahum, 2000: 222).
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Law on Order passed during the Kurdish rebellions in the east. In the same year, 
the rabbinate’s revenues fell with the prohibitions on its authority to collect tax 
from the Jewish community for licensing kosher food (Bali, 2000: 55).^  ^ It was 
only a year later that the Chief Rabbinate was allowed to collect taxes from the 
community. With the passage of the Law on Secularism in 1928, the role of the 
Chief Rabbinate as a mediator between the Jewish community and the state was 
further weakened. As secularism became one of the cornerstones of Republican 
Turkey, any connotation of religious communal identification in the public sphere, 
either Muslim or non-Muslim, was strictly forbidden. According to Law on Attire 
No. 2596, attire worn for religious purposes, either Muslim or non-Muslim, was 
prohibited from being worn on the streets outside the scope of religious practice. 
The intention of the law with respect to the Jews was that the attire of the chief 
rabbi could only be used by the rabbi himself, while ordinary Jews were
prohibited from wearing any attire signifying religious orientation. The decline in
)
the authority of the Chief Rabbinate was also evident in appointments to fill the 
post, or rather the lack thereof. For over two decades up imtil 1953, the Jewish 
community had neither an elected chief rabbi nor an appointed one. Chief Rabbi 
Haim Nahum^^ resigned from the office in 1921 due to internal conflicts within 
the Jewish community, with only Mo§e Becerano remaining to serve as deputy 
chief rabbi. After Becerano’s death in 1931, the Turkish government appointed no 
one to fill the post, leaving it vacant until 1953 when David Asseo was assigned
25 Kosher is the term used for Jewish dietary laws.
26 Haim Nahum was in the Turkish delegation to the negotiations over Lausanne in 1923.
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chief rabbi. The Republican leadership aimed to weaken the central minority 
organizations such as the Chief Rabbinate for two reasons: first these central 
organizations resembled the Ottoman Millet system, and one of the basic 
paradigms of new Turkey was a rejection of the Ottoman legacy; and second, due 
to the past record of some minorities in working for the dismemberment of 
Anatolian lands, the existing central organizations were suspected of serving 
similar ends.
Turkey’s legal framework set forth the full equality of all its citizens 
regardless of differences of religion, sect, ethnicity, gender or class. Despite an 
inclusive understanding of citizenship in the law, during the Early Republican 
Period “Turk” was generally equated with “Muslim,” and the Kemalist 
bxireaucratic elite tried to establish state authority over ethnic and religious groups 
(Toprak, 1986). On the practical level, certain issues arose concerning 
discriminative tendencies against minorities and hence, from time to time, the 
Jews. For instance, in the 1920s non-Muslims were discharged from their 
positions in state offices and state-owned companies (Levi, 1998: 37).
In 1928, Turkish citizenship was specified with a special law acting as 
supplement to Article 88 of the Constitution. The law, no. 1312, set forth the 
blood (descent) principle as the basic paradigm of Turkish citizenship and 
excluded territorial specifications.^’ Due to the low population levels of the 1920s, 
the law aimed at an inclusive definition of Turkish citizenship (Aybay, 1998: 40). 
Under the law, children of a Turkish citizen, whether a mother or father, were
Article 1 of Law No. 1312 states: “Children bom from a Turkish father or mother whether in 
Turkey or in a foreign country are considered Turkish citizens” (Nomer, 1989: 45).
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entitled to Turkish citizenship by birth regardless of where they were bom. The 
law also stipulated that individuals living abroad who failed to register themselves 
at a Turkish embassy would have their Turkish citizenship revoked through a 
Council of Ministers decision.
This equality under the law was aimed at not only the construction of 
modem citizenship but also as part of the process of nation-building through a 
homogenization imder the new category “Turk”; hence the “Turkification” of non- 
Muslim groups and their assimilation into Turkish language and culture (Bali,
•V- '^  ^ 7 ;
1998a: 171). Since the major criterion for being a ‘Turk” was speaking Turkish, 
during the Early Republican Period the unity of language was thought to carry key 
importance in Turkification and nation-building.
During Ottoman times the Millets spoke their own languages, and in their 
closed neighborhoods, a diversity of languages used among the communities that 
might be considered an extension of the private sphere caused no problems for 
public affairs. Hence, Jewish men who had access to the Muslim world in their 
work usually knew how to speak Ottoman to facilitate their public affairs, but 
women and the children only knew their community language.
However, the Early Republican Period witnessed abmpt changes in 
demography, the foremost being mass migration into and out of the country 
accompanied by modification in settlements and the disintegration of closed 
neighborhoods, all of which caused transformation in the public and private 
spheres. The need for a common language emerged as one of the fundamentals of 
nation-building, yet there were many groups, such as minorities, whose mother 
tongue was not Turkish. These minority groups spoke their own language, a
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marking point in their difference which became more obvious in the public 
sphere. Similarly, the Jewish minority continued to speak Ladino, but their 
community was no longer considered confined to the private sphere at a time 
when the definitions of public and private spheres were changing with the 
establishment of a new territorial and national state. Ladino became more 
conspicuous in the public sphere as a form of difference within that sphere, and 
hence more susceptible to the policies of homogenization and Turkification in line 
with the_ official nationalism targeting Turkish as the common tongue. In the
■V ^7'
1920s this move for a common language provoked press criticisms, both exphcit 
and acute, against Jews for speaking Ladino (Levi, 1998: 66). Moreover, a 
campaign called “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” {Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!) organized 
specifically to make Turkish the language of minority groups was in force until 
the mid 1930s.
The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign was launched in 1928 by a group 
of students at Istanbul University’s Faculty of Law. However, it very quickly 
spread to other segments of society through press endorsements and generated a 
mass reaction against minorities for their language differences. As part of the 
campaign, posters were himg on walls, bulletins were distributed on the streets 
and public declarations were made advocating that Turkish be spoken by Turkish 
citizens. There were even individual responses such as warnings to Jews to cease 
speaking Ladino in favor of Turkish in schools at all levels, on streets and on 
public conveyances such as buses, ships and trains.
The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign received the support of not only 
the Turkish- speaking masses but also intellectuals and leaders of the Jewish
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community such as Moiz Kohen (Tekinalp) and Avram Galanti (Landau, 1996). 
Speaking in Turkish was considered a sign of loyalty to the ideals of the republic, 
while speaking Ladino was thought to be an obstacle to the Jewry’s imification 
with society and integration with Turkish culture. Language differences were 
evaluated through the lens of the citizenship question and so in order to become 
full citizens, Jewish leaders exhorted their communities on the necessity to learn 
and use Turkish (Bali, 1999b: 44). In order to facilitate the spread of Turkish 
amongst^themselves, many associations were founded by the Jews towards this 
end, i.e. Türkçe Konuşturma Birliği (Union for the Turkish Language), Türk 
Dilini Yaygınlaştırma Komisyonu (Jewish Commission for the Dissemination of 
the Turkish Language), Kültür Birliği (Union for Culture), Türk Kültür Birliği 
(Turkish Culture Association), and Balat Türk Kültür ve Yardım Demeği 
(Association for Balat Turkish Cultıue and Aid).
Despite the encouragement of Jewish leaders, the campaign also caused a 
counter-reaction among Jews when some of them resisted learning and speaking 
the tongue of their adopted land. The tension between advocates of the “Citizen, 
Speak Turkish!” campaign and Jews who preferred speaking their own language 
led to a rise in legal charges filed against Jews under Article 159 of the Penal 
Code -  the “Insulting Turkishness” clause -  which allowed charges to be brought 
on the basis of any verbal or physical act judged to insult or denigrate 
Turkishness. Still, the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign can be considered 
successful in the sense that, alFeit with some ups and downs, it lasted until 1934, 
and through creating a consciousness of the Turkish language and Turkish 
citizenship, more Jews, especially younger ones, started to learn and speak
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Turkish. The 1934 Law on Surnames also helped spread the use of Turkish. Under 
the law, the use of titles such as Madame and Mösyö, previously a very common 
practice among non-Muslims, was prohibited. The law also had an impact on 
Jews as they adopted surnames which were easily pronounced in Turkish.
The 1931 program of the RPP included the definition of nation as a social 
and political whole formed by citizens imited by a common language, culture and 
goal; there was no mention of ethnicity. This RPP definition can be characterized 
as civic nationalism. However, in practice the government’s stance deviated from 
civic nationalism, because non-Muslims were discriminated against and 
Turkishness was linked closely to Islam.^  ^ In the construction of “Turk,” one of 
the instruments of the Turkish state was the Law on Settlement, which is still in 
use for granting people Turkish citizenship (Soyank, 2000).
Law on Settlement No. 2510 was passed in 1934 to set forth the basic 
principles of immigration and settlement policy at a time when in Europe, 
preparations for war could already be seen. The law distinguished between people 
of Turkish culture and others who were not, and grouped settlements into three 
regions as follows (Kirişçi, 2000: 5-6): 1) Regions where people of Turkish 
culture are fi’ee to settle; 2) regions where people who are to be integrated into the
28 With the same Law on Surnames, titles indicating a rehgious, tribal or societal class-rank 
difference such as sheikh or pasha were also banned.
Such a linkage between Turkishness and Islam was apparent in immigration policies as well. For 
instance, Turkish-speaking Christian. Greeks in Konya were sent to Greece during the Greek- 
Turkish population exchange of 1923-24; in the mid-‘30s the government rejected immigration 
applications from the ethnic Turkish Romanian Christian Gagauz; but Muslims who migrated from 
the Balkans to Turkey during the same period were naturalized very swiftly. Moreover, although 
Turkey had declared that it would prioritize factors of Turkish language and ethnic affiliation but 
remained silent on the issue of religion, in practice immigrants from the Sunni or Hanefi sects of 
Islam were received more easily (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997).
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Turkish culture can settle; and 3) regions in which civilian settlement is prohibited 
for military, security, political, economic, or health reasons or to maintain public 
order. Similarly, immigrants to be settled were grouped intro three groups: 1) 
Those who speak Turkish and are of Turkish identity and ethnicity; 2) those who 
speak no Turkish but are considered to be of Turkish culture (e.g. Albanian and 
Romanian immigrants); 3) those who are neither of Turkish origin nor Turkish 
culture (i.e. non-Muslims, Kurds, Arabs).
With respect to the settlement of minority groups, the Armenians, Greeks 
and Jews fell under the second group of regions and were regarded as group of 
people who were to be integrated into Turkish culture. The most significant 
section of the law for non-Muslim minorities was its provision of legal grounds 
for the government -  contrary to relevant portions of the Treaty of Lausanne -  to 
dislocate and disintegrate the community neighborhoods, as in the 1930s the Jews 
were still living in closed circles in urban settlements. In this respect, the Law on 
Settlement can be considered a fundamental piece of legislation which altered the 
life of Jews in Turkey, as shown by the 1934 Thrace incidents which occurred in 
the immediate aftermath of Parliament’s passage of the law. '^
^  The law prescribed that iimiugrants who were of Turkish culture and descent (immigrant group 
1) were either to settle in a region of their choosing or if they were to receive state subsidies , they 
were to settle in places determined by the state. However, immigrants of non-Turkish descent 
(immigrant group 3) were to settle only in places specified by the state and were not to move 
without government permission, notwithstanding the absence of any subsidy.
Law on Settlement No. 2510 was issued on Jime 14, 1934, and the Thrace Incidents occurred on 
July3.
81
Although the law’s main objective was to provide the government with the 
means to maintain security at a time when there were Kurdish rebellions in 
eastern and southeastern Anatolia and the threat of Nazis at the European borders, 
the demarcation between people who belonged to Turkish culture and descent and 
those who did not, caused anxiety among the Jewish minority (Bali, 2000: 244). 
The Turkish government, on the other hand, was anxious that the war in Europe 
might spread to Turkey. Within the possibility of a Nazi attack, the province of 
Thrace on the border with Europe was thought to be the primary area in jeopardy 
and therefore the first needing protection. For that reason, the Republican elite 
thought to relocate “untrustworthy” elements such as non-Muslims from Thrace to 
eastern regions due to their past record of betrayal (Karabatak, 1996: 6). Although 
the Law on Settlement supplied the government a legal tool for dislocating the 
Jews living in Thrace and settle them in regions far from the European border, in 
fact it was never used with respect to non-Muslims.
The rise of racism in Europe not only impacted Turkey’s domestic politics 
with the enactment of the Settlement Law and the accompanying defense 
measures, but also caused anti-Semitism to seep into domestic extreme-right 
movements. There was a rise in far-right publications carrying anti-Semitic 
writings. Anti-Semitist allegations included charges of the threat international 
Jewry posed to the world order, the Jews’ dominance of Turkish trade, the 
exploitation of Turks by Jewish capital, and the betrayal of the Jews during the 
conquest of Istanbul (Levi, 1998: 34). These themes were also prevalent in the 
cartoon magazines of the 1930s and ‘40s, which stereotyped Jews as rich, money- 
grubbing merchants living in Istanbul and speaking heavily accented Turkish,
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utterly lacking in affinity or loyalty to the nation, with money as their master 
(Mallet, 1996). These anti-Semitic publications, most notably the ones of Cevat 
Rifat Atilhan and Nihal Atsız, were the chief cause of the anti-Semitic attacks on 
Jews living in Thrace (Bali, 1999a: 50).
The incidents first began in Çanakkale, a province in southern Thrace, 
with Jews receiving imsigned letters telling them to leave the area. The letters 
wrote that then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and the Turkish government also 
wanted the Jews to leave Çanakkale. Rather than replying to the far-right, anti- 
Semitic accusations by way of counter publication, the Jewish elite preferred to 
write to Prime Ministry officials, but no response was forthcoming. This inaction 
has been blamed on the chronic indolence of the bureaucracy, and also that at the 
time the matter of verbal attacks on minorities was considered nothing unusual 
(Levi, 1998:128).
On July 3, 1934, the anti-Semitic campaign that began with unsigned 
letters and extreme-right publications escalated into physical violence against the 
Jews. Jews living in the various provinces of Thrace such as Çanakkale, Edime, 
KIrklareli and Tekirdağ were attacked and beaten, their houses and shops 
destroyed, and their goods stolen. Afterwards, most Jews were forced to sell off 
their remaining goods very cheaply. Jews who fled to Istanbul were settled in 
Balat by the Jewish community there. It is estimated that out of a total 15,000- 
20,000 Jews living in the Thrace region, fully half immigrated to Istanbul during 
and after the incidents (Karabatak, 1996: 7). Although some of them remained in 
Istanbul, never to return to their hometowns, others emigrated firom the metropolis 
to Palestine (Levi, 1996b: 10).
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The Prime Ministry swiftly intervened in the incidents, and the local 
authorities suppressed the anti-Jewish violence and restored order and peace. The 
rightist press organs that provoked the incidents were shut down and charges filed 
against them. The governors and mayors of the provinces where the incidents 
occurred were removed fi-om office. The government made a public declaration 
that there was no anti-Semitism in Tm-key and that the anti-Semitism behind these 
events originated firom abroad, specifically firom Europe, and not firom within 
Turkey’s borders.
Some newspapers claimed that the Jews were still non-Turkified and that 
their insistence on speaking Ladino instead of Turkish had led to the incidents. By 
the same token, during and after the events, the pressme for Jews to speak Turkish 
intensified. In response to accusations of a refusal to speak Turkish, following the 
Thrace Incidents Jewish community leaders declared their loyalty to the state and 
furthermore donated money to civic foundations to underline it (Toprak, 1996: 
23).
The 1934 Thrace Incidents caused not only a mass Jewish migration to 
Istanbul and to Palestine fi'om the region but also a rise of Zionism among 
Turkey’s Jews. The first domestic Zionist association, the aim of which was 
Jewish migration to Israel, was founded by a group of Jews in Istanbul in 1934, 
just after the incidents. (Bali, 1999b: 43). Especially after the rise of European 
anti-Semitism in the 1930s and ‘40s, Zionism spread among Turkey’s Jews. 
Although Zionism was constitutionally restricted and the state barred dual loyalty 
among minorities, aiming instead at their full integration into the Turkish nation, 
the authorities did not persecute Zionist activities (Bali, 2001a: 60). However, the
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1938 Law on Associations (No. 3512) brought restrictions on associations with 
connections outside Turkey. Under this law, associations operating as local 
branches of international groups were banned. Consequently, Jewish associations 
such as B ’nai B ’rith were closed down. Additionally, any community 
associations, foundations or sports clubs bearing foreign names were given new 
Turkish ones.^^
During World War n, the policies of the Turkish government on minority 
issues were largely dominated by the paradigm of national security and defense.^  ^
The state’s prime concern was to not get involved in the war, but with the proviso 
that if war proved unavoidable, Turkey should be economically and 
militaristically strong enough to defend itself. The economy was prioritized not 
only for the welfare of society -  which fell sharply due to the war atmosphere -  
but also for supporting military readiness. Within this context, minorities were 
considered untrustworthy elements of society. In addition, since under the national 
security and defense paradigm they were to be pacified, the militaristic and 
economic measures had unforeseen consequences for the non-Muslim minorities.
As part of these militaristic measures, in 1939 it was decided that 
minorities serving in the military or due for conscription would not be given arms 
training but would instead be enlisted in support services. This decision was in 
effect until the end of the war, in 1945 (Nahum, 2000: 222). In their recruitment, 
desegregation was the active principle -  that is, although non-Muslims were
32 The Law on Associations was amended in 2001.
33 For a discussion on the national security and defense paradigm, see îba (1998).
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present in the support services, they worked alongside Muslim soldiers. It was 
only in 1941 that a principle of segregation was applied when non-Muslim men 
age 26 to 45 were recruited to the military as reserve forces. This special 
recruitment is known as the Incident of Reserves {Yirmi Kur'a İhtiyatlar), and is 
significant for the history of non-Muslims in Turkey not only for forming a 
reserve force composed solely of non-Muslims, but also because this reserve force 
was set up solely to serve a particular support branch which had been disarmed 
and deployed for civic purposes such as building national parks and roads and 
collecting garbage. Non-Muslim men recruited to this special reserve force were 
distressed at being gathered under a special branch segregated from Muslim 
soldiers at a time when concentration camps were in widespread use by racist 
regimes in Europe. However, the main concern of the Turkish government and the 
military was not to constitute a racist tool with this reserve force but rather to 
maintain national security by isolating society’s “untrustworthy” elements in 
camps at a time when the war had already spread close to Turkey’s borders and 
was drawing nearer (Bali, 1998b). The non-Muslim soldiers served the military as 
reserve forces for nearly a year and were released from duty in 1942. As for the 
professional military cadres, during World War II the military academies set forth 
“being of the Turkish race” as an eligibility requirement for admission (Bah, 
2000: 410).
As part of the economic measures taken during World War n, the Law on 
Capital Tax (Law No. 4305) was issued in 1942. The Capital Tax was a special 
one-time tax designed to provide additional resources for the Treasury and to 
discourage war economy market speculation and profiteering (Ökte, 1987: 24).
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During those years a number of basic goods such as oil, flour, sugar and gasoline 
were scarce, with their supply in the control of group of merchants who frequently 
used speculation to inflate market prices. In the eyes of the public, merchants and 
traders were corrupt businessmen, and successful non-Muslims merchants -  more 
specifically the Jews -  suffered from this negative stereotype. In response to the 
dominance of non-Muslims in the trade sector, state authorities tried to weaken 
their position with the Capital Tax. The tax also aided the rise of a Muslim- 
Turkish bourgeoisie under state protection. The Turkish state curbed non-Muslims 
minorities and redistributed their capital to other sectors of society so as to create 
a national bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1989).
There were four groups taxed under the law; Muslims, non-Muslims, 
converts and foreigners. '^* Using categories set forth according to these groups. 
Tax Assessment Boards made up of governmental, commercial and local 
authorities from each city, town or district were formed to calculate the tax biU 
owed by individuals in that region. Per the tax boards’ rulings, non-Muslims and 
converts were made to pay much higher taxes than other groups.^  ^In order to pay 
the tax, most non-Muslims were forced to sell off their property. It is estimated 
that 98% of the real estate owned by non-Muslims was either bought by 
individuals, mostly Muslim, or made the property of the state (Akar, 2000: 147). 
Those unable pay their taxes were sent to the Aşkale Work Camp in Erzurum, an
^  Jewish iminigrants holding German, Austrian, Romanian or Bulgarian citizenship were 
classified for tax purposes in the foreigners’ group.
35 The tax rate calculated on the basis of annual revenue earned was 5% for Muslims, 156% for 
Greeks, 179% for Jews and 232% for Armenians (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 376).
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eastern province, to construct roads and shovel snow under severe weather 
conditions. Since the tax rate for non-Muslims was higher than that of other 
groups and the local council decisions were biased against them, all of the people 
sent to the Aşkale Work Camp were non-Muslims.^^ The Jewish Agency in 
Palestine did not condemn the Capital Tax as an anti-Semitic measure, noting 
instead that not only Jews but also other non-Muslim minority groups were being 
charged extra taxes (Bali, 2000: 424). The Capital Tax was abandoned in 1944 
with a new law, no. 4530, ending the levies and forgiving former tax debts.
The Capital Tax is generally considered to have been a racist policy, and 
alongside the long tradition of tolerance shown towards Jews is regarded as an 
exception (Yetkin, 1996: 252)?^ Still, it caused a number of Jews to emigrate 
from Turkey, and their capital was transferred to the Muslim bourgeoisie. 
Furthermore, most Jews voted for the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1946 general 
elections in protest of the Capital Tax imposed by the ruling RPP (Akar, 2000; 
Bali, 1997).
Soxirces differ on the пшпЬег of non-Muslims sent to the Aşkale Work Canq>. Akar (2000) 
estimates the number to be around 6,000-7,000. Yetkin (1996), on the other hand, estimates it at 
2,057.
There was even a belief among the Jews that if Atatürk (who had passed away four years earlier) 
were still alive, he would not have allowed passage of the Capital Tax (Bali, 2000: 489).
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2.4 The Multi-Party Democracy Period (1945-1980): More Democracy for a 
Shrinking Jewish Minority
During the Early Republican Period, Turkish modernization was 
formulated and moderated by the RPP and the Kemalist elites. It was also the 
period of the establishment of the national-territorial state (Karpat, 1991). 
Although Turkish politics was facing two more parties, the Progressive 
Republican Party and the Free Republican Party, they proved short-lived, as they 
were closed very quickly in the wake of domestic rebellions. Turkish politics’ 
transition to multi-party democracy occurred only in 1945 when new parties were 
allowed to be foimded and to compete in national elections. The most influential 
parties in the early stages of multi-party democracy was the Democrat Party (DP). 
The 1950s witnessed the clash of the DP and the RPP -  that is, proponents of 
populist democracy versus proponents of rationalist democracy, or national wiU 
against national interest (Heper, 1990a). Due to wartime shortages and 
profiteering, social unrest resulted in the DP’s victory in the national elections of 
1950, ‘54 and ‘57, and it ruled the country until 1960, the year of the first mihtaiy 
intervention in the history of modem Turkey.
As for the non-Muslims and Jews specifically, the Early Republican 
Period was generally a period of pressure for nation-building and Turkification. 
The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign, national legislation designed to form a 
homogeneous citizenship, efforts to establish a national bourgeoisie and finally 
the Capital Tax were all instruments of the Turkification project, and all can be 
considered special tools of the general “top-down” tradition during the Early
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Republican Period. It has been argued that, in the same period, people had choices 
but their choices were limited (Karpat, 1991). Such choices were even more 
limited for non-Muslims. Therefore, after the transition to multi-party democracy, 
the DP’s program promising equality and fi’eedom attracted most of the non- 
Muslim minority vote (Bali, 1998a: 173). In addition, the number of non-Muslim 
deputies in Parliament rose under DP rule. However, although the political 
climate during DP rule favored Jews more than in previous years, nearly half of 
the existing Jewish population emigrated to Israel in the early 1950s.^* Therefore, 
the Multi-Party Democracy Period can be considered an era of relaxation of the 
Turkification policies, though there were then fewer Jews present to make use of 
this relative fireedom.
The aftermath of the war climate not only paved the path for the multi­
party system and the introduction of the DP into Turkish politics, it also ushered 
in a more liberal environment for Jews and other non-Muslim minorities. As of 
1945 non-Muslims could be admitted to military academies, and they began to be 
recruited to the professional cadres of the Turkish military (Bali, 2000: 489). The 
Jewish press also saw a leap in both its variety and number. Many newspapers and 
journals such as §abat, §alom, Atikva, Or Yehuda, Or Israel and La Boz De 
Turkiya began to be published in Turkish, French or Ladino. The “Citizen, Speak 
Turkish!” campaign ended. However, the steps taken during the Early Republican 
Period towards nation-building yielded the projected results. For instance, the
The Jews’ emigration to Israel continued in the following decades extending even up to this day. 
Since emigration to Israel from Turkey will be covered in Chapter III, relevant immigration and 
population figures will not be covered here.
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adoption of Turkish names and the use of Turkish as a language spread among the 
Jewry, and the early 1960s saw Turkish become the mother tongue of Turkey’s 
Jews ($aul, 2001: 158)/^ Language use became to be differentiated more by 
generation. In the new situation, by 1970s, for the vast majority of middle-aged 
Jews, the norm became to use Ladino at home, Turkish in the street (§aul, 2001: 
159). Older generations spoke Ladino more in contrast to yoimger generations 
who started to speak mainly Turkish.
In contrast to the exclusion of Islam from the public sphere during the 
Early Republican Period, the DP legitimized Islam and rural values. The DP 
coming to power signified the victory of a periphery made up of grassroots and 
the counter-official culture (Mardin, 1990). This development not only shook the 
balance of the traditional Ottoman-Turkish polity, which had hitherto followed a 
policy of strengthening the center against the periphery for the sake of a strong 
state, but also provoked unintended consequences with respect to non-Muslims.
The Early Republican Period saw efforts to suppress Islamic identity 
through the lens of the state’s project of secularization and modernization, but 
being Muslim remained one of the essential criteria of Turkishness. The 
resurgence of Islam during DP rule did not alter the basic condition of 
Turkishness, and Islam was still considered one of the characteristics of Turkish 
identity. However, in the 1950s, as Islam came to be more frequently used as a 
social and cultural touchstone for politics, and religious liberties began to be 
practiced more in the public spfrere, non-Muslims felt a lessening in the pressure
39 In the 1960 census, the Turkish literacy rate among the Jewry was 85% (Dündar, 2000: 63).
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to secularize. By the same token, they were able to make the most of their 
communal rights, which were defined in close relation to religious rights. This 
trend was confirmed for Jews in 1953, with first appointment to the Chief 
Rabbinate since the foundation of the republic. In this regard, it can be argued that 
non-Muslims were part of the periphery. Similar to the coimtryside, which was 
suspected as being separatist due to several rebellions (i.e. Kurdish and Islamic 
ones) against the Turkish state in the 1920s and ‘30s, non-Muslims were also
consigned to the periphery with similar suspicions cast on them due their past
•%··^
history in the National War of Independence. The centralist policies of the RPP 
therefore not only set limitations on Islam transgressing the public sphere but also 
restricted other religious groups within society. When the DP articulated Islam in 
politics and facilitated the periphery, such as rural masses, becoming a medium of 
power against state elites, then non-Muslims, as elements of the periphery, also
found a more liberal environment for their communal identities.'**^
;
However, with respect to the definition of nation and the building of the 
Turkish nation, analogous changes failed to materialize. During the Early 
Republican Period, nation-building and secularization were complimentary parts 
of Turkish modernization, and the construction of modem citizenship required 
Islamic identity to be curtailed. This indicated a complicated position for non- 
Muslim minorities. Although they were not Muslim and therefore had no Islamic
‘® In his autobiography, Eli §aul (1999), Jewish emigrant from Balat, a Istanbul district where 
there was a Jewish majority until the mass migration to Israel, tells that when the Free Republican 
Party (FRP) was established in 1930 under Atatiirk’s order, Balat’s Jews resoundingly supported 
this new party, in contrast to the RPP. The party was closed down the same year for attracting 
Islamist and separatist elements. It was Turkey’s first attenq>t at multi-party democracy, and it was 
very short-lived.
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identity to be curbed, they still fell outside the definition of the Turkish nation 
(Keyman and îçduygu, 1998: 177). The exclusion of non-Muslims fi-om this 
definition continued during the DP period. It seems that though Islam was an issue 
to be dealt with in Turkish politics either in the form of prohibition or permission 
in the public sphere as well as a criteria for Turkishness both during the RPP and 
DP periods imtil the 1960s, the status of non-Muslims was more susceptible to the 
center-periphery cleavage than was Islam. Therefore, setting the center-periphery 
relation instead of Islam as an independent variable of the constmction of 
citizenship provides an explanatory key to the changing milieu of non-Muslim 
citizenship in the 1950s.
The DP utilized populist policies, and in the emergence of the conflict over 
Cyprus with Greece in 1954, it fi'equently utilized nationalist discourse. The party 
adopted a hard-line foreign policy against Greece. This Cyprus conflict also had 
implications for domestic politics. The Greek minority living in Turkey was 
accused of taking sides with both Greece and the Greek Cypriots in anti-Turidsh 
Cypriot violence on the island. In 1955, in the wake of the burning in Salonika of 
the house where Atatürk was bom, the DP’s propaganda against Greeks both in 
Greece and in Turkey itself grew even harsher. In consequence, on September 6-7, 
1955, anti-Greek violence over the Cypms dispute erupted in Istanbul and Izmir, 
and then spilled over to Jewish-owned businesses.
Other non-Muslims groups such as Armenians were also threatened. Some 
people swayed by both nationalist rhetoric and their sensitivity over Cypms went 
on to assault non-Muslims, putting the torch to their shops, attacking minority 
schools, insulting NATO-commissioned Greek officers on the streets of Izmir,
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and burning down the residence of the Orthodox patriarch. There were some 100 
injuries. Although there was speculation that the DP itself had engineered the 
arson attack on Ataturk’s house in Salonika, the government paid compensation to 
the victims of the violence in Turkey. The September 6-7 Events constituted one 
of the major causes behind non-Muslim emigration from Turkey to foreign 
countries in the 1960s. Hence, as the Greeks emigrated to Greece, the Jews 
emigrated to Israel.“*'
Sensitivity on the Cyprus issue and the attack on Ataturk’s house were not 
the only reasons behind the September 6-7 Events; the hostility towards non- 
Muslims that developed in the 1950s among the Islamic and nationalist right was 
also a factor (Bora, 1995: 39). The seed of this reaction against non-Muslims 
dates back to Ottoman times. In the 19th and early 20* centuries, when the 
Ottoman Empire was clearly in decline, in negotiations over international pacts 
such as the 1856 Treaty of Paris, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and the Treaty of 
Sevres in 1918, the issue of the status of non-Muslim communities was always a 
key issue. In view of this, the widespread belief that imperial Western powers 
used the minority issue as a tool during international negotiations to weaken 
Turkey gained currency among the rightists. In the September 6-7 Events, the 
view that “imtrustworthy, alien elements within Turkish society are being aided
The integration of Turkey into the international migration regime in the 1950s made emigration 
to foreign countries easier. The 1950s and ‘60s were not only years when non-Muslims left 
Turkey, but also years of urbanization and industrialization which saw the beginning of migration 
from rural areas to urban ones and from eastern regions to western ones. Likewise, many Jews 
living in southeastern provinces such as Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır and Hakkari migrated to Israel in the 
early 1950s, and many living in the eastern province of Van migrated to Istanbul in the ‘60s 
(Aydın, 1985: 511). According the 1965 census, 80% of Turkey’s total Jewish population lived in 
Ae metropolis of Istanbul (Dündar, 2000: 61).
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by foreign powers” resurfaced/^ However, in subsequent years the damage done 
to civilians was compensated by the government.
With respect to the Jews, the hostility towards “alien elements within the 
nation” was reflected as anti-Semitism and throughout the 1950s and ‘60s, the 
view that non-Muslims were outsiders exploiting Turkey through reaping huge 
profits in domestic trade and then moving this money to foreign investments 
maintained its dominance among rightists (Demir and Akar, 1994).'*^  Even more, 
some extreme rightists established associations to combat Zionism such as Izmir’s 
“Association for Combating Zionism in Turkey” established in 1968 (Bali, 1996). 
Throughout the 1950s while the latitude of citizenship was widened by political 
liberties at the social level, questions and doubts about the citizenship of 
minorities persisted.
The 1960 coup d'état brought DP rule to an end. The party was closed 
down and some of its leaders were tried and executed. Blame for the failure of
j
democracy during DP rule and the subsequent military intervention is generally 
laid on the center-periphery cleavage: the DP became authoritarian due to a lack 
of necessary checks and balances in the system, and the military and bureaucratic 
elites grew weak and reacted to the failure of civilian mechanisms with a coup 
(Heper, 1984; Heper, 1991a). The Constituent Assembly composed of
Even in the debates in the 1980s and ‘90s over Turkey’s application to join the European Union, 
the issue of minorities frequently resinfaced in a strikingly similar context -  that is, the alleged 
interference of Western European Union powers in Turkey’s internal affairs and their using 
minorities to weaken its position in international relations.
Traditionally, the nationalist and Islamic extreme right in Turkey had been anti-Semitic and 
targeted not only Jews but also converts.
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representatives from various civic organizations and military commanders 
gathered to draw up a new constitution. Also included in the Constituent 
Assembly group were a single representative from each recognized minority 
group -  one Armenian, one Greek and one Jew.
The 1961 Constitution promoted a democratic environment by creating an 
effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of the elected 
assemblies as well as by strengthening the Council of State, sustaining the 
independence of the judiciary, granting autonomy to imiversities, and enhancing 
civil liberties and social rights. Since the foundation of the republic, all citizens 
had been equal before the law; citizenship rights were granted from above without 
public deliberation; and citizens were bound to the state on the individual level 
regardless of their cultural, religious or ethnic affiliation. With the 1961 
Constitution, the scope of citizenship was expanded and the basic elements of 
civil society -  such as the right to organize and the freedoms of the press, public 
speech and political participation -  were safeguarded. The new Constitution 
allowed a freedom of association which resulted in an increasing number of 
organizations, including religious ones (Toprak, 1988). Although the new 
Constitution extended the grounds of political participation through enhancing it, 
still from the 1960s onward no non-Muslim deputy took a seat in Parliament for 
over 30 years.
A new form of citizenship, one more participatory and active, took shape 
though still maintaining the constitutional emphasis on duties to the state such as
^  It was only in the 1995 elections that a Jew from the True Path Party (DYP) won a seat in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly.
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voting, paying taxes and doing military service (Keyman and l9duygu, 1998: 
177). The 1961 Constitution limited the interference of the state in the affairs of 
individuals and aspired for a more liberal understanding of citizenship in 
comparison to the “devoted” citizen of the Early Republican Period (Soyank, 
2000: 156).
The 1961 Constitution laid out the specifics of Turkish citizenship in 
Article 54 (Gozubuyuk, 1995: 131):
Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is a Turk. 
The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizenship 
status of a child bom from a foreign father and a Turkish mother will be 
arranged by law. Citizenship is acquired and lost xmder the circumstances 
defined by law. No Turk can be expelled fi"om citizenship, unless s/he 
engages in activities contrary to the loyalty to the country. The decisions 
and implementations of expulsion can be subject to appeal.
In 1964, a new Citizenship Law, no. 403, was put into effect.^  ^This law 
was an amendment to Law No. 1312 according to the general firamework on 
citizenship laid out by the 1961 Constitution. This new law, like its predecessor, 
also emphasized the blood principle. The law, which is still in use today, set forth 
three basic principles (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1964) Everyone should have a 
citizenship; 2) Everyone should have single citizenship; 3) Everyone should be 
free to choose their own citizenship and no one should be forced to hold a 
citizenship they do not want.'*®
This Law was published in the Official Gazette No. 11638 dated February 22, 1964.
^  Law No. 403 was amended in 1981 by Turkish Citizenship Law No. 2383 to allow dual 
citizenship.
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The law regarded citizenship as unique, disclaiming dual citizenship. The 
underlying assumption of this premise seems to be the idea that citizenship means 
loyalty to the state, so loyalty to more than one state is not viable. Revocation of 
Turkish citizenship, for instance, was designed as a response to activities putting 
one’s loyalty to the state into question. Loyalty to the state was perceived as a 
requirement of national security (Soyank, 2000: 162). As discussed above, loyah>' 
to the Turkish state was one of the parameters of non-Muslim citizenship. 
Therefore, although the 1961 Constitution and 1964 Citizenship Law set forth a 
more specified citizenship that enhanced the sphere of the individual vis-à-vis the 
state, the emphasis laid on loyalty in these legal documents maintained the burden 
on Jews of demonstrating their loyalty to the state.
The rights and liberties defined by the 1961 Constitution led not only to a 
participatory citizenship but also promoted a more active civil society. In addition, 
however, in the late 1960s and early ‘70s rightist and leftist groups came to 
confiront each other more and more, leading to an alarming rise in political 
violence. The Justice Party, established as an heir to the shuttered DP, was the 
ruling party during the ‘60s. In a reflection of the old cleavage between the 
centralist bureaucratic elite and the forces of the periphery which commanded an 
electoral majority, both civilian bureaucrats and the military distrusted the Justice 
Party and in response to its failure to rein in political terrorism, in 1971 the 
military intervened for the second time in modern Turkish history. As a result, 
constitutional amendments were enacted to strengthen the executive and limit the 
activities of citizens so as to safeguard national security and unity.
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With respect to relations between non-Muslims and the state, the 
conjecture of the ‘70s was mainly dominated by the Cyprus issue. With the rise of 
violence on the island in 1964, Ankara withdrew from the 1930 Turkish-Greek 
Agreement. The agreement, whose strong advocates at the time included Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, aimed at economic cooperation between the two countries. It also 
regulated the status of Greek citizens living in Turkey with generous residence 
permits as a gesture of friendship between the Greek and Turkish nations. After 
the agreement was terminated in 1964, the Turkish government revoked the 
residence permits of Greek citizens living in Turkey and had them deported.'*’ The 
rising nationalism due to the Cyprus conflict put pressure on the Greek minority, 
leading most of them to emigrate to Greece (Demir and Akar, 1994). In 1974 the 
Cyprus issue flared into an international crisis with the entrance of the Turkish 
military on the island to protect the Cypriot Tmks. For its intervention, Turicey 
was faced with international pressure in the form of an arms embargo, diplomatic 
crises and accusations of human rights violations. Turkey’s Jewish elites, who had 
been exerting constant efforts to prove their community’s loyalty to the Turkish 
state, launched lobbying campaigns to defend Turkey in the international arena 
(Başak, 1995:153).
Against the background of the prevalent hostile atmosphere against non- 
Muslims during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the issue of religious foimdations arose as 
a sphere of control over minorities. Under Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne, 
non-Muslims were already granted the right to establish their own religious
It is estimated that around 30,000-40,000 ethnic Greek Turkish citizens emigrated to Greece 
after Turkey terminated the Turkish-Greek Treaty in 1964 (Aydm, 1985; 510).
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foundations. But in 1936, with Law on Religious Foundations No. 2762, the 
Turkish government undertook to treat those foundations on the same basis as 
Muslim ones. Furthermore, since the Civic Law outlawed the establishment of 
any religious foundation designed to support the members of any race or 
community, the Law on Religious Foundations, which desegregated the status of 
minority foundations with other foundations, disclaimed the establishment of new 
foundations by minority groups.“** The Law on Religious Foimdations also urged 
foundations to prepare a declaration of properties they owned at the time. 
However, in 1974, the Council of State decreed that no corporate body constituted 
by non-Turkish citizens would be allowed to obtain immovable property (Soner, 
2004). Consequently, governmental authorities began to liquidate real estate 
belonging to the religious foundations of minorities. The official confiscation was 
based on the declaration of properties made in 1936. All the properties declared 
on the 1936 listing were considered the true property of a given foundation. On 
the other hand, properties acquired from that date up to 1974 either through 
donation or purchase were considered illegal. These properties were returned to 
the heirs of those who had first donated them and if no suitable heir could be 
found, they were confiscated. Post-1936 property purchases were confiscated 
outright (Oran, 2001: 229).“*^ The liquidation of these non-Muslim assets hindered
48 Today, the legal prohibition against religious communities founding any non-profit collective 
entity is still in effect. Non-Muslim minorities still cannot establish new religious foundations or 
other nonprofit associations for their communities. It should be noted that this is not specific to 
non-Muslims; the same restrictions apply to Muslims and adherents of other faiths.
The provision prohibiting the acquisition of property by minority religious foundations 
remained in force until 2002, when it was removed under the pressure of the EU accession 
process.
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the services that they provided to their communities, i.e. religious, educational and 
charity services, because most of them depended on the revenues earned from 
rents of the properties.
The 1970s was also a period when the traditional center-periphery split 
started to give way to a functional cleavage (Ozbudun, 1988). Class relations 
started to dominate the polity. The voters adopted more autonomous and 
instrumentalized criteria in most developed western regions and metropolitan 
areas (K^'^cigil, 1994). In a way, as a result of rapid urbanization, construction 
of shantytowns and changes in the socio-economic outlook of the country in 
general, the scope and content of groups forming the periphery was altered, a 
development which left its mark on the political parties as well. The Justice Party 
veered more to the right, and the RPP more to the left. At the same time, political 
terrorism was also becoming more violent, causing an ideological polarization of 
society.
2.5 The Post-1980 Period: Jews vis-à-vis Globalization Process
Due to the political violence between leftist and rightist groups as well as 
the fragmentation and polarization of society during the 1970s, the Turkish 
military intervened in politics in 1980 for a third time to forestall the erosion of 
state authority. Stringent measures were taken, such as strict control of the media, 
universities and the bureaucracy. All the existing political parties were closed
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down and their leaders banned from politics.^® In 1982, the military regime 
replaced the 1961 Constitution with a new one. The 1982 Constitution aimed at a 
major restructuring of Turkish democracy to prevent any recurrence of the recent 
domestic crises (Heper, 1990b). Under the new Constitution, the executive was 
strengthened, the powers of high coxirts reduced, the universities centralized, and 
the National Security Coimcil given more authority. The procedural rules of 
politics were tightened -  e.g., political parties were banned from organizing in 
foreign countries -  and there were restrictions put on their women and youth 
branches. The Constitution brought strict limits to individual rights as well. It 
limited the rights of labor and other interest groups and barred trade unions, 
associations and cooperatives from engaging in political activities.
The military at that time viewed Islam as the antidote to the extremism of 
the late 1970s, and so wielded it as a tool for promoting social and political
stability as well as societal unity (Bora and Can, 1991). In line with this
)
conception, the military advocated a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, a rightist position 
which presumed that Turkishness and Islamism were complimentary aspects of 
Turkish culture and furthermore emphasized religious values in the fabric of 
Turkish nationalism (Bora, 1998). This synthesis leaned in favor of cultural Islam 
rather than political Islam. Hence, Islam started to take its place as a resource in 
public policies (Heper, 1991b). The foremost policy change took place in the 
arena of education. Mandatory religion courses with a content based on Islamic 
ethics and the Sunni sect were,introduced into the cxirriculum of primary schools
50 With a referendum in 1986, the formerly banned politicians were able to return to poUtics.
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(Oni§, 1997). It was only in 1987 that Christians and the Jews were excused from 
these lessons, and in 1990 they were completely freed from any obligation to 
participate in classes on religion or ethics (Franz, 1994: 333; Anar, 1997: 91).
The 1980s were marked not only by the limitation of rights and freedoms 
brought by the new Constitution but also by the demilitarization and 
civilianization of the regime (Evin, 1994). In the competitive elections held in 
1983, the Motherland Party (MP) -  a group bringing together conservative, 
nationajpii, social democratic and liberal wings under its roof -  won a large 
majority in the Tmrkish Grand National Assembly, leading it to rule for the rest of 
the decade. The party brought significant changes to the economy and politics, 
ones similar in nature to the other contemporary neo-rightist waves in other 
Western countries.^* The MP replaced the import substitution economic policy 
with a free market model based on export-oriented growth. The liberal strategies 
of the MP aimed at Turkey’s economic integration with global capitalism. The 
MP combined engineering pragmatism with cultural conservatism, and all its 
policies emphasized traditional values, economic development and the 
entrepreneurial spirit of individuals (Toprak, 1993). In addition, in line with the 
dominant Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the time, rises were seen in religious 
sentiments, publications and education alike (Salt, 1995).
Besides these internal developments, the Post-1980 Period was also 
characterized by globalization. The domain of intertwining politics and economics
As the neo-rightist wave was called Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganism in the 
United States, after its most prominent local proponents, it was called Ozalism in Turkey after 
Turgut Ozal, the leader of the Motherland Party.
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overtook the conventional nation-state and brought international networks and 
realms to the fore. The people’s expectations about what the state ought to deliver 
grew, even as the state’s ability to provide these much-needed services was 
rapidly falling (Öniş, 1997). Homogenization went hand-in-hand with 
fragmentation across and within societies, leading to a rise in nationalist 
movements and ethnic conflicts as well as transnational movements such as 
feminism, environmentalism and Islamist fundamentalism. These movements, 
known under the blanket term identity politics, were also felt in Turkey. Besides 
the rise of Kurdish nationalism which took on violent expression as terrorism and 
reactionary Turkish nationalism, Turkey witnessed the rising Islamist movement. 
Hence the Welfare Party, with its Islamist worldview, gained prominence in 
various national and local elections during this period.
With respect to citizenship, the 1980s saw increasing consciousness of this 
concept. Although the MP’s liberalism conception lacked a concrete definition of 
citizenship encompassing individualization as in the West and was instead taken 
merely as an easy way to get rich (Göle, 1996), its policies such as privatization, 
transferring funds to municipalities, and development of the market economy 
served to indirectly strengthen civil society (Heper, 1990a). With its close 
relationship with the development of civil society, the increasing consciousness of 
citizenship pointed to contradictory trends in precisely this sphere. Citizenship, as 
an instrument within the domain of democracy and civil society and not of the 
state, entered the public agenda in the Post-1980 Period. The rise of civil society 
was accompanied by a shift from state-centered modernization imposed from
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above to a more civil society-centered modernization coming from below (Göle,
2000).
In the interface between citizenship and globalization, two issues 
concerning citizenship marked the Post-1980 Period. The first was dual 
citizenship and the legislation having to do with it. Against the changing contexts 
of globalization driven primarily by international migration, the existing laws on 
citizenship were inadequate. Before 1981, Turkey did not allow dual citizenship 
and its citizenship laws primarily emphasized the blood principle. However, due 
to extensive labor emigration to European coimtries, the Turkish state felt the 
need to alter the citizenship laws in accordance with trends in international 
migration, especially with regard to second- and third-generation émigrés. 
Therefore, in 1981’s Dual Citizenship Law -  Turkish Citizenship Law No. 2383 -  
the basic principle was loyalty to the state rather than the nation. Theoretically, 
dual citizenship refers mainly to membership to more than one state, and the 
concept presupposes loyalty to the state rather than the nation. Therefore, this law 
on dual citizenship illustrated the tendency to prioritize loyalty to the Turkish state 
rather than the Turkish nation. In consequence, besides the blood principle, which 
is also generally preferred by other migrant-exporting countries, Turkey stressed 
the legal aspect of citizenship so as to permit émigrés to qualify for naturalization 
without giving up their original citizenship (İçduygu et al. 1999: 198). The Dual 
Citizenship Law not only impacted Turkish émigrés in European coimtries but 
also Jewish migrants from Turkey to Israel and returnees from Israel back to 
Turkey.
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Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 was amended in 1995 with a 
supplemental law, No. 4112, to further encourage dual citizenship. Under this law, 
people naturalized in foreign countries prior to 1981 when dual citizenship was 
not allowed were granted the same set of rights as Turkish citizens, among which 
were property, inheritance, settlement and travel . The challenges posed by the 
rise of civil society and the complexity of international migration demonstrated 
that the conventional imderstanding of the nation-state was under challenge by 
globalization. As the artificial link between the nation and state started to break 
down, definitions of community based on blood and soil began to lose their 
power. Specifically in Turkey, the attempt to deal with these challenges was found 
in new legislation on dual citizenship, laws which can justifiably be interpreted as 
the liberalization of citizenship policies (igduygu et al. 1999: 203).
The second issue in the interface between citizenship and globalization 
was the discussion on constitutional citizenship that occurred specifically in the 
1990s. In response to the rise of identity politics, multiculturalism, and demands 
fi'om different segments of society (i.e. Islamists, Kurds, etc.), constitutional 
citizenship was proposed as a solution which would ensure internal peace in 
academic and political party circles (Soyank, 2000: 202). In constitutional 
citizenship, the constitution represents a kind of social contract safeguarding the 
recognition of different ethnic and religious groups whose loyalty to the state 
would supersede the principle of loyalty to the nation (i9duygu, 1996b; Keyder, 
1997). Although constitutional citizenship was suggested primarily as a possible 
solution to the Kurdish problem or the Islamic question, it also had implications 
for non-Muslim minorities.
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The Post-1980 Period saw not only a sharp rise in publications put out by 
non-Muslim minorities discussing their communal identities such as community 
newspapers and journals, but also a proliferation of other publications, research, 
and websites addressing a wide-ranging audience of both academics and 
laypeople/^ Although since Turkey’s foundation non-Muslims had had self- 
published newspapers and journals addressing their closed communities, the post- 
1980 publication wave differed with its emphasis on commimal identity and 
assertions of the preservation and promotion of ethno-religious cultures.
The surge of publications by and about non-Muslim minorities signified a 
rise of public interest in both differences and identities. It also confirmed the 
relevance of issues of difference and equality to the growing debates throughout 
the 1990s on loyalty to the nation/state and Turkish citizenship alike. In this 
regard, the simultaneous occurrence of debates on constitutional citizenship and 
on the status of non-Muslims cannot be mere coincidence. As differences within 
society became more visible and therefore more publicly discussed, debates on 
how to deal with this host of ethnic, linguistic and religious differences inclined 
and tended to center around citizenship, with a focus on what the fundamentals of 
Turkish citizenship should be.^^
All the cultural minority groups, including those not officially recognized by the Treaty of 
Lausanne, expressed themselves dirough a number of newspapers and journals. The most widely 
known publications today are Agos (by Armenians), Ogni (Lazes); and §alom (Jews).
The most inçortant discussion in the ‘90s about non-Muslims centered on the Capital Tax. The 
debate was spurred by “Salkım Hanimm Taneleri” (The Jewelry of Miss Salkım), a historical film 
based on a novel by Yılmaz Karakoyunlu which many saw in both movie theaters and on 
television. The film concerned the inçact of the Capital Tax on one Armenian family, some of 
whose members were forced to sell off their property just in order to pay the tax, and others who 
ended up being sent to the Aşkale Work Camp.
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In these discussions, minorities’ loyalty to states other than Turkey was 
also questioned and certain criteria were set unofficially to resolve conflicting 
identities and loyalties. The Cyprus issue was considered the breaking point for 
the Greek minority, just as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict served the same purpose 
for the Jews and the Armenian genocide issue for the Armenians.
For the Jews, the influence of identity politics could be traced back to the 
surge in studies and publications on Turkish Jewry from the ‘90s into the next 
decade, fri line with the general tendency to celebrate differences, the Jewish 
community emphasized its religious identity but without going so far as to 
exclude a preeminent Txirkish culture and identity in the formation of this identity. 
These publications and studies focused mainly on the tolerance granted to the 
Jewish community both by the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic and the 
loyalty that the Jews felt in return (Emecen, 1997: 10). Although in various 
publications Islamists frequently deployed anti-Semitic propaganda against the 
Jews (i.e., allegations of an Jewish-Freemason conspiracy manipulating states 
across the globe, Jews exploiting the resources of countries where they live, or 
Israel being the “devil” of the Middle East), still it is generally argued by both the 
Jewish elite and state officials that anti-Semitism in Turkey is nearly nonexistent 
(Bali, 2001a: 16). Even the 1984 bombing of the Neva Shalom Synagogue, which 
left a death toll of 23, was blamed on foreign elements and anger over the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict since the bomber was an Arab (Franz, 1994: 329). Two more 
synagogues were bombed in November 2003. These recent bombings were more 
related to the bombing of the Twin Towers in U.S.A known as 9/11 Incident.
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The Jews’ insistence on demonstrating their loyalty and at the same time 
pursuing a cultural politics based on religion was underlined in 1989 with the 
establishment of the Quincentennial Foundation (Bali, 2001b). With their strong 
ties to American Jews, Turkish Jewry has lobbied on the international stage since 
the 1970s to refute the Armenian genocide allegations and to support the Turkish 
position on Cyprus. With the Quincentennial Foundation, this Jewish community 
role continued under an institutional framework. The foundation’s original aim 
was to celebrate the welcome that Jewish refugees found in the Ottoman Empire, 
but it also served to bolster Turkey’s image in the face of damaging accusations of 
human rights violations and the like (Bali, 2001a: 309; Kılıç, 1995: 9).
As mentioned above, the post-1980 rise of civil society and the 
development of a consciousness of citizenship both as legal status and identity 
served together to illustrate a paradox in light of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and 
limitations of the 1982 Constitution. In the case of Jews, these contradictory
I
trends pointed to a further paradox. On the one hand, Jews became more visible in 
the public arena by virtue of the public interest in differences within society as 
well as the Jews’ pursuit of identity politics. This trend was accompanied by 
discussions of citizenship. Yet on the other hand, political and cultural Islam 
became more hegemonic in the public sphere and discussions of Turkish 
citizenship centered occasionally on its connection with Islamic identity. This 
trend was accompanied in the 1990s by a rise in anti-Semitic rhetoric making its 
mark in Turkish politics, especially on the part of Islamists and the Welfare Party. 
These conflicting trends can be imderstood by examining globalization and its 
inspiration upon the global and local. The global endorses a universal concept of
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citizenship with its attendant basic rights and freedoms and calls attention to the 
legal aspect of citizenship. The local, however, substantiates an understanding of 
citizenship based upon differences and therefore reinforces the identity aspect of 
citizenship. The local lacks imiform characteristics and so in the process of 
celebrating and authenticating differences, multiple identities of the local come 
into view. Therefore, in the post-1980 Zeitgeist, though Islamic identity and 
Jewish identity have sometimes come into conflict, they actually go hand-in-hand.
The European Union also construed yet another important aspect of the 
process of globalization and its reflections in Turkey. The 1993 Copenhagen 
siunmit of the EU Council affirmed that before its accession a candidate coimtry 
must have achieved a stable democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, 
and respect for and protection of minorities. In the council’s conclusions from that 
summit, one sine qua non condition set out for the accession of candidate states 
was the protection of minorities. Under the so-called Copenhagen criteria, 
candidate countries had to satisfy standards related to democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Detailed articulation of 
standards for minority protection was left to the progressive implementation of the 
accession partnership documents reached between the EU and its various 
candidate countries. In addition, progress reports were released annually on the 
efforts made by candidate countries to meet the accession requirements. In 
Turkey’s Accession Partnership Document, priority was given to enhancing the 
linguistic and cultural rights of minorities. Turkey, as a candidate coimtry, was 
tasked with satisfying minimal standards of protection within the national system. 
Starting in 1998, the EU Commission’s annual reports also monitored Turkey’s
no
progress in protecting minorities and included comprehensive assessments of the 
prevailing state of minority treatment. These reports insisted that the Assyrian, 
Alawite and Kurdish groups be officially recognized, along with the Armenians, 
Greeks and Jews, and necessary legislation be enacted in order to promote and 
protect the distinct identities of these Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. 
Towards this end, the reports urged Turkey to adopt constitutional amendments to 
integrate with EU standards on minority protection.
Turkey’s EU Accession Partnership Document compelled it to review the 
prevailing minority regime whose basics were originally set out in the Treaty of 
Lausanne. Historically, the minority issue has been a sensitive issue for Turkey 
both domestically and internationally. In the latter, the minority issue was 
considered a springboard for foreign powers to interfere in Turkey’s domestic 
affairs and hence threaten its sovereignty. In the former, the issue was seen 
through the lens of national security in response to secessionist pressures. But in 
the 1990s, with the accession requirements, Turkey faced the question of how to 
preserve its national and territorial integrity while also recognizing the ethno- 
linguistic and religious diversity present within society (Soner, 2004). The rise of 
identity politics, demands for cultural rights, and debates on constitutional 
citizenship all contributed to EU accession process pressures on Turkey vis-à-vis 
changing the minority regime (Soner, 2004). In the ‘90s, although Turkey 
continued to resist enlarging the existing fi-amework of minority rights, the 
standards required by the EU came to be recognized within the context of 
individual rights and freedoms. In 2002, major constitutional amendments were 
introduced. Accordingly, it became legal to do broadcasts in both minority
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languages and dialects used traditionally by many Turkish citizens in their daily 
lives. Although the official language of education in the schools remained 
Turkish, special courses for different languages and dialects were henceforth 
allowed. The Law on Religious Foundations was also amended. Foundations run 
by non-Muslim minorities were allowed to acquire and dispose of property. 
However, after the amendment was adopted, complications arose. Religious 
foundations run by non-Muslim minorities were allowed to register property that 
they actually used as long as they could provide proof of ownership. However, the 
procedures for registration were complicated and subject to fi^equent bureaucratic 
intervention. Furthermore, the amendment did not cover the authority of the 
General Directorate of Foundations to dismiss the board of trustees. The 
amendment also failed to address the question of the already confiscated 
properties of non-Muslim foundations. The problems related to bureaucratic 
procedures were resolved with additional decrees in 2003.
With the last constitutional amendments made in accordance with 
European Union requirements in 2003, the establishment of new synagogues was 
also allowed. From the changes of the previous year, building synagogues or 
places of worship for non-Muslim believers was no longer legally prohibited, yet 
the Law on Public Works still covered only mosques, leaving out entirely other 
places of worship. That year the wording of the law was changed, replacing 
“mosques” in the phrase “in the public work plan, a place for mosques is 
reserved” with the ecumenical “places of worship.” These amendments taken to 
satisfy EU requirements, however, did not alter the policy of specifying the faith
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of individuals on their national identity cards. Today, Turkish identity cards still 
identify the religious affiliations of Turkish citizens.
In the Post-1980 Period, in addition to these steps taken, a first time event 
regarding Jewish minority occurred. After the death of David Asseo, the Chief 
Rabbi who was appointed in 1953, the Jewish community in Turkey held 
elections in October 2002 for the first time in the history of modem Turkey. It was 
a two-roimded election in which Jews over the age of 18 would vote for delegates 
composing the committee who would then elect the Chief Rabbi. Permission for 
elections was taken fi’om the Ministry of Interior Affairs, according to Lausanne 
Treaty, and General Directorate of Security the Bureau of Minorities saw that the 
elections were executed in peace and order. The motto during the elections, as 
repeated fi'equently in §alom weekly, was “Voting is a duty, candidacy is a right!” 
In result of the elections, Izak Haleva was chosen as the Chief Rabbi.
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CHAPTER III
CITIZENSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION:
A HISTORY OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION FROM TURKEY
TO ISRAEL
3.1 Introduction
Turkey, traditionally, is recognized as a sending country in terms of 
international migration flows, and in the form of both labor migration and asylum 
seekers, it has sent out thousands of immigrants, mainly to European countries.* 
For these reasons, existing studies on Turkey and international migration have 
traditionally focused on Turkish immigrants in Europe or on Turkey’s sending 
country characteristic (l9duygu, 1991; 2000).
The migration of Jews from Turkey to Israel is the second-largest mass 
emigration movement out of Turkey, the first one being its labor migration of 
workers to European countries (Geray, 1970). Despite this prominent 
characteristic, the mass migration of Jews to Israel has failed to attract significant
* One must add that Turkey’s dominant character as an immigrant sending country has in recent 
decades seen a shift. There is growing widespread acknowledgement that since the 1990s, Turkey 
has become a country of immigration and irregular transit migration as well as a country of asylum 
(İçduygu, 2000; Kirişçi, 2002).
 ^ It should be added the largest mass emigration of minorities fi'om Turkey was that of the Greeks 
during the Turkish-Greek population exchanges of the early 1920s. However, the emigration of the 
Jews was not part of a government-mandated population exchange. On the contrary, the Jews 
emigrated to Israel of their own free will.
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attention either from the perspective of policy-making or of social science, as 
shown by the paucity of studies on the subject. Even in terms of official 
documentation on the scope of migration from Turkey to Israel, the more concrete 
and reliable data come from Israeli sources, which can be interpreted as a natural 
consequence of Israel being founded by waves of immigration from all over the 
world.^ On the Turkish side, as a sending country, there is a scarcity of official 
documentation of Jewish emigration.
The current study, drawing upon the existing literature on Jewish 
migration from Turkey to Israel, deals mainly with the triangle of international 
migration, Israel and Turkey with an in-depth perspective on citizenship. It 
centers on the quandaries posed to citizenship in both Turkey and in Israel 
through the case of migration from Turkey to Israel. Such a framework is built 
through employing a historical accoimt of this migration to Israel and hence 
respective transformations in citizenship in both countries."* A historical analysis 
of the nexus between international migration and citizenship in the case of Jewish 
migration from Turkey to Israel necessitates drawing a distinction between the 
1948-51 mass migration that occurred immediately after Israel’s establishment 
and subsequent migrations, which were smaller in both scope and number but 
continue even today. Therefore migration from Turkey to Israel is examined in-
 ^The data on international migration is posted regularly on the official website of Israel’s Central 
Bureau of Statistics at httD://www.cbs.gov.il.
 ^ The discussion on citizenship in Israel omits the citizenship of the minorities in Israel or the 
population problems of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and focuses only on the subject of the
dissertation which is Jewish immigration to Israel.
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depth in two periods; (1) the mass migration of 1948-51 and (2) subsequent 
migrations up through today.
The task of historicizing migration from Turkey to Israel with a focus on 
citizenship is undertaken within this chapter in four parts. In the first part, a brief 
historical overview of Israel as a nation of immigrants foimded in Palestine is 
presented. Due to the religious and ideological importance attributed to Israel by 
the Jews, historically, Israel, as a destination country, has attracted numerous 
migration flows from all over the world. Therefore, the history of Israel is
— r
presented in light of the historical roots of immigration. In order to pinpoint the 
specificity of Jewish migration to Israel from Turkey, a rough outline of the 
migration waves directed to Israel and the transitions within and between these 
waves are presented. Furthermore, Israeli laws regulating immigration and 
citizenship are covered in this part.
In the second part of the chapter, backgroimd information is presented on
t
Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine prior to the establishment of the state 
of Israel. This part discusses Jewish emigration before 1948 in two periods. 
During the period of the Ottoman Empire, as there was Jewish emigration to a 
number of countries, the specificity of the migration to Palestine as an Ottoman 
province and as part of internal migration is discussed briefly. The period after 
Turkey’s establishment in 1923 until the foundation of Israel in 1948 is marked by 
a nation-building process in Turkey at the national level and by the rise of Nazism 
and anti-Semitism in Europe at the international level. Therefore, Jewish 
migration to Palestine from Turkey in the period of 1923-48 is presented in light 
of the changing global and national context. The impact of World War II on
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international migration flows in general and on Turkey in particular is also 
clarified in this section by treating the migration of Jewish refugees to Turkey and 
transit migration to Palestine through Turkey.
In the third part of the chapter, Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel 
after 1948 up until today is discussed. As stated above, the mass migration of 
1948-51 is different in both size and character from subsequent migrations to 
Israel, and the third part of the chapter depicts Jewish migration from Turkey to 
Israel in two separate periods. The wave of 1948-51 is explored with a general 
description of the actors, factors and conditions involved. Furthermore, the 
consequences of this mass migration on the Jewish community in Turkey left 
behind are discussed. The ensuing migrations from Turkey to Israel since 1951 
through today demonstrate differences not only from the mass migration of 1948- 
51 but also amongst themselves. Therefore, the post-1951 period is discussed by 
considering these inner differences which illustrate themselves as specific 
migrations in the late 1960s and late ‘70s. After 1980, since migration from 
Turkey to Israel fell even as return migration from Israel to Turkey showed a 
relative increase compared to previous return rates, return migration is also 
discussed in this part. The third part of the chapter ends with a general evaluation 
of the current situation of the Turkish Jews in Israel in terms of group and 
organizational ties, demographic character and socio-economic status.
In the fourth part of the chapter, the question of how Turkey and Israel 
dealt with the immigration of Jews from Turkey to Israel takes the focus. Herein 
are summarized the legislative changes and administrative measures taken by 
Turkey and Israel on such issues as citizenship, nationality, military conscription.
117
inheritance, immigration and visa regimes that affected the status of Israeli 
migrants from Turkey. Furthermore, Israel’s reception policies towards the 
migration of Turkish Jews are treated. Last but not least, Israeli-Turkish relations 
and their influence on Jewish émigrés from Turkey, especially after the mid 
1980s, are also treated very briefly.
3.2 Immigration to Israel: Historical Roots and Transitions
As stated in Israel’s 1948 Declaration of Independence by its first Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion, Israel is the state of the Jews. Under the Law of 
Return, all the Jews of the world were granted the right to immigrate to and settle 
in Israel. The significance of “returning to the homeland” and the state of the Jews 
is rooted in their religious and political history dating back even from ancient 
times.
The Jews have a history spanning more than 2,000 years.^ The stories told 
in Genesis, the first book of the holy Jewish Pentateuch, say that the first famihes 
to be called Hebrew (children of the ancestor Eber or people coming from eber, 
beyond the river) lived near Babylonia in the ancient Near East. King Abraham 
moved the Hebrew tribe to Canaan, the Promised Land, and then his grandson 
Jacob moved it to Egypt. The Hebrews suffered under slavery in Egypt, but 
sustained their hope of returning to the Promised Land. The Prophet Moses led the
’ This sunmiary of the ancient history of the Jews is conpiled from Patai (1970).
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Hebrews out of servitude in Egypt, and this exodus symbolized the birth of the 
Jewish nation. After wandering in the desert for 40 years, Moses received the 
Jewish Law at Mt. Sinai. The Jews lived in Canaan for nearly six centuries, first 
under the helm of local leaders called the judges, then under the rule of kings. The 
Temple was built by King Solomon in Jerusalem. Canaan was divided into two 
kingdoms, the Kingdom of Judah in the south and the Kingdom of Israel in the 
north. In 721 B.C., Israel was conquered by the Assyrians. In 586 B.C. Judea was 
captured by the Babylonians, the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem was destroyed, 
and the Jews were exiled. Only a minor part of the Jewish people remained in the 
Land of Israel or Palestine, meaning land of the Philistines (a non-Semitic tribe) 
as it was called by the Romans. However, the Jews maintained their belief that the 
Land of Israel {^retz Israel) belonged to them, and so some of them returned after 
the conquest of Palestine by the Persians with the permission of King Cyrus and 
rebuilt Jerusalem and its religious center, the Temple. However, the Romans 
captured Jerusalem in 70 B.C. and Emperor Titus destroyed the Temple and 
dispersed the Jews, an incident referred to in Hebrew as galut (the exile). Only a 
very small number of Jews remained in or returned to Jerusalem after this 
dispersion. Over the centuries, the rule of Palestine passed from the Romans, to 
the Byzantines, to the Arabs, to the Ottomans and finally, in the early 20*** century, 
to the British.
But after the Jews were expelled fi'om Palestine in 70 B.C., they went on 
to form various Diaspora communities in places as wide-ranging as Central and 
Western Europe, North Afiica, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Indian 
subcontinent, and even the Middle East itself From the 11*'’ century A.D., the
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Jews of France and Germany were designated Ashkenazim in Hebrew writings as 
distinguished from the Sephardim, the Jews who lived on the Iberian Peninsula. 
Though the Jews lived in diverse societies and sometimes became assimilated in 
their adopted cultures, Zion, the name given to the religious heart of Jerusalem, 
maintained its religious significance among world Jewry and was often 
symbolized as the desire to return to Eretz Israel. In the late 19* century, the 
doctrine of Zionism carried this religious significance attributed to Israel to a
political level.
- - -  ■
The emergence of modem Zionism is closely related to the wave of 
nationalism in the 19 century, as it provoked Jewish nationalism among the Jews 
in eastern and central Europe as well as anti-Semitic violence against these same 
Jews. For instance, the Russian pogroms of 1881 not only spurred the Jews to 
emigrate abroad but also led to Russia’s first Zionist association, Hovevei Zion
(Lovers of Zion) by name. Some of the young idealists in Hovevei Zion launched
)
the Bilium Movement and in 1882 manifested the first Zionist declaration of a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine followed by a wave of emigration from Russia.
There were only four cities in Palestine that had organized Jewish 
communities -  Jerusalem, Tiberias, Safed and Hebron -  until 1882, when Jewish 
settlement in Palestine began to be invigorated by waves of immigration. Between 
1882 and 1947, there were five waves of immigration that together made up the 
Yishuv (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66).^ In the first aliya of 1882-1903, aroimd 25,000
' Yishuv is the name given to the Jewish community in Palestine prior to independence.
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Jews moved to Palestine from Romania and Russia (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66)/ 
That wave was sparked by a series of pogroms in Russia in 1881 and grew out of 
Hovevei Zion, Russia’s Zionist movement.
Hovevei Zion failed to find as many followers among Russian Jewry as 
did the movement started by Theodor Herzl. Influenced by the Dreyfus Affair,*  
Austrian journalist Herzl published Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) in 1896 
proposing a nation of the Jews living in a homeland in Palestine. In 1897, the First 
Zionist Congress was convened in Basel, Switzerland with representatives from 
each Zionist community. The Zionist organization was formed xmder Herzl’s 
leadership, but the congress did not insist on a “Jewish state” but rather “a home 
in Palestine secured by public law’ with a “Zionist Program.” The Second Zionist 
Congress was held in 1898 during which the Jewish Colonial Trust was 
established to fund a Jewish homeland. Towards this end, Herzl had visited 
Istanbul two years earlier, in 1896, and offered to Sultan AbduUiamid n  that the
i
trast would cover Ottoman debts, which were putting a huge drain on the 
economy, in return for lands for the Jews in Palestine. Abdulhamid II rejected this 
offer, but fearing that the Ottoman Empire would share the fate of Egypt, which 
was occupied by Britain de facto after having failed to honor its national debts, he
 ^ Aliya is a very common Hebrew term that means ascendancy. It refers to the immigration of 
Jews into Israel.
* Captain Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish soldier in the French Army who in 1894 was dismissed on 
accusations of espionage on behalf of Germany. His Jewishness served to legitimize the 
accusations against him in the eyes of the French public and provoked rising anti-Semitism , 
Although in the end he was cleared of all charges, the Dreyfus Affair dashed the hopes of many 
Jews worldwide that assimilation was a solution to the “Jewish question.” The idea for a homeland 
of the Jewish nation gained weight.
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agreed to meet Herzl again in 1901 (Öke, 1982: 330). However, since the two 
men were unable to agree on plans for debt consolidation and colonization, 
Abdulhamid II rejected the idea of charter for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He 
thought that this charter would turn into a rejection of Ottoman municipal law as 
well as pressure for international recognition under the law of nations. 
Furthermore, the sultan feared that the immigration and settlement of Jews in 
Palestine would lead to the emergence of a Jewish question in the Ottoman 
Empire, something considered dangerous at a time when there were already other 
nationality problems such as the Armenians. Zionism was viewed suspiciously as 
another vehicle for further European influence in the Ottoman Empire (Öke, 1982: 
331-33). In order to restrict immigration and settlement of foreign Jews to 
Palestine, various measures were taken at different times, such as prohibiting all 
foreign Jews from visiting Palestine (with the exception of pilgrims), requesting a 
cash deposit for visas to Palestine so as to guarantee departure, controlling 
residence permits with red tickets, the deportation of Jews without documents, 
and forbidding land sales to Jews (Öke, 1982: 335-36).
However, none of these measures was able to prevent the waves of 
immigration directed to Palestine and the establishment of Jewish colonies there. 
In the second aliya of 1904-14, 40,000 Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine 
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66). These immigrants were mainly members of Russian 
Zionist labor groups who had grown disappointed with the social reform 
movement there. They launched new forms of settlements known as the moshav
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and kibbutz.^ Urban development also began as the foundations were laid for the 
all-Jewish town (and future capital) of Tel-Aviv. During this period, the World 
Zionist Organization started to work in Palestine (1908).
The great powers, making use of the capitulation concessions granted to 
them by the Ottoman Empire, became promoters of Jewish colonization in 
Palestine. During World War I, British policy became gradually committed to the 
idea of establishing a Jewish home in Palestine. After discussions in the British 
Cabinet and consultation with Zionist leaders, the decision was made known in
r-
1917 in the form of a letter by Arthur James Lord Balfour, the British foreign 
secretary, to Lord Edmund Rothschild, the head of the Zionist Federation. The 
Balfour Declaration was met with great enthusiasm in the Jewish world. After the 
war, Palestine became a mandate of Britain and was also recognized by the 
League of Nations in 1922, and larger waves of legal and illegal immigration 
followed. In the third aliya of 1919-23, some 35,000 Jews mainly from Emopean 
countries moved to Palestine \mder its British mandate (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66). 
This wave of immigration began after the Balfour Declaration, which was 
recognized as a major step towards the realization of the Zionist ideal by the 
Jewish world. This group of immigrants consisted largely of young people who 
had been trained through Halutz (pioneer) organizations prior to their departure
’ The moshav (plural moshavim) arid kibbutz (plural kibbutzim) are collective forms of rural 
settlement in which land is owned by the Jewish National Fund. On a moshav, the land is divided 
among its inhabitants equally, on which production and consunption are done privately. On a 
kibbutz, however, production and consiunption are collective and the guiding principles are 
“contributing according to one’s own ability” and “consuming according to one’s needs.”
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for Palestine. They were ready to do any work required of them, so they moved to 
moshavim and kibbutzim.
On the other hand, the Arabs in Palestine were at odds with the intentions 
of the British mandate rule. Although Britain tried to delimit Jewish immigration 
from time to time in response to rising Arab nationalism and concomitant protests, 
it could not head off the Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine that has persisted up 
to this day. In the 1920s, violent conflicts arose between the Palestinian Arabs and 
the Jews, in Palestine. Both sides of the dispute formed a number of groups, 
associations and organizations, the most prominent Jewish ones being the Jewish 
Agency and the Haganah armed group. In the meantime, the fourth aliya took 
place in 1924-31. In this wave, 85,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine from Eastern 
Europe (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66). This aliya was spurred by improved economic 
conditions in Palestine enabling the absorption of further immigrants. In addition,
the Polish Jewry’s worsening economic situation stemming from Warsaw’s policy
}
of excluding Jews from the major economic sectors helped motivate the migrants. 
Most of the migrants in this aliya were middle-class. They mainly settled in towns 
and went into commerce or industry or else became artisans.
Britain tried to resolve the Palestinian-Jewish conflict by the Passfield 
White Book in 1930, the Peel Commission Report in 1937 and the MacDonald 
White Book in 1939, all of which proved futile. Such conflicts continued during 
World War n  as refugee migration from Europe accelerated. In the fifth aliya of 
1932-47, 270,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine, mainly due to the rise and spread 
of Nazism in Germany and Eastern Europe (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66). The 
immigrants brought with them large amounts of capital which served large-scale
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development of the as yet unincorporated country’s economy, agriculture and 
commerce and boosted population growth in urban areas. As a result of these 
waves of immigration to Palestine, the Jewish population and hence the number of 
Jewish settlements, both rural and urban, rose. By 1945, there were 27 Jewish 
towns, 98 moshavim and 115 kibbutzim, with a total population of 588,400 Jews 
(Lipshitz: 1998: 39).
Towards the end of World War II, the United States of America began to 
get involved in the conflict, and several suggestions were prepared by Anglo- 
American commissions on the status of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. None of 
the suggestions provided resolution, however, and so Britain decided to bring the 
conflict over Palestine to the United Nations. In 1947, the United Nations Special 
Conunission on Palestine was formed. A UN resolution of November 29, 1947 
decided on partition of the territory and the establishment within it of two states -
one Jewish and one Arab.**^  Israel declared independence on May 14, 1948 as the
>
state of the Jews and opened its gates to unrestricted Jewish immigration. The first 
Arab-Israel War broke out immediately thereafter, eventually ending with victory 
for the Jews. After its cease-fire agreements with the neighboring Arab countries 
and recognition firom many states, Israel was accepted into the United Nations in 
1949, thus becoming a full-fledged member of the international community.''
The decision was voted on and passed by the UN General Assembly. Earlier, Turkey voted “no” 
on the decision to partition the land.
"  Turkey recognized Israel officially in 1949.
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As seen in the discussions by Rouhana, there are three pillars of state 
ideology in Israel which together form the basic structure of the state (Rouhana, 
1997: 28-43). The first pillar is that Israel is a Jewish state. Israel’s raison d’être is 
that it is a Jewish state, which in turn represents the essence of the state’s identity, 
guides its relations with Jewish communities in other countries, and steers its 
policies toward its non-Jewish minorities. Israel views itself as the guardian of all 
the Jewish people, including the Jewish Diaspora. Although Israel is in practice a 
state of both Jews and non-Jewish citizens (i.e. Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs, 
non-Arab Christians, Druze, Circassian, Bahais and Bedouins within its borders), 
the dominant culture is determined by its Jewish majority, as the laws governing 
cultural, educational and memorial institutions give statutory recognition to 
cultural and educational institutions and define their aims in strictly Jewish terms. 
The second pillar of the state ideology is that Israel is a democracy. Democracy is 
a fimdamental component of Israel’s political system and national self-concept. 
Israel’s democracy emphasizes the procedural component by focusing on aspects 
of representational politics such as a multi-party system and fi’ee and fair 
elections. The third pillar is that Israel is a state with profound security concerns. 
Security is a central and predominant concern for the Israeli state and its Jewish 
public, and as an ethos has acquired supremacy owing to the threats, fears and 
anxieties on all levels shared by the Jewish public. The reason for its 
preoccupation with seciuity is that Israel has been involved in many wars since its 
establishment, more than any coxmtry since World War H. The current Palestinian
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Intifada against the Israelis plays an important role in the dominance of security
concerns as well (Rouhana, 1997:28-43). 12
Israel’s laws governing immigration and citizenship rest primarily on the 
pillars of the state ideology outlined above. The immigration to Israel of Jews 
from all over the world was not only accepted but actively promoted by Israel. 
Therefore, its immigration laws reflected the priority given to Jews in reception 
and naturalization policies. The acquisition of Israeli nationality was covered by 
its NationaUty Law passed in 1952.*  ^ Under the law, Israeli citizenship can be 
acquired by birth, residence, naturalization, or the Law of Return. Through birth, 
people bom in Israel to at least one parent who is an Israeli citizen are granted 
Israeli nationality. Through residence, certain provisions are included in the law 
specifying the terms and length of residence required to gain Israeli citizenship. 
For instance, according to a special provision in the Nationality Law for former 
citizens of British Mandatory Palestine, those who remained in Israel from the 
1948 foimding of the state imtil the 1952 passage of the Nationality Law became 
Israeli citizens by residence. For the acquisition of nationality by naturalization, 
certain conditions are set forth, including a knowledge of Hebrew (former 
Palestinian citizens are exempt from this provision), the renoimcement of prior
To date Israel has fought in six wars: its War of Independence (1947-49), the Suez War (1956), 
the Six-Day War (1967), the War of Attrition (1970-71), the Yom Kippin: War (1973), and the 
Lebanon War (1982-83).
This Nationality Law -  a quite long text -  is available in full at Israel’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.il. It was amended in 1968, 1971 and 1980 with additional 
articles.
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nationality and taking an oath of loyalty to the state of Israel. Israel often allows 
its citizens to get dual citizenship in other countries.
Citizenship for non-Jewish foreigners is regulated by the Law of Entry to 
Israel, and this law does not permit dual citizenship. The conditions of birth, 
residence and naturalization relate to persons bom in Israel or resident therein, as 
well as to those wishing to settle in the country, regardless of race, religion, creed, 
sex or political belief. However, the Law of Return relate only to the Jews. Jewish 
persons, citizens of any country in the world, become Israeli citizens according to 
the Law of Return, which does permit dual citizenship.
The Law of Return, which is a condition of acquisition of Israeli 
citizenship, is the basic work of legislation regulating Jewish immigration to 
Israel. Law of Return 5710-1950 was enacted on July 5,1950.*“* Under the law, all 
Jews, wherever they may be, are granted the right to come to Israel as olim 
(immigrants) and become Israeli citizens.'^ Israeli citizenship becomes effective 
upon an oleh's arrival in the country or upon receipt of an oleh’s certificate, 
whichever is later, but within the first three months the immigrant may declare 
that s/he does not wish to become a citizen. The status of oleh may be denied to
Law of Return 5710-1950 was passed by the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) on July 5, 1950 and 
published the same day in Sefer Ha-Qiukkim No. 51, p. 159.
Oleh (plural olim) is a Hebrew word meaning a Jew immigrating into Israel.
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persons deemed to have engaged in activity directed against the Jewish people or 
to constitute a danger to the public health or security of the state.
In 1954 Law of Return 5710-1950 was modified with Amendment 5714- 
1954, under which the Ministry of Immigration was replaced by the Ministry of 
the Interior as the institution in charge of implementing the law.^  ^The amendment 
further specified that the oleh visa would be granted to every Jew wanting to settle 
in Israel unless the Minister of the Interior determined that the applicant was a 
person with a criminal past likely to endanger public welfare. This amendment 
aimed at discouraging criminals fi*om trying to escape domestic law in their home 
countries by immigrating to Israel.
The full text of Law of Return 5710-1950 is presented on the website of the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs fhttp://www.nifa.gov.in as follows:
Article 1: Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh.
Article 2: (a) Aliyah [immigration to Israel] shall be by oleh’s visa.
(b) An oleh’s visa shall be granted to every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel, 
unless the Minister of Immigration is satisfied that the applicant
(1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or
(2) is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State,
Article 3. (a) A Jew who has come to Israel and subsequent to his arrival has expressed his desire 
to settle in Israel may, while in Israel, receive an oleh’s certificate.
(b) The restrictions specified in section 2(b) shall apply also to the grant of an oleh’s certificate, 
but a person shall not be regarded as endangering public health on account of an illness contracted 
after his arrival in Israel.
Article 4: Every Jew who has immigrated into this country before the coming into force of ftiis 
Law, and every Jew who was bom in this country, whether before or after the coming into force of 
this Law, shall be deemed to be a person who has come to this country as an oleh under this Law. 
Article 5: The Ministry of Immigration is charged with the ur5)lementation of this Law and make 
regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation and also as to the grant of oleh’s visas 
and oleh’s certificates to minors up to the age of 18 years.
The Law of Return (Amendment 5714-1954) was passed by the Knesset on August 23, 1954 and 
published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 163 dated September 1, 1954, p. 88.
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In 1970 Law of Return 5710-1950 was modified once again, with 
Amendment No. 2, 5730-1970.^^ This amendment specified who was considered 
as a Jew and therefore entitled to the rights of an oleh.^  ^ Under the law, “Jew” 
means a person bom of a Jewish mother or someone who has converted to 
Judaism and does not belong to any religion.^^ The law prescribes that the rights 
of an oleh are also vested in the children and grandchildren of Jews, the spouses 
of Jews, and the spouses of children and grandchildren of Jews, excepting 
formerly Jewish individuals who have voluntarily changed their religion. The 
purpose of this amendment was to ensure the unity of families where 
intermarriage had occurred. The legal definition of “Jew” specified in the 1970 
amendment was also referred to in an amendment to the 1965 Population Registry 
Law 5725-1965 included in the same legislative package as its Law of Return
counterpart.21
The Law of Return (Amendment 5730-1970) was passed by the Knesset on March 10, 1970 and 
published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 586 dated March 19, 1970, p. 36.
The full text of the amendments made in 1970 is available on the website of the Israeli Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs fhttp://www.mfa.gov.in. The major sections added to Article 4 of the Law of 
Return 1950 are as follows:
Article 4A. (a) The rights of a Jew under this Law and the rights of an oleh under the Nationality 
Law 5712-1952, as well as the rights of an oleh under any other enactment, are also vested in a 
child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse 
of a grandchild of a Jew, except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his 
religion.
Article 4B. For the purposes of this Law, “Jew” means a person who was bom of a Jewish mother 
or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion.
We should note that Judaism accepts matrilineal affiliation in religion. In order to be considered 
a Jew, the person should have a Jewish mother, and religion passes from the mother alone.
On the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs fhttp://www.mfa.gov.il). the section 
added to Article 3 of the Population Registration Law is as follows:
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The establishment of Israel as a Jewish state and the priority given to Jews 
in Israel’s immigration regulations led to mass Jewish immigration from countries 
all over the world. This immigration did not rise gradually over time but rather 
was characterized by waves of both rates of immigration and their varied somces. 
To date there have been four waves of immigration since independence 
(Goldscheider, 1996: 49-52). The first immigration wave occurred between 1948 
and 1951 known as the great wave. In these years marked by war and the 
transition to national independence, a high volume and rate of Jewish immigration 
from diverse countries of origin arrived in the new state of Israel. The number of 
immigrants who in 1948 arrived in Israel in this wave was 101,828 (after the 
establishment of the state on May 14), 239,954 in 1949, 170,563 in 1950, and 
175,279 in 1951, for a grand total of 687,624 (State of Israel, Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 2003). In the course of the four years just after independence, the bulk
of Jewish immigration came from Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Tmkey and North Africa,
>
and was composed mainly of Oriental and Sephardic Jews who changed the ethnic 
composition of the Yishuv, which up to then had been predominated by the 
Ashkenazim (Patai, 1970: 70, lA)?^ From Yemen and North Ajfrica, large
Article 3A. (a) A person shall not be registered as a Jew by ethnic affiliation or religion if a 
notification under this Law or another entry in the Registry or a public document indicates that he 
is not a Jew, so long as the said notification, entry or document has not been converted to the 
satisfaction of the Chief Registration Officer or so long as declaratory judgment of a conqjetent 
court or tribunal has not otherwise determined,
(b) For the purposes of this Law and of any registration or document thereunder, “Jew” has the 
same meaning as in section 4B of the Law of Return, 5710-1950.
Oriental Jews are those who have lived in Middle Eastern or North Afiican countries (i.e. Syria, 
Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Morocco and Yemen), Sephardic Jews are those ultimately 
originating from Spain (i.e. proximally from Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Yugoslavia and 
Italy), and Ashkenazic Jews come from Central and Eastern European countries (Austria, 
Germany, Romania, Hungary, Russia and Poland).
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numbers arrived not only due to their religio-nationalistic enthusiasm, but also as 
part of forced migration due to the political pressures that Arab countries put on 
their Jewish citizens. The mass immigration of 1948-51 established some of the 
basic elements of modem Israeli society, expanding major social, pohtical, 
economic and cultural institutions and forging the development and extension of 
the welfare entitlement system (Goldscheider, 1996: 50).
The second wave of irmnigration to Israel had its start in the mid-1950s. In 
1955-57, a total of 166,492 immigrants arrived in Israel (Israel’s Central Bureau 
of Statistics, 2003). They came mainly from North African countries such as 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Immigration continued slowly after 1957, but 
picked up again in the early 1960s. In 1958-60, a total of 75,970 immigrants 
arrived in Israel, and 1961-64 saw an additional 228,793 (Israel’s Central Bureau 
of Statistics, 2003). The occupational skills and educational backgrounds of these 
immigrants differed significantly from the earlier European-origin streams. 
Accordingly, this period saw Israel impose immigration regulations to curb the 
negative impact of large-scale immigration (Goldscheider, 1996: 50). From the 
1950s on, different immigrant groups -  predominantly those from Europe -  began 
to form immigrant associations (Eisenstadt, 1985: 319).
The third major immigration wave began after the 1967 Six-Day war, 
mostly from Eastern Europe and Western countries, mainly the United States. The 
1969-71 period saw a total of 116,791 immigrants arrive in Israel, followed by 
267,580 in 1972-79, and 153,833 in 1980-89 (Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2003). The Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors led not only to 
this immigration wave but also to a growth in financial and political support to
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Israel from Jewish communities worldwide. The immigrants arrived amidst a 
period of economic growth and geographic expansion which was also 
characterized by a new national and military self-confidence. Higher standards of 
immigrant integration within Israeli society also emerged during this period. 
Housing, jobs and provisions for university-level education for the children of 
immigrants were given special focus in the absorption policies. These subsidies 
offered to the new immigrants were higher than the subsidies (i.e. elementary 
health care and minimum living accommodations) offered to previous immigrant 
waves. Therefore, some immigrants of the previous waves and their Israeh-bom 
children remained disadvantaged (Goldscheider, 1996: 51). Restrictions on the 
emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and the option of alternative 
destinations, especially the United States, delayed the flow of Russian immigrants 
to Israel until 1990.
The fourth major immigration wave began in 1989 and has continued up to 
this day. This wave is composed mainly of Jews emigrating from countries of the 
former Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and restrictions on 
immigration to the United States directed Jews from former Soviet republics to 
Israel. From 1990 to 2001, the number of immigrants coming to Israel reached a 
total of 882,600 (Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). This wave is 
different from the previous ones in that a significant proportion of the immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union were non-Jews, primarily Christians. Since the 
1970 amendment to the Law of Return allowed the immigration of Jews’ relatives 
to Israel, 218,000 of the immigrants were non-Jewish over the same 1990-2001
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period in comparison to 664,600 Jewish immigrants (Israel’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 2003).
Although Zionism is certainly a factor in immigration to Israel, ideological 
shifts cannot accoimt for the changes over time in rates and sources of 
immigration. Similar to other examples of international migration after the 1960s, 
economic factors have started to play a significant role in voluntary immigration 
to Israel. Furthermore, changes in the political conditions of Jews in countries 
outside Israel and the options available for migration to alternate destinations have 
shaped the fluctuating rates of migration to Israel and the changes in the country 
of origin (Goldscheider, 1996: 53).
Just as immigration to Israel (aliyd) occurred, there has also been 
emigration out of the country {yeridd)P There were 340,000 emigrants fi*om 
Israel to other countries fi-om 1948 to 1979, reflecting an average annual 
emigration rate of 4.6 residents per 1,000. Although emigration fi’om Israel is a 
less-studied subject than imnugration into the country, it has been suggested that 
emigration is much more volimtary and individual in character than immigration 
to Israel. It is conjectured that young adults, single males and immigrants fi'om 
Western countries have higher rates of emigration out of Israel. Return migration 
to places of origin is more likely among immigrants to Israel fi-om Western 
Europe and the United States. Emigration rates are also higher among those who 
moved voluntarily to Israel. Family, social and economic networks between
^  In Hebrew, aliya, the term used for immigration to Israel, literally means “going up,”’ while 
Yerida, the name given to emigration out of Israel, means “going down.” As these meanings show, 
yerida denotes an undesirable or pejorative condition.
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Israelis living in Israel and in other countries are some other factors lying behind 
emigration (Goldscheider, 1996: 58). Economic expectations rather than 
economic conditions per se also have a strong effect on emigration.
Immigration to Israel has over time led to an enormous increase in the 
country’s Jewish population. The total number of immigrants from the founding 
of the state imtil 2001 is 2.89 million. The Jewish population during the 
Declaration of Independence was 717,000. By 2002 the total population of Israel, 
both Jewish and non-Jewish, had reached over 6 million. The Jewish population 
of Israel is over 5 million. Jews in Israel constitute fully 40 percent of all world 
Jewry, whose population is currently estimated at around 13 million. As of 2002, 
the number of Israeli-bom Jews had surpassed the number of immigrants.^^ 
Hence, Israeli-born Jews with their population of 3.27 million make up nearly 
65% of the total Jewish population of Israel.^^
After this brief history of Israel as a country of immigration, the next 
section considers how Jews from the Ottoman Empire and Turkey became 
integrated into other streams of immigration from all over the world to 
PalestineAsrael.
Israeli-bom Jews or those reared in Israel are generally referred to as the Sabra, after the cactus 
fruit sabra which is prickly on the outside and sweet on the inside. The Sabra symbolizes 
emancipated Jews who enjoy self-confidence free from the insecurities of the Diaspora 
communities and are considered to be ready for the ultimate stand and the most heroic self- 
sacrifice. These new generations were the first Jewish children brought up in only a single culture 
(Patai, 1970: 179-80).
These figures are derived from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 
2002 No. 53, posted in 2003 on the website http://www.cbs.gov.il.
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3.3 Jewish Emigration from Turkey to Palestine
Jewish emigration from Turkey is not a purely modem phenomenon, since 
it dates back to imperial times, as some Ottoman Jews migrated to Palestine when 
the region was still under Ottoman mle. Nor was Palestine the only destination for 
Ottoman Jews, as some chose to emigrate to other regions. For instance, when 
Jews who had been expelled from Spain and Portugal were received into Ottoman 
lands in the early 16* century, not all of them chose to stay, with some electing to 
emigrate further to Europe, Egypt, and even as far as Latin America. Continuing 
the long and rich Jewish heritage of immigration, some Ottoman Jews emigrated 
to the Congo, Rhodesia, South Africa, the US, France, Italy, Spain, Morocco, 
Belgimn, Cuba, Mexico or Argentina (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 380). The 
reasons for this emigration were economic or social in nature, as Jews stmggling 
with severe economic conditions chose to start a new life either individually or 
with their families in foreign countries (Weiker, 1988: 19). Since Spanish was 
linguistically close to Ladino, some of the Sephardic Jews in the Ottoman Empire 
chose Latin American countries where Spanish predominated. Wartime situations, 
i.e. the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, also led the Jews to emigrate to foreign 
countries. After universal conscription was made compulsory for non-Muslims in 
1909, some young Jewish men seeking to avoid conscription and war emigrated 
from the Ottoman Empire to Latin American coimtries as well as Egypt and 
France (Giilsoy, 2000; Nahum, 2000: 81,239).
Jewish migration from various towns of the Ottoman Empire to Palestine 
differs from the emigration paths of Jews in the Ottoman Empire to other
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countries. First, Palestine remained xmder the control of the Ottoman Empire until 
the end of World War I; therefore, migration to Palestine from other regions under 
Ottoman rule can be considered an example of internal migration, in contrast to 
examples of international immigration such as immigration to Latin American or 
European countries. Second, the migration of the Ottoman Jews to Palestine was 
not merely due to economic conditions but also to religious or Zionist goals 
(Weiker, 1988: 19). Some aging Jews who wanted to die in the holy lands of 
Palestine moved there for religious reasons.^^ Others influenced by Zionism 
migrated in order to contribute to the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine.^’ Third, this internal migration to Palestine was occasionally put under 
strict controls by the Ottoman state. Jewish immigration to Palestine, both from 
Ottoman territory and other parts of the world, was generally considered an issue 
of international politics and relations, and was therefore subject to limitations set 
by the Ottoman government, with the exception of the 1882 visit of pilgrims to 
Palestine. However, these immigration restrictions, either of Ottoman subjects or 
foreign Jews, proved ineffective, and so the immigration continued until the 
collapse of the empire at the end of World War I. There are no exact figures 
available on the migration of Ottoman Jews to Palestine, but it is estimated that
According to Jewish theology, during the apocalypse the messiah would gather all the people 
together in Palestine. Those living far away would come there under miserable conditions, so 
settlement in Palestine was thought to be a means of liberation from that threat.
The spread of Zionism among Ottoman Jews took place especially after the Balkan Wars of 
1912-13, later than its spread among Ashkenazic Jews in Central and Eastern Europe. This was 
due to the religious tolerance granted Jews under the Ottoman Millet system (Benbasse and 
Rodrigue, 2001: 299).
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larger numbers made their way there after the foundation of Turkey (Weiker, 
1988: 19).
The invasion of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the 
beginning of the Turkish War of Independence in 1919 generated a push on 
emigration of non-Muslims to foreign coimtries which continued after the 
proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Similarly, many Jews emigrated 
abroad in groups due to economic, social and political factors, i.e. to France, Italy, 
Greece, the US, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay, or Palestine (Bali, 2000: 48; 
Franz, 1994: 329; Nahum, 2000:206).^®
The basic difference between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Republic with respect to Jewish immigration/emigration seems to lie in which 
countries received and which sent the migrants. The Ottoman Empire had mainly 
been a receiving country for Jews all around the world. Although there has always 
been emigration of Jews as discussed above, the large numbers of Jewish 
inunigrants received can be considered incomparable to the small scope of Jewish 
emigration. The empire’s liberal reception policies towards Jews as well as its 
religious tolerance towards non-Muslims made the coimtry a choice destination 
for Jewish immigrants from Europe and Russia where Jews frequently suffered 
under severe ethno-religious oppression. In contrast, however, Turkey was
The migration flows to these countries fluctuated over time as a reflection of the intensity o f the 
factors spurring them (Bali, 2000, 2003; Levi, 1998; Nahum, 2000; Weiker, 1988). A s  will be 
discussed in later sections, the following factors lay behind Jewish emigration from Turkey: a 
failure to adapt to the ideas of the new nation-state; the 1924 purging of non-Muslims from state 
offices; Turkish statist economic policies which blocked adequate welfare opportunities; the 
aftermath of the 1960 and 1971 military interventions; and various incidents against non-Muslim 
minorities such as the 1934 Thracian Incidents and the September 6-7 Events of 1955.
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predominantly a sending country with respect to its Jewish population.^^ Over 
time the number of the Jews in Turkey dwindled, leaving only some 20,000- 
25,000 Jews in 2003 from an estimated 1927 census figure of 81,400 (Dündar, 
2000: 154; Karimova and Deverell, 2001). Emigration was the major reason for 
this decline. To this day, Turkey can still be considered a sending country of Jews, 
as its Jewish community continues to shrink due to emigration.
Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine from 1923 to 1948 -  that is, 
from the foundation of the Turkish Republic imtil the foimdation of Israel -  can be 
analyzed at both the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, 
Turkey’s nation-building process urged that the status of non-Muslims (and hence 
Jews) who were long used to live under the Millet system be changed to a 
minority regime the essentials of which were set by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. 
In attempts to generate this “from above,” the Turkish nation entailed certain
social, economic and cultural reforms (Kadioglu, 1998). In this process, education
;
was unified under a national administrative unit, Turkish was promoted as the 
national tongue, population exchanges were done between non-Muslims in 
Anatolia and Muslims in the Balkans, and the emergence of a national bourgeoisie 
and entrepreneur class was supported. All these reforms aimed at homogenization, 
which put pressure on minority groups to adapt themselves to the new reforms
During World War II, Turkey did receive a small number of Jews fleeing the Nazis. Turkey’s 
role was more that of a limited transit country site for Jews en route from Europe to Palestine.
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and policies. Hence, emigration from Turkey to Palestine in 1923-48 had 
domestic dynamics that were shaped by Turkey’s own nation-building process.^® 
At the international level, the rise of anti-Semitism and the Nazi Party in 
Germany in the 1920s led to gravely tragic consequences for European Jews and 
worldwide Jewry alike. The Nazis’ 1933 rise to power in Germany brought with it 
a systematic anti-Semitism armed with militaristic and fascist weapons. Before 
and during World War n, Jews living in countries invaded by the Nazis were 
forced to flee to escape, at best, harsh oppression or, at worst, the methodical 
slaughter seen in the concentration camps and elsewhere. Around 6 million Jews 
were systematically killed in the genocide known as the Holocaust (or the Shoah 
in Hebrew). This wave of Nazism also spread to other countries which were never 
actually occupied by Germany. Either as part of the policy of appeasement or 
under the spread of extreme nationalism that took racist forms, rising anti- 
Semitism was seen in many countries. All these worldwide developments 
reinforced the idea that a Jewish state established in Palestine was needed so Jews 
could have a place to live in a safe, liberal environment, free from anti-Semitism. 
Consequently, Jewish immigration to Palestine accelerated. On the Turkish side, 
Turkey served as a legal/illegal transit site for Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
However, the rise of Nazism in Europe influenced some nationalists in Turkey 
and so led to a rise in anti-Semitism in the 1930s and ‘40s. Accordingly, Jews in 
Turkey joined the global wave of Jewish emigration to Palestine. Therefore, the
This subject was previously covered in greater detail in the chapter on the history of Turkey’s 
Jewish minority.
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international context shaped by World War II and the rise of Nazism also affected 
Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine in the 1923-1948 period.
From 1923 up to the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, an estimated 
7,308 Jews emigrated from Turkey to Palestine (Weiker, 1988: 19). Through the 
1920s, the immigration of Jews remained small scale. In newspapers of the 
period, frequent pointed reference was made to the way some Greeks and 
Armenians sided with invasion forces and against Turkish forces during the War 
of Independence. Although for their part Turkey’s Jews had not sided with the 
invaders, they were lumped in with other non-Muslims and therefore faced similar 
accusations. These accusations called on some of the Jews to emigrate to Palestine 
(Bali, 2000: 26, 47). In addition, some Jewish office-holders working at state- 
owned companies emigrated to Palestine after their positions were terminated 
(Nahum, 2000: 239).
A noteworthy rise was seen in Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine 
after the 1934 Thrace Incidents, which were discussed previously Chapter II. 
Anti-Semitic attacks on Jews in Europe and anti-Semitic publications in Turkey -  
especially in the Thrace region -  were causing fiiistration among Turkish Jewry. 
After the Thrace Incidents beginning on July 3, 1934 in Kirklareli, Edime and 
Çanakkale, some Jews who had faced attacks by civilian groups went on to 
emigrate to Palestine either directly or via Istanbul. It is estimated that 521 Jews 
left Turkey for Palestine in 1934, and another 1,445 emigrated the following year 
(Bali, 1999b: 43). Jewish emigration to Palestine after the Thrace Incidents was 
generally organized by The Jewish Colonization Agency and The Palestine Aliya
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Anoar Organization, both of which had offices or representatives in Istanbul 
(Bali, 1999b: 43).
Developments on the international stage cast a long shadow over the years 
following 1934. The rise of Nazism provoked a wave of Jewish refugee 
emigration fi’om Europe. The outbreak of World War П in Europe in 1939 made 
international migration much more difficult for the Jews.^' Refugee emigration 
fi'om Europe before and during World War П affected Turkey in two respects. 
First, part of the resulting refugee wave was directed towards Tiukey -  naturally, 
as it shared borders with Emope and also pursued a foreign policy of neutrality, hi 
1933-45, some 800 German-speaking Jewish refugees fleeing the Nazis were 
received in Turkey (Yetkin, 1996: 250). Yet Turkey did not alter its immigration 
policy radically dining World War Turkey followed an immigration policy 
that prioritized the reception of Muslims fi'om the Balkans and the Caucasus 
regions (Kirişçi, 2000: 3). Therefore, the reception of Jewish refugees fleeing en 
masse from Nazi persecution remained l im i t ed . In  addition to the general 
fi'amework of immigration policy. Law on Professions and Services for Tmkish 
Citizens No. 2007, passed in 1932, also restricted the hnmigration of Jews fiwm
Although Germany annexed Austria in ’38, most historians date the war to Sept. ’39, when 
Britain and France declared war on Germany after it invaded Poland.
It was only after Turkey signed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Geneva 
Convention) in 1951 that it adopted a modem asylum policy. Accordingly, Turkey became obliged 
to accept refugees fleeing persecution in Europe (Kirişçi, 2002).
It should be noted that the Turkish ambassadors to France’s Vichy puppet government saved 
around 3,000 Jewish French citizens who were former Turkish citizens. They also provided forged 
Turkish citizenship documents to Jews who were in imminent danger of being sent to 
concentration camps (Shaw, 1992: 8).
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Europe (Bali, 2000; 331; Levi, 1998; 99). The law imposed restrictions on non- 
Turkish citizens holding certain occupations and professions. Therefore, Jews 
subject to these restrictions were not granted refugee status in Turkey and their 
immigration was prohibited. Among the Jewish refugees received were 
intellectuals, scholars and artists who were recruited to lead Istanbul University’s 
educational reform program (Bali, 2000; 331-32; Levi, 1998; 97-99). These 
professors established universities in Turkey in 1933-45 and furthered the nation’s 
scientific advancement (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001; 370; Franz, 1994; 329).
The second aspect of the impact of the European refugee wave on Turkey 
was transit migration. Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust with Palestine as 
their destination used Turkey as a transit coimtry en route. However, fearing that 
many would instead settle within its own borders, Turkey did not grant full 
refugee status to these immigrants (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001; 371; Kirişçi, 
2000; 10).^“* Two domestic laws set Turkey’s policy towards transit migration. 
The Law on Passports enacted in 1938 stated that individuals who wished to use 
Turkey as transit site to immigrate to other countries would not be allowed to 
enter its border without a visa from their destination country as well as sufficient 
money and means for the journey. Law on the Settlement and Travel of 
Foreigners No. 3529, also passed in 1938, stated that the deportation of non- 
Turkish citizens out of Turkey was possible with Council of Ministers decisions
Turkey’s status as a safe transit site for Jewish migrants to Palestine dated back to the 1920s 
when Istanbul was used by Russian Jews on their way to the Holy Lands (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 
2001: 291). Even after 1948, Turkey continued to serve as an unofficial tençorary asylum and safe 
transit country for Jews en route to Israel (Frayman et al. 2000: 12). For instance, in 1979 Turkey 
allowed Jews fleeing Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran to enter and stay temporarily without a visa 
(Kirişçi, 2000: p: 10-11).
143
and that the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for the deportation of 
immigrants with foreign citizenships (Bali, 2000; 333). Under the law, transit 
visas would be issued only to those with official entry visas and travel tickets to 
Palestine. The Turkish government cooperated with Britain in its efforts to stem 
illegal human traffic to Palestine and developed a policy that combined a 
willingness to make some concessions with a desire to remain in control of the 
refugee flow (Ofer, 1990: 162-63). On the one hand, Turkey provided assistance 
to European Jews by allowing Istanbul to be used by the Jewish Agency and other 
Jewish groups set up to assist and rescue East European Jews (Shaw, 1992; 6, 
17).^  ^Furthermore, it did not interfere with the local Jewish commimity’s efforts 
to lend aid and support to Jewish refugees. On the other hand, the restrictions on 
refugees without the required documents sometimes led to disasters such as the 
1942 Struma case (Gdkay, 1993).^  ^ However, overall Turkish policy towards 
transit and/or illegal migration was in favor of Jewish refugees on their way to 
Palestine (Ofer, 1990: 164), as shown by how 37,000 European Jews used Turkey 
as a transit site to immigrate to Palestine from 1934 to 1944 (Benbasse and 
Rodrigue, 2001: 292).
35 Such Jewish organizations as Aliya, Betar, Sohnut, Ne’emanei Tsion and Hahalutz aided Jewish 
transit migration through Turkey during World War II (Bali, 2000: 405; Yetkin, 2002: 40).
The incident known as the Struma case was named after the sinking of the ship Struma, which 
was carrying to Palestine Jewish refugees who had been expelled fi-om Romania. The Struma was 
in poor condition and during its course through the Black Sea, it was forced to stop at Istanbul to 
make repairs. After these repairs, however, the Turkish authorities did not allow the vessel to 
remain docked because its passengers lacked the necessary immigration documents. Britain 
refused to provide the entry visas for Palestine, and the Struma went back into the Black Sea. 
Shortly afterwards, the vessel was struck by a missile and sank. The identity of the attackers 
remains unknown, but 768 immigrants drowned. There was only one survivor.
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The Jews of Turkey, on the other hand, did not go to Palestine en masse as 
did their European counterparts but rather joined in the wave of immigration in 
small numbers. The emigration of Turkish Jews to Palestine from 1923 to 1948 
was largely illegal and unsystematic. Visas for Palestine were strictly controlled 
by Britain, and priority was given to applicants from Central European and 
Balkan countries. Permits for Turkish Jews to immigrate to Palestine were given 
in very limited numbers by the British authorities. Since married couples were 
issued a single visa for the entire family, fake marriages were performed among 
Jews in Turkey in order to obtain this family visa. Apart from legal means of 
emigration, there were also illegal ways to get from Turkey into Palestine. Some 
Turkish Jews emigrated there using fake documents or without passports (Bali, 
2000; 408).
The main factors behind the emigration of Turkish Jews to Palestine 
during World War II were the fear that the Nazis would also come to occupy
i
Turkey, Zionist ideals such as helping the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine, and the Turkification process (Bali, 2000: 405-6).^  ^ The 1942 Capital 
Tax also served as a cause of this emigration (Bali, 2000: 406; Benbasse and 
Rodrigue, 2001: 383; Dündar, 2000; 61; Levi, 1998: 158).^ * In 1943-44, aroimd 
4,000 Jews emigrated (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 383). Just after World War 
n, this emigration fell, but the decrease only continued until Israel declared
One source suggests that in 1946, only 1% of the Jews living in Istanbul were Zionists 
(Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 292).
The Capital Tax was previously discussed in Chapter II.
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independence in 1948. From 1946 to 1948, it is estimated that only 121 Jews 
emigrated from Turkey to Palestine (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 392). The 
mass immigration seen after 1948, however, will be discussed in the following 
parts.
3.4 Jewish Emigration from Turkey to Israel
The establishment of Israel transformed the conventional Jewish 
movement from Turkey into a mass wave of emigration. Jews in Turkey greeted 
the establishment of an official state of the Jews with great enthusiasm. Since 
Turkey’s single-party period had ended with the Democrat Party emerging as a 
strong opposition party which granted more freedom and relaxed some of the 
more rigorous aspects of secularism, the immediate mass emigration wave to 
Israel following its founding was mainly due to Israel’s attraction (Weiker, 1988: 
23).^  ^Naturally, Turkish Jews immigrated to Israel not as part of an exchange of 
populations as had been the case with some Arab countries such as Iraq or 
Yemen. They were able to return to Turkey and therefore they maintained their 
ties there.
In the great wave of 1948-51, a total 34,547 Jews -  making up nearly 40% 
of the Jewish community in Turkey at the time -  emigrated from Turkey to Israel 
(Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 386; Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003).'*°
However, it must also be noted that Jews emigrated to countries other than Israel as well. 
According to one estimate, between 1948-1973, around 20,000 Jews emigrated to countries like 
France, Austria and American continents (Liberies, 1984; 141).
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From May 14, 1948 until that November, 4,362 Jews emigrated from Turkey to 
Israel (Weiker, 1988: 21). Turkey, having not recognized Israel immediately after 
its proclamation of statehood, suspended permits to emigrate there in November 
1948, in response to objections from Arab countries. However, this restriction did 
not stop the emigration of Jews through illegal means. In particular young Jews 
seeking to avoid conscription in Turkey emigrated to Israel, sometimes using Italy 
or France as transit sites (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001; 384; Levi, 1998: 157). In 
1949 Turkey officially recognized Israel and so cancelled all the travel and 
immigration restrictions. The Turkish state neither promoted nor obstructed 
immigration to Israel but after the suspension of permits to emigrate to Israel was 
lifted in March 1949, a breakneck rush ensued, with around 26,000 going in that 
year (Weiker, 1988; 21). Jews were able to emigrate to Israel directly from Turkey 
without having to use transit sites. This wave continued in 1950 with 2,491 
emigrants and in 1951 with 1,388 (Weiker, 1988: 22). By early 1951, after even 
Jews who felt encumbered by business or family responsibilities in their desire to 
emigrate from Turkey to Israel ended up leaving, the mass migration was 
completed (Weiker, 1988: 21). After 1951, the emigration of Jews to Israel 
slowed down but has continued, though in lesser numbers, until today (Tekeli, 
1990; 63).^ *^
40 Israel received many waves of immigrants from various countries since its foundation. The wave 
of 1948-1951 is commonly known as the “Great Wave,” a term used to differentiate the first wave 
to Israel from the consequent ones. In a similar vein, the migration from Turkey between 1948- 
1951 is called great wave.
However, not all the Jews in this emigration wave stayed in Israel. In the mid 1950s, 10% of the 
total immigrants returned to Turkey. Some returnees later re-migrated from Turkey to other 
countries in Europe and North and South America (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 386).
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In the great wave of 1948-51, a large majority of the emigrants came from 
the lower classes (Liberies, 1984: 142; Tekeli, 1990: 63). They were by and large 
involved in low-skill occupations with experience in crafts and industry, and they 
moved to Israel for access to better opportunities to elevate their economic 
status.'*  ^ These lower classes were less influenced by alliance schools and the 
republic’s modernizing trends. Furthermore, they were less upwardly mobile and 
more disadvantaged in terms of access to opportunities for economic betterment. 
Among this group of poor emigrants, there were also those forced under the 
Capital Tax to sell all their property, becoming lower class in the process (Levi, 
1998: 158). In addition to the desire for better life opportunities, there was also the 
impact of religious beliefs. The lower-class emigrants had a strong Jewish 
identification deeply rooted in the traditional and religious institutions of the 
Jewish community. The messianic belief played a role in the emigration of lower- 
class Jews to Israel. Especially the elderly, notwithstanding illness or advanced 
years, emigrated to Israel in keeping with their belief in the promised land (Bali, 
2003: 266). Still, economic factors were the dominant theme among lower-class 
emigrants in their motivation to move. Most of the lower-class emigrants did not 
speak Hebrew, nor had they any knowledge of the conditions they would face 
upon their arrival in Israel.
Another group of emigrants in the great wave of 1948-51 was that of 
young Jews. There were many subsets within this group, one being that of upper-
According to Walter Weiker, in 1935 the occupational breakdown of Jews in Turkey was as 
follows: 24% in trade, 20.5% in industry and artisanship, 4.4% in the service sector and 45.9% in 
unidentified occupations. This last group is argued to have had migrated to Israel after its 
establishment (Weiker, cited in Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 246).
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middle and middle-class youth. Most of them had high school and university 
educations. They also had a strong sense of Jewish identity, but were more 
influenced by Zionism (Weiker, 1988: 17, 30). As stated above, Zionism was not 
a powerful mass ideology among Jews in Tmkey, though during World War II 
some Jews, especially younger ones, came to find it attractive. The Turkish state 
did not believe that the ideology of Zionism posed a threat to its fundamental 
pillars (Bali, 2003: 352). At that time Zionist associations and groups were weak 
in terms of both numbers and organization (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 292). 
The most prominent Zionist organizations in Turkey were N e’emanei Tsion, 
Betar, Hahalutz and Irgun Tsinoi Be Kusta. These organizations not only aided 
illegal migration to Israel from Tmkey before 1949, when restrictions on 
migration were lifted, but also spread the ideology of Zionism to young Jews to 
recruit them to move to Israel and help establish a Jewish state. Apart from 
Zionist ideals, some of these young Jews, who were either university students or
j
recent graduates of universities in Turkey, emigrated to Israel to pursue careers in 
public service. As members of Turkey’s non-Muslim minority, they believed it 
would be impossible for them to find positions in civil service due to 
discrimination against non-Muslims in state recruitment policies. Thus they 
sought rather to try their chances at forging a public service career path in Israel. 
Another subset among emigrant youth was made up of young Jewish women. 
These women were mainly from lower-class families who were unable to pay 
drahoma*^ to Jewish grooms for marriage. So that their daughters could get
Drahoma is a Jewish custom. It is the dowry paid by the bride to the groom before marriage.
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married to Jewish men in Israel without need for drahoma, such families 
supported their daughters’ emigration to Israel (Bali, 2003: 266). Young males at 
or near the age of conscription made up another subset of this youth wave. These 
men wanted to avoid being drafted by the Turkish military. Turkey permitted 
emigration to Israel, and passports were easily obtainable. However, they were 
given to male citizens only upon proof that their legal military service had been 
fiilfilled. Therefore, these young men emigrated to Israel through illegal means 
and without the use of Turkish passports (Bali, 2003: 190).
Migrants fi'om Turkey to Israel in the great wave of 1948-51 were settled 
in various kibbutzim, moshavim, small villages or migrant camps. Some 
immigrants from Turkey were involved in establishing kibbutzim or moshavim, 
but their number was low compared to other immigrant communities (Weiker, 
1988: 20-21).'^ The infrastructure conditions of these settlements were poor. 
There was a scarcity of food, drugs and energy. There was also a cultural divide 
between the immigrants from Turkey and other immigrant groups. Since most of 
the immigrants from Turkey did not speak Hebrew when they first arrived, in the 
beginning communication with others was done through translators. Work 
opportunities were also very limited and priority was given to Ashkenazic Jews. 
Though there were protests by immigrants criticizing conditions in the 
settlements, the Turkish Jews chose not to participate in these, presenting instead *
* *  Some of these settlements established with the support of immigrants from Turkey were 
Hagoshrim, Bet Netef, Burgata, Geva Hakarmel, Gazit, Tel Shahar, Kfar Zeharia, Olesh, Tzuba, 
Bet Jubri, Nahsholim, Gevulot, Nir Eliyahu and Kerem Ben Zimra (Bali, 2003: 293). The name 
Hagoshrim, given to the kibbutz where Turkish Jews were most concentrated, means “bridge,” 
thus symbolizing the bridge built between Turkey and Israel.
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a more passive outlook in contrast to other groups who questioned the reception 
policies (Bali, 2003: 292). Only a small number of the immigrants in the great 
wave stayed in the moshavim or kibbutzim, as most of them moved to small 
towns, such as the formerly Arab town of Yahud, where they found work and 
small houses to settle in. Through their immigration, Turkish Jews carved 
themselves out a place in two sectors they had never been involved in while still 
in Turkey. One of these was agriculture. Jews in Turkey were mostly urban, and 
there was no Jewish peasantry in either the times of the Ottoman Empire or the 
Turkish Republic. Instead, Jews were concentrated mostly in trade and 
artisanship. However, when they immigrated to Israel, they took up work in 
agriculture. Another addition to their occupational mix was the defense sector. 
Although these Jews had not pursued professions in the Turkish Army, among the 
migrants from Turkey in Israel there were several who were recruited to the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) as professional soldiers (Weiker, 1988: 81).
The mass immigration of Turkish Jews to Israel in 1948-51 not only 
affected the immigrants themselves but also caused immense changes in the 
profile of the Jewish community which chose to stay behind (Bali, 2003: 148). 
Since Jewish community leaders moved to Israel not in the 1948-51 wave but 
rather in subsequent years, the ranks of leadership saw no immediate changes. The 
foremost shift occurred at the mass level, mainly in the class structure. The mass 
emigration to Israel left the remaining Turkish Jews with a more homogenous 
class structure. Since it was mainly lower- and middle-class Jews which chose to 
move, the remaining Jews in Turkey presented a more middle- and upper-class 
picture, one with a higher socio-economic status.
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Another prominent change resulting from the mass emigration of 1948-51 
was the disappearance of Jewish communities and neighborhoods from various 
towns of Anatolia and the Balkans (Andrews, 1992: 223-224). If they elected to 
stay in Turkey, Jews from these towns usually ended up moving to the bigger 
cities of Istanbul or İzmir. The development of urban Istanbul and Izmir also 
played a role in this internal migration. In addition, non-emigrant Jews living in 
such traditional Istanbul Jewish neighborhoods as Balat, Kuledibi, Galata, 
Hasköy, Ortaköy largely moved to newer areas such as Şişli, Osmanbey, Taksim, 
Nişantaşı and Kurtuluş, all districts which took on a higher socio-economic 
character in the 1950s and ‘60s (Bali, 2003: 368; Weiker, 1988: 15). A similar 
pattern emerged in İzmir, where former residents of such districts as îkiçeşmelik, 
Karataş and Göztepe moved within the city to Alsancak, Basmane, Çankaya and 
Karşıyaka. These new settlements were distinguished from the previous ghetto­
like closed neighborhoods by their more dispersed and integrated characters. Such 
internal movement also tended to weaken the solidarity of the Jewish community.
The importance placed on community welfare associations by Turkey’s 
Jews was reduced not only by the weakening of community bonds over time but 
also by the declining number of poor Jews in need of community support, as most 
of them ended up emigrating to Israel. Since traditional, conservative Jews tended 
to move to Israel in the mass emigration, this accelerated the adaptation of the 
remaining Jews to Turkey’s secularization and homogenization process (Bali, 
2003: 369). In addition, Zionism as an ideology lost its significance for the 
remaining Jews, especially for the upper class (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 
297). After the mass emigration to Israel, the community leaders remaining
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tended to resist any show of support for Israel, fearing that Zionism would 
threaten the relationship between the Turkish state and the Jewish community. 
After Israel’s founding, moreover, in the eyes of the general public the previous 
common image of Turkey’s Jews as engendering fear gave way to a Jewish image 
of courageousness (Bali, 2003: 355).
After the emigration of 34,547 Turkish Jews to Israel in the 1948-51 
period, up through 2001 another 27,473 made their way to the Jewish state, for a 
grand total of 62,020 Turkish Jews moving to Israel since its foundation to 2001 
(Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). The subsequent emigrations from 
Turkey to Israel after the great wave were smaller in number and saw fluctirations 
in certain periods. A total of 6,871 emigrants arrived in Israel in 1952-60,4,793 in 
1961-64, 9,280 in 1965-71, 3,118 in 1972-79, 2,088 in 1980-89, 1,215 in 1990- 
2000, and finally just 108 in 2001 (Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). As 
a close look at these figures indicates, Jewish migration to Israel showed increases 
during and just after Turkish political and economic turmoil, provided Israel’s 
own attraction factors remained stable (Franz, 1994: 333). For instance, following 
the September 6-7, 1955 Events, the number of emigrants climbed to 1,710 in 
1956 and to 1,911 in 1957, as compared to just 339 in 1955 (Weiker, 1988: 22). 
Similarly, after Turkey’s 1960 military intervention, the number of emigrants shot 
up from 387 in 1960 to 1,829 in 1961 and 968 in 1961 (Weiker, 1988: 22). The 
1964 conflict in Cyprus between Turks and Greeks also led to a spike in the 
number of emigrants, which rose above 1,000 in both 1964 and 1965. The number 
of emigrants also rose above 2,000 for the four years from 1969 to 1972 as a
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result of both the 1971 military intervention and economic woes/^ Also, when 
street violence among Turkish leftist and rightist groups reached its worst level in 
1979-80, leading to the military intervention of September 12, 1980, the number 
of Jewish emigrants rose to nearly 1,000 per year (Weiker, 1988: 22).
Post-1951 emigrants from Turkey to Israel were different from those of the 
great wave of 1948-51. As stated above, the initial mass emigration changed the 
profile of the remaining Jewish community in Turkey. Therefore, Jews who 
emigrated after 1951 were mainly from the middle- or upper-middle class. In 
occupational terms they were mostly tradesman, but there were also many 
professionals (Liberies, 1984: 140). Job opportunities for Jews in Turkey were 
very limited due to a process of modernization along with the shrinking economy 
of the 1970s. Traditionally, Jews would inherit small shops from their fathers or 
fathers-in-law. At a time when the impact of modern financial and economic 
mechanisms began to be felt in both foreign and domestic trade, and when foreign 
exchange was strictly controlled in an import-oriented economy, these Jews saw 
no future in the jobs they inherited from their fathers. As a result, trying their 
chances in the rising Israeli economy of the 1970s seemed a better bet. These 
emigrants were able to continue in similar occupations as those they held in 
Turkey with the advantage of fitting into previously established communities of 
Turkish émigrés.
It should be noted that the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War that ended with Israel’s victory also 
drew some of Turkey’s Jews to move to Israel. Not only the pride felt on the Jewish side in 
winning a war in just six days attracted many Jews worldwide -  including those from Turkey -  to 
Israel, but also Israel’s economy moved into a period of development and prosperity after the war.
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Some of the young Jews who emigrated to Israel in the late 1960s did so to 
attain a better university education. Others arrived in Israel at a yoimger age to get 
a good education at Israeli boarding schools at the intermediate or high school 
level. From the ‘60s until the 1980 military coup, education at the high school and 
university level in Turkey was highly politicized. There were severe ideological 
clashes between the right and left that fi’equently flared into violence. These 
yoimg Jews thought that education in Israel would not only be better but also 
safer. As this violence spilled outside the school walls and campuses into the 
streets, threatening the daily life of civilians, many Jews who felt endangered by 
the atmosphere of conflict moved to Israel. Terror began to be a factor spurring 
emigration, especially after the late 1960s, and it dominated the motivation to 
emigrate in the late ‘70s in particular. In 1979-80, emigrants were dominated by 
families with high socio-economic status who believed Israel would offer a more 
secure life.
The mass emigration of 1948-51 also caused splits in family ties with the 
remaining Jews. Therefore, in the subsequent migrations, those who had remained 
behind in Turkey but then chose to emigrate did so for family unification. The 
previous immigrants helped these newcomers, either fiiends or relatives, to find 
jobs and housing. Most of the post-‘60s emigrants settled in Bat-Yam.'*  ^ They 
were mainly middle-class immigrants firom Turkey who maintained close
46 Bat-Yam is Israel’s most prominent settlement with a majority Turkish émigré population. It hes 
south of Tel-Aviv along the Mediterranean coast and resembles Turkey’s Izmir province on the 
Aegean. Its populace is generally dominated by lower- and middle-class Turkish Jews. The 
Russian aliya of the 1990s, however, has brought many ex-Eastem European and Russian Jews to 
the region.
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community ties amongst themselves. Upper-class families who immigrated after 
the mid-‘70s and early ‘80s tended to settle in Ramat-Aviv or Herzeliya (Weiker, 
1988; 43). Although the newcomers had more information about Israel than 
previous immigrants from Turkey, they were still not prepared in tenns of 
knowing Hebrew (Weiker, 1988: 31). The immigrants of the great wave generally 
spoke Ladino within their communities and families. However, the subsequent 
immigrants, who were more integrated into Turkish society, knew Turkish better 
than Ladino, and therefore they spoke more Turkish amongst themselves or in 
their households.
Besides emigration from Turkey to Israel, there has also been return 
migration in the opposite direction. In general, returnees to Turkey were 
immigrants from all periods who foimd themselves unable to integrate into Israeh 
society. The main reasons for return migration to Turkey were as follows: 
polarization between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews; poor living conditions in 
the moshavim and kibbutzim; disappointed expectations; misinformation about 
conditions in Israel prior to migration; and the emerging liberal economic and 
social policies in Turkey (Bali, 2003: 313). There are no exact, reliable figures on 
the return rate among emigrants from Turkey in Israel, but estimates put the 
number at around 3,000 (Weiker, 1988: 6). Upper-class immigrants living in 
Ramat-Aviv and Herzeliya tended to have a higher rate of return than earlier 
groups. Their return to Turkey was mainly due to the post-1980s liberalization 
period. Still, the rate of return migration from Israel back to Turkey can be 
considered low in comparison to return rates among other immigrants groups and 
significant in indicating the good integration of Turkish Jews in Israel.
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Today, it is estimated that the number of immigrants from Turkey to Israel 
has reached around 100,000-150,000, including the offspring of the first 
generation of immigrants, (Franz, 1994: 329; Yetkin, 1996: 56).*  ^ It is estimated 
the current number of Jewish immigrants from Turkey living in Israel who have 
not given up their Turkish citizenship is around 20,000.'** These immigrants live 
in Israel either with residence permits or have dual citizenship, both Turkish and 
Israeli.'‘^
In general, Turkish Jews in Israel were integrated into Israeli society and 
became “invisible” -  that is, undistinguishable from other Israelis (Weiker, 1988). 
As a specific immigrant group they shunned involved in mass movements, 
protests and political parties but rather conformed themselves to the general 
milieu. Although mainly Sephardim, they do not affiliate themselves to other 
Sephardic groups but rather to Turkey and Turkish culture. The process of 
migration to Israel transformed the Jews of Turkey into Israeli Turks in Israel 
(Bali, 2003: 341). The Turkish Jews in Israel consider themselves a Turkish 
diaspora and try to retain their Turkish culture (Yetkin, 1996: 257). Although they 
do have contact with other immigrants from Turkey and are involved in the 
activities of immigrant associations, they maintain an identification with the
47 According to official Israeli statistics, in 2001 Turkey was considered the country of origin for a 
total of 82,400 Jews living in Israel (Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). A total of 30,600 
Jews out of this figure had been bom abroad, and the remaining 51,800 were Israeli bom.
These estimates come fi-om interviews conducted by the author with personnel from Turkey’s 
Embassy in Tel-Aviv on June 18, 2003. In subsequent interviews with the personnel of the Turkish 
Consulate in Jerusalem on June 30, the current number of Turkish citizens who immigrated from 
Turkey to Israel and currently reside in Jemsalem was estimated at around 1,000.
49 There are no statistics available on naturalization broken down by country of origin.
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Israeli-Turkish community. In general, Turkish Jews in Israel perform a role of 
lobbying for Turkey’s side. Either individually or in immigrant associations, they 
serve the continued state of good relations between Israel and Turkey. They also 
serve the official Turkish position in international relations in working to counter 
the Arab, Armenian and Greek accusations against their former home (Levi, 1998: 
159). They have positive feelings towards Turkey, even those who immigrated 
due to discrimination there. Most of them maintain ties with relatives in Turicey 
and even if such are lacking, they keep an interest in the Turkish news and 
customs and a desire to revisit. Generally Turkish Jews, and especially the first- 
generation migrants who -arrived after the 1970s, speak Turkish in their home and 
with other Turkish Jews in Israel. In addition, since their efforts to learn read and 
write Hebrew were not as strong as those of some other immigrant groups in 
Israel, their Hebrew fluency is less than that of other Israelis (Weiker, 1988: 88).^ 
Turkish Jews have formed various immigrant associations. Both Irgun 
Olei Turkiya (Organization of Immigrants from Turkey) and Itahdut Olei Turkiya 
(Association of Immigrants firom Turkey) were founded in the late 1950s by 
immigrants firom the mass wave, but they were short lived. These associations 
helped to establish a forest near Tel-Aviv named after Turkish Republic foimder 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Seventies émigrés took over Itahdut and renamed it 
Itahdut Yotsei Turkia (Association of People Coming fi'om Turkey). However, its
Most Turkish Jews now living in Israel did not know Hebrew when they first arrived. The 
immigrants who arrived in the wave of 1948-51 learned Hebrew in the migration can5>s. 
Immigrants in subsequent years learned the language in the Ulpanim, which are special boarding 
or day schools expressly established for adult learners of Hebrew.
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activities were also few, as its leaders were inexperienced, welfare services 
traditionally delivered by Jewish communal organization in Turkey were 
delivered by the Israeli state, and its women members were inactive (Weiker, 
1988). Itahdut Yotsei Turkia increased its activities in the mid-‘80s with the 
Ramat-Aviv group. In 1985 the same upper-class group established the Herzeliya 
Culture Club for Turkish émigrés, but by 1990 it had closed. The middle-class 
immigrants, however, continue their activities in the Moadon Tarbut Yotsei Turkia 
(Bat-Yam Culture Club). The association Morit (Foundation for a Center of 
Turkish Judaism in Israel) was founded in 1986 by immigrants from the 1970s 
with the aim of promoting Turkish culture, but it too ended operations by the mid- 
‘90s. Israel’s only Zionist organization fovmded by Turkish Jews is Amutat Yotsei 
Hatnua Hatziyonit Be Turkiya (Association of Activists for the Zionist Movement 
in Turkey). Turkish Jews have also published newspapers and journals in Ladino 
and/or Turkish such as La Vera Luz, Haber, Dostluk, Gelişim, Sesimiz, Bülten and 
Türkiyeliler Birliği Bülteni.
Besides immigrant associations, Turkish Jews, specifically upper-class 
ones who immigrated in 1979-80, spearheaded the establishment of a Masonic 
lodge called the Nur Masonic Lodge in 1985 in Tel-Aviv. This was the first 
Turkish-speaking Masonic lodge formed outside of Turkey’s borders with the 
initiation of Turkish Jews in Israel.
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There is also a chapter of B ’nai B ’rith International in Tel-Aviv called the 
Yosef Niyego Lodge.^^ Most of the current members of the lodge are immigrants 
from Turkey, and the dominant language used in their activities is Turkish.
This brief overview of Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel having 
concluded, the next section will discuss how Israel and Turkey responded to this 
migration, with a focus on the policies and legislation piusued by both states 
concerning citizenship and migration.
3.5 Policies on Citizenship and International Migration in Turkey and Israel
Israel and Turkey are two relatively young states, both established in the
century in the Middle East. Yet, the two states have different tendencies in 
their administrative traditions. For instance, since Israel is a state founded 
predominantly by Jewish immigration, its policies and legislation regulating 
immigration are diverse. Towards this end, there is even a special ministry of 
immigration dealing with the absorption/assimilation of immigrants. On the other 
hand, Turkey has traditionally been a country of emigration. There is no ministry 
established specifically for immigration, but the Ministries of the Interior, Labor
The B ’nai B’rith (Children of the Covenant) International Association is a non-profit, non­
governmental organization founded by US Jews in 1843 with the aim of uniting Jews in service to 
their community and the world. Today it has branches in more than 58 countries. The group’s 
activities involve food and clothing drives, creating affordable homes for low-income elderly 
persons, mentoring the young, and conducting public awareness campaigns on issues such as child 
safety and cancer (http://www.bnaibrith.orgl. The first Turkish B’nai B’rith lodge, number 678, 
was founded in Istanbul in 1911 and its first chairman was Yosef Niyego. However, after the 1938 
Law on Associations abolished associations with central organizations outside Turkey, it was 
closed. Later, the B’nai B’rith lodge established in Israel by immigrants fi^om Turkey was named 
after Yosef Niyego to honor this prominent leader of Turkish B’nai Brith.
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and Foreign Affairs and their various directorates deal with immigrants and 
emigrants among other issues in their purview. There is no coordination 
mechanism among these ministries. One can argue that in Turkey there are no 
established policies on international migration but rather only ad hoc 
arrangements. Therefore, the question of how Israel and Turkey dealt legislatively 
and policy-wise with Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel will by necessity be 
two separate discussions.
Immigration to Israel has been traditionally considered a unique 
phenomenon by experts in the field (Shuval and Leshem, 1998: 10). In 
international migration, immigrants normally move to a new destination from 
their home country but in the case of immigration to Israel, Jews are perceived to 
be initially “in exile” from their home country -  Israel -  and to be returning to 
their “original homeland” in the form of return of the Diaspora. The Israeli law 
regulating Jewish immigration to Israel is even called the Law of Return. The 
immigration of the Jews is not restricted and Israel’s commitment to immigration 
is based on ideological considerations rather than economic ones (Ichilov, 2002:
5). However, with the 1980s, sui generis characterizations of immigration to Israel 
gave way to illustrations of similarities with other trends in international 
migration (Shuval and Leshem, 1998: 39). Hence, immigration to Israel has begun 
to be viewed as sharing characteristics with immigration in the European context, 
against a backdrop of Western countries such as Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom as well as traditional immigration-destination countries such as Canada, 
the United States and Australia admitting large numbers of migrants, refugees, 
asylum seekers, foreign workers and persons seeking family unification.
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Furthermore, immigration to Israel in the 1990s is more closely connected to 
economic conditions there than to ideological factors (Shuval and Leshem, 1998: 
11, 17). Despite post-1980s efforts to draw parallels between immigration to 
countries in Western Europe and traditional immigration-destination coimtries on 
the one hand and Israel on the other, there remains a strong difference -  to wit, 
although immigration to the first set of countries is subject to limitations or 
quotas, Jewish immigration to Israel has never been restricted but on the contrary 
is encouraged by Israel.^  ^ Since the founding pillar of Israel is its status as a 
Jewish state, Jews, wherever they are, have the potential right to immigrate to 
Israel whenever they want, upon fulfilling the conditions under the Law of Return 
(Shuval and Leshem, 1998: 13). The ex-Soviet aliya that brought in its wake an 
increase in organized crime and prostitution provoked discussions in Israel in the 
mid-‘90s on the possibility of putting restrictions on immigration. Nonetheless,
these suggestions remained on the level of mere discussion, and the Law of
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Return was left unchanged. Today, the Law of Return, first passed in 1950 and 
later amended in 1954 and 1970, remains Israel’s main legislation regulating its 
reception policies. As described previously, the 1952 Nationality Law, which 
refers to the Law of Return, also sets forth criteria for naturalization. However, 
this law underwent few changes, with the last amendment including further 
stipulations on acquiring citizenship by residence added in 1980.
There are other forms of migration to Israel besides that of Jews, too. When Israel prohibited 
Palestinians working in Israel, it opened its gates to guest workers from various coimtries. These 
guest workers may turn into permanent workers over time leaving Israel with a task of integrating 
a great part of this non-Jewish population socially, culturally and politically (Baubdck, 2001).
162
Although Israel’s laws on citizenship by immigration were not altered 
radically, there were shifts in the state’s absorption policy. Immigration to Israel 
since 1948 to today has not occurred gradually but rather in waves of immigration 
marked by large number of immigrants in short periods of time (Lipshitz, 1998: 
2). These waves of immigration affected not only the country’s economic, social, 
demographic and cultural structure but also that of the entire Middle East. Since 
the 1950s, the Israeli state has intervened in migration towards its shores and 
applied a diverse set of reception and absorption policies. Upon the receipt of an 
immigrant certificate, which is a booklet issued by the Ministry of Immigrant 
Absorption to register all types of assistance given to persons with immigrant 
status; immigrants were supported with housing, employment, education and 
welfare in their first years in Israel. In a way, immigration to Israel was strictly 
planned by the state fi’om above to absorb the immigrants regardless of market 
forces. Such an absorption strategy was a reflection of the Israeli political 
economy which has been characterized by centralization, widespread ownership 
of major enterprises, and strong collectivistic policies (Eisenstadt, 1992: 173)
However, with the recent wave of migration that started in the ‘90s fi’om 
the former Soviet Union, the state shifted its strategy of intervention fi'om above 
using a service-intensive institution to a new strategy of direct absorption 
(Lipshitz, 1998: 2; Leshem, 1998; 307). Under this new policy, upon their arrival 
in Israel immigrants were given an absorption package, as it is called, that 
included a sum of money to cover expenses for a limited period of time as well as 
other benefits. The immigrants were fi’ee to use this subsidy according to their 
personal wishes and considerations. The aim of this new model was to reduce
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immigrants’ dependence on the state, speed up the immigrants’ integration, and 
make the absorption process more efficient and flexible. Governmental 
responsibility for their absorption was transferred to the community and the local 
government (Leshem, 1998: 307). This change also reflects Israel’s switch from 
centralized economic policies to a free-market based model begun in the 1980s. 
Since the wave of immigration from ex-Soviet states turned out to be larger than 
officially forecasts, especially the spike of 1997, the government began to 
intervene to an extent in constructing new housing units on the territorial 
periphery (Lipshitz, 1998: 2). Although absorption basket diminished dependency 
on state and magnifies the importance of more veteran immigrants as source of 
information as well as assistance, it reinforces former identities and affiliations 
and slows doAvn integration into Israeli society (Ichilov, 2002: 6).
Today, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption provides assistance to 
immigrants as broken down into seven categories: New Immigrants, Immigrant 
Minors, Immigrant Citizens, Children of Immigrants, Immigrant Families, 
Returning Minors and Returning Residents.^^ Immigrants falling under these 
categories are provided an absorption basket according to their age and socio­
economic status as financial assistance for their initial arrangements, renting an
The Ministry of Absorption’s website at http://www.moia.gov.il describes these categories as 
follows: new immigrants are individuals who came to Israel and received the status of “new 
immigrant” from the Ministry of the Interior under the 1950 Law of Return; “immigrant minors” 
are new immigrants who came to Israel before reaching age 17; “immigrant citizens” are 
individuals bom abroad to Israeli citizens who are therefore ehgible to immigrate to Israel imder 
the Law of Return if they do not already hold Israeli citizenship; “children of immigrants” are 
individuals who immigrated to Israel close to the time that their parents did; “immigrant families” 
denotes families all members of which have immigrant status; “returning minors” are minors who 
left the country with their parents before age 14 and returned after reaching age 17; and returning 
residents are Israeli citizens who have spent at least two years abroad.
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apartment and living expenses. The absorption basket also covers the period of 
ulpan study, if the immigrants do not know Hebrew before their arrival. In 
addition to the financial sum given in the absorption basket, there are also grants 
that the state provides to immigrants: supplementary grants for rental expenses; 
customs tax grants for purchasing household electrical appliances; housing grants 
(i.e. assistance with rental fees, mortgage, and public housing) in cooperation with 
the Ministry of Housing; and employment grants (i.e. income insurance for six 
months, licensing, training and retraining courses, advancement and placement in 
employment). Previously, the absorption basket was granted to immigrants who 
made aliya firom countries in such regions as Eastern Europe, Latin America, and 
some Asian and Afiican countries. Immigrants coming fi’om a low socio­
economic status in their countries of origins were granted a larger amount of 
financial assistance, whereas immigrants who had better incomes were granted 
lesser amounts. The decision on how much the immigrant needed was generally 
given according to the general status of Jews in the country of origin. For 
instance, immigrants coming fi"om Ethiopia (Abyssinia) were provided with 
extensive absorption baskets, but those fi"om Turkey would receive smaller 
baskets, whereas Jews fi’om France received none. The status of Jews in Turkey 
was considered to be better than that of Jews in North Afiica and Central Asia, not 
only in terms of economic conditions, but also in terms of social and political 
status. As of 2003, however, the absorption basket became available to all new 
immigrants fi-om all countries, including France and South Africa. Furthermore, 
immigrants from Turkey started to receive equal amounts of financial assistance 
as the other immigrants. Israel, either through municipal administration or central
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government (Ministry of Interior) supports immigrant associations or cultural 
clubs. For instance, financial assistance is provided to publications of the 
immigrant associations; places for cultural and social clubs for people with similar 
country of origin are provided by the municipalities; and there are state-sponsored 
neighborhood clubs where people can come together in their spare time. Turkish 
Jews get use of these facilities as well. The bulletin of the Itahdut Yotsei Turkia is 
published under the partial sponsorship of the Ministry of Interior. The place of 
Bat-Yam Culture Club is provided by the Bat-Yam Municipality.
In addition to changes in absorption policy, there were shifts in the mode 
of integration Israel went through changes in the courses of its nation-building 
process and manipulation of immigrants’ integration. In the initial years of the 
state, the “melting pot” was the predominant Zionist ideal for the cultural integrity 
of Israeli nation. Accordingly, the steps were taken to weld various cultural 
traditions of many Jewish communities which have gathered firom various 
countries into one amalgamated Israeli culture. The creation of the Sabra, the 
offspring of the immigrants bom or reared in Israel, reflected this ideal for a new 
culture for a new nation. The vision for melting pot has been gradually replaced 
by a more pluralistic vision of Israeli culture and society (Ichilov, 2002: 6). By 
1970s, the influence of particularistic traditions on the nature of public life in 
Israel began to increase (Hacohen, 2002: 186). Consequently, the diversity among 
Jews came to be recognized. Today, there is no longer a single definition of 
identity in Israel acceptable to a majority of the population. Such a shift fi-om an 
assimilationist to a multicultural model of integration is also observable in other 
traditional immigration cotmtries like Canada or Australia.
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On the Turkish side, Jewish emigration to Israel was not dealt with special 
provisions or legislation but was rather considered within the general framework 
of existing policies and laws applicable to all groups of emigrants, regardless of 
religious affiliation. As stated previously, the Turkish state neither encouraged nor 
prohibited this emigration. In terms of citizenship, however, there arose certain 
legal issues that immigrants from Turkey in Israel could not avoid. According to 
Article 9 of Law No. 1312 (enacted in 1928), any Turkish citizen who had either 
adopted another country’s citizenship without first obtaining official permission 
from the Turkish authorities or served in the armed forces of another coimtry 
could have his/her Turkish citizenship revoked through a decision of the Council 
of Ministers. Therefore, when Israel passed its Nationality Law in 1952, 
immigrants from Turkey in Israel were faced with a citizenship dilemma. 
Obtaining Israeli nationality meant termination of Turkish citizenship and the 
closing of Turkey’s doors to them. Many had relatives remaining in Turkey they 
wanted to maintain ties with. Furthermore, since they were insecure about their 
future in Israel, they wanted to keep open the option of returning to Turkey (Bali, 
2003: 340). If immigrants from Turkey in Israel gained Israeli nationality, they 
would be obliged to get a visa from the Turkish Embassy in Israel to enter Turkey 
imder the countries’ bilateral visa arrangements. However, when they applied for 
visas with their Israeli passports which included their places of birth, the Turkish 
Embassy reminded them that they were still Turkish citizens and could only quit 
Turkish citizenship through official procedures. If no official procedures had been 
taken to terminate their Turkish citizenship, the immigrants would have to fill out 
official forms towards this end. However, since the Council of Ministers was the
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single institution authorized to revoke Turkish citizenship, the bureaucratic 
procedure took several years to be finalized and in the meantime immigrants fi-om 
Turkey in Israel would be denied visas to re-enter Turkey. Therefore, some 
immigrants tried the option of entering Turkey with their Turkish passports and 
hence avoiding the visa requirement. This method was usually preferred by 
immigrants who were able to obtain valid passports before their expiry date. 
These immigrants were able to renew their passports, just like other Turkish 
citizens, by applying either to the Ministry of the Interior or General Directorate 
of Security during their stay in Turkey or to the Txirkish Embassy in Israel.
In the case of renewing passports in Turkey through the offices of the 
Ministry of the Interior, male Jews were checked for having fulfilled their military 
service as part of the regular official procedure for both obtaining and renewing 
passports. Male emigrants who had not done their tour of duty would have their 
renewals denied. Furthermore, they would be immediately conscripted. For 
immigrants trying to renew expired passports through the Turkish Embassy in 
Israel, the embassy demanded firom them a docmnent fi"om the Israeli Ministry of 
the Interior certifying that they were not Israeli citizens. Consequently, those who 
had already obtained Israeli citizenship were not able to renew their passports at 
the Turkish Embassy in Israel and therefore had to wait for the result of their 
expulsion procedure through Turkey’s Council of Ministers.
Turkey’s requirement for the completion of procedure for expulsion fi'om 
Turkish citizenship was not only due to the state’s position of outlawing dual 
citizenship but also to the Convention to Reduce the Number of the Cases of 
Statelessness, to which Turkey became a signatory in 1973. Under this
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convention, a person could not simultaneously be a citizen of two states and if 
s/he was, s/he had to choose one or the other. In this person failed or refused to do 
so, s/he would lose the citizenship of both countries. In order that Turkish citizens 
holding concurrent citizenships would not lose both of them, Turkey demanded 
that its own citizenship be revoked, hi a way, this revocation was aimed at 
reducing the number of cases of statelessness. However, Israel’s citizenship laws, 
in contrast, permitted a dual citizenship status. Furthermore, Israel granted 
citizenship rights to all Jews worldwide under the provisions of the Law of 
Return. Jews who immigrated from Turkey to Israel would not become stateless, 
because Israel permitted them citizenship just as it did for other Jews arriving 
from other countries. As a result of negotiations between Turkey and Israel, in 
1990 Turkey abandoned the requirement for entrance visas from Israeli citizens. '^* 
Turkey decided to allow dual citizenship for Turkish citizens living abroad 
in order that they might retain their citizenship and transfer them to their children. 
The main motivation for this policy change was that the state did not want Turkish 
citizens abroad to lose their ties to Turkey (l9duygu, 1996c). Towards this end, 
1964’s Citizenship Law No. 403 was amended on Febraary 13, 1981 by Law No. 
2383.^  ^The law allowed people seeking the citizenship of another coimtry to first 
obtain permission docxunents to end their Turkish citizenship. If they had already 
obtained another country’s citizenship, they would be able to retain their Turkish
54 Ekrem Güvendiren, Turkey’s ambassador in Tel-Aviv from 1986 to 1992, played a pivotal role 
in the decision to lift the visa reqiurement.
Turkish Citizenship Law No. 2383 was published in Official Gazette No. 17286 dated March 
21, 1981.
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citizenship provided they presented the required documents within three years 
after they got the permission papers. The law’s Articles 20, 22 and 25 are 
important in terms of citizenship by immigration:
Article 20: Withdrawal from Turkish citizenship is subject to permission by 
the Coimcil of Ministers when citizenship of a foreign country has been 
acquired in any manner or when there is convincing evidence that someone 
is going to acquire a foreign coimtry’s citizenship.
ic ic le  22: If a person who wants to withdraw from citizenship is at the 
same time a citizen of another country, the withdrawal documents will be 
immediately issued to him. If a person who wants to withdraw from 
citizenship is not a citizen of another country, the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs will issue him a document of permission. When the person in 
question produces documents showing that he has acquired foreign 
citizenship, the same Ministry will give him a withdrawal certificate. In 
accordance with the rationale set by die Council of Ministers, the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs may issue a permission document to a person who wants 
to acquire another cotmtry’s citizenship. The permission document is valid 
for three years. Those who receive permission documents have to turn over 
to the competent Turkish authorities the required information and 
documents within this period.
Article 25: The Coimcil of Ministers may rule that the following persons 
have lost their Turkish citizenship: ...those who have acquired foreign 
citizenship without first obtaining permission; ...those persons abroad who 
are called by the competent authorities to do their military service or, in the 
time of war, to join home defense but have not done so within three months 
without excuse...
The new dual citizenship law had an impact on Jewish immigrants from 
Turkey living abroad. In consequence of Article 25 of the law, Jewish immigrants 
living abroad, including those in Israel, lost their Turkish citizenship by the
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decision of the Council of Ministers of 1981-83.^  ^ In those same years, a total of 
1,171 people, including Jewish immigrants from Turkey in Israel and the other 
groups falling under Article 25, applied for permission to withdraw their Turkish 
citizenship (Soyank, 2000: 187).
After dual citizenship was allowed in 1981, Tiirkish Citizenship Law No. 
403 was amended in 1995 with Law No. 4112 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1995).^’ 
The amendment granted dual citizens the same set of rights as those of other 
Turkish citizens. The amendment embraced the rights of residence, acquiring and 
transferring real estate, inheritance and labor, as follows:
Those who held Turkish citizenship by birth, and acquired another coimtry’s 
citizenship after getting permission to withdraw by the decision of the 
Council of Ministers and their inheritors, may benefit from the rights of the 
Turkish citizens in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real 
estate, inheritance and labor, so long as provisions for the national security 
and public order of the Turkish Republic are reserved.
As the general framework of the laws on citizenship in Turkey prescribed 
that withdrawal from Turkish citizenship or obtaining another country’s 
citizenship could only be carried through with the permission of the Turkish state, 
the amendments allowed dual citizenship for mainly three groups: those who had 
Turkish citizenship and sought the Turkish state’s permission to get additional 
Israeli citizenship; those who took Israeli citizenship without the permission of the
It should be noted that it was not only Turkish immigrants in Israel who lost their citizenship; 
extreme leftists who fled the country due to clashes with rightist groups and the resulting 1980 
military coup also shared the same fate (Soyank, 2000: 190).
Law No. 4112 was published in Official Gazette No. 22311 dated Time 12, 1995.
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Turkish state but wanted to maintain their Turkish citizenship; and those who had 
had their Turkish citizenship revoked but wanted to re-eam it.
Apart from the policies adopted by Israel and Turkey regarding 
citizenship, the state of bilateral relations between these countries also impacted 
the Turkish Jews in Israel. Relations between Turkey and Israel have long been a 
contentious issue of domestic Turkish politics. Islamist and extreme nationalist 
groups within Turkey have utilized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as fodder for 
their political campaigns, usually taking sides with the dominant Palestinian view 
and condemning Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East. Criticisms of Israeli 
foreign policy have been one of the rare areas of common ground between groups 
on Turkey’s extreme left and right. However, official Turkish foreign policy 
towards Israel differs from the strident voices of domestic politics (Salt, 1995). 
Turkey has always conformed to the decisions of the United Nations. With respect 
to Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations, there has been improvement, and several 
cooperation agreements were signed after the mid-1980s in such diverse areas as 
culture, education, science, sports, agriculture, hydro politics, trade and defense. 
One of the most important aspects of cooperation between the two coimtries 
concerned the conscription of dual citizens. Conscription is obligatory and 
universal in both countries.^® Before 1998, conscription of dual Turkish-Israeli 
citizens was regulated independently in accordance with the domestic laws of 
each country. Therefore, male dual citizens were drafted into military service in
In Israel, conscription is universal and covers both men and women age 18 and older. Turkey, 
on the other hand, requires military service of men only, age 18 and over.
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Israel and Turkey respectively. Under a 1998 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
regulation, dual Turkish-Israeli citizens who had already completed their 
obligatory military service in Israel were exempted from their military duty to 
Turkey. The regulation also specified that the exemption was valid only for those 
who had either been bom in Israel or who immigrated and settled in Israel before 
the age of 18.
In Sinn, Israel and Turkey, still-young states founded in the 20* century, 
have regulations and policies on citizenship and international migration which are 
subject to constant transformation and emendation due to changes wrought by the 
tide of events. Israel is a country which was founded solely by international 
migration and consequently, it has a broader scope of legislation regulating the 
flow of immigration into its borders. Turkey, however, has traditionally been a 
country of emigration. It started to enact regulations on citizenship and 
international migration after the 1950s concurrent with its integration into the 
international community’s migratory regime. The migration of Turkish Jews to 
Israel is an issue that has implications for nations, the sender and the recipient. 
International relations between these two countries play an important role not only 
for the flow of Turkish Jews to Israel, but also vis-à-vis the status of both as 
nations of the Middle East, a region long dominated by years of dispute.
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CHAPTER IV 
JEWS IN TURKEY:
BOTH TURKISH CITIZENS AND A NON-MUSLIM
MINORITY
4.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter to discuss how Jews in Turkey perceive 
and experience being citizens of the country as well as members of a non-Muslim 
minority group in light of the empirical evidence obtained in the field research in 
Turkey. The three aspects of citizenship -  legal status, identity and civic virtue -  
are given special focus. Since the Jews’ minority status affects their perceptions 
and experiences of citizenship, the discussion in this chapter aims to explore the 
relationship between citizenship and minority issues. It attempts to explore the 
history of Turkey’s Jewish minority, as touched on in previous chapters, but here 
in a more concrete and substantial form. Furthermore, it tries to make a case for 
the existing discussion on citizenship in Turkey with regard to the empirical 
evidence obtained in the field research. The discussion in this chapter is presented 
in four parts. In the first part, an overview of Turkish citizenship and the status of 
non-Muslim minorities per se are put forth. This part also sets forth the essentials 
of Turkish citizenship with its aspects as discussed in the literature. In addition, 
the paradoxical consequences of the dominant paradigms inherent in citizenship in 
Turkey regarding non-Muslim minorities are demonstrated. In the second part of
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the chapter, a portrayal of the general characteristics of the sample group is given. 
The profile of the respondents is drawn with use of certain sociological categories 
such as age, gender, socio-economic status and etc. In the third part of the chapter, 
the interviews findings themselves are discussed. The respondents’ perceptions of 
the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of Turkish citizenship are 
presented. Also covered are the respondents’ views concerning membership, 
belonging and attachment to the Turkish nation-state. The findings also highlight 
the experiences of the Jewish respondents as a minority group living in a Muslim- 
majority coimtry. The data is conveyed with an individual-level of analysis. The 
chapter ends with a short conclusion as the fourth part.
4.2 Citizenship and Non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey: An Overview of 
Paradoxes
Turkey is generally considered an example of a strong state (Heper, 1985). 
The structure of the state in Turkey, since its establishment, is traditionally rooted 
in Republican and imitary norms (Barkey, 2000). These characteristics of the 
Turkish state are reflected in the development of citizenship with its aspects of 
legal status, identity and civic virtue} With the proclamation of the Republic in 
1923, the legal status aspect of citizenship was incorporated in the 1924
' The development of citizenship in Turkey does not refer to a coherent and articulate mode of 
being but raAer to a transitional mode of becoming. In other words, modem Tiurkey’s 80-year 
history does not embrace a single, dominant form of citizenship, and there may be specific cases 
for different citizenship histories of various groups within Turkish society, i.e. women, workers, 
non-MiKlims, cultural minorities, the handicapped, homosexuals, etc.
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Constitution and as part of the Kemalist Reforms, civil, political and social rights 
were sustained in a protective constitutional shield secured by a legal framework 
that forms the basis of Turkish citizenship (Bilgin, 1998). However, with the 
impact of the strong state tradition dominated by Republican and unitary norms, 
the rights granted to individuals were not fettered with negative freedom -  that is, 
the absence of obstacles or constraints imposed on actions by the state or society 
confining the personal area of noninterference asserted against the state or other 
people. Rather, these rights were more societally based within the medium of 
Republican democracy and more devoted to positive freedom -  that is, individuals 
were granted rights as they were defined in the legal framework (Kazancigil, 
1994). By the same token, the duties and responsibilities of citizens defined in the 
legal fi-amework prioritized rights and privileges. Therefore, citizenship in 
Turkey, contextualized in the strong state tradition, tended to emphasize the 
obligations of individuals in their relation to the state rather than the obligations of 
the state to its citizens (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998).
The identity aspect of citizenship in Turkey is also related to the strong 
state tradition and monist state structure. Although social movements based on 
identity politics were more discernible in the political arena after the 1980s, all 
throughout the Republican period starting in the 1920s claims for the recognition 
of identities were generally met with suspicion and regarded as disrupting the 
unity of the Turkish nation (Akçam, 1995; Göle, 1994). Furthermore, any demand 
for group rights or special interests was perceived as threatening the general 
interest and the integrity of society, which were guaranteed by the unitary and 
centric state. Consequently, the use of categories of gender, race, relig i^on.
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ethnicity and class in Turkish politics has frequently been restricted in the 
regulation of state-society relations and in the interests of the stability of 
democracy. Even more, the politicization of these categories served as grounds to 
shut down political parties imder the Law on Political Parties (Parla, 1991).
The civic virtue aspect of citizenship is closely related to the Turkey’s 
history of modernization and the maturation of its civil society. As discussed in 
previous chapters, Galston classified the civic virtues into four categories, namely 
the general virtues (i.e. courage, law-abidingness, loyalty), social virtues (i.e. 
independence, open-mindedness), economic virtues (i.e. the work ethic, capacity 
to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change), 
and political virtues (i.e. capacity to respect others, willingness to demand what 
can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness 
to engage in public discourse) (Galston, 1991). The development of civic virtues 
is extensively interconnected with criteria for modernization such as education 
levels, socio-economic status and urbanization. Turkey’s modernization process 
did not unfold as the result of class divergences due to industrialization and 
iu“banization (Keyder, 1997). Rather, the conventional means for modernization 
were provided by the state itself (Keyder, 1989). In other words, Turkey’s socio­
economic development has been state initiated and directed, which can be 
evaluated as a natural end of the nation’s etatism (İnsel, 1983). Therefore, it can 
be argued that the development of civic virtue in Turkey is a byproduct of the 
state’s modernization policies. By the same token, the strong state tradition in 
Turkey also served to impede the development of civil society (Uğur, 1998). 
Despite the growth of civil society since the 1980s, the state of civil organization
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in Turkey is very low when compared to levels in advanced Western democracies 
(Poulton, 1999).
The framework drawn above of the legal status, identity and civic virtue 
aspects of citizenship in Turkey reflects a state-centric approach to citizenship. 
How the citizens themselves experience and perceive citizenship in Turkey is a 
subject generally very much ignored by the social science disciplines within the 
coimtry. There are many different ethno-religious groups within Turkish society, 
and studies on the impact of membership in these groups could provide important 
clues for understanding citizenship at the individual level and hence contribute to 
the existing literature on citizenship in Turkey. Since Greeks, Armenians and 
Jews are the only ethno-religious groups officially recognized as minorities by the 
state, studies on these non-Muslims exploring their citizenship in Turkey would 
complement the studies in political science. Such explorations of citizenship in 
non-Muslim groups would not only provide empirical evidence on the relationship 
between the three aspects of citizenship but also would highlight how citizenship 
is perceived and experienced by different segments of society.
As stated in previous chapters, after the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey, the three major non-Muslim Millets -  the Armenians, Greeks and Jews -  
were granted the status of minority groups under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and 
protected under the provisions of international law. The transformation of the 
three major Millets into minority groups refers also to a transformation from 
Ottoman subjecthood to Turkish citizenship (Unsal, 1998a). This process of the 
construction of modem citizenship was accompanied by a process of nation­
building. Over time, the presence of these non-Muslim minorities declined due to
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population exchanges as well as emigration and so by the early 21*‘ century, there 
were only around 60,000-65,000 Armenians, 20,000-25,000 Jews and 3,000 
Greeks left in Turkey (Karimova and Deverell, 2001).
The process and transformation of nation-building pointed to two major 
paradoxes concerning the citizenship of non-Muslim minorities. First, despite the 
use of the category of ‘Turk” as a building block of the nation-state, what this 
word referred to was initially ambiguous and this ambiguity was to persist, with 
the definition and content of Turk undergoing changes in different eras, subject to 
the influence of events and developments (Kadıoğlu, 1998). ‘Turk” was 
sometimes used to refer to an ethnic group originating in Central Asia, sometimes 
to a legal status of citizenship on the basis of identity cards and passports, and 
sometimes to individuals sharing a common culture, i.e. Turkish culture (Deringil, 
2000).^ As to the religion of the “Turk”, Islam was fi-equently used to define 
Turks, the Turkish nation and Turkish culture. In other words, Islam provided a 
reference point in the definition of the “ordinary Turk” (Kirişçi, 2000; Özbudun, 
1998; Özdoğan, 1996). As a result, the inclusion of non-Muslims in the normative 
definition of Tmk was problematic in an epistemological sense (Keyman and 
îçduygu, 1998). What's more, the difference of non-Muslims was recurrently 
underlined, and not only was their membership, belonging or attachment to the 
Turkish nation repeatedly questioned and tested, but also their loyalty to the 
Turkish state (Bali, 2001). If one considers loyalty to the state one of the
 ^A number of studies on citizenship and nationalism in Turkey illustrate the periodic shifts in the 
definition and content of ‘Turk.’ See Bora (1995, 1998), Kirişçi (2000), Poulton (1997) and 
Soyank (2000).
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predominant hallmarks of Turkish political culture and official nationalism, thus 
prioritizing loyalty to the Turkish nation (îçduygu et al. 1999), it can be argued 
that there is an abstraction in the stipulation of non-Muslims vis-à-vis the Turkish 
state which is fi'equently revisited.
The second paradox inherent in the citizenship of non-Muslim minorities 
with regards to nation-building is due to the monistic conceptualization of 
citizenship in Turkey. In the nation-building process, efforts to sustain cohesion 
have employed a deliberate ignorance of the differences present within society 
(îçduygu et al. 1999). As a reflection of this ignorance, in addition to RepubUcan 
norms that invalidated any claims for special rights on the basis of social 
segments or territorial/local specificity, calling attention to the rehgious 
differences of non-Muslims by the non-Muslims themselves was problematical. It 
should be noted that under Turkey’s principle of secularism, religion was strictly 
confined to the private sphere. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter H, religion 
and more specifically Islam served as a distinguishing criterion of the center and 
periphery cleavage in Turkish politics (Mardin, 1990). However, such a 
confinement of religion to the private sphere aimed not at regulating the status of 
non-Muslims but rather at that of Muslims themselves in order to prohibit Islamic 
fimdamentalism. Yet, this restriction of religious intentions in the public sphere 
still had an impact on non-Muslims, one leading to a strict confinement of their 
religion to the private sphere. Therefore, non-Muslims were faced with the 
complex dual task of trying to win the use of their communal rights pertaining to 
the public sphere such as the fi'eedoms of education, organization and expression 
yet at the same time avoiding drawing attention to their religious differences fi'om
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the majority of society. This was another dilemma frustrating the situation of non- 
Muslims in addition to frequent tests of their loyalty at the hands of the Turkish 
state.
Turkish society has many different religious communities among its 
Muslims (i.e., the Alawites, Caferi/Twelver Shiites and Sunnites), and its non- 
Muslims (i.e., the Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Yezidis and Assyrians). Despite 
these differentiations, the history of citizenship in Turkey does not point to a 
broad spectrum embracing the multicultural aspects of Turkish society. In other 
words, Turkey’s administrative system did not develop citizenship pohcies 
specific to particular societal subgroups. Furthermore, despite occasional copious 
praise of the rhetoric on universal citizenship, the actual policies on citizenship 
changed over different periods. As discussed in Chapter H, these policies were 
closely related to the conjecture of historical periods in Turkish politics. For 
instance, although citizenship was more interconnected to the nation-building 
process in the Early Republican Period imtil 1945, in the Multi-Party Democracy 
Period it was more related to changes in the center-periphery cleavage until the 
1970s, and in the Post-1980 Period, policies on citizenship were more reflective of 
globalization. The changes witnessed throughout these periods show that although 
the basis of citizenship was rooted in the foundation of the Republic and the 
dominant norms of Kemalist reforms during the Early Republican Period, it was 
subject to several changes and amendments in later decades. With respect to non- 
Muslims, these changes signified that consistent and unilateral policies on 
citizenship had been lacking.
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Furthermore, the historical development of citizenship in Tinkey was 
related to the rhetoric of different nationalisms and their definition of Turkish 
nationhood. The various types of nationalism such as civic nationalism, ethnic 
nationalism and culhnal nationalism were present in every period of Turkish 
politics (Kadioglu, 1996a).  ^ According to civic nationalism, those people hving 
within the boundaries of Turkey who consider themselves Turks and who are by 
nature citizens of Turkey are thereby and therewith Turkish. Turkish citizenship 
rested on loyalty to the state and therefore, regardless of ethnicity, language or 
religion, all the majority and minority groups were considered Turkish. Civic 
nationalism, with its emphasis on territorial citizenship, seems to embrace non- 
Muslims as Turks. In ethnic nationalism, by contrast, Turks were defined as a 
coherent and definable ethnic group which was and should be the dominant group 
in power. Under this conception non-Muslims were not considered ethnic Turks, 
and their loyalty to the Turkish nation was subject to constant examination. In 
cultural nationalism, emphasis is given more to the cultural aspects of society, and 
Turkish culture symbolized more a culture shaped by pre-Islamic Turkic 
traditions, Islamic ethics and morals and the Turkish language. Therefore, citizens 
not affiliated with Islamic culture by religion or who did not speak Turkish were 
excluded fi-om the definition of Turkish national by cultural nationalism. 
Although there are various kinds of Turkish nationalisms that prescribe different 
definitions for a Turkish nation or prefer to emphasize certain aspects of the 
Turkish nation more strongly than others, none of the nationalisms dominated
 ^ For a brief discussion on the civic, ethnic and cultural forms of nationalism, see Kymlicka 
(1995).
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Turkish politics or society in one historical period; rather, most of them co-existed 
simultaneously, though the acknowledgement or popularity of each differed 
according to the period. Also, as one analyst argues, there are shifts from one type 
of nationalism to another, e.g. the shift from an emphasis on ethnic origin to 
Islamic cultural traits within a single decade (Kadioglu, 1996a).
With respect to citizenship in Turkey, it can be argued that although the 
forces of civic nationalism tried to implement from above identified Turkishness 
within the medium of territorial boimdaries and safeguarded territorial citizenship, 
it also made use of the cultural aspects prescribed for the Turkish nation. As 
discussed in Chapter n, language reform or the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” 
campaign of the 1920s and '30s and the use of Islam as a unifying tool for Turkish 
society in the Post-1980 period are some examples of the shifts in different 
nationalisms and hence shifts in the development of citizenship in Turkey. The 
Republican state led to the creation of an official, monolithic and absolute Turkish 
identity by ignoring the multiplicity of identities within society (Kadioglu, 1996a). 
At the same time, over non-Muslims it cast a shadow of ambiguity or constant 
questioning of their affiliation to Turkish identity.
The citizenship of non-Muslim minorities either in different periods of 
Turkish politics or in different nationalisms in Turkey is generally treated as a 
specific category. However, trying to put these communities under a holistic 
differentiation of Muslims and non-Muslims may lead to methodological 
complications. There are significant differences not only within Muslims but also 
within non-Muslims. As discussed in the previous chapters, not all of Turkey’s 
non-Muslims are officially recognized; rather, only the Armenians, Greeks and
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Jews are. The characteristics of these three minority groups differ from each other. 
For instance, the Jews are not historically as homogeneous as the other non- 
Muslims in terms of language and ethnicity, as there are many subgroups among 
the Jews such as the Ladino-speaking Sephardim (the vast majority today), the 
Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim, the Karaites who refuse rabbinical tradition, and 
the Arabic- or Kurdish-speaking Mizrahis. Jews in Turkey display a more urban 
and middle-class outlook and in terms of education and knowledge of foreign 
languages, they can be considered to be at a more advanced level than other non- 
Muslims. Historically, these Jews are economically concentrated in trade or 
artisanship. Furthermore, since the times of the Ottoman Empire, the Jewish 
community has been known as the most loyal group among non-Muslims, a 
reputation which it enjoys even today. Although the loyalty of non-Muslims has 
frequently been tested, the Jews have suffered less from the consequences of this 
testing than have the Greeks and Armenians. International relations between 
Ankara and Athens affected in turn the Greek minority in Turkey, as did relations 
between Turkey and Armenia in the case of the Armenian minority. By the same 
token, when relations with these countries got rocky, this made the relations of the 
Armenians and Greeks with Turkish state and society unsteady. But to the 
contrary, the relations between the Jewish community and Turkish state officials 
followed a more stable path.
In light of the above-mentioned framework, making the Jewish community 
the focus of our study promises an in-depth understanding of the three aspects of 
citizenship in Turkey -  legal status, identity and civic virtue. The question of how 
Jews perceive, experience and interpret their citizenship in Turkey as members of
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a specific group has the potential to challenge the state-centric approach of studies 
on citizenship and the nation-state.
4.3 Profile of the Sample Group in the Field Research in Turkey
In order to explore how Jews in Turkey perceive and experience 
citizenship, a total of 31 interviews were conducted in field research carried out in 
Turkey. The structures of the research and its methodological concerns have been 
previously described in detail in Chapter I of this dissertation. In the present 
section, we will discuss the results of the research in terms of the general 
characteristics of the interview respondents. So as to briefly present who the 
interviewees were, a short profile will be given.“*
The sample group selected firom Turkey’s Jewish population presented a 
diverse picture in terms of age, gender, marital status, citizenship, place o f birth, 
place o f residence, employment status, education level, socio-economic 
background and ethno-religious origin.^ As to the age of the respondents when 
they were questioned, the youngest was 20 and the oldest 89. The mean ratio of 
all the subjects’ ages at the time of the interviews was 52. Out of the 31 total
 ^For a tabular illustration of the interviewees’ profile, see Appendix D.
 ^ Some of these characteristics are inherited ones not subject to change over time such as ethnic 
origin, gender, place of birth, etc. However, others are sociologically dependent ones such as 
education, occupation and marital status, as they may change during the course of the interview 
subjects’ lives. Therefore, the below portrayal of the interviewees by and large encompasses their 
characteristics as pertinent only at the time of the interviews.
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interviewees, 10 fell into the 20-40 age group, another 10 were in the 40-60 
bracket, and the 11 remaining were over 60.
In terms of gender, the 31 respondents were nearly evenly split, with 15 
women and 16 men. The marital status of the respondents also varied: nine were 
bachelors, two were divorced, two were widowed, and the remaining 18 were 
married, with just four having entered into a second marriage. The married 
respondents overwhelmingly had Jewish spouses, with only two married to 
Muslims. For the respondents with children, most had two, especially among 
those who were married or had been previously, but at the time of the interviews 
some had one child or three.
With respect to citizenship, all of the 31 respondents had Turidsh 
citizenship. Three had dual citizenship, one Turkish-Israeli and two Turkish- 
Italian. These foreign citizenships were either gained through marriage or 
inherited from their parents. The remaining 28 interviewees had only Turkish 
citizenship. All of the respondents’ Turkish citizenship was gained by birth; in 
other words, all were bom in Turkey. Broken down by place o f birth, all but six of 
the 31 interviewees had been bom in the province of Istanbul, with three bom in 
İzmir, two in Edime and one in Çanakkale. These birthplaces correspond with 
regions where the Jewish community in Turkey traditionally settled before the 
1950s and ‘60s. Today, the majority of Jews in Turkey live in Istanbul and Izmir. 
Hence, by place o f residence, all of the respondents were living in Istanbul at the 
time of the interview, though some had recently moved there from İzmir. The 
districts that the respondents lived in correlated to their income level. Those with 
high or medium income levels lived in districts such as Beylerbeyi, Levent, Ulus,
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Göztepe, Kemerburgaz and Nişantaşı, ali of which are typically middle- or upper- 
class areas. Those with comparatively lower income levels lived in Haskoy and 
Kuledibi, areas characterized by lower- and lower-middle class residents.
In terms of employment status, out of total 31 respondents, nine of the 
respondents were employed at the time of the interviews. Out of these nine 
respondents, seven were males and two were females. Among these working 
respondents, six of them were employed in mostly white color jobs (two 
economists, one procurement specialist, one lawyer, one academician and one art 
creator) and the remaining three were self-employed (two traders and one 
accoimtant). None of the respondents held positions in state offices, excepting one 
academic working at a state university. Out of the total 31 respondents, 22 of them 
were not employed at the time of the interviews with 13 females and nine males. 
Among the respondents who were not employed, 11 of them were housewives, six 
of them were retired mostly from blue color jobs, three of them were students, one 
of them was unemployed but was actively in search of job and one of them was 
fulfilling his military service. Employment statuses differed markedly according 
to gender, as most of the female respondents neither worked outside the home nor 
were seeking jobs at the time of interviews. Those between 20 and 40 years of age 
were, however, either working or hoped to work at some point of their lives. In 
contrast, the majority of the male respondents held occupations or professions, 
and were working, excepting those who were unemployed, fulfilling their military 
service, enrolled in university, or already retired at the time of the interviews.
The education level of the 31 respondents also varied. Two of the 
respondents had no education at all, two had finished elementary school, three had
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finished jimior high school, 12 were high school graduates, one had finished two 
years of school beyond high school (college), six were university graduates, four 
had master’s degrees and one had a doctorate. The education level of all of the 
respondents was higher than that of their parents. For instance, if a subjects’ 
mother had completed only primary school, the subject herself had gone further 
than this, by for example graduating high school. Similarly, if the father of an 
interview subject had finished high school, the subject himself had gotten a 
university education. Thus the Jewish respondents exemplified a generational 
educational advancement during Turkey’s Republican modernization period.
If one looks at the occupation and education levels of the respondents, it 
can be argued that the socio-economic background of the 31 respondents reflected 
more of a middle-class orientation in terms of social class stratification. Most of 
the interviewees were of the middle socio-economic class in terms of income and 
education levels. Although some were poor, these were mainly older respondents 
living in nursing homes. The middle-age and younger Jews varied between lower- 
to upper-middle class.
With respect to ethno-religious origin, out of the total 31 respondents, 30 
were Sephardic Jews and one was an Ashkenazic Jew. Ethno-religious origin also 
includes the respondents’ profiles in terms of mother tongue and the language 
used in both private and public spheres. The mother tongues of the respondents 
were as follows: two had French, 15 had Ladino and 14 had Turkish as their 
mother tongue. However, the interviewees with non-Turkish mother tongues 
stated that Turkish was not completely alien to them and that their command of it 
had improved during their elementary school years. None of the respondents
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characterized either Turkish or Ladino as a foreign language. Although either 
language could be their mother tongue, they did not exclude the predominance of 
other languages in their lives. All of the respondents knew Ladino, although their 
level of proficiency varied by age, with the older generations more at home in the 
tongue. Since Ladino is generally a spoken language and is rarely written, none of 
the respondents reported knowing how to read or write it. Most of the respondents 
knew more than two foreign languages, with French as the most common 
followed in descending order by English, Italian, Greek, Hebrew, German and 
Arabic. Some of the interviewees who considered Spanish a foreign tongue had 
taken or were taking courses in it so as to improve their Ladino (due to the latter’s 
heavy Spanish elements).
4.4 How Do Jews in Turkey See Citizenship? Their Experiences and 
Perceptions
In this part of the chapter, the findings obtained fi"om in-depth interviews 
with members of Turkey’s Jewish community are analyzed in light of the 
questions guiding this research. The main questions are: How do Jews in Turkey 
perceive and experience citizenship? How is the interface between the Jews’ 
minority status and Turkish citizenship?; and ‘What is the relation between the 
legal status, identity and civic virtue of citizenship in Turkey in the sample group 
of Jews? The scope of the findings is diverse and multifaceted due to the in-depth 
nature of the interviews, but only the data relevant to the main research questions 
are discussed. The question “How do the interview respondents perceive their
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membership, belonging and/or attachment to the Turkish nation-state?” also 
complements the basic research questions and refines the interface between 
Jewish minority status and Turkish citizenship. Therefore, the discussion which 
follows unfolds according to the three aspects of citizenship, yet the findings on 
membership, belonging and attachment to the Turkish nation-state also 
supplement the discussion.
The profile of the respondents shows that there have been changes in the 
general profile of Turkey’s Jewish minority since the foundation of the Republic 
to the present. As laid out in Chapters II and HI, the sociological and demographic 
features of the Jewish minority imderwent radical changes due to two major 
phenomena, namely Turkey’s process of modernization and westernization and 
the emigration abroad of Turkey’s Jews, mainly to Israel. As a result of these two 
forces, the changes in the general profile of the nation’s Jewish minority followed 
a sequential and successive track along the course of modem Turkey’s own 
history. In accordance with Turkey’s path of modernization and westernization, 
firstly, in the 1930s and ‘40s, the Jews’ educational level rose due to reforms of 
secular education; in the ‘50s, traditional Jewish settlements and neighborhoods 
were eclipsed by the emergence of new districts in metropolitan areas due to 
internal migration and urbanization; since the ‘50s, in particular, the Jews’ Ladino 
and French mother tongues were over time both replaced by Turkish; since the 
‘70s, the occupational and professional spectrum open to Jews expanded; and 
since the ‘80s, gender relations grew more liberal over time and the status of 
Jewish women rose as more women started to receive higher education, take 
public jobs and gain visibility. Secondly, as the result of mass Jewish emigration
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to Israel, the remaining Jews in Turkey took on a more homogeneous socio­
economic makeup. Most of them moved to cities and metropolitan areas, 
specifically to Izmir and Istanbul. These changes are also evident in the profile of 
the respondents given above. For instance, the older generations were bom in 
traditional Jewish neighborhoods, whereas the newer generations were bom in 
cities with no experience of such neighborhoods. Drawing on these research 
results showing similarities with the historical transformation of Turkey’s Jewish 
minority, one can argue that the age and hence generation of the respondents will 
be helpful in understanding their experiences and perceptions of citizenship. In 
other words, rather than an analysis taking into account separately the 
respondents’ gender, socio-economic status and ethnic origin, a general evaluation 
of the interviews on the basis of generation will be preferred. The special focus on 
the generation of the respondents will help not only to illuminate the changes in 
the history of Turkey’s Jewish minority and the development of citizenship by 
period but also to clarify the roots of the differences and similarities between and 
among the respondents in their ideas, thoughts, values and life histories. 
Therefore, the analysis of the interview findings rests on a special focus on the 
respondents’ generation as marked by their age groups.
4.4.1 Turkish Citizenship and the Legal Status of Jews in Turkey
Jews in Turkey were granted the status of minority group with the Treaty 
of Lausanne and hence special social and cultural rights. However, with the 
enactment of the 1924 Constitution and 1926 Civil Law, the elites of Turkey’s
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Jewish community voluntarily opted out of Lausanne’s Article 42 in favor of 
accepting the Turkish Civil Code to regulate Jews. In line with their view that the 
state’s regulations on citizenship (as protected by constitutional provisions) put 
Turkey’s Jews in the same legal framework of rights and responsibilities, the 
Jewish elites rejected special legal treatment towards their community. However, 
developments such as the Thrace Incidents, the Incident of the Reserves, the 1942 
Capital Tax, and the September 6-7 Events cast into doubt the universal nature of 
the existing legal framework.
In the interviews, it emerged that in terms of the respondents’ general 
historical knowledge, they were unaware of the special rights granted to non- 
Muslim minorities in the Treaty of Lausanne and the decision to opt out of Article 
42. Even more, most of the interviewees thought that since they were Turkish 
citizens, they had the same rights and responsibilities as their fellow citizens, and 
that in due course calling them part of a ‘minority’ group was incorrect or 
misleading. One respondent who knew little about the status of minorities in the 
Treaty of Lausanne had this to say:
We don’t have a minority status. I don’t know the details, but we don’t want 
to be considered minorities. In the past, we rejected minority status. This 
was the right decision. As far as I know, the Greeks and the Armenians have 
minority status, but Jews don’t. I don’t know for certain, but I think it’s like 
that. I know we’re not a minority. (FRIT27, 65, female)^
* Each interview subject’s code, age and gender follow every interview quotation within 
parentheses. Individual codes are used to identify every subject. The style for the codes is as 
follows: ‘FRIT’ is an acronym for ‘field research in Turkey.* The number following FRIT is the 
number (1-31) given to the interviewee. Therefore, each interviewee code begins with FRIT but 
ends with a unique number. These codes are listed in Appendix D that gives interview subjects’ 
general profile. TTie number next to the code refers to the age of the interviewee which is followed 
by female or male identifying the gender.
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When the respondents were reminded about such developments as the 
Capital Tax which impinged on the equal and universal framework of citizenship, 
all agreed that such past hostile practices against non-Muslims, including Jews, 
were unequal and discriminatory in nature and disrupted imiversal citizenship. 
Though they generally acknowledged that such discriminatory acts could possibly 
recur, the respondents largely emphasized that these hostile practices were a thing 
of the past; that Turkey since its establishment had gone through many phases of 
its nation-building; in these phases the Jewish community had experienced some 
occasional hardships; but that these difSculties could be interpreted neither as 
oppression of nor systematic discrimination against the Jews. However, there 
were marked variances among respondents of different age groups. The plus-60 
elderly respondents knew more about these incidents, as some of them had 
witnessed them firsthand with their families when they were young or were 
personally victims of such acts. As two interviewees recollected:
I lived through the Thracian Incidents myself personally. At that time, my 
father was away in Istanbul to buy fabric for the shop and I was left alone 
running it. Then gangsters from other towns came to Kirklareli [where the 
subject lived- a Thracian province where Jews were concentrated 
historically] and looted all the shops owned by the Jews. These people even 
raped the sisters of my relatives in Kirklareli and other young Jewish girls. 
There was no doubt about these events; they were crystal clear. After 
looting the Jewish shop a few blocks away from ours, these gangsters came 
to our fabric shop. [At that time] there was a Tatar tailor who sewed clothes 
for customers with fabric sold from om shop. His pame was Akif. He didn’t 
usually visit our shop a lot but that day, the day that the gang of looters 
came to rob our shop, by chance he was there. One of the looters told me to 
open up one parcel of fabric, which I did. Then he asked several pointless 
questions. I understood that he was trying to start an argument. Akif, who 
like an angel was watching what the man was doing, asked me whether I 
was going to keep selling goods or would agree to sell the shop to him. Then
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he went up to this gangster and said, ‘This Jewish man is selling the store to 
me. You can buy fabric from me tomorrow morning.’ The gangster was 
surprised and left the store without taking anything from it. After he left, 
Akif and I hugged each other. I thanked him for this brilliant idea and for his 
help. In this way we were saved from the incidents known as the Thrace 
Incidents. But other Jews weren’t as lucky as we were. (FRIT28, 86, male).
During the time of the Capital Tax, my father had to pay 350,000 liras 
[around 100,000 US dollars]. We had to sell our apartment to pay this. In 
those days, all the capital was accumulated by minorities. Jews were very 
rich. This tax was a policy of the government in power at that time. The 
government wanted to take capital that was in the hands of minorities and 
transfer it to Muslims. A person may have nationalistic feelings. This is 
normal. Why should all the money be in the hands of a particular societal 
group? I think the Capital Tax was normal but its implementation was unfair 
because you could neither object to the amount levied nor appeal it in court. 
They should’ve also demanded the same amount from the Muslims, but they 
didn’t. The tax rate for non-Muslims was much higher than the rate for 
Muslims. (FRIT27, 65, female)
Although elderly Jews knew of past discriminatory acts committed against 
themselves and their community in Turkey, they chose not to transmit this 
knowledge to subsequent generations, tending instead to either ignore or forget 
this discrimination. In the words of one:
These bad events should be forgotten. They don’t oblige modem Turkey in 
any way. These are minor historical details which belong only to the past. 
(FRIT21, 77, male)
Some of the over-60 respondents thought that Turkey’s laws were nearly 
impartial but that there were specific ones barring Jews from taking positions in 
state and military offices as well as the Grand National Assembly (Parliament), 
though when asked to specify these claims, were imable to do so. Those who 
thought that there were no specific laws of the type mentioned above raised the
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specter of invisible social barriers.^ Two interviewees expressed their thoughts as 
follows:
They don’t recruit us as public officials. Not in this country. There are very 
few Jews in Turkey. Nobody in the Jewish community would work to 
become a state official. We’re citizens of this country. "W^en we’re drafted 
they give us weapons. But they don’t make state officials out of us. I don’t 
know why. (FRITS, 83, male)
Jews can become deputies in Parliament but not president or prime minister. 
Nobody in our community has said he would want to become prime minister 
Or a state minister. Other people in the political parties wouldn’t support a 
Jewish candidate. There’s no legal barrier, but there may be problems 
among individuals. (FRIT25,71, male)
It was interesting to note that while some of the elderly respondents 
believed that the supposed legal or social barriers to Jews taking high state or 
political office were actually sensible, others criticized the barriers. One defended 
the supposed restrictions as follows:
I wouldn’t favor Jews holding high state positions, because there are very 
talented and competent people among the Muslims for these positions. I 
don’t think Jews or other non-Muslims would be proficient to serve the state 
because they’ve never done so in the past. They don’t know how to 
administer a state. I would prefer a Turk to administer the state. I also think 
that in terms of identity, it wouldn’t be proper for a Jew to hold a high 
position. The majority is Muslim and a Muslim should represent this 
majority. Society wouldn’t accept a non-Muslim representing it. They may 
see a Jew as being different fi'om themselves. There is democracy in Tiurkey 
and it’s a real democracy. But democracy means that the majority rules 
society. This is normal. (FRIT23, 77, female)
’ In Turkey’s legal system, there are no specific laws that bar Jews from taking positions in offices.
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On the other hand, there were also strong criticisms of these supposed barriers, 
like so:
If you’re a Muslim, you can become a state minister but if you’re a Jew, you 
can’t. This is unfair. Are there any Jews in state offices? Not a one. There 
should be Jewish state officials. As the Jewish community we tolerate it but 
Europe is keeping a file on this. Turkey can’t join the European Union 
unless it recruits non-Muslims to state offices. The European countries want 
to see Jewish officials in Turkey. Democracy also demands this. Everybody 
knows this for a fact, but we can’t see what’s right under our noses. 
(FRIT29, 81, female)
Interview respondents who were middle-aged (40-60) at the time of the 
interviews pointed to a transitional generation in terms of similarities and 
differences with the preceding and rising generations. These interviewees were 
better educated than those over 60. However, they also lacked knowledge of the 
special rights granted to them by Lausarme, nor were they well informed about 
past discrimination such as the Capital Tax, as they had learned very little firom 
their families about this history or had been very yoimg at the time. However, in 
contrast to their elderly counterparts, the middle-aged group generally believed 
that accoimts of past discriminatory acts should be transmitted to future 
generations so they could learn about the history of Jews in Turkey:
I heard about the Capital Tax not firom my own family but fi-om my mother- 
in-law, whose family became poor after paying the tax. I’m of the opinion 
that every incident in history, whatever it may be, must be told to the young 
generations. This isn’t like raising children in hatred or enmity but 
everything must be made open to them. We can forgive but we’ll never 
forget. This must be the basic principle for every issue. (FRIT30, 45, 
female)
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The middle-aged interviewees by and large considered themselves to be 
Jewish-origin Turks and Turkish citizens. Most of them believed that on the legal 
level, there were no special provisions for Jews and that furthermore, all the laws 
were equal for Turkish citizens, all of whom had the same sets of rights and 
responsibilities despite religious differences. However, they also said that at 
various times there might have been social barriers blocking Jews. Such barriers 
would have involved not being recruited to the professional ranks of the Turkish 
Armed Forces, discrimination in seeking driver’s licenses or involving the draft, 
and being passed over in political and bureaucratic promotions. Some of the 
points mentioned by the respondents are as follows;
The laws are generally equal but there are restrictions. For instance, Jews in 
Turkey can’t be police officers. I don’t think this is a big problem because I 
guess no Jew in Turkey would want to be a police officer but every Turkish 
citizen should have the same rights as others have. (FRITS 0,45, female)
A Jew can become a bureaucrat or a minister if they’re capable but first they 
have to change their name. A person named Solomon can’t serve as a state 
minister in Turkey, but a Nedim or Selim could. (FRITH, 52, male)
Jews can’t be parliamentary deputies because they can’t bring more votes to 
their party. If a Jew was elected to Parliament, I think the Islamists and 
rightists would be unhappy about this. Some years ago there was a Jewish 
deputy but he was beaten by other deputies. A Jew can’t become a military 
officer, first because he wouldn’t want to because Jews earn good money in 
other fields, and second he wouldn’t be recruited to the army even if he 
wanted to. However, we have Jewish state officials. For example, there are 
academics in state xmiversities. (FRIT 14, 50, male)
For most of the respondents, the term ‘Turk’ referred to their citizenship 
status. Although many of them mentioned that Muslims were the majority in 
Turkey, they argued that Turk was a more appropriate term to use for the nation’s
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citizens. Most of them agreed that a Turk and hence a Turkish citizen was a 
person who was bom in Turkey, was living in Turkey, spoke Turkish and shared 
the same culture and history as the society in Turkey.
The citizens of Turkey are Turks. I don’t believe people who say Turks 
came originally from Central Asia. These are just made-up stories. In my 
opinion, ‘Turk’ doesn’t mean the same as ‘Muslim.’ Of course, 99 percent 
of the Turks in Turkey are Muslims but when someone mentions a Turk, I 
don’t immediately think that that person is a Muslim. ‘Turk’ sounds like a 
secular adjective, one separate from religious identity. In my opinion, a Turk 
is a citizen of the state of Turkey. (FR rri2 ,45, male)
For me, there’s only one criterion for being a Turk, and that’s holding a 
Turkish identity card. It’s a legal status prescribed by citizenship. Looked at 
this way, all the people living in Turkey are Turks. I don’t make distinctions 
of religion, race or language within Turkish society. Of course there are 
some people who have two passports at the same time. They are also Turks. 
For instance, there are Turkish citizens living in Germany. Not only we, but 
those people in Germany are also Turks. (FRITIO, 49, female)
The respondents age 20 to 40 see themselves as Turks having Turkish 
citizenship, as we see in these interview excerpts:
The word ‘Turk’ brings to my mind people who were bom in Turkey, live in 
Turkey and hold Turkish citizenship, I think citizenship is the basic criterion 
for being Turk. Some say that ‘Turk’ by nature means Muslim. I disagree. 
There are many people in Turkish society who aren’t Muslims. Turkish 
citizens who live under the Turkish flag are Turks, in my opinion, whatever 
their religion. (FRITS, 27, female)
The first thing that comes to my mind about ‘Turk’ is Turkish citizen. Turk 
means culture, in my opinion. Of course it’s important to speak Turkish, but 
ethnic background isn’t. People generally believe that Turks came originally 
from Central Asia, which is wrong. This is a very cosmopolitan society with 
people from different places. I don’t think Turk is an ethnic origin. Speaking 
generally, it’s true that most Turks are Muslims. But this is how it looks like 
when seen from outside. If we look from inside, we see that Turks are
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people holding Turkish citizenship. Citizenship marks the basis of being 
Turk. (FRITl, 35, male)
Although these young interviewees acknowledge their difference of faith, 
they think that society in general is composed of different ethno-religious or social 
backgrounds yet that these differences need not lead to disparities in treatment, 
either legally or socially. Although some of the respondents admitted that they 
had experienced, witnessed or heard about incidents that reminded the Jews of 
their difference of religion, they thought these incidents did not weigh so heavily 
on their lives in Turkey. Almost all these yoimg respondents believed that there 
were no special legal provisions which discriminate against citizens of Jewish 
origin. However, some also made points about social barriers to the recruitment of 
Jews to politics or state administration:
I’d like to get a post at the Foreign Ministry but I know that since I’m a Jew, 
I can’t. It was so obvious that I wouldn’t be recruited to the Foreign 
Ministry so I didn’t even apply. No law in Turkey would ever say, ‘Jews 
can’t take the Foreign Ministry entrance exams,’ but I know deep down that 
they wouldn’t let me pass it. This is a violation of my citizenship rights, but 
I can’t show this it’s discrimination that’s provable in a court of law. 
(FRTT4, 23, female)
When asked about past incidents which worked against Jews and non- 
Muslims in general such as the Capital Tax or the September 6-7 Events, the 
young respondents showed in their responses that their families had not told them 
about these incidents, electing instead to remain silent. Therefore, most of the 
respondents lacked relevant information about these historical events. Most of 
them said that they had heard about these incidents only very recently either
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through seeing movies on the Capital Tax or by books discussing these issues. 
After getting information from these secondary sources, they asked their families 
about what happened in Turkish history against the Jewish community. One 
interviewee had this to say:
I hadn’t had any information on these issues before. Frankly, they weren’t 
discussed in my family. Of course, this is partly due to the general character 
of Turkish society. We tend to forget our history, our past very quickly. I 
mean, not only Jews but also Muslims forget their history. Recently, I read 
some books about these issues and learned about them. (FRITl, 35, male)
When the interviews focused on the legal aspect of Turkish citizenship, the 
common theme that arose across all age groups was that equality was a right of 
citizens. In other words, the respondents from various categories of age, gender, 
socio-economic status, etc. generally emphasized equality as a basic norm of 
citizenship. Furthermore, they identified equality as a fimdamental right of 
citizenship. Equality, in their understanding, referred to a legal matter of equality 
before the law. Concerning equal and universal citizenship in Turkey, they 
pointed to the rights to be treated like others, to not be classified differently, to be 
subject to the same provisions and practices as other citizens and to not be 
distinguished by their differences of religion. Some of the interviewees had this to 
say;
To start with, one needs to be equal with others in every respect. One needs 
to have the right to obtain property, work, have access to health services, 
vote, and be nominated in elections. (FRIT15,28, male)
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One needs to have all the constitutional and legal rights. That’s what 
citizenship is as I understand it. The basic right that I have, in my opinion, is 
being equal with others. This is what I look for. (FRITS, 52, female)
Not being discriminated against and being treated equally are basic rights. 
Since we’re bom here, in this country, we demand the same rights that 
others have. (FRIT28, 86, male)
In this regard, it can be argued that when the Jewish elite opted out of 
Article 42 of the Treaty of Lausanne, this action did not indicate a contradictory 
position on the part of the Jewish community. Even more, one can argue that such 
a strong emphasis on legal equality by members of a minority group reflects a 
desire to be assimilated into the general public not through their difference in 
religion but rather their sameness in having Turkish citizenship. Some of the 
respondents went so far as to claim that the inclusion of citizens’ religion on the 
identity cards -  e.g. writing ‘Muslim’ for Muslim citizens and ‘Jew’ for Jewish 
ones -  threatened the concept of equality of Turkish citizenship. All the 
respondents also pointed out that they were not in favor of special group rights for 
the Jewish community. They thought that such special rights would stand in the 
way of equal and universal citizenship.
Concerning the responsibilities entailed by Turkish citizenship, it must be 
noted first of all that the respondents mainly associated citizenship with 
responsibilities rather than rights, especially in the middle-aged and older 
generations. Generally, paying taxes and military conscription were regarded as 
the basic responsibilities borne by Turkish citizens. Furthermore, it was also 
frequently stated in the interviews that the responsibilities of citizenship were 
loyalty to the state, obeying state laws and regulations that are applied equally to
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all its citizens, conforming to the existing legal framework and fulfilling the 
prescribed duties. These views referred to a passive understanding of citizenship 
in Turkey, as shown by these interviewees, both over 40:
There are no rights but duties. I think citizenship has more to do with 
responsibilities. For instance, a citizen should obey the laws, fulfill his draft 
duty and participate in helping to solve social problems as much as is 
possible. (FRIT25, 71, male)
Loyalty to the state is important. Citizens should be loyal to the state. Also, 
citizens should pay their taxes. Military conscription is an obligation that 
must be fulfilled in any case. Voting is not a right but a responsibility. In 
short, we do what we have to, what the state requires of us. This is our duty. 
(FRITIS, 57, female)
However, with the younger generations, the responsibilities of citizenship 
in Turkey were not separable fi"om the rights granted by the state to its citizens. 
These interviewees mainly emphasized that since they were fulfilling their 
responsibilities such as obeying the draft or paying taxes, they also had the right 
to social security, education, health care, etc. in return. Their understanding of 
citizenship pointed to a more active citizenship. For instance, although the older 
respondents did not mention the possibility of the Religious Affairs Directorate 
boosting its budget/allocating money to synagogues and for Jewish religious 
affairs, the other respondents said that since they were paying taxes, their 
synagogues should receive funds from the state budget. Some statements by a 
younger respondent below referred to a more active imderstanding of 
responsibilities with regards to citizenship in Turkey, like so:
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The draft is the primary responsibility. Also, citizens must represent their 
country very well in other countries. I understand these issues as citizenship. 
I know from my male friends that when they say that they’re Turkish, girls 
have nothing to do with them. The image of Turks abroad is depressing. 
What do we try to do in Turkey? Don’t bum the flag, protect your flag, and 
sing the national anthem every morning or similar silly things. Of course 
these are also important but though Americans wear their flag as underwear 
they’re still patriotic about their country and their flag. Our people do like 
their country, but we can’t be like them. Those people are very loyal to their 
country. Citizenship is not only about rights and responsibilities. The state 
shouldn’t frustrate its citizens to further its own interests. The state 
shouldn’t block its citizens like a wall. A citizen should be united with the 
state in the same body. Citizens shouldn’t fear the police walking down the 
street as if they were fearing God. On the contrary, when they see a police 
officer, they should first think that the police are there to protect them. Why 
do I fear them? Why? (FRITl?, 23, male)
4.4.2 Turkish Citizenship and the Identity of Jews in Turkey
The various cultural, educational and social policies initiated after the 
foundation of the Republic of Turkey during its nation-building process sped up 
the integration process of its Jews to society at large. The findings of the field 
research on Jews in Turkey reflected a similarly gradual process of integration. 
One of the most significant changes seems to have been in the use of language 
among the Jews. Turkey’s Jews traditionally used either French, Ladino or 
Turkish as their mother tongues, depending on their socio-economic status, i.e. 
upper-class Jews preferred French or Turkish, but the less-educated lower classes 
favored Ladino. However, the use of French and Ladino diminished over time as 
Tiirkish started to displace the other languages. Turkish eventually became the 
dominant language used in the private sphere. The spread of the use of Turkish 
among Jews of various classes was mainly due to the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” 
campaign launched in 1927 and the national educational reform. Most of the
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respondents argued that each country should have a single dominant language, 
which in Turkey naturally would be Turkish. Furthermore, they were of the idea 
that Turkish needed to be learned by citizens who lacked it as their mother tongue. 
Having set proficiency in Turkish as a requirement of living in Turkey, they 
stressed that the nation’s Jews, especially older members of the Jewish 
community who lacked Turkish or preferred not to use it, should speak Turkish in 
the public sphere and in relations with people outside the community. However, 
most of them also emphasized that the spread of Turkish need not take the form of 
pressure or obligation but rather could be done in a spontaneous and gradual way, 
without the imposition of the state or society on those who lack Turkish. Most of 
the respondents knew about the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign. Although 
some of them lacked solid information about the campaign itself and thought of 
the stipulation to speak Turkish as a social trend in evidence since the early years 
of the Republic through today, they thought that either in as a campaign or a 
social trend, Turkish was considered as one of the essential norms of public life in 
Turkey. Yet, for them it need not be imposed by force or pressure but rather could 
be part of a gradual transition. The pressure to speak Turkish was felt most keenly 
by less-educated Jewish women fi"om the lower and middle classes who were 
generally housewives. Since they were confined to the private sphere with limited 
access to the public sphere where Turkish was more dominant, they generally did 
not know any Turkish. Some of the views on mother tongues and the languages 
used by Jews in Turkey are as follows:
Everybody should speak Turkish on the streets. When people visit the 
grocer, they shouldn’t ask for a kilo of potatoes in some other language.
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You can speak whatever language you like at home but on the streets 
communication between people needs to be in Turkish. (FRIT22, 23, 
female)
Due to the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign, after a certain period 
families started to send their children to Turkish schools so they could learn 
to speak good Turkish. My father and mother were speaking Ladino with 
each other, but my brother and I would speak Turkish. Even when they were 
speaking Ladino to us, we would answer them in Turkish. This was an 
attempt at integration. We wanted to become integrated. My grandmother 
and grandfather were living with us when I was a child. My grandmother 
didn’t know any Turkish. She was speaking Ladino. I used to mock her for 
being unable to speak Turkish. Poor grandma! (FR rri2 ,45, male)
I knew about the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign. No one ever warned 
me to speak Turkish because I knew how. But people raised in Jewish 
neighborhoods didn’t know any Turkish and so this campaign hurt them. 
They would have spoken Turkish if they had known any but they didn’t. 
They tried speaking but after a certain age they couldn’t learn well. They 
were speaking very funny Turkish. For instance, we had an Armenian 
neighbor and she wrote, ‘Do park in fi’ont of the house!’ on the wall of her 
house. Actually she meant, ‘Don’t park in front of the house!’ and she got 
angry at the cars parked in front of her house because everybody who read 
her sign parked there. I think the campaign was natural but you know, both 
parties were right. Those who wanted Turkish to be spoken were right but 
those who couldn’t speak Turkish were right as well. Today nobody can 
compel others to speak a certain language. But those times were different. In 
those times the state was pulling itself up. (FRIT21,77, male)
The respondents were also asked whether they saw any difference between 
the Txirkish terms ‘Musevi’ and ‘Yahudi.’* Most of the respondents said that they 
did not see any difference between the two terms, as both referred to believers of 
the religion Judaism and its prophet, Moses. However, some of them contended
“ Musevi is a Turkish word used frequently to refer to the followers and descendents of Moses 
(Musa in Turkish). Yahudi, also a widespread term, has the same connotation but refers more to 
believers in Judaism. Similar Turkish terms used for Christians are İsevi referring to the followers 
of Jesus (isa) and Hristiyan referring to Christians in general. Yahudi is generally considered a 
negative term and commonly used in daily life to degrade the Jews. Musevi on the other hand is 
accepted as a more polite term in the Turkish society. The findings in the field research confirmed 
the distinction as well.
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that Yahudi carried a more pejorative meaning than Musevi. Yahudi, according to 
them, was used in a context of denigrating Jews along the lines of ‘cowardly 
Jews’ or ‘dirty Jews,’ whereas Musevi was a more polite and respectful term. 
Likewise, some of them preferred that Musevi be used so as to free the term from 
any negative connotations, but there were others who felt no partiality. The 
following interview quotations demonstrate both views:
For me, Judaism is a religion. I’m not so religious, so I see it partly as a 
religion and partly as a culture. I’m a Jew. Being called Yahudi never 
bothered me. Actually Yahudi is the correct term. Musevi is the name 
coined by Atatürk for Jews, referring to the followers of Moses. I learned 
this very recently during a conference organized by a Jewish organization. 
The person giving the speech said, ‘You’re actually Yahudi. Musevi is the 
name given by Atatürk.’ I agree that Yahudi has traditionally been used to 
belittle Jews. But in my case, either Musevi or Yahudi, it makes no 
difference. (FRIT3,27, female)
I define myself as a Jewish Turkish citizen. Judaism is a religion. Of course, 
religion brings with it a Jewish culture as well, but the term Yahudi annoys 
me. Yahudi sounds like a label for degrading Jews. I prefer Musevi. Musevi 
sovmds like a religion and nothing more. I see it like that as well; it’s only a 
religion and has no other meaning. (FRIT2, 32, male)
When asked whether being a Jew meant belonging to a religion or 
national/ethnic groups, the respondents’ replies varied according to their age 
group and affiliation with Israel. For instance, older respondents seemed to 
perceive their status as Jews as meaning belonging to an ethnic or a national 
group.
Musevi and Yahudi are the same. Actually Musevi is a new word. All the 
Jews, the Jewish nation was bom in Egypt. (FRIT6,89, male)
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Those interviewees who at some time had emigrated to Israel then later 
returned to Turkey seemed to identify Jewry with nationhood or national/ethnic 
identity, like so:
Musevi and Yahudi are different things. Musevi refers to a religion, but 
Yahudi represents a nation. Israel is a state founded as the result of this 
voluntary unity. Now Israel is under attack. Its sovereignty is under 
question. As long as the existence of Israel is questioned, there will be Jews 
who will fight for the unity of the Jews. Jews in Turkey seem to be in the 
midst of an identity crisis. Some of them say, ‘We’re Turks.’ And others 
say, ‘We’re Jews.’ There are also people in the community who refuse both 
identities and see themselves as citizens of the world with no affiliation or 
identity. I’m not a religious person, but I believe in the nation of the Jews as 
long as Israel exists. (FRITl 1, 52, male)
The younger respondents, however, tended to emphasize the religious 
aspect of their being Jews, overshadowing any national aspect. The following 
quotations are examples of this self-perception:
The term Yahudi sounds more like a person who dogmatically and strictly 
sticks to the rules of religion. Yahudi reminds me of such a conservative 
person. I’m more a Musevi. I’m a modem Jew. I believe in Judaism but I’m 
not dogmatic. My practice of Judaism is flexible. For me, there are no hard 
mles in Judaism. (FRTT20, 31, female)
One of the most significant issues that emerged in the field research with 
members of the Jewish community was the varying level of integration across 
different generations. When we look comprehensively at all the interviews with 
various age groups, it becomes clear that in terms of the opinions, worldviews and 
self-perceptions voiced in the interviews, over time, by the newer generations, 
Turkish identity as a “super identity” has been displacing or squeezing out Jewish 
identity. This Turkish identity comes fi:om being bom and living in Turkey and
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therefore covers the sharing of a mutual culture and history with society at large, 
according to most of the respondents. Jewish identity seems to have been more 
emphasized by the older generations and Turkish identity more by the younger 
ones. However, it must be noted that all of the respondents referred to the 
presence of both identities in a kind of dual-identity. The following quotations 
from different age groups are examples of this dual-identity:
I define myself as a Turk. I mean, a Turkish Jew. But Turkish comes before 
Jewish and not vice versa. I’m first of all a Turk and then a Jew. (FRrr4, 23, 
female)
In terms of identity, our situation is more complex than other ordinary 
Turkish citizens. To start with, I’m a Turkish citizen. Let me put it better: 
I’m a Turkish citizen with a Jewish origin. Judaism is my religion. As an 
identity, I belong here. I’m a lawyer and a member of the Bar Association. I 
started to question my identity only after I became an adult. It’s true that I’m 
a Turkish citizen but one with a Jewish origin. I think I’m not alone in this 
feeling of divided identity. (F R m 2 ,45, male)
The Jewish community faced the problem of intermarriage, especially after 
the 1980s and ‘90s, as an apparent result of this integration process. Although 
most of the respondents affirmed integration at the level of values, they tried to 
resist the idea of intermarriage on the argument that the rising intermarriage rate 
w ^  threatening Jewish identity as well as on the specter of the already declining 
Jewish population. As a result of this resistance to intermarriage, said the 
interviewees, Jewish families constantly and persistently urge their children not to 
marry non-Jews, which results in pressure on the children. This pressure on young 
Jews seemed to be felt more among young Jewish women than young men, as one 
young single Jewish woman related:
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I’ve had Muslim boyfriends before. I like a Muslim guy right now but I 
can’t introduce him to my family. How can I when I can’t admit that I like 
him even to myself? Religious difference is a very complex issue and every 
young person in our community suffers from it. Some young Jews have 
even tried to kill themselves when prevented from marrying their gentile 
bojrfriend or girlfriend. My mother and father would be extremely upset if I 
married a gentile. No matter what you do, bring a Jewish child into the 
world! -  That’s their main concern. It’s a huge burden on young people and 
very hard to bear. There’s more pressure on the women of the Jewish 
community because they need to raise the future Jewish generations. 
There’s [also] the pressme of assimilation on us. Since there’s always this 
pressure on us not to intermarry, you always make more mistakes than you 
would otherwise. The community always tries to play matchmaker so they 
offer you five potential husbands. [But] one of them is blind, one is 
handicapped and another is uneducated. There are very few Jews in Turkey 
anyway. Who’s left? No one. People shouldn’t get married on the basis of 
religion but the families don’t imderstand this. I really don’t want to see 
Jews disappear from Turkey in 100 years. I’d like my community to survive. 
But for that survival, they want us, the young people, to sacrifice ourselves. 
I’d marry a French Jew or an Israeli Jew. It wouldn’t matter but of course, 
the ideal situation would be marrying a Turkish Jew because you know, the 
whole language thing is very important. Also spouses’ sharing the same 
culture in marriage is important. (FRIT4,23, female)
Other single young women interviewed expressed sentiments about 
intermarriage similar to those above. However, the views and feelings of the 
single men were different in that they seemed more relaxed about the issue and 
did not take it as seriously as the yoimg women. However, this does not mean that 
they felt no pressure or anxiety. Rather, the pressure on the young men seemed to 
be felt less than that on the young women. The following excerpt from the 
interview of a single young man shows this:
Whether I marry a Jew or a gentile isn’t a concern for me. Of course my 
family wouldn’t be happy about me marrying a Muslim but they know they 
can’t interfere in my life. Sometimes I suggest to them jokingly that I could 
marry a Muslim. Intermarriage isn’t accepted by our community so my 
mother doesn’t laugh at this, but instead says seriously that that would make
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her very unhappy. I do invite my Muslim girlfriends home and introduce 
them to my mother. But if I introduced one of them as, ‘Yes mother, this is 
the girl that I’m going to marry! ’ my mother would be angry at me. I know 
that. I don’t think they would cast me out of the family. If they did, I would 
reject them as well. My family should understand me. I can’t marry a Jewish 
girl just because she’s Jewish. Right now I have more Muslim friends than 
Jewish ones. I broke through the boundaries of the Jewish community. This 
happened after I graduated from high school. I learned a new life which was 
more interesting and full of life. I don’t want to go back to my past life 
when I only had Jewish friends. I say this to my family openly. (FRITl?, 23, 
male)
The reason for the difference in the pressure felt by the young men and 
women could lie in Judaism’s status as a matrilineal religion, that is, one carried 
down by birth through the mother, not the father. Thus girls might be raised with a 
concern that their choice of marriage partner would be important for the Jewish 
community as a whole and their Jewish offspring. A more likely explanation, 
however, is a sociological one seen in the field research in Turkey, namely how 
Jewish culture is transmitted and disseminated mainly by the women of the 
community. In other words, women are the fundamental agents of the protection 
and survival of Jewish identity, religion, tradition and culture. The Jewish 
community’s religious rituals, ceremonies, customs and social relations are 
maintained mainly by its women. For instance, Jewish women are more active 
than the men in preparing kosher food at home, organizing for the religious 
festivals, raising children according to Jewish traditions and values, doing 
volunteer work in Jewish groups and associations, and acting as matchmaker 
among Jewish young people. As a result of the role filled by Jewish women in 
practicing and spreading Jewish culture and identity, daughters of marriageable 
age may feel a stronger pressure to marry Jewish spouses than do the sons. 
Another reason for the anxiety among female Jews may be rooted in their
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community’s patriarchy. Jewish families may see their daughters as being more 
controllable, pliable and obedient than their sons and hence may exert more 
pressure on them. The daughters, on the hand, may be internalizing the pressure 
put on them by their families more than do the sons.
In addition to the conflict between resisting intermarriage on the one hand 
and advocating integration into Turkish culture and society on the other, the 
Jewish community in Tmkey seems to be suffering from another conflict that 
springs mainly from the nation’s official secularism. The principle of secularism, 
since the establishment of modem Turkey, has provided a barrier against the 
influx of Islamic norms in the public sphere. It not only assumed an important 
place in the nation’s legal and constitutional framework but also served as a 
fundamental pillar of Turkish democracy and its institutions. However, the 
principle of secularism and its reflection in reforms since the establishment of the 
Republic at the same time restricted the place of religion in society. In other 
words, secularism strictly confined religion to the private sphere. The appearance 
or use of any symbols of religion, either Muslim or non-Muslim, was kept on a 
tight leash. Furthermore, with the fear of Islamism, a movement thought to 
threaten the ideals of westernization and modernization, Islam was not only 
disallowed from the public sphere but also stringently regulated and controlled 
through institutions such as the state’s General Directorate of Religious Affairs. 
Although the prohibition of Islam in the public sphere enabled a more secure and 
liberated environment for non-Muslims, one free from the threat of an Islamic 
order, such restrictions on Islam and all other religions in the public sphere also 
curbed the religious identity of the Jews.
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Secularism is generally perceived as loyalty to the Kemalist reform 
program aiming at westernization and modernization and therefore, the Jewish 
commimity in Turkey also placed importance on the principle of secularism. 
Under secularism, however, symbols of Judaism itself were also restricted from 
appearing in the public sphere. Although the Treaty of Lausanne provided 
religious freedom to the Jews as well as to the Greeks and Armenians, this 
religious freedom was limited by secularism. For instance, under Lausanne and 
other domestic legislation, the wearing of religious attire in the public sphere was 
allowed only for leaders of the religious communities. Consequently, for 
Muslims, wearing the turban was disallowed to all but the director of the 
Religious Affairs Directorate; for Jews, attire symbolizing the religious leader was 
allowed only to the chief rabbi; and for the Armenians and Greeks, garb 
symbolizing their religious leaders was only allowed to the patriarchs. The 
wearing of the common religious skullcap known as the kipah (or yarmulke), 
normally worn by ordinary Jews on the streets, was restricted. In sum, it can be 
argued that secularism had a dual role for the Jewish community in Turkey. On 
the one side, it served as a buffer against Islamism and Islamic tendencies in the 
regulation of society and public order and also secured liberties for non-Muslims. 
On the other side, it served the secularization of Judaism as well, paving a path for 
the confinement of religion to the homes of Jews and thus pushing for more a 
moderate practice of Judaism. The findings obtained in the interviews pointed to 
this phenomenon.
Almost all of the respondents identified the principle of secularism as the 
major guarantee on behalf of non-Muslims living in a Muslim-majority country.
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They emphasized that secularism is a vital norm that prohibits Islamic 
fundamentalism and hence provides liberty to the Jews. In a similar fashion, most 
of the respondents stressed that the rise of Islamism as a movement in Turkey and 
the coming of the Islamic parties to government after the 1980s threatened the 
nation’s secularism. The following statements from interviews are reflections of 
the discontent with the rise of Islamism and anxiety felt towards the loss of 
secularism:
I see secularism as a safeguard of my religion. Turkish society is an open 
one. Muslims and non-Muslims have lived in harmony. Especially with the 
Özal era [1983-87], values and worldviews became liberal. However, in the 
last five years. I’ve seen a retreat of secularism. The [mid-1990s] rise to 
power of the Welfare Party, the ideas of its leader Necmettin Erbakan 
gaining popularity and this whole Islamism irritated the Jewish community 
in Turkey. These Islamists don’t practice religion but rather politicize it. Not 
only non-Muslims but also most Muslims feel offended by the rise of 
Islamism. Now the Justice and Development Party, which is part of a similar 
movement, is in power [as of November 2002]. Although the party seems to 
be conforming to the secular rules, I have suspicions as to whether it will 
continue to do so. In my opinion, religion should be completely separated 
from the state administration. We shouldn’t have to wonder after every 
election whether the government in power will disrupt secularism or not. 
(FRIT20, 31, female)
In fact secularism is a guarantee for all of society but in my case it provides 
a further guarantee, because if there was no secularism we would be forced 
to convert to Islam or as women we would be forced to wear headscarves. If 
such laws began to be enforced, I would immediately emigrate from Turkey. 
(FRIT3, 27, female)
Secularism is definitely important. It should be put in the Constitution. How 
are things in Iran? The hanged several Jews there. There are no Jews in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Tunisia or Algeria today. They are very horrible countries. But 
in Turkey, we had Atatürk. Atatürk gave secularism as a gift to us. 
Secularism is needed, especially for Muslim countries. (FRIT 19, 67, female)
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Most of the respondents also argued that religious belief is a matter 
between God and the individual, making third party interference of any form (i.e. 
other people, communities, institutions, or the state itself) wholly unacceptable. 
The field research found that Turkey’s Jewish community adopted secular norms 
of Judaism and generally did not approve of strict adherence to religious norms 
and principles in daily life. Among the interviewees, it was found that the practice 
of Judaism had diminished over the generations. The elderly seemed to practice 
Judaism more, and in contrast a loose practice of religion seemed to be more 
prevalent among the younger respondents. For instance, the frequency of fasting, 
visiting synagogues and praying, and performing religious rituals was higher 
among the older respondents than the younger ones.
4.4.3 Turkish Citizenship and the Civic Virtue of Jews in Turkey
The civic virtue aspect of citizenship was explored through various 
questions in the interviews concerning political participation, membership in civil 
society organizations, dealing with social problems on an individual level, 
fulfilling the responsibilities and duties of citizenship, and trusting other 
individuals in society.’ Though the research questions tried to cover various types 
of civic virtue such as general, social, economic and political, during the course of 
the research it was realized that studying Turkey’s Jews as a minority group 
necessitated a further elaboration of civic virtue.
’ For the structured questions on civic virtue, see Appendix A.
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First, the findings demonstrated that civic virtue as an attitude is different 
from civic virtue as behavior. In other words, the reflection of civic virtue in the 
attitudes of the respondents seemed to signify a broad range of ideas, thoughts, 
deliberations and values which, however, do not necessarily correlate to civic 
virtue behavior in reality or in actual life. The attitudes of the respondents may not 
always result in concrete actions, and the respondents may not themselves always 
perform or illustrate what they think a good citizen would or should do. In short, a 
prescription for virtuous citizenship may not always result in its faithful 
performance. For instance, a respondent may argue that one should contribute to 
the state budget so the national debt can be paid down, but the same respondent 
may fail to make such contributions in addition to taxes. Therefore the following 
discussion on the civic virtue of the Jews will consider separately the matters of 
attitudes and behavior regarding virtues of citizenship.
Second, the field research foimd that the domain of civic virtue was 
twofold. It seems that as a result of the interface between Jewish identity and 
Turkish citizenship, the attitudes and behavior regarding civic virtue developed in 
separate domains. As a result of Jewish identity, the respondents seemed to have 
concerns about their membership in Turkey’s Jewish community such as 
participation in community affairs or good representation of the community. This 
may be called the communal domain of civic virtue. Apart from Jewish identity, 
however, the respondents also seemed to have concerns about their membership in 
Turkish society such as contributing to the nation’s development or participation 
in the social and political mechanisms of general society. This domain may be 
called the societal domain of civic virtue. The following discussion of civic virtue
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draws on the above-mentioned specifications of civic virtue as attitude and 
behavior in the local and national do in Turkey in Turkey mains.
In the communal domain, the civic virtue developed on the basis of Jewish 
identity, it must be noted at the outset that the respondents’ level of membership 
and participation in Turkey’s Jewish organizations is very high. Most of the 
interviewees are keenly involved in both the religious and social activities of their 
synagogues and various Jewish groups such as sports clubs, cultural clubs, local 
organizations and welfare associations. The older respondents showed sensitivity 
to fulfilling religious duties such as keeping the number of male worshippers to at 
least 10, the minimum required for praying in a synagogue. Since the Jewish 
population and hence the number of worshippers who regularly visit synagogues 
has declined over time, most of the synagogues face the threat of the termination 
of their religious facilities. Therefore, the older respondents, especially the men, 
keep an eye on the religious facilities of the synagogues and try to participate in 
them as much as possible;
Every day I go to the synagogue to pray. I used to go to the synagogue twice 
a week. On Saturdays [the Sabbath which is the resting and praying day for 
Jews] especially, as a Jewish citizen, I go to the synagogue. (FRIT9, 79, 
male)
The middle-aged respondents seemed to be more involved in the 
management of the communal institutions.*® Leadership positions in organizations 
and the like are generally held by middle-aged Jewish men, and women who 
usually take part in the same groups as volimteers fill hierarchical positions in
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only the women’s branches. Among the female respondents, there were women 
who had been involved in volxmteer work for several years and were heads of the 
women’s branches. In the words of one:
I’ve done volunteer work for this association for 18 years. When the former 
head of the women’s branch resigned, the association chairman proposed 
that I take over, and I accepted. In the past, I used to come here once a week 
but now, since I became leader of the women’s branch, I come here four 
days a week. (FRIT18, 57, female)
The participation of the young respondents age 20-40 was concentrated 
largely in youth, sports and culture organizations. The field research also found 
that young Jews mainly remained active in these organizations until they reached 
age 18. The families of yoimg Jews generally encourage their children to take part 
in the activities of these organizations so they become socialized into Jewish 
culture and community through gaining Jewish fiiends, acquiring Jewish culture 
and values, and eventually marrying Jewish spouses that they piet in the groups. 
However, since integration with society at large becomes inevitable after age 18 
by way of university education or employment, the young Jews’ participation and 
interest in these Jewish organizations tend to fall over time. Some of the younger 
respondents explained their relations with Jewish associations as follows:
All my fiiends are Muslim now. I used to have only Jewish fiiends. For 
instance, I used to go to one of the Jewish youth clubs every weekend and I 
had fiiends only fi"om the Jewish community. I went to Jewish school so my 
fiiends were all Jews. I didn’t have the chance to make fiiends fi"om 
different environments. School during the week and youth club during the 
weekends, that’s how my life went until I graduated fi"om high school. Now
Information on some of these communal institutions was given in Chapter I.
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I can say I’ve got more Muslim friends than Jewish ones. My entire social 
network has changed. I don’t go the Jewish associations anymore. I didn’t 
even go to the Jewish high school annual alumni reunions. (FRIT17, 23, 
male)
If the positive presentation of Jewish culture to society and dispelling 
stereotypes about Jews are considered exemplary acts of civic virtue, the 
respondents seemed to value this type of virtue. Most of the respondents think that 
every Jew in Turkey should get involved in actions that would present them as 
good Jews or virtuous Jewish citizens to both themselves and the nation’s 
gentiles. They also think that Turkey’s Jews should try to refute anti-Semitic 
claims against themselves and their community. These views can be considered 
examples of civic virtue as attitude. At the level of values and views, the 
respondents seem to project a more active position in terms of Jewish identity. 
However, civic virtue as attitude, as in positively representing the Jewish 
community to general society or defying the unjust claims raised by others against 
the Jewish community, seems to not always translate into actual behavior or 
actions. More precisely, although most of the respondents value good 
representation and defense of their Jewish identity, most of the time they do not 
actually get involved in individual acts towards this end. Civic virtue as behavior 
regarding Jewish identity may vary depending on the person or people towards 
whom the act is directed. Most of the respondents seemed to prefer passivity or to 
not take sides when they encounter anti-Jewish claims from people they do not 
know personally, for instance somebody on a public bus. However, if these claims 
are raised by the friends of the respondents, most of the subjects apparently
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choose to tell their friends that what they said was wrong or at least did not give 
the full picture. In the words of two of the respondents:
If a person who says bad things about Jews happens to be my friend, I 
would immediately tell them that what they said is wrong. Maybe my friend 
has prejudices about something but doesn’t know enough to know better. In 
those cases, I would intervene and help my friend to overcome this 
prejudice. However, with people that I don’t know or have no relationship 
with, I never intervene or interrupt when they’re speaking badly about the 
Jews. I shut my ears and pretend not to hear them. (FRITIS, 48, male)
If my friends start joking about the conventional stereotypes attributed to 
Jews, I make fun of my friends in turn. I don’t stay silent but try to make 
them understand how I may feel with this teasing. (FRIT31,26, male)
Most of the respondents apparently prefer to show civic virtue as behavior 
more openly within the Jewish community than within the general public or 
among gentiles, especially strangers. This may be due to a lack of trust in society 
at large which seems to decrease in the younger generations. The quotations 
below are examples of this insecurity felt about the general public:
My mother always warns me. She says, ‘You meet different people. You 
don’t know who they are. There are many kinds of people in society. You 
should be careful because you’re a Jew.’ I xmderstand why my mother is 
warning me, since there’s a risk of meeting anti-Semitic people by chance. 
However, the Jewish community in Turkey is both notorious and respected. 
Before something bad happens, the community takes its precautions. 
There’s no unrestrained behavior in the community. This of course loads 
responsibilities onto the shoulders of its members. You’re expected to 
behave properly so you don’t attract much attention. Because of this, Jewish 
mothers warn their children. They fear the outer world. They’re hesitant 
about their actions in public and they demand that we do the same. I don’t 
agree with my mother. I have lots of Muslim friends. Even I must admit that 
I’ve got more Muslim friends than Jewish ones. Things change. We have to 
adapt ourselves to these changes. (FRIT24, 20, female)
I remember that when I was at elementary school, I used to hide my 
religion. I wouldn’t openly say that I’m a Jew. I no longer try to hide my
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Jewishness. Maybe it’s because of my age now, I don’t know. But I see that 
my sons don’t try to hide their identity either. They’re very conscious about 
things and they have self-confidence. The teachers are also very conscious 
now. Nothing bad has happened to my sons at school, for example. 
(FRIT30,45, female)
Civic virtue as behavior positively representing the community to the 
public sometimes seems to carry the meaning of not upsetting society or not 
showing Jews’ differences with society so that gentiles do not get annoyed or so 
the Jews do not become targets of accusations. One of the respondents 
exemplifies this goal as follows:
When we were living in Şişhane [in Istanbul], we had celebrations that we carried 
out onto the streets. There were many Jews in Şişhane then, but most of them later 
emigrated to Israel. Now there aren’t many Jews in Turkey. Everybody knows 
each other. It’s a very small community. Today, we can’t celebrate our religious 
festivals on the streets. Jews can’t even wear their kipahs [yarmulkes] on the 
streets. If we see somebody wearing the kipah outside or somewhere else, we 
immediately warn him to take it off. We say, ‘Why are you wearing your kipah? 
What are you doing? Are you nuts? Wearing it isn’t smart.’ Somebody could 
come up to him on the street and ask him why he’s walking around with that hat. 
A Jewish man may feel irritated when confi"onted like that by such negative 
responses. To avoid such unwanted incidents, we, the people in the community, 
always warn each other about proper behavior. We shouldn’t be singled out by 
society. (FRIT26,43, female)
It seems that the respondents do not display civic virtue on behalf of 
Jewish culture and community in the public sphere at the individual level. Rather, 
they prefer to put the responsibility for this mission of defending Jewish culture 
and presenting it to the public on the shoulders of the Jewish community elites. 
These elites are not only heads of Jewish organizations but also respected figures 
who perform the role of leadership within the community. The institution of the 
Chief Rabbinate deals mainly with religious issues and the chief rabbi represents
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the Jewish community in relations with the society and the state. However, other 
members of the elite usually accompany him at appropriate occasions and official 
ceremonies such as the celebration of the foundation of the Republic, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatiirk’s Memorial Day, or the reception of courtesy visits of foreign 
ambassadors in Turkey. When asked if they had reacted personally to newspaper 
reports about or containing biased stereotyping, most of the respondents replied 
that they did not act individually but rather told community leaders about the 
news so the leaders could respond on the Jewish community’s behalf As two of 
the respondents explained:
We, the Jews, have no problem. First of all, we have very good relations 
with state officials. For instance, if a new governor is appointed, our leaders 
visit him or her to establish rapport. Our leader of the community thinks that 
there is no anti-Semitism in Turkey. I don’t agree with him. The anti- 
Semitism isn’t explicit but hidden, which in my opinion is not very 
important. [By way of comparison] I may want to kill you but I don’t 
actually do it. Reality isn’t what I want to do but what I actually do. If you 
look into people’s souls, you may not like what you see. You have to see the 
outlook of things and not their contents. Our outlook is good towards the 
Turks, and the Turks’ outlook is good towards us. I think our community 
leaders do an excellent job in protecting the community. They don’t appear 
in the newspapers or on TV but they scold journalists or producers when 
they put out anti-Semitic publications or programs. They always tell us to be 
anonymous in public. For example, they warn us not to wear very expensive 
jewelry. Young Jews criticize the community as a closed one. But I think 
things should be like this. (FRITIP, 67, female)
Since they think that we’re a religious minority, they usually avoid 
attracting attention. The media is always after us. Therefore, our community 
leader sometimes gives warnings to the community such as, ‘Don’t do this, 
don’t go there, don’t spend a lot of money, don’t attract the attention of the 
society by spending on luxuries, and don’t seek the public spotlight.’ 
(FRIT21, 77, male)
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The respondents seemed also to not react to verbal claims directed against 
them at the personal level by others. Seeking legal redress for such accusations or 
claims against them was a strategy very seldom used by the respondents. 
Although the respondents underlined that they did not take proactive actions to 
defend their dignity or identity, they emphasized that the Jewish community as a 
whole did react and the elites performed this role on behalf of the community. As 
can be seen in the community newspaper Çalom, public discussions moving 
dangerously close to anti-Semitism were not left imanswered or unrefiited. 
Regarding this point, it can be argued that the civic virtue aspect of Jewish 
identity is closely related to the organizational structure and hierarchy of Turkey’s 
Jewish community. The following quotations are examples of how both the 
community as a collective and the respondents individually usually reacted to 
verbal or written accusations against Jews:
In Turkey there are many mixed groups of people. The people are very 
different fi'om each other. Every kind of people lives in Turkey. There are 
extreme nationalists and extreme Islamists. There are all kinds. There are 
certain TV programs on various channels that frequently and deliberately 
broadcast themes of hostility towards the Jews. These programs bother me a 
lot. Reactions are made to these programs not personally but rather 
collectively. I mean, the community takes measures. I’ve never taken an 
individual action myself but if I came across such a program when watching 
TV, I tell one of my Jewish friends about it and he tells others and so the 
community leaders learn about the program. Since we’re a small 
commimity, everybody knows each other and the grapevine is fast. (FRITl, 
35, male)
Our community immediately raises its voice against such broadcasts and 
notifies the producers. We never permit such TV programs. Our community 
considers these to be serious matters and so immediately responds. (FRIT 18, 
57, female)
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I often come across such programs. Some of the news in some newspapers 
identifies all Jews with Israel. Our Jewish community isn’t a party to the 
dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. Of course, there is an 
attachment to Israel due to our faith but if people don’t like Israeli foreign 
policy, they should simply say so. However, instead of expressing their 
opinion on Israeli foreign policy, these people tend to condemn world Jewry 
as a whole. The Chief Rabbinate denounces writings against Jews in 
Turkey. I’ve never personally denounced these offensive writings but the 
community leaders do. Our community leader finds a fiiend or colleague of 
the author who wrote the offending article and demands that he tell the 
author to stop misinforming the public and sowing discord. (FRIT21, 77, 
male)
In the societal domain, civic virtue, which is more related with 
membership in general society as regular Turkish citizens, is arguably closely 
related to modernization. Both today and in years past, Jews make up a group 
within Turkish society which has taken a leading role in modernization and 
westernization. They were one of the groups in the forefi"ont of willingly adopting 
modem norms. The adoption of Western culture and values demarcated the social 
ranks within the Jewish community, e.g. with the upper-class Jewry speaking 
French, raising their children with the help of maids, going to prestigious colleges 
for education, etc. and the lower classes speaking Ladino, attending ordinary 
Jewish schools, and showing a more ‘oriental’ outlook.
As discussed in Chapter m, the emigration to Israel of most of Turkey’s 
Jewish population resulted in the homogenization of the remaining Jewish 
minority in terms of socio-economic status. Those who stayed in Turkey were 
middle-class Jews or above who adopted a more Western, modem and urban 
outlook as compared to other groups in Turkish society and the Jewish emigrants 
to Israel. Furthermore, their level of devotion to the norms of westernization was 
used by the Jews to signify the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims.
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For instance, Jews generally denigrated the rural, uneducated, ‘oriental’ and 
traditional masses while praising urban. Western, middle- and upper-class mass 
culture. As a result of the willing embrace of modernization by Turkey’s Jewish 
community, it is plausible that the Jews internalized the liberal-democratic criteria 
on several issues of state-society relations such as democratic participation, 
human rights, women’s rights, protection of the environment, secularism, 
transparency of the state administration and accountability in democratic 
mechanisms. The findings of the field research also confirmed such a tendency, as 
the following quotation shows:
The state should be transparent. It should be democratically governed. 
Corruption should be nonexistent. There are many problems in Turkey but 
they should be solved by the leaders that we choose. Of course the citizens 
should help them. For example, there are many things that citizens can do 
such as using public transportation for clean air and less traffic, taking care 
not to damage the parks and roads, throwing garbage into garbage cans only, 
taking a stand against corruption and refusing to pay bribes. I myself am 
very sensitive about environment. I don’t throw away garbage pell-mell. I 
organize my garbage and put the paper and glass in separate bags for 
recycling. If only everybody else did the same! Millions of dollars go to 
waste when we already have lots of national debt. (FRIT 10,49, female)
None of the respondents were active members of non-governmental 
organizations active at the national level. For instance, some of them volunteered 
at Jewish-run nursing homes for Jews but not at state-run homes open to all 
citizens. What two of the interviewees said about this lack of interest in 
associations at the national level helped to illuminate how being a Jew affected 
volunteer or charity work in a Muslim-majority society:
224
I heard about a group that provides shelter to women who are victims of 
domestic violence. I’d like to work in that group as I think I could help those 
victims of violence. But I didn’t volimteer because I feared that the 
association would make an issue out of my Jewishness. Let me explain it to 
you like this: I have a daughter. She was inspired by my volunteer work for 
people in need and she volunteered to be a caring mother in the House for 
the Protection of Children. Her name is Esther, so it’s very clear that she 
isn’t Muslim. The house didn’t allow her to look after the orphaned 
children. They told that they didn’t need any volunteers. How can that be? I 
know very well that they need people to work as volunteers there. I was 
very disappointed. My daughter was bom in Turkey, grew up in Turkey, and 
was raised in Turkish culture. I think this is a case of discrimination because 
fiiends had told me that the house needed volunteers. Why do they say no? 
Why do they discriminate against people? My daughter is a 20-year-old 
yoimg lady. She wants to devote herself to helping others. Either a Muslim 
becomes a ‘volunteer mother’ to children or a Jewish one does, what’s the 
difference? (FRIT 10,49, female)
I had a co-worker in my office. He no longer works in the same office 
because he resigned, but this incident happened before that. This person was 
giving me nasty looks. I could sense it. With this incident I’ll tell you about, 
his mean feelings towards me came to the surface. This person had a sister 
who had a car accident. She was taken to the hospital. She needed a blood 
transfusion. I used to donate blood regularly to help other people who were 
in need of blood. But after the spread of HIV, I stopped doing it. I told my 
co-worker that I could give blood to his sister who needed an emergency 
blood transfiision. He turned me down. This man was fi'om Çanakkale. In 
years past there were many Jews living in Çanakkale. So this man knew 
about Jews. He had actually told me before that he had known Jews. I 
believe that he refused my offer to donate blood for his sister because I’m a 
Jew. He didn’t say this directly or mention my Jewishness but instead said, 
‘We don’t need your donation.’ (F R m 2 ,45, male)
The field research foimd that most of the respondents seemed to have a 
high level of civic virtue in the societal domain, at least on the level of values. In 
other words, most of them praised liberal-democratic criteria as cornerstones of 
democracy. However, the research also showed that the value placed on 
democratic ideals did not always produce actions taken directly on the individual 
level. In other words, although most of the respondents advocated that the entire 
citizenry uphold civic virtue to support a democracy that meets Western
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standards, these values did not correspond to actions taken in the same regard per 
se. The respondents mainly remained passive in taking both collective and 
individual actions to help to resolve problems that they saw. As one of the 
respondents said:
For example, a cellphone network company put a base station on the roof of 
the mosque next to my children’s school. It’s a public school. All the 
parents protested this by circulating a petition. However, nothing has 
changed. That base station is still on the roof of the mosque and it still 
threatens the health of our children. No matter how hard we fight, 
unforhmately it’s very hard to change things in Turkey. A person holding 
power can deal with things quicker and more easily than hundreds of people 
gathering for the same purpose. If I could be sure that everybody would 
behave ethically and act as good citizens. I’d do the same. I see that 
everybody tries to solve their problems by finding someone powerfiil. If I 
knew that everybody would wait their turn in the queue, for instance in 
banks. I’d wait my turn as well. But [instead] I find a person I know at the 
bank and skip the queue. Everybody does this. Other people would even call 
me nuts if they knew I had an opportunity to jump the queue and didn’t use 
it. This is how things are in Turkey. (FRIT20, 31, female)
The respondents also seemed to be not interested in active politics. They 
did not work in political parties and furthermore, they did not have any plans to 
work in a party or to become a candidate in elections. Most of them stressed the 
importance of political parties for democracy but they seemed to r e f i ^  firom 
entering political life by way of membership to political parties. Some of the 
respondents mentioned that the Jewish community in Turkey was in general 
apolitical and only participated by voting, especially to center-right parties. One 
of the respondents explained their observations about the Jewish community as 
follows:
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The Jews in Turkey are very passive in politics. There is timidity among the 
community. Most of the Jews think, ‘We should not go for politics. We are 
very comfortable in this country. We earn our money. Nobody disturbs us. 
Go and open your store on the street market. Nobody would oppose. Why 
would you go for politics or want to become a military ofBcer?’ We should 
break this chain of thinking. I criticize the Jewish community in Turkey for 
this. We are not courageous in politics. Maybe it is an inheritance on us. 
Maybe it has roots in the past. I don’t know. But at least, people should give 
fight for this. Maybe the commimity fears that such a change in political 
attitude would be interpreted as a revolt. (FRITIS, 48, male)
There may be other reasons, but the main one for the mismatch between 
the values espoused and actions taken in terms of civic virtue seems to lie in the 
minority status of the respondents. They generally refi'ained fi“om presenting any 
generalization on behalf of the Jewish community at large through their individual 
attempts. Most thought that society at large would not recognize their good will 
and sincerity in contributing to the development of society and democracy and 
would judge them not as ordinary citizens but would rather focus on their Jewish 
identity. Being a Jew, according the respondents, overshadowed their 
individuality and gave rise to societal prejudices against all of Jewry. Thus, most 
of the respondents seemed to not be actively seeing through their values on civic 
virtue. They were generally swayed by the idea that they should not stand out in 
performing acts of civic virtue but should instead remain silent and invisible to 
shield themselves firom criticisms fi'om society at large. The following quotations 
reflect how most of the respondents thought:
Jews in Tinkey are generally quiet people. They don’t raise their voices on 
social or political issues. They don’t gather in the city center for protests. 
They don’t want to be singled out as Jews. (FRIT22, 23, female)
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Jews in Turkey don’t generally make themselves stand out. Rather their 
deeds are usually controlled and hesitant. They act with caution. For 
instance, they very much conform to the laws and rules. No Jew wants to go 
to jail. But there’s something else I should mention. If the state asked for a 
share of every citizen’s income to save the national economy, what will be 
the criteria to calculate how much everybody pays? Most probably they’ll 
set up commissions to determine each individual’s share. Then there’ll be a 
problem for the Jews because these commissions might ask them for a 
higher rate of contribution like with the Capital Tax. Because of that, I 
mean, because of that the contributions won’t be on equal footing. I’m 
against such procedures. (FRITIS, 28, male)
Most of the time, Jews think, ‘We should be cautious about our deeds and 
words in public.’ They don’t want to stand out. Our differences shouldn’t 
bother others. We should conform to society’s rules and not challenge them. 
(FRITIO, 49, female)
Generally Jews hold back their identities. Most of the Jews in Turicey live in 
Istanbul. They usually think about doing what others do, nothing more, and 
nothing less. They think, ‘Our differences are for ourselves. Other people 
shouldn’t see that we’re different.’ They do whatever an ordinary Turidsh 
citizen does. They don’t like to stand out or be noticeable. They’re afraid 
that in the midst of daily life they may draw reactions, or they shrink from 
appearing in the media. (FRIT16, 57, male)
To sum up the findings on the civic virtue aspect of citizenship, it can be 
stated that the civic virtue of the respondents was twofold, namely that performed 
vis-à-vis the Jewish community and that vis-à-vis society in general. Civic virtue 
exemplified as defending and protecting Jewish culture and identity via the 
institutions of Turkey’s Jewish community is high. However, civic virtue shown 
within society in general as ordinary citizens is high only at the level of values, as 
these values are not always translated into action, and the fulfillment of civic 
virtue remains limited due to the discomfort that minority status entails for the 
Jews.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter discussed how members of Turkey’s Jewish community 
experience and perceive Turkish citizenship through its aspects of legal status, 
identity and civic virtue. The research found that the differences in opinions and 
experiences of the respondents were mainly determined by their differmces in 
generation or age groups. The focus on generations also served as a helpfiil tool to 
highlight the changes in the historical development of citizenship in Turkey. Since 
the Jews who remained in Turkey after the late 1940s mass Jewish emigration to 
Israel presented a homogeneous group, the generations of the respondents serves 
as an instrumental medium for understanding how citizenship in Turkey, 
specifically the citizenship of its Jews, transformed over time. Due to this 
homogeneous outlook, generation/age group as a category seems to be closely 
linked with other sociological categories such as gender, class, education and 
ethnic origin in the case of contemporary Jews in Turkey.
Within the state-centric approach to citizenship, it has been discussed 
previously that in the legal status aspect, responsibilities prioritized the rights in 
Turkish citizenship; in the identity aspect there was the dominance of the unitary 
and monistic structure; and in the civic virtue aspect, civil society was 
underdeveloped and state-directed modernization paradigms continued to exist. In 
this study of how Turkish citizenship was experienced and perceived at the 
individual level in the case of the nation’s Jewish minority, the findings 
demonstrate that the state-centric approach to citizenship has reverberations in the 
experience of Jewish individuals. Such a reflection of the legal status, identity and
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civic virtue aspects of Turkish citizenship using a state-centric approach within a 
minority group traditionally known as ‘the loyal nation’ in Turkey might be 
considered natural. It can be argued that the will to maintain identity and the will 
to integrate have caused a dilemma for the Jews. However, whether this dilemma 
is significant only for Turkey’s Jews or valid for all minority groups in other 
nation-states is an important issue which needs further exploration. How other 
nation-states deal with minority-majority relations and how citizenship as a means 
for governance is treated, juxtaposing the dilemma between cultural authenticity 
and assimilation, may provide important signals for democracy and help to direct 
policies on citizenship within Turkey.
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CHAPTER V
TURKISH JEWS IN ISRAEL: SIMULTANEOUSLY CITIZENS
AND IMMIGRANTS
5.1 Introduction
The main purpose of the current chapter is to discuss how Turkish Jews in 
Israel perceive and experience citizenship through the course of migration. The 
three aspects of citizenship -  legal status, identity and civic virtue -  are given 
special attention. In Chapters II and IV, the history of Turkey’s Jewish minority 
and the relationship between minority status and citizenship were discussed. In 
this chapter, supplementing the brief history of the Jewish emigration presented in 
Chapter HI, the relationship between international migration -  that is, migration 
from Turkey to Israel -  and citizenship is taken up. The discussion is built on the 
findings of the field research in Israel and focuses on the Turkish Jews’ changes in 
perception of citizenship accompanying the impact of their experience migrating 
to another country. This task proceeds in four parts. The first part presents an 
overview of citizenship and international migration in Turkey and in Israel. The 
dominant paradigms both in Turkish and Israeli citizenship as well as the 
transformations in citizenship policies with respect to transformations in the area 
of international migration are discussed. In the second part, the general 
characteristics of the sample group in the research are illustrated. The profile of
231
the respondents is drawn using sociological categories. In the third part, the 
findings of the interviews are discussed. The respondents’ perceptions of the 
aspects of legal status, identity and civic virtue of citizenship are covered 
separately in turn. The fourth part concludes the chapter with a short discussion on 
the three prongs of the sending country (Turkey), the receiving country (Israel) 
and the immigrants (Turkish Jews).
5.2 Citizenship and Emigration from Turkey to Israel: A Comparative 
Overview
It is generally accepted that theories of international migration were widely 
developed by the disciplines of demography, economics, sociology and 
anthropology. The discipline of political science was a relative latecomer to the 
field of international migration, one that contributed to the field studies of state 
sovereignty and citizenship (Faist, 1997: 249, 251). By the same token, studies of 
the relationship between citizenship and immigration complemented earlier 
research on the significance of citizenship questions for democracies feeling the 
strain of globalization.
As there are various forms and types of international migration, there is a 
corresponding variety of statuses of immigrants and hence citizenships. For 
instance, regarding the relationship between citizen status and immigration, 
Baubock historically categorizes three typologies, namely dependent immigration, 
colonizing immigration and citizen immigration (Baubock, 1991: 26-32). In 
dependent immigration, the immigrants lack the right to immigrate and settle in
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the country for an extended period. In most cases of dependent immigration, 
neither the sending country nor the receiving country entitles individuals the 
rights of immigration, but when they enter the receiving state, for instance as 
guest workers, these immigrants find themselves under a reduced citizenship 
status within the new country’s legal and political system. In colonizing 
immigration, the sovereignty of the coimtry of immigration is severely restricted 
by the coimtry of emigration, as in the colonization schemes of sub-Saharan 
Afiica. In citizen immigration, individuals hold an independent right to immigrate, 
generally by obtaining an internationally valid passport. The countries of 
immigration grant these individuals immigration rights, even to people who have 
not been formally registered citizens before immigration. The best-known cases of 
such countries are Germany and Israel, both of which grant immigration rights to 
people who meet certain criteria of ethnic origin (Baubdck, 1991: 26-32). Apart 
fi'om the status of formal citizens, citizen immigration-type immigrants may be 
given the status of dual citizens or denizens.
Dual citizenship in citizen immigration may be granted to immigrants if 
both of the states in question legally allow dual citizenship. Prior to recent 
decades, dual citizenship was generally legally prohibited by most states, and 
corresponding measures were taken to discourage it. Despite these international 
efforts to limit dual citizenship, the number of people holding more than one 
citizenship has climbed in recent decades, with international migration being one 
of the key reasons for this. The opposition to dual citizenship is rooted in 
conceptions of the well-ordered international world as follows: every person 
belongs to one and only one state; dual citizenship is to be avoided in order to
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protect the unity, cohesion and strength of the state; dual citizenship is 
incompatible with loyalty to the state; dual citizenship may cause problems in 
cultural and national identification; dual identifications may threaten both national 
unity and nations themselves; and dual citizenship threatens national security and 
democracy. Traditional antipathy to dual citizenship springs from a tendency to 
evaluate the relationship between citizens and the state fi'om the latter’s point of 
view. From the point of view of individuals, however, it is contended that the 
inconveniences of dual citizenship are minimal and outweighed by its advantages 
(Hammar, 1989: 86-93).
Another status category of immigrants in cases of citizen immigration is 
denizens. Citizens are members of a state who have certain rights and duties in 
their relationship with it. However, apart fix)m formal citizens, there may be other 
individuals in the society who have rights and duties similar to those of other 
citizens, yet may not be endowed with formal citizenship status. In some cases, 
either the sending or the receiving countries may not allow dual citizenship. In 
order not to lose their citizenship rights in the sending country, these immigrants 
may opt for permanent residency. They may have the right to enter the state’s 
territory firom abroad, to settle in the coimtry, to take up work there, to receive 
social benefits and to vote in local elections. These “privileged non-citizens” are 
called, in Tomas Hammar’s definition, “denizens” who have certain work, 
residence and welfare rights just like ordinary citizens (Hammar, 1989: 83). The 
naturalization of denizens includes not only their reception into legal citizenship 
status but also contains the political, social, cultural and psychological dimensions 
of membership and belonging to their resident state (Hammar, 1989: 85).
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Immigration to Israel may be considered an example of citizen 
immigration, as all the world’s Jews have the legal right to immigrate there. It also 
entails, as discussed in Chapter HI, unique features in comparison to other 
examples of citizen immigration. It is primarily made up of large immigration 
waves which gathered Jews from various parts of the world and concentrated 
them in a small portion of former Arab lands in the Middle East, a development 
that led to conflict with the Palestinians over the territory that rages even today. 
The establishment of Israel was the result of a historical will which had roots even 
in ancient Jewish history. It was founded with the aim of establishing a 
democratic Jewish state and since its early years, the features of the state have 
been prolonged and commonly supported by its own resident Jews and those of 
the diaspora. As a result of this historical formation of the state of Israel, one can 
therefore argue that the development of citizenship in Israel has two determinants 
that serve as the backbone of citizenship, namely immigration and Jewish ethno­
religious identity.*
The immigration of Jews is Israel’s raison d'être. With respect to 
citizenship, immigrants of Jewish origin are granted Israeli citizenship under the 
Law of Return, which also permits dual citizenship.^ The state of Israel accepts 
dual citizenship so that Jewish immigrants do not lose their rights, specifically the 
rights of inheritance or property, in their sending countries. In cases where the
' For the purposes and limitations of this study, the discussion of Israeli citizenship ignores the 
nation’s minorities, covering instead only its Jewish population.
 ^For details of the Law of Return permitting dual citizenship for Jewish oleh, see Chapter III.
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sending countries do not permit dual citizenship, as with immigrants from Turkey 
in decades past, these immigrants either gave up their previous citizenship in 
favor of Israeli citizenship or maintained their previous citizenship while 
assuming permanent residency status, the latter as denizens of Israel. Denizens, 
Jewish holders of permanent residence permits who seek to reside in Israel, have 
all the privileges of Israeli citizenship except the right to vote in general elections 
and carry an Israeli passport.^ It should be noted that full citizens are not 
immediately issued passports either. Although citizenship is acquired immediately 
upon establishing residence in Israel (unless the immigrant refuses to accept 
citizenship in 90 days), an Israeli passport is normally issued only after one year 
of residence.
The Law of Return is the basic legal documentation that allows Jewish 
immigrants to settle and earn citizenship in Israel. In line with Israel’s foundation 
as a Jewish state, the law prioritizes bloodlines and ethnic origin for citizenship. 
The emphasis on Jewish ethno-religious identity in the making of the state and the 
development of citizenship has provoked debates among Jewish expatriates from 
Israel over the role of religion in the public sphere and the inheritance of Israeli 
citizenship. Although democracy is considered one of the pillars of the Israeli 
state, the impact of Judaism in the regulation of the Jews’ civic life has raised 
questions of secularism in Israeli democracy which persist to this day (Arian,
 ^ Under the category of denizens in Israel, there are ‘potential immigrants,’ or persons entering 
Israel on potential immigrant visas. According to the 1969 regulations of Israel’s Ministry of the 
Interior, a potential immigrant is a person entitled to an oleh’s visa under the Law of Return who 
intends to stay in Israel for more than three months. In 1991, the three months-plus provision was 
replaced by one reading “up to three years to examine the possibility and the conditions of settling 
in Israel as an immigrant.’’
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1998: 10). As to the blood principle’s dominance in Israeli citizenship, various 
amendments to the Law of Return and the related procedural adjustments over the 
years began to introduce the territoriality principle to citizenship, though only for 
emigrants from Israel. Accordingly, emigrants who moved from Israel and reside 
in foreign countries can maintain Israeli citizenship, as can their children, but the 
grandchildren of such emigrants do not automatically inherit Israeli citizenship.
Jewish immigration from Turkey to Israel is an example of the citizen 
iimnigration type, but in contrast to some other Israeli immigrant groups, i.e. the 
Yemenites, it is also an example of voluntary immigration, as this was neither part 
of a population exchange nor a refugee flight provoked by the Holocaust or anti- 
Semitism. Jews in Turkey experienced a more liberal and tolerant attitude in 
contrast to the harsh discrimination faced by some of their counterparts in other 
countries.^
The migration experience to Israel influenced the Turkish Jews’ perception 
of citizenship. On the legal status aspect o f citizenship, it must be stated foremost 
that Turkish Jews were easily accepted by Israel due simply to their Jewish status, 
and furthermore that Turkey did not prohibit this Jewish emigration. Therefore, 
the rights of immigration were granted to Turkish Jews going to Israel by both the 
sending state and the receiving one. Since Turkey did not recognize dual 
citizenship until 1981, most of these emigrant Turkish Jews obtained Israeli 
citizenship and gave up their Turkish one. At the same time, those who chose to *
*  Yet both political and economic factors lay behind the immigration from Turkey to Israel. These 
reasons can also be observed in the profile of immigrants according to their dates of arrival, as 
discussed in Chapter III.
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retain their Turkish citizenship received Israeli denizen status with the same sets 
of rights as other formal Israeli citizens including the right to vote, but only in 
local elections. After Turkey passed dual citizenship legislation in 1981, tbese 
denizens began to apply for Israel citizenship in addition to their existing Turkish 
citizenship. In addition, Turkish Jews who had previously obtained Israeli 
citizenship started to apply for additional Turkish citizenship.
Another change in the legal status of citizenship occurred in the 
minority/majority status of immigrants from Tinkey. Turkey’s Jewish community 
was officially recognized as a minority group, but after immigration and arrival in 
Israel, former members of a minority group became members of the nugmity 
group in a Jewish state. In other words, immigrants who were once a Jewish 
minority in Turkey were turned into part of the Jewish majority in Israel.
However, the changes in the identity aspect o f citizenship after arrival in 
Israel do not correlate to a direct change from a minority group into a nugority. 
The Jewish population of Israel falls into two major ethnic categories, the 
Ashkenazim of European and American descent, and the Eastern or “Oriental” 
Jews of North African and Near Eastern origins. There is a social divide between 
these two categories. The Oriental Jews, including both the Mizrahi Jews of the 
Middle East and the Sephardic Jews of the Mediterranean, make up more than 
half of the population, but they control relatively few economic, pohtical and 
social resources (Lewis, .1985: 133). The Oriental immigrants, who have tended to 
remain concentrated in homogeneous communities, largely fall into the lower
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societal strata. la contrast, the Ashkenazic Jews have gradually evolved into a 
unified socio-cultural group which is predominantly middle or upper class.^
Although there are variances in self-perception depending on when they 
arrived in Israel, it can generally be argued that Turkish Jews were predominantly 
seen as Oriental Jews by other Israehs. As other Israelis have perceived and 
derugrated them as Oriental Jews, Turkish Jews in Israel have begun to identify 
themselves as Sephardic Jews who are distinct from both European-origin 
Ashkenazic Jews and Middle’ Eastern-origin Mizrahi Jews (Benbassa and 
Rodrigue, 2001; Weiker, 1988). Although the Ashkenazim-Sephardim 
polarization has lessened since the 1960s and ‘70s, it still has a place in Israeli 
society’s social memory. It must be recalled, however, that the identification of 
Turkish Jews in Israel varies according to their year of arrival. Furthermore, as 
discussed in earher chapters, these Turkish Jews have ties with Turkey not only in 
terms of citizenship and famihal attachments, but also in terms of Turkish culture.
Concerning the changes in the civic virtue aspect of citizenship among 
Turkish Jews in the immigration process, two points must be mentioned. First, 
similar to the Jewish community in Turkey, Turkish Jews in Israel frequently 
utilize the strategy of invisibility in which they refrain from- showing their 
differences and displaying virtuous citizenship in the pubhc sphere. Turkish Jews 
are generally evaluated as well integrated into Israeh society as they are “unseen” 
or unmarked' by their differences (Weiker, 1988). They are regarded as well 
adapted to the norms of the democratic Israeli state and as conforming to the
 ^Despite the strong correlation between ethnic affiliation and class, some immigrants from Middle 
Eastern and African countries have achieved upward social mobility (Ben-Rafeel, 1985: 57).
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existing rules and laws. They show little involvement in public protests or social 
movements.
Second, as îçduygu (1996a) mentions, studies on international migration 
and citizenship need to consider the three actors involved in the process, namely 
the sending country, the receiving coimtry and the immigrants. By the same token, 
the civic virtue aspect of citizenship is closely related to the positions that the 
states uphold in response to societal issues such as civil society, basic rights of 
organization and protest, freedom of expression, and liberties for all types of 
identities and status, including ethno-religious identity and immigrant status. 
Therefore, the question of the civic virtue of the Turkish Jews in the process of 
international migration is an issue that also falls into the hinterland of the 
positions that Turkey and Israel take vis-à-vis civic virtue. In a similar line of 
thinking, it can be suggested that the strong state tradition in Turkey feeds the 
common idea among the Turkish public that the state is the ultimate, fearsome, 
authority-wielding supreme power, whereas in Israel’s political culture, the state 
has no similar meaning. Yet, it must be noted that Israel is counted among states 
that have strong capabilities to initiate and enforce the rules of the game in their 
societies. However, it is also acknowledged that the Israeli state is more 
successful in making people obey its rules once they are made than in making 
such rules in the first place (Migdal, 1989: 3). The Turkish Jews, with their 
obedience to the general norms of order as part of the political culture they 
inherited in Turkey, can be considered as contributing to the success of the Israeli 
state. In other words, the reading of Turkey’s strong state tradition in the eyes of
240
its Jewish community that prevailed in Israel after their immigration may have 
resulted in rewards for Israel’s state tradition.
Readers of the below discussion on Turkish Jews’ perception and 
experiences of citizenship should keep in mind one of the perennial key 
dimensions of Israeli politics, that is, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since its 
establishment Israel has weathered a series of wars with its neighboring 
Palestinians and Arab states, and the question of Palestine has left a deep 
impression on not only domestic but also international politics. The conflict has 
resulted in such security problems as terrorism greatly influencing daily life in 
Israel. Universal conscription of Jews is obligatory and, in comparison to other 
countries, quite lengthy. It still plays a vital role for the socializing of inunigrants. 
These security problems impact citizenship in Israel and furthermore shape the 
perceptions and experiences of its Turkish Jews on issues as varied as majority- 
minority relations, nationalism, the limits of democracy and threat perception.
In addition to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the changing nature of 
bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel has contributed to the shaping of 
perceptions of citizenship. Turkey and Israel started to establish close trade and 
defense ties in the 1980s and ‘90s. These relations in turn seem to have played a 
role in the perceptions of citizenship in the eyes of Israel’s Turkish Jews, as will 
be discussed later. Last but not least, the changing integration policies of Israel 
over time need to be kept in mind when reading the perceptions and experiences 
of the Turkish Jews below. Israel’s early years were characterized by efforts to 
plant firm roots for the Jewish nation and state. Sabra, the idealized stereotype of 
a courageous, strong-willed Jewry, was introduced in this period. However, after
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the 1970s, the ideal of a common identity for all Israelis began to be challenged 
by the recognition of different identities and ethno-cultural backgrounds in Israeli 
society. Changes in immigration policies reflected this new multicultuxalist trend. 
Along the same lines, experiences and perceptions of citizenship at the individual 
level also changed. The Turkish Jews felt these changes too.
5.3 Profile of the Sample Group in the Field Research in Israel
In this section, before discussing views on and experiences of citizenship, 
a profile of the interviewed respondents will be drawn.^ In addition, the general 
migration history and group characteristics broken down by periods of migration 
will be introduced. A total of 34 interviews were conducted with the sample group 
in the field research in Israel. All of the respondents were first generation. 
Turkish-born immigrants who moved to Israel at some point in their lives. The 
sample group selected from the population group of Turkish Jews in Israel 
reflected diversity in terms of age, gender, marital status, citizenship status, place 
of birth, place o f settlement in Israel, employment status, education, socio­
economic status, ethno-religious origin and year o f migration?
As to the age of the respondents when they were interviewed, the youngest 
was 45 and the oldest 79. Out of the 34 Turkish Jews, 21 were between 40 and 60
^  For the characteristics of the interviewees in the field research in Israel, briefly summarized in 
Appendix E.
’ The below portrayal of the respondents enconpasses their profile at the time of the interviews 
only.
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years of age at the time of interviews, and the 13 remaining were over 60. The 
average age of all the respondents when interviewed was 61. The mean ratio of 
age at the time of immigration from Turkey to Israel was 24. The respondents’ 
age variety helped the researcher to obtain a mixture of immigration stories from 
the respondents.
In terms of gender, the 34 respondents were evenly split between 17 
women and 17 men. The marital status of the respondents also varied: two were 
divorced, one woman was widowed and the remaining 31 were married. Out of 
the 34 respondents, only two were married to non-Turkish Israeli Jews. The 
remaining 32 respondents had chosen Turkish Jews as spouses. Most of the 
respondents had two children, though some had three or four at the time of the 
interviews.
With respect to citizenship status, eight of the respondents out of the total 
34 had dual citizenship -  Tmldsh and Israeli. All of these eight dual citizen 
respondents had begun as Turkish citizens exclusively, but after the enactment of 
the law on dual citizenship in Turkey in 1981, they applied for an additional 
Israeli citizenship. Five out of 34 respondents had Turkish citizenship only. 
Although it had been several years since they arrived in Israel, they had not 
changed their citizenship status even after Turkey changed its law to accept dual 
citizenship. A single respondent had only Spanish citizenship. Though he was 
bom in Turkey and had no affiliation to Spain, he gained Spanish citizenship 
during the 1917 occupation of Istanbul by Western forces, and even after the 
foundation of Turkish Republic, the respondent's family chose to retain the old 
citizenship, as did he. He kept it after settling in Israel as well. The remaining 20
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respondents out of the total 34 had Israeli citizenship only. All of these Israeli 
citizens opted out of Turkish citizenship for practical reasons such as avoiding the 
Turkish military draft, being able to visit Turkey as tourists without incurring the 
legal obligations of Turkish citizenship, and the considerable expense of 
extending their Turkish passports.*
As for the birthplaces of the respondents, all but one were bom in Turkey, 
as follows: one was bom in Bergama, one in Menemen, one in Kirklareli, two in 
Edime, 13 in İzmir and 15 in Istanbul. These are all places in Turkey where 
historically Jews were concentrated. Only one respondent was bom in Israel; his 
family immigrated to Israel in 1943 during World War n, but returned to Turkey 
after the war’s end.
As to their places o f settlement, the respondents who migrated to Israel in 
the mass wave of 1948-51 came largely to reside in Tel-Aviv or else Farsaba, 
Haifa, Sahala or Yahud.^ The respondents who migrated between the years 1951 
and 1980 settled in such regions as Tel-Aviv, Bat-Yam, Natanya, Ashdot, Or 
Yehuda and Rarnat-Aviv.'° At the time of the interviews, the respondents were
* The effect of Turkey’s laws and policies on citizenship and emigration on the status of Turkish 
Jews in Israel was explored in Chapter III.
’ Israel is territorially a small country, about 1/40* the size of Turkey. Tel-Aviv (Tel-Aviv Yafo) is 
its biggest city, and was capital for eight months in 1948, when Jerusalem was given that 
designation, though most other countries have kept their embassies in Tel-Aviv, effectively 
refusing to recognize the controversial move. The other areas mentioned are small settlements or 
villages, mostly former Arab property.
With urbanization, population growth and the building of highways between towns, some o f  
these towns became townships of Tel-Aviv. In addition, new suburbs were estabhshed but most of 
them are concentrated in the Tel-Aviv hinterland.
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living mainly in Bat-Yam, Herzeliya, Ramata Hasharon, Ramai-Aviv, Rishon 
Lezziyon, Yahud or central Tel-Aviv.
The employment status of the respondents also reflected diversity among 
the sample group of Turkish Jews in Israel. Out of all 34 respondents, 18 were 
employed at the time of the interviews. Among these working re^x>ndoits, 13 
were women and five were men. Six out of the total 18 working respondents were 
employed mostly in white-collar jobs (one bank manager, three accountants, one 
university academic and one technician), and the remaining 12 were self- 
employed (one dry cleaner, one photographer, five small retailers, two 
contractors, two lawyers and one trader).*' A little less than half, 16 out of the 
total 34, were not employed at the time of the interviews. Most of these non- 
employed respondents were women, with only four men. There was considerable 
variance among this non-employed group: seven were housewives, another seven 
were retired (mostly fi-om white-collar jobs), and two were unemployed but 
actively seeking jobs.
The education level of the 34 respondents also varied. A single respondent 
had no education at all, three had finished elementary school, six had finished 
junior high school, 13 were high school graduates, three of them had finished two 
years of education beyond high school (college), six were university graduates, 
one had a master’s degree, and one had a doctorate. Advancement can be seen in 
the education levels of the Turkish Jews as compared with their parents’ education 
level. The socio-economic status of the respondents in terms of education and
"  The two small retailers of the 12 self-employed were former IDF officers who opened shops 
after retiring from the military.
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income levels was mainly in the middle range, though some had a lower or higfaCT 
status.
In terms of ethno-religious origin, all of the 34 respondents were 
Sephardic Jews. Two of the respondents had French as their mother tongue, 20 
had Ladino and 12 had Turkish, but all knew both Hebrew and TuridsL Almost 
all of the respondents knew Ladino very well, excepting two who knew none at 
all. Most of the respondents knew English and some knew Italian as foreign 
languages in addition to Ladino, Turkish, French and/or Hebrew.
In terms of their year o f migration, out of the total 34 respondents, 11 
arrived in Israel during the great wave of 1948-51. The other 23 migrated from 
Turkey to Israel in the period of 1952 to 1980. Out of these 23 later arrivals, 13 
migrated between the late 1960s and early ‘70s, and 10 of them came in the late 
‘70s. Their dates of arrival in Israel pointed to sub-group characteristics and 
differences in migration history by periods of migration. At the outset, it should 
be clearly underlined that the sample group illustrated group characteristic 
tendencies very much like those of the Turkish Jews in Israel discussed in Chapter 
rn.'^ Hence, the immigrants who arrived in the mass wave of 1948-51 were a 
significantly different immigrant group compared to those who arrived after 1951.
The interviewees who arrived in Israel in 1948-51 generally had a lower 
socio-economic status than those who came in subsequent migratory flows. Most 
of them had low education levels and were by and large involved in low-skilled 
occupations concentrated in crafts and industry. The female respondents had no
In Chapter III, the reasons for migration as well as the profile of the immigrants were laid out 
according to the existing literature on Jewish migration fi^om Turkey to Israel.
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working experience when they were in Turkey but after arriving in Israel, they 
began working. The main reason for migration was to get access to better 
opportunities to raise their economic status, which they apparently achieved after 
their arrival in Israel. Among the respondent group of immigrants fi'om 1948-51, 
there were also some who migrated out of Zionist ideals or due to the pressure 
that the Turkification process put on Turkish Jews. These interviewees came 
mainly fi-om the middle class, and after graduating fi-om universities in Turkey, 
they moved to Israel to contribute to the Jewish state and/or to pursue careers in 
the public sector, which they thought would be impossible in Turkey due to their 
Jewish status. One of the respondents fi'om this group said that she had migrated 
to Israel so she could get married without paying the drahoma (dowry), a sum 
beyond her means in Turkey.
After their arrival in Israel, the respondent group fiom the 1948-51 wave 
was settled first in migration camps or kibbutzim. The living conditions were poor. 
After a couple of years, when they found jobs outside the camps, most of the 
respondents moved to other places and settled in very small houses. As their 
earnings rose, they expanded these houses and established a better living for their 
families. Most of the respondents had Ladino as their mother tongue, but they 
learned Hebrew over time. In contrast, their children learned Hebrew as their 
mother tongue, and Turkish remained very limited, in comparison to the low level 
of Ladino. They established social networks with other Israeli Jews, especially the 
Sephardim, as well as with other Turkish Jews.
The interviewees who arrived in Israel after 1951 generally had higher 
socio-economic status than the previous immigrants and were generally fiom the
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middle or upper-middle class. In occupational terms they were mostly tradesmen, 
but there were also some professionals. By taking advantage of tbe already 
established Turkish immigrant communities, members of this group were able to 
continue in occupations similar to those they had held in Turkey. As stated 
previously, some also went on to take positions in the nation’s military or police, 
something with no precedent in Turkey itself The main motivations for migration 
for them were family unification, better economic and educational opportunities 
in Israel, higher standards of living, Turkey’s general economic woes, Zionism, 
sharing Israel’s pride as a Jewish state (especially after the 1967 Six-Day War), 
and the extreme rightist-leftist terror plaguing Turkey.
The respondents who arrived in Israel after 1951 differed among each 
other as well. The Jews who arrived in Israel in the late 1960s and late ‘70s varied 
in terms of class and reasons for migration. Those who came to Israel in the late 
‘60s were mainly fi-om the middle class, whereas those who came a decade later 
tended more towards the upper-middle class or upper class. It should be noted that 
the remaining Jewish community in Turkey showed a gradual upward mobility 
due to the gradual emigration of lower-class Jews. In other words, as the lower 
and middle classes emigrated, the remaining Jews in Turkey moved towards the 
middle and upper classes. Such a trend in the Jewish community in Turkey 
occurred gradually. As of the late 1970s, the remaining Jews in Turkey were more 
upper class than previous members of their community who emigrated. Moreover, 
rising political violence throughout the decade resulted in an atmosphere of great 
insecurity and was the main motivation for emigration for most respondents who 
arrived in Israel in the late ‘70s.
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The settlement patterns of the respondents who arrived in Israel after 1951 
seems to be the result of their social and familial connections with previous 
emigrants, the increased state aid to the newcomers, and the buying power of their 
socioeconomic class. The respondents who arrived in the late ‘60s settled mainly 
in Bat-Yam, and those in the late ‘70s settled in Ramat-Aviv or the Herzeliya 
region. All the post-1951 respondents spoke better Turkish and conversely less 
Ladino. However, this group also used Turkish more often in their lives and 
maintained closer relationships with other Turkish Jews than did their 
predecessors. Furthermore, maintaining Turkish citizenship was more common in 
this group of respondents than with immigrants who came in the great wave.
5.4 How Do Turkish Jews in Israel See Citizenship? Their Experiences and 
Perceptions
After our brief presentation of the profile of interviewees in the field 
research in Israel, in this part of the chapter the focus shifts to an analysis of the 
findings concerning the Turkish Jews. Since the interviews were in-depth, the data 
collected covers a broad spectrum of issues concerning citizenship and 
international migration, a full discussion of which is impossible in a dissertation. 
Therefore, the discussion here is limited to only exploring the research questions 
within the medium of the research paradigm set forth in Chapter I. The main 
research questions addressed are; “How is the interface between international 
migration and citizenship?” and “How does the experience of international 
migration affect the relation between the legal status, identity and civic virtue of
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citizenship in Turkey and in Israel among the Turkish Jews in Israel?” The 
question “How do the respondents perceive their membership, belongiag and/or 
attachment to the Turkish nation-state and/or to the Israeli nation-state?” also 
complements the basic research questions and refines the interface between 
international migration and citizenship.
In the interviews, it became clear that the year of migration was the main 
determining factor of the similarities and dissimilarities between and among the 
respondents. The immigrants differed among themselves significantly according 
to their dates of arrival in Israel, which coincided to a large extent with the profile 
of the immigrant groups presented above. Therefore, our analysis of the findings 
concentrates on the breakdown of the respondents by year of migration to Israel, 
i.e. immigrants that arrived in 1948-51 and those who arrived post 1951.
5.4.1 Citizenship and the Legal Status of Turkish Jews in Israel
All of the first generation immigrant respondents had, prior to migration, 
experiences of being members of a minority group in Turkey. Their perceptions 
and experiences regarding the legal status of citizenship before migration were 
directly related to their nfinority status while still in Turkey. After they arrived in 
Israel, they became members of the Turkish-Jewish community in Israel. Such a 
move to Israel inevitably led the respondents to compare and contrast their former 
lives in Turkey and present lives in Israel.
Looking back at their former membership in the Jewish minority, most of 
the respondents said they generally had not experienced anti-Semitism while in
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Turkey but rather had had peaceful and harmonious relations with the dominant 
Muslim, Turkish society. They frequently mentioned their good relations with 
their neighbors or co-workers. Most of the respondents seemed to have a warm 
nostalgic feeling about their past life in Turkey. When asked directly about their 
legal status as Jews in Turkey, most of the respondents reiterated their optimistic 
views and evaluations, emphasizing that they had been on equal footing with 
other Turkish citizens and had not faced overt discrimination rooted in citizenship 
law. Most of them emphasized that the legal framework of basic rights and 
responsibilities applied equally and universally for every subject of the Turkish 
state. However, despite such a general tendency to accentuate the positive 
conditions and relations affecting Jews in Turkey, differences in opinion among 
the respondents emerged according to their year of migration. Although most of 
the respondents emphasized that they had not faced discrimination in Turkey on 
account of their Jewishness, the degree of emphasis on the equality between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in Turkey varied accordingly.
The interviewees who migrated between 1948 and 1951 mainly argued 
that while non-Muslim minorities in Turkey had faced difficulties in the 1930s 
and ‘40s, this was an archaic problem which had since disappeared. These 
respondents had experienced firsthand such events as the Thracian Incidents, the 
Capital Tax and the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign, or at least heard about 
them from fellow Turkish Jews. Even though they believe these incidents put 
pressure on Jews and other non-Muslims living in Turkey, they also believed such 
events would not recur, for a variety of reasons: today very few Jews remain in 
Turkey, over time the nation had become modernized and developed, and Israel as
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the protector of world Jewry would not allow such incidents to happen. Even 
when recalling these incidents, the respondents seemed to steer away from any 
harsh criticism of Turkey or Turkish society, and instead, in a forgiving tone, 
framed the incidents as things of the past. They also characterized the incidents as 
anomalies in Turkish history partially attributable to the environment of World 
War n. The following comments are an example of this tolerant attitude towards 
such incidents:
I didn’t live through the Thracian Incidents myself, but my parents told me 
about it. What happened was passed down by word of mouth. The Capital 
Tax, I do remember. They took everything in our house away. They also 
took my father to a camp. Those were very hard conditions. Some people 
even died in those camps. I didn’t favor the Capital Tax. I think it was 
imequal, but those were difficult times. Even the Turks themselves lived in 
fear. The [Nazi] Germans were at the borders preparing to invade Turkey. 
But İsmet İnönü protected us from the Jews. He said, “They won’t touch the 
Jews!” İnönü and Atatürk protected us. İnönü imposed the Capital Tax 
because he needed to do something to protect us from the Nazis. But I must 
admit that İnönü was a bit religious. He was more religious than Atatürk. 
Some people claim that İnönü was anti-Semitic, but I don’t believe it. On 
the one hand he protected us and on the other, he imposed the Capital Tax 
on us. He was also fearfiil. He needed to do something to protect us. 
(FRIS12, female, 1948 immigrant)’^
Other than these historical incidents, the respondents who arrived in Israel 
in 1948-51 said that they had experienced some anti-Jewish discrimination in 
Turkey, but their stories fit in with the attitude laid out above. Here are two other 
accoimts of discrimination:
 ^FRIS is the abbreviation for ‘field research in Israel.’ The number beside it refers to the number 
given to each interview.
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In high school, some teachers discriminated against us as Jews but despite 
this, I was very happy with my life in Turkey. I needed to do perfectly in 
every course so that nobody could discriminate against me. This actually 
turned into an advantage for me. I became very successful at school and was 
able to attend university as the result of my hard work. There were also 
other ways Jews were discriminated against. For instance, there was 
discrimination at work. Jews at that time were mainly doctors, lawyers or 
traders. I was the first Jewish girl living in İzmir who went to Istanbul for a 
university education. I was afraid my father wouldn’t let me go since we had 
no relatives in Istanbul. We knew that the state dormitories weren’t 
accepting Jewish students at the time and so I didn’t even apply. I lived in a 
guesthouse but a friend who was going to the same school lived in the state 
dorm. There was no written rule, but everybody knew that the state dorms 
wouldn’t admit Jewish students. Things are very different in Turkey now. 
Times have changed. You’re a new generation. Maybe you’re hearing about 
these things for the first time in your life, but these things did happen. 
(FRIS30, female, 1951 immigrant)
I never experienced any discrimination. When I was 10 or so, there were 
bastards in the street who said “Dirty Jew!” to me but over time Turkey 
learned to be respectful. We didn’t face any hardships in Turkey. If you read 
about the things Jews in other parts of the world had to face, you see that 
they faced very hard times. But we, the Jews in Turkey, didn’t have to deal 
with such things. We had very good conditions. Nobody in Turkey ran after 
us, threw us into the sea or did anything to insult us. What saved us was 
Turkey, and this fact always stayed with us. We’ll never forget that Turkey 
saved us. (FRIS7, male, 1948 immigrant)
The respondents who arrived in Israel after 1951 emphasized more 
strongly than previous immigrants that legally speaking, there was full equality 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. Although they conceded that there might 
have been some incidents against Jews and other non-Muslims in the past, they 
themselves had not suffered from discrimination. In addition, they frequently 
recalled the tolerance that society in general showed them. Such a positive 
evaluation of the past both in terms of legal status and social relations with society 
at large seemed to be connected to their nostalgia for the country and society they 
grew up in. Similar to the immigrants of 1948-51, this group of respondents
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seemed to recall their past life in Turkey in largely positive terms. Even though 
some respondents argued that there were instances of anti-Semitism during their 
time in Turkey, they declined to tar either Turkish society in general or the state 
with the taint of anti-Semitism, underlining that these were but small incidents 
that did not add up to a picture of large-scale anti-Semitism. Incidents such as the 
“Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign, the Thracian Incidents, the Capital Tax and 
the September 6-7 Events were generally heard about from other Jews, either in 
Israel or in Turkey. As they did with their own experiences, most of the 
respondents did not believe that these incidents could be interpreted as out-and- 
out racism or other severe forms of discrimination. The following quotations from 
two Jews illustrate how they see these incidents and their previous life in Turkey:
We had a very beautiful life in Turkey. I didn’t feel any discrimination. 
Nothing bad happened to my family or to me personally. I only heard 
rumors of past incidents. It was like a wave and it came and went. Nothing 
happened to me. I only heard [about these] but didn’t experience [them] 
myself. (FRIS24, female, 1970 immigrant)
I haven’t heard about the Thracian Incidents. I know that with the Capital 
Tax, they took everything from the Jews. Some people lost their homes. I 
think it was a bad tax and it would have been better if it had never existed. I 
hear about the September 6-7 Events and the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” 
campaign. But you have to recognize that all these events occurred during 
World War n. Because of European influence the attitude in Turkey towards 
Jews changed at that time, but later everything was resolved. In Europe, 
they burned six million Jews but not even a single Jew died in Turkey. 
There is a Holocaust museum here in Israel. They list the nmnber of Jews 
who died in every country. For Turkey it says “zero,” which means no Jew 
died in Turkey during World War II. This is a very important point. Things 
should be considered from this perspective. (FRIS22, male, 1964 
immigrant)
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The emphasis put on legal equality and the harmony between Jews and 
other segments of Turkish society rises with the migrants who arrived in the late 
1970s. It can be argued that the tendency to describe their past life in Turkey in 
affirmative, optimistic terms as citizens and as Jews solidifies for the respondent 
group of late ‘70s immigrants. The following quotation is an example of this 
strong emphasis on equality between Jews and other Turkish citizens:
I was never bothered in Turkey for being Jewish. Sometimes there would be 
bad jokes, but that was it and nothing more. There was no enmity against 
Jews. There was the distinction between the [Muslim] Alawites and 
Sunnites, and this conflict disturbed me the most. In the ‘70s there was 
ideological polarization, especially among the workers. I assigned Alawite 
workers to one factory and the Sunnites to another because the Alawites 
were leftists and the Sunnites were rightists. It was a sectarian as well as an 
ideological conflict. Neither Erbakan [leader of the extreme Islamist 
National Salvation Party at the time] nor the assassination of Elrom [then 
chargé d’affaires at Israel’s Embassy in Istanbul] worried me.*“* Erbakan 
caused me no concern because I was already doing business with 
conservative Islamic people. Furthermore, those rehgious extremists had no 
hopes of realizing their goals because the Turkish Army would never ever 
let them get hold of power... No, I won’t complain about Turkey. It would 
be very silly to complain. Today there are problems in Israel and there were 
the same problems in Turkey at that time. This is how things are. In Turkey 
I was on the same footing as Muslims, and that’s it. I had no greater cause 
for complaint about Turkey than I do for Israel. (FRIS5, male, 1979 
immigrant)
As for their post-immigration legal status in Israel, the respondents were as 
one in strongly and frequently stressing the equality among citizens of Israel. The
Here, the respondents draw out a general picture of the political conjecture in 1970s marked by 
conflict between leftist and rightist groups among Turkish society. Despite military intervention in 
1971, the conflict continued until the next intervention in 1980. National Salvation Party, which 
was a conservative-Islamic party headed by Necmettin Erbakan started to gain weight in the same 
years. The assassination of Efraim Elrom that the respondent told about occurred in May, 1971. 
One of the illegal socialist organizations at the time, Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi (Turkey 
People’s Independence Front) which was influenced by the Palestininan movement, kidnapped and 
killed Elrom, Israel’s ambassador in Istanbul. Some of the leaders of the Organization were 
executed in 1972.
255
respondents argued that democracy in Israel provides equality and freedom for all 
its citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious origin. In their opinion, Israel’s 
minorities -  i.e. Muslims, Christians and Druze -  are treated without any 
discrimination and under the same set of legal provisions. Some of the 
respondents also argued that the laws and policies on citizenship provided 
equality not only to ethnic and religious groups but also to women, the disabled 
and the elderly. Regardless of their year of arrival in Israel, the following are 
exemplary of the respondents’ view of equality under Israeli law:
The laws are equal for everybody. They thought about everybody’s needs. 
For example, my husband is very old. He gets a retirement pension. Now 
he’s very ill. The state sends a nurse to our house every day to look after 
him, (FRIS14, female, 1951 immigrant)
There are courts under the law, and they are very just. Women, men, 
everybody is equal before the law. The Arabs also benefit from these laws. 
Women’s rights in Israel are very advanced. (FRIS20, female, 1965 
immigrant)
However, with respect to equality between Jews and Arabs, complicated 
views about military conscription emerged. Conscription in Israel is not universal, 
as it is obligatory for Jews only. Arabs can serve in the Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF) only if they volunteer, and if they are then accepted. This issue arose in 
some of the interviews. The non-universal nature of conscription was not 
interpreted as a form of inequality, but rather as a requirement for the security’s 
sake. One respondent expressed his views like this:
The laws in Israel are equal. It’s true that for security reasons, the military 
investigates non-Jews more. For instance, if a Christian Arab wants to join
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the military, they would investigate him more. If that person proves his 
loyalty, he can reach a high position in the military but if there are doubts 
about him, they won’t let him in to begin with. For ordinary citizens, there’s 
no difference in the laws. Arabs have all the same rights that we have. I 
think that it’s they who don’t want equal rights. The state has certain rules. 
Nobody bothers Arabs as long as they stay in their villages. They can build 
where they want to. They have the right to vote, but few do. (FRIS33, male, 
1970 immigrant)
The aid provided by Israel to Jewish immigrants was argued to be just in 
the sense that Jews who needed more received more. For instance, Jews coming 
from underdeveloped coimtries or ones where there was severe anti-Semitic 
discrimination got a larger share of the absorption basket than those from 
countries where Jews generally enjoyed a high socio-economic status.’^  Along 
such lines, Turkish Jews were considered to be less privileged than Jews from the 
United States but more so than Iraqi or Yemeni Jews. Past migrants, especially 
those of the migration wave of 1948-51, mentioned that there was discrimination 
against Sephardic Jews by Ashkenazic Jews. In the migration camps and 
kibbutzim, for instance, they claimed that Ashkenazic Jews were favored for open 
positions, with Sephardic Jews thought little of Since Turkish Jews were put 
alongside other Sephardic groups, they were certain incidents of discrimination 
against them, as one respondents related:
In the beginning, those who came from Turkey were discriminated against a 
bit. But later this stopped. We’re a very warm people. We believe what 
other people tell us. This is Turkish style. Here they call us “Turco.” At the 
start, there were the Ashkenazim who came here before us. They already 
had houses and jobs. They knew more than us. They knew the country. 
When we came, we knew nothing. We didn’t know the language. Nobody
For further information on the absorption basket, see Chapter III.
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helped us, I mean the Ashkenazim. There was this Ashkenazim-Sephardim 
distinction. They knew us as Sephardim, and there was some discrimination 
against us at that time because of this. (FRIS12, female, 1948 immigrant)
At the present, all new immigrants receive the same share from the 
absorption basket. Most respondents know that in the past there was 
discrimination between the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, but they said that 
over time it disappeared and today no such inequahty remained. Even the way in 
the past immigrants from Turkey received less government support than Jews 
from Morocco or Argentina was viewed as a just procedure, not a form of 
inequahty. One of the post-1951 unmigrants laid out his views as follows:
Everybody gets a different amount of support, and this is determined 
according to people’s needs. This isn’t unfair. The Turks were in a better 
situation, but those from Russia or Abyssinia [Ethiopia] were not, and that’s 
why they got more support from the state. (FRIS16, male, 1980 immigrant)
The respondents compared their experiences in Turkey and in IsraeL 
regarding citizenship as well. The respondents were asked several questions about 
the reasons for their current citizenship status. These questions not only 
highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of changing citizenship but also 
revealed how they compared citizenship in Israel and citizenship in Turkey. The 
respondents with only Israeh citizenship said that they had not wanted to revoke 
their Turkish citizenship but had had to do so for practical reasons. Those who 
kept their Turkish citizenship emphasized that doing so was important for them as 
an indication of their social/famihal ties with Turkey as well as of their bonds of 
loyalty to their former home country. One of the respondents, a Turkish citizen, 
told the meaning of his holding a Turkish passport like this:
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I don’t need dual citizenship. Every time I come to Turkey, the policeman at 
the passport control asks us: ‘"You’re living in Israel and come to visit 
Turkey every year, so why don’t you get an Israeli citizenship?” I tell him, 
“I was bom a Turk, so let me die a Turk.” Then the conversation changes, of 
course. That policeman doesn’t question my Turkishness because I’m a Jew. 
What he questions is my long years of staying in Israel and maintaining my 
Turkishness. This is what surprises him. “Are you hving in Israel? Are you 
living in Tel-Aviv? How can you remain a Turk after many years?” are 
some of the questions they ask. I’ve been away from Turkey for so many 
years, but I’m still a Turk. I can’t see myself as an Israeli. My mind and my 
heart belong to Turkey. When I come across something about Turkey, for 
example on the TV or when I’m waUdng down the street, my ears 
automatically prick up. For example, customers who are Turkish come to 
t»ur bank and I’m more interested in them. I pay more attention to them. I’m 
more sympathetic towards them. I sit and chat with them about Turkey. We 
didn’t cut off our ties with Turkey and we never wanted to. (FRIS23, male, 
1970 mmaigrant)
The respondents explained the advantages and disadvantages of holding 
Turkish citizenship in practical terms. They said that it was harcf to get visas with 
their Turkish passports. However, when visiting some Muslim coxmtries that 
Israel has been at odds with, they preferred Turkish passports. Since Israeli- 
passport holders are denied visas to some Middle Eastern countries such as Dubai, 
Turkish Jews use their Turkish passports to get these visas. Another interesting 
issue that arose during one of the interviews was the security afforded to Turkish 
passport-holders in contrast to Israeh citizens and passports. As is commonly 
known, Israeli citizens and Jews are targets of terrorist attacks not only in Israel 
but also in other countries. But in dangerous situations such as a plane hijacking, a 
Turkish passport provides proof of its bearer being neither Israeli nor a Jew and so 
affords a degree of security. One respondent exjplained the security that Turkish 
passports provide as follows:
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I wanted my wife to get dual citizenship. An Israeli plane had been hijacked 
on its way to Uganda. The hijackers released the foreigner passengers but 
kept the Israelis on board. One of our fiiends was on the plane. He was 
holding a Turkish passport, and he was among those who were released. I 
told my wife, “You should get a Turkish passport. When we go abroad and 
if our plane is hijacked, at least you can be released with your Turkish 
passport.” (FRIS31, male, 1949 immigrant)
In the interviews, quickly and easily obtaining visas from European 
countries was held up as the foremost advantage of holding Israeli citizenship. 
Some of the respondents said that they had applied for dual citizenship and 
obtained Israeli citizenships so as to get voting rights (permanent residents in 
Israel can vote in local, but not general, elections).
When the respondents compared citizenships in Turkey and in Israel, the 
common theme that emerged was Turkey’s lack of a notion of social welfare and 
hence social rights. In contrast, Israel was characterized as a country where 
citizens’ rights were more advanced, the social welfare system was better quality 
and social rights granted to its citizens cover a broad range of needs and services. 
Oft-cited services dehvered in Israel are its free, modem healthcare system, the 
existence of an unemployment insurance system, and good post-retirement living 
standards owing to high pensions.
Whatever their year of arrival, the respondents characterized Turkey as a 
place marked by the supremacy of the state over individuals, whereas in Israel, 
there were human rights, and the value placed on individual citizens was higher. 
The basic responsibility of state officials in Israel, they said, was to serve the 
citizens. The respect and professionalism of state officials in Israel was also 
mentioned. On the other hand, Turkish state officials, especially police officers.
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were characterized as acting in a heavy-handed and authoritarian manner. Such a 
difference seen in citizenship rights in Turkey and in Israel seems to come from 
the perception that Israeli citizens are clients of the services delivered by the state, 
whereas Turkish citizens have limited power vis-à-vis state ofBcials and the state 
apparatus. The following provides an illustration of this difference:
Here [in Israel], if my citizenship rights were violated even by a police 
officer, I can file a complaint against him/her. If the same thing happens in 
Turkey, I would fear the pohce and wouldn’t do anything to protect my 
rights. This isn’t because I’m a Jew. In Turkey, everybody is afraid of the 
pohce. Nobody would raise their voice against the pohce hi Turkey. (FRIS3, 
male, 1979 immigrant)
Another issue that arose during the interviews when the respondents 
compared citizenship in Turkey and in Israel was the recruitment of minorities to 
powerful or decision-making positions. Generally, as was shown above, the 
respondents emphasized the equality among Muslims and non-Muslims in 
Turkey, though the degree of emphasis varied according to the year of arrival in 
Israel -  it was lower among immigrants who arrived in the great wave, and higher 
among post-1951 immigrants. When asked about the prospects and conditions for 
Jews in Turkey to be recruited to high state or pohtical positions, the opinions 
paralleled the year-of-arrival trend of views about equality. Immigrants from both 
the great wave and its aftermath said that there were no legal prohibitions in 
Turkey blocking Jews from holding high positions such as the prime ministry, 
other ministries, the bureaucracy, the chief of general staff or deputies in
261
Parliament. However, the great wave immigrants also mentioned that certain 
legal restrictions had existed in Turkey in the past, but that such restrictions no 
longer existed today. One of them explained this issue as follows:
It’s possible in theory but in practice, it can’t be done. Hardly any Jews in 
Turkey are involved in politics. Once there were some Jewish deputies in 
the Parhament but there are none today. There’s no legal restriction, but the 
Jews themselves aren’t interested in poHtics. There- used to be some legal 
prohibitions like restrictions on the recruitment of the Jews or Roma 
[Gypsies]. Although every man is drafted by law, Jews who were put in jail 
weren’t registered as Jews but as Roma so that they wouldn’t be drafted. 
Roma were not drafted at the time. This was not written in the laws but they 
were not drafting Roma or Jews under prison at the time. (FRIS28, male, 
1951 immigrant)
The common theme emerging in the interviews with the immigrants of 
both 1948-51 and afterwards was that despite the absence of legal barriers, 
invisible social barriers did exist to Jewish candidates attaiciing those positions of 
power. They furthermore argued that Jews in Turkey were not interested in state 
affairs or politics but rather preferred professions in the private sector.
The resulting invisible barriers for Jews in Turkey were, according to the 
respondents, natural and rational. The respondents believed that in any given 
society positions of high power ought to be filled by members of its majority. In 
Turkey, the majority is of course Muslim. Correspondingly, the majority in Israel 
is Jewish. The respondents argued that it would be “rational” and “tbe norinal 
way” that in Israel the chief of general staff or president would be a Jew, and in
16 In fact, as stated earlier, there are no legal provisions barring the recruitment o f Jews to any state 
position. The views mentioned reflect perceptions only.
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Turkey a Muslim. In particular, the respondents argued very strongly that the 
chief of general staff position should be occupied by a member of the majority. 
Some of the respondents conceded that there could be Parliament deputies or 
Cabinet ministers from minority groups provided they were chosen usmg the 
normal procedures. They gave examples of both Jewish deputies in the Tiukish 
Parliament and Arab parhamentarians in Israel’s Knesset. Below are some of the 
inunigrants’ views about the recruitment of minorities to high government or 
pohtical positions in both Israel and in Turkey:
No Jew can become chief of general staff, and this is nonnal. I compare the 
situation in Israel with Turkey. It would be impossible for an Arab to 
become Israel’s chief of staff, and it’s the same in Txirkey, it would be 
impossible for a Jew to hold such a position. For instance the Druze in 
Israel, none of them could become chief of general staff.,There’s no legal 
prohibition but they wouldn’t allow it. In my opinion, who ever’s in the 
majority should govern the country. If a Jew became Turkey’s chief of 
general staff, this would be unwise. Turkey is a conservative country and 
some people wouldn’t like this. I would understand their reaction. No, it 
wouldn’t be right. (FRIS22, male, 1964 immigrant)
Jews could become deputies, but not anything more. They also can’t serve 
as chief of general staff, and this is very understandable. Turkey’s chief of 
general staff should be a Mushm Turk, because Trukey is Muslim country. 
This is the normal way, in my opinion. For example, a Muslim Arab can’t 
become Israel’s chief of general staff. I believe that the majority should rule. 
Besides, Jews in Turkey are interested ia trade and wouldn’t prefer a 
profession in the military. But more than that, I think it should be someone 
from the majority. (FRIS2, female, 1979 immigrant)
5.4.2 Citizenship and the Identity of Turkish Jews in Israel
During the interviews, the identity aspect of citizenship was explored 
through various questions and poiats related to the cultural formation and re­
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formation of the respondents due to their experience of international migration. 
One of the impacts of immigration as a process on Turkish Jews was a change of 
names. Although most of the immigrants had Jewish names taken from the Jewish 
m}dhology or theology, after they arrived ia Israel they changed these names for 
ones which better suited Hebrew phonetics. These new names carried meanings 
similar to their previous ones. For children, almost all the respondents chose 
Israeli names. Customarily, Jews in Turkey named children after then forebears -  
more usually, after their mothers and fathers. This custom was maintained in 
Israel as well, but the names given the children were adapted to Hebrew 
phonetics.
Another crucial component of identity is language. The mother tongues of 
Turkish Jews varied according to their year of migration and socio-economic 
status. Among Turkey’s Jewish community, French was cormnon as a mother 
tongue among higher socio-economic status Jews, with Ladino more common
3
among those of lower socio-economic status. The use of Turkish existed in every 
generation of the Jews, yet its status as mother tongue became more prevalent 
after the 1950s. Hebrew was not among the foreign languages that Tmkey’s 
Jewish minority knew. It was used only in synagogues prayers, and the rabbis 
generally knew and used it for religious purposes. Therefore, the Jews who 
migrated to Israel in the great wave of 1948-51 mainly had Ladino as their mother 
tongue, with a limited use of Turkish. Hebrew was nearly unknown to them. Since 
most of the irmnigrants were of a lower socio-economic status, the use of French 
was rare. These early immigrants learned Hebrew in Israel and continued to speak 
mainly Ladino amongst themselves, though Turkish was also used when needed.
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When Israel’s community of Turkish immigrants grew due to the subsequent 
migrations, especially in the 1970s, earher unmigrants from Turkey spoke Turkish 
with these newcomers, who by that time had mostly adopted Turkish as their 
mother tongue. The children of these early immigrants learned Hebrew, which 
became the dominant language used in the household. They understood Ladmo as 
well, but used it Httle. Their level of Turkish remained very limited; some of them 
learned oidy a couple of words or expressions. One of the respondents who 
arrived in Israel in 1948 explained the linguistic changes resulting from migration 
like this:
When we first got here, we used to speak Ladino amongst ourselves. Then 
Hebrew came into the house. When we didn’t want the children to 
rmderstand us, my husband and I used Ladino. The newcomers, I mean 
those who came after the ‘70s, speak Turkish. But when we arrived, there 
wasn’t much Turkish spoken. We used Ladino or Hebrew. It was with the 
newcomers we began to talk Turkish. (FRIS6, female, 1948 immigrant)
The Jews who arrived in the 1970s, however, had Turkish as their mother 
tongue. Although their level of Ladino was also high, the Turkish tongue had been 
more dominant m their fives in Turkey. They transmitted Turkish to their children, 
though Hebrew came to be used frequently at home. If these Jews married fellow 
Turkish immigrants, the use of Turkish was more frequent. These respondents, 
like other Turkish Jews, had not previously known Hebrew but learned it mostly 
iu Israeli ulpan language schools. Both the use of Turkish and its transmission to 
children is more common among respondents who arrived in the late ‘70s. It 
should be recalled that these respondents are from the upper-middle and upper 
class, and some had French as their mother tongue.
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The research also showed that most of the respondents follow news related 
to Turkey and tune into Turkish television channels. Moreover, the immigrants 
who arrived in the great wave said that their Turkish improved after watching 
these channels, which were available only after the 1980s with Turkish media 
deregulation. The habit of reading Turkish-language pubhcations also varied 
according to year of arrival. The immigrants who arrived in 1948-51 did not read 
and write in Turkish, but those who arrived later, especially after the ‘70s, 
followed some Turkish-language publications such as daily newspapers and 
magazines, especially after the widespread availability of the Intemet in the 
1990s. However, the reasons for this difference in reading and writing abihty 
seem mainly to lie in the education levels and socio-economic status of the 
respondents, as the less-educated and lower class respondents’ proficiency in 
Turkish was low. It should also be remembered that general literacy rate of 
Turkish society in the 1940s was lower than in the ‘70s. Therefore, reading and 
writing in Turkish among the Turkish Jews may be related to other factors, not 
only to their year of arrival.
Concerning attitudes towards the use of one language in one country, it 
can be suggested at the outset that most of the respondents firom across the 
migration waves think that all members of a nation should learn and speak the 
country’s dominant language. They also saw the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” 
campaign as a means of the Turkish nation-state to achieve this goal. However, 
with regards to the state’s methods of making citizens not versed in the dominant 
language speak it, views once again varied according to year of migrations. 
Respondents who arrived in the great wave were more familiar with the
266
Turkification policies of the Early Republican Era. In addition, neither their 
families nor they themselves knew Turkish very well. Such a campaign for 
spreading the use of Turkish in the pubhc sphere put them underpressure. For that 
reason, although they agree with the aim of the campaign -  to make Turkish the 
language of the newly founded state — they were concerned that such campaigns 
were futile, and that language courses or education in Turkish schools would 
serve better this aim. As one of the respondents who arrived in the great wave had 
this to say:
I remember the Campaign. They even sent postcards saying “Citizen, Speak 
Turkish!” to shops. I think it was a wrongheaded campaign. I agree that 
there should be one language spoken in a country, but the Turkish 
authorities didn’t understand that making people who’ve spoken a different 
language for 500 years start speaking Turkish overnight was simply 
impossible. (FRIS9, male, 1951 immigrant)
Jews who arrived in the late 1960s and early /70s argued that every 
country should have one dominant tongue and that every member of its society 
should learn and use this tongue in the public sphere. They also added that the 
state, either through, campaigns or other means, should promote the use of the 
dominant language. As individuals, they advocated the use of Turkish among 
Turkey’s Jewish community. The following quotation is an example of such 
thoughts:
I was in elementary school. The school principal, for example, used to put a 
key in our pockets if we were caught speaking Ladino. Whoever was caught 
speaking a foreign language was given a key and as punishment was made 
to write 100 times in their notebook, “I will speak Turkish.” I never got the 
key since I knew Turkish. The school was right to impose such a
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pmiishmeiit. It’s a school and in every school, the students shouldn’t speak 
some foreign language. It would be very rude to speak in a language that 
other people don’t understand. I think the campaign to make people speak 
Turkish was in the right. (FRIS19, male, 1961 immigrant)
The respondents who arrived in the late 1970s shared the opinions of other 
Turkish Jews in Israel iu strongly supporting the principle that everybody in one 
state should speak the same language. Some had never heard about the “Citizen, 
Speak Turkish!” campaign. Here is how one of the respondents reacted, surprised 
when the interviewer asked her about the campaign;
I never heard about that. What is it? We sometimes play games on the 
Internet, with Turks mainly, but sometimes some foreigners join us. We’re 
friends with a lot of people on the Internet. We usually play bridge. If 
there’s a British player but the remaining three players are Turks, we start 
speaking Turkish among us. This is rude, and we remind each other of this 
using a joke; “Citizen, don’t speak Turkish!” But it’s a private joke. I never 
thought it was ever a campaign. Is there a campaign like that in Turkey? 
(jFRIS2, female, 1979 immigrant)
The findings in the interviews seem to suggest that the respondents’ ideas 
and values about one language in one state were influenced by their experience of 
migration. Hence, most of the respondents seemed to make a comparison of then- 
previous lives in Turkey and their current lives in Israel. In other words, they 
seemed to have developed a comparative perspective with regards to their attitude 
about languages. Most think that as Hebrew is the dominant language in Israel, so 
Turkish is tire dominant one in Turkey. Along these lines, immigrants to Israel 
should learn and use Hebrew, just as Jews in Turkey should learn and use Turkish. 
Such a comparative perspective was valid among aU the interviewees, regardless 
of their year of arrival. Some of the respondents supported their views with
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examples from the Russian aliya of the 1990s. Below is an example of this 
comparative perspective:
It annoys me when I hear a Russian [immigrant] speakmg Russian. I believe 
that iu one country the language that everybody understands should be 
spoken. (FRIS21, female, 1974 immigrant)
The respondents were also asked whether they perceived any difference 
between the terms Musevi and Yahudi.^”^ Almost all replied that they saw no 
difference between the terms, as both carry the same meaning iu denoting both a 
rehgion and a nation. Only a few respondents, great wave, immigrants, mentioned 
Musevi’s more poHte connotation and that they preferred that Yahudi be used.
As to how they perceived themselves with respect to identity, almost all of 
the respondents regardless of their year of arrival in Israel called" themselves Jews 
and Israehs but of Turkish origin. There was a difference of stress on the Turkish 
origin part: immigrants who arrived in the great wave emphasized their Tmrkish 
roots less, while those who arrived later emphasized them more strongly and 
frequently. In the following quotations, one can see how the immigrants identify 
themselves as Jews and Israehs but of Turkish origin, as well as the differences in 
the degree of stress on Turkishness:
The same question was adressed to the sample group of respondents in Turkey as well. In 
Chapter IV, there is a discussion o f the terms Musevi and Yahudi,
It should be noted that by the 1970s, there was a shift in Israel’s immigrant absorption policies 
in terms o f its nation-buüding process. In the early years, the ‘melting pot model for socio-cultural 
mtegration was the doroinant norm, but this gradually gave way to a more pluralistic notion o f 
Israeli culture. This shift to the acknowledgement o f multiculturaHsm corresponds to the 
identification o f Jews from Turkey as Turkish Jews,
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I see myself as a Jew, a Jew of Turkish origin, and at the same time as an 
Israeli. (FRIS31, male, 1949 immigrant)
I see myself as л Jew of Turkish origin, because we were born and grew up 
in Turkey, and this didn’t leave us. We’ve been here for 30 years and this 
how we still are. We never lost our Turkishness. (FRIS24, female, 1970 
immigrant)
I see myself as an Israeli of Turkish origin. Our culture, our heritage is very 
different. We stand out in Israel because we’re Turkish by custom and 
tradition. We’ve raised our children the same way. They are easily noticed 
among other Israeh children... Turkish culture means hstening to what 
others say, being patient, not being aggressive and behaving pohtely 
towards others. (FRIS3, male, 1979 immigrant)
Ordy two of the respondents, late ‘70s arrivals, specified that they 
perceived themselves as Sephardic Jews in addition to the labels of Turks and 
Israelis. They said that in Turkey they had been unaware that they were Sephardic 
Jews but after their arrival in Israel, they discovered a distinction between
3
Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews. In the words of one respondent:
I see myself as a Jew of Turkish origin and a Sephardic Jew. Before we 
came to Israel, I wasn’t even aware that we were Sephardic Jews because 
there was no other Jewish group other than the Sephardim in Turkey. I only 
knew that the Jews in Turkey came from Spain 500 years ago. When we 
came to Israel, we saw that there was a distinction between Ashkenazic and 
Sephardic Jewry. They put us into the group of the Sephardim. I learned that 
I was a Sephardic Jew and internalized this identification. (FRIS34, female, 
1979 immigrant)
The difference in the degree of emphasis on Turkishness seemed to be 
reflected in the level of interaction with other immigrants from Turkey in Israel. 
Those who arrived in the great wave seemed to have social networks with other
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Jewish immigrants from various countries, though not with the Arabs hving in 
Israel. Those who arrived in subsequent decades forged social networks primarily 
with other Turkish Jews. Social ties with Arabs were also weak to nonexistent 
with this group of immigrants. The maintenance of social networks among 
Turkish Jews could be seen in the Turkish Jews’ immigrant organizations. Most 
of the Jews who arrived after 1951, especially after the ‘70s, were involved in the 
activities of these immigrants’ organizations or at least attended them irregularly.
Across all immigration periods, hnmigrants from Turkey in Israel 
maintained ties with their relatives who stayed behind in Turkey. Either their 
relatives hi Turkey came to visit them in Israel, or vice versa. The frequency of 
visits seemed to rise especially after the 1980s, when Turkey adopted a more 
hberal economic regime and restrictions on foreign exchange were hfted. The 
aftermath of the 1980s also witnessed a rise in tourism between Israel and Turkey, 
especially due to cheaper airfares and tourist site options in Turkey. As the 
respondents said, bilateral tourism not only allowed the immigrants to take 
vacations and visit their relatives hi Turkey at the same time, but also brought 
other Israeli tourists to Turkey. Although Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, 
before the ‘80s Israelis had httle information about this giant to its north. 
However, with the rise of the Turkish tourism sector, more Israehs visited Turkey 
and learned about Turkish culture and even more came to appreciate the 
hospitality and the warmth of the Turkish people. As they grew more famihar 
with native Turkish culture, Israehs also began to get to know Israel’s own 
Turkish Jews better, seeing in the process what this group had inherited from its 
former homeland. Furthermore, diplomatic ties between Turkey and Israel
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strengthened after the 1980s, and cooperation in a host of fields had a positive 
influence on the perception of Israehs towards Turkey and immigrants from 
Turkey in Israel. Such a change in the IsraeH perception of Turkish Jews 
coincided, again, with the general profile of the immigrants by year of arrival. As 
the respondents related, Turkish Jews were initially seen as Oriental Jews corrung 
from the lower socio-economic strata. However, the post-1970s ahya brou^t with 
it an improved image of Turkish-origin Jews. Turkish Jews were seen more and 
more by other Israelis as sympathetic and kind people after the late ‘70s. Below 
are some quotations summarizing how the change in the Israeh perception of 
Turkish Jews changed over time:
Turkish Jewry’s sick and jobless came to Israel -  that’s how it was iu the 
first years. They left a negative mark on the image of Turkish Jewry. When 
others started to come in the ‘70s, the Israehs got confused because these 
people didn’t look hke the earher immigrants from Turkey. These 
newcomers, who were mostly educated professionals, changed the image of 
Turkish Jews. (FRIS29, male, 1950 immigrant)
There was a stigma left by those who came in 1948. In that time, porters, 
carriers and other workers came to Israel. They were from the lower classes. 
They were uneducated. Due to this stigma, Turkish Jews were not known 
well by others. But the image changed with the immigrants who came in the 
‘70s. There was also more tourism between Israel and Turkey. They learned 
more about Tmkey. Relations between Israel and Turkey also improved. 
Now Israelis like Turks. (FRIS5, male, 1979 immigrant)
Migration to Israel, as a process, also seems to have impacted attitudes 
towards intermarriage. Since Jews are the majority in Israel, the respondents said 
that their children would most probably marry other Israeli Jews. In this regard, 
there was no problem of intermarriage for Turkish Jews in Israel as there had been 
with Turkey’s Jewish minority, who regarded intermarriage as a threat to the
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survival of their group’s cultural characteristics. The respondents in Israel told 
how while in Turkey their conunimity tried to avoid intermarriage. When they 
arrived in Israel such concerns vanished, as the former minority group members 
ovem i^t became members of the majority group -  Israel’s Jews. The respondents 
also said that iu Israel the tradition of drahoma (dowry) had died out. Some of the 
respondents told like so how intermarriage was seen among Turkey’s Jewish 
community before their migration:
WTien I was in Turkey, there was no intermarriage. It was the normal way to 
marry among the Jews. At least, it was the expectation. In Edime, both the 
Muslims and the Jews were conservative and religious. A Muslim girl 
marrying a Jewish man was considered Tost’ by the Muslims. The same was 
true for the Jews, too. (FRIS28, male, 1951 immigrant)
There were few cases of intermarriage at that time. Families would oppose 
such marriages. But today, more intermarriages are seen in Turkey, more in 
Istanbul and fewer in İzmir. (FRIS21, female, 1974 immigrant)
Although intermarriage is no longer seen as a problem by the Israeli 
immigrants from Turkey, when asked to evaluate a hypothetical situation about 
the marriage of Jews to gentiles, the respondents who arrived in the great wave 
seemed to oppose the idea of intermarriage more strongly than the post-1951 
immigrants. The latter respondents also confessed that they would not favor their 
children marrying non-Jews but would respect the decision of their children in the 
end.
The research demonstrated that the meaning of intermarriage changed 
during the course of migration. Prior to immigration, it meant marrying a gentile 
in Turkey. However, after moving into a Jewish majority, iutermarriage seemed to
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have earned an additional meaning for the respondents -  marriage among fellow 
Jews who yet had different ethno-cultural backgrounds. Almost all of the 
respondents would prefer that their children marry Turkish Jews. The immigrants 
said that they raised their children as Israelis yet mamtained Turkish culture to a 
certain extent, and that if their offspring were to marry other Jews of Turkish 
origin — including Jews currently hving in Turkey — they would get along better as 
the food, values and quotidian habits would be similar. The closest culture to that 
of the Turkish Jews was seen to be the other Sephardic Jews from Iran, Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia. Ashkenazic Jews were seen as “cold” and “ahen” to the culture 
of tire “warmer” Jews of the East or the Mediterranean. Particularly the 
respondents who arrived after 1951 seemed to be more adamant that it would be 
better for Turkish Jews in Israel to marry spouses sharing a similar mentality and 
cultural background. The below quotations are examples of such thoughts about 
intermarriage -  that is, marriage to Jews who are not from Turkey.
My daughter has a Turkish origin boyfriend and Fm very pleased about this. 
It’s easier for us because Israel is very mixed, since many people aromd the 
world have come here. Our Turks wish to marry among the Turks. They 
prefer it because of the culture and the food cooked at home. (FRIS18, male, 
1967 immigrant)
Everybody is Jewish here. There is no risk [of interfaith marriage]. We 
prefer our children to marry among Turkish Jewry. Some of us even tried to 
play rnatchmaker with the children in the Herzeliya Culture Club. (FRIS2, 
female,'1979 immigrant)
The respondents not only saw the Turkish Jews in Israel bearing a 
distinctive cultural and historical inheritance but also made a distinction between 
them and Israel’s Orthodox Jewry, the former being more secular and moderate in
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terms of religion and the latter being strict in religious observance. The Harednn, 
an ultra-Orthodox group in Israel which strongly advocates Messianic belief and 
questions the sovereignty of the state, were frequently mentioned as exemphfying 
the distinction. Secularism appeared to be an important concern for the 
respondents. According to the respondents, religion should not be a reference 
point in the organization of public hfe. Furthermore, secularism as a principle was 
seen as a requirement of modem democracy both ia Turkey and in Israel. Most of 
the respondents said that they Were uncomfortable with the rise of Islamism in 
Turkey and were closely watching its conservative government (as of the fall 
2002 elections). For Israel, they seemed to have similar concerns about 
fundamentalist Jews and argued that these extreme rehgious groups threatened not 
only Israel’s democracy but also the harmony of Israeli society. They also 
contended that Israel should learn from Turkey’s experience in dealing with 
rehgious extremists. Some of the respondents were even of the idea that Turkey 
was a secular country but Israel was not.^  ^ They believed that religion was a 
matter best confined to the private sphere and that pohtical abuses of rehgious 
behefs should be prohibited by law, as is the case iu Turkish democracy. To 
illustrate:
There is secularism in Turkey -  rehgion and the state are separated. But they 
don’t separate them here that much. I thiok secularism is a problem in Israel.
Some o f the issues casting doubt on Israel’s secular status are the legal sanction for public 
sphere observance o f the Sabbath and Jewish holidays; the almost exclusive jurisdiction granted 
religious courts over matters o f family law; state support for reUgious educational institutions 
largely autonomous o f the general educational system; and various privileges granted Orthodox 
individuals, most urportantly, their exenqstion from compulsory military service granted Orthodox 
women and Orthodox yeshiva students.
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For example, if someone wants to get married, the marriage has to be 
religious. El A1 [the Israeli national airline] doesn’t fly on Saturdays [the 
Sabbath]. There’s no public transportation on Saturdays. These are all 
contrary to secularism. But recently we’ve seen some opposition. In the last 
elections, the religious parties didn’t attract many votes. (FRIS13, male, 
1973 immigrant)
As most of the respondents said that they were opposed to any form of 
religious fundamentalism, they added they were not as religious as they had been 
in Turkey. In Israel, the food sold outside is kosher, resting and praying was 
already reserved offlcially for the Shabbat (Sabbath) and weddiug ceremonies 
were not held iu synagogues but in secular entertainment settings. Therefore, the 
frequency of visits to synagogues and strict observance of the Shabat and casherut 
declined over time, according to most of the respondents. Although respondents 
from the great wave seemed to practice religion more, which may be due to their 
advanced age, immigrants who arrived in later decades reported less observance. 
Migration to Israel, a Jewish-majority coxmtry, seemed to be the major reason for 
the declining religious observance. One of the respondents told about the change 
in religious practice hke so;
We only go to synagogues on Yom Kippur (fasting day) and Bar Mitzvah 
ceremonies. The marriages aren’t held in synagogues here. We used to go to 
synagogues more often when we were in Turkey. If we had stayed there and 
hadn’t migrated to Israel, we would have gone to synagogues more in order 
to keep om religion and to be able to transmit our rehgious culture to our 
children. But here in Israel, everybody is Jewish so we don’t feel obhgated 
to transmit Judaism to our children. We’re among Jews here and that’s 
enough I guess. (FRIS3, male, 1979 immigrant)
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5.4.3 Citizenship and the Civic Virtue of Turkish Jews in Israel
The civic virtue aspect was explored through various interview questions 
concerning pohtical participation, membership in civil society organizations, 
individual efforts to address social problems, and cooperation with other members 
of society in order to solve and fulfill the duties and responsibilities of 
citizenship.^^ Though the research questions initially tried to cover various types 
of civic virtue such as general, social, economic and pohtical virtue, it later 
became clear that this case study necessitated the differentiation of civic virtue as 
attitude, on the one hand, and as behavior, on the other.
Again, in the field research in Israel, it emerged that the attitudes and 
behaviors regarding civic virtue had developed in two domains ^stinguishable as 
the communal and the societal domains. The communal domain is closely related 
to the identity of the respondents as members of Israel’s Turkish Jewish 
community. As the result of their immigrant identity, the respondents seemed to 
have concerns about their membership in this community in such areas as 
participation in community affairs, good representation of the community in front 
of other Israelis, and promoting Turkish culture and Turkey in Israel. The societal 
domain is related to the immigrants’ settlement in Israel and membership in Israeli 
society at large. In the societal domain, the respondents seemed to develop 
attitudes and behaviors about civic virtue regarding Israeli politics and societal 
affairs.
For a list o f the structured questions concerning civic virtue besides identity and legal status, see 
Appendix C.
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The research uncovered a familiar pattern in that the civic virtue of the 
respondents in the communal domain varied significantly according to their year 
of arrival in Israel. The association of Turkish Jews, Itahdut Yotsei Turkic 
(Association of People Coming from Turkey), was founded in 1960 by 
immigrants of the great wave who belonged to the educated subgroup of Turkish 
Jews. With the 1970s, when a different profile of Turkish immigrants started to 
arrive in Israel, the association renewed itself These newcomers contributed to 
the rooting of the sense of ‘coming firom Turkey’ and of ‘sharing Turkish culture’ 
among the community. The trend of the acknowledgement of multiculturalism in 
Israel provided these newcomers with an environment conducive to realizing their 
identity aims. The Txirkish Jewish immigrant identity was further expanded with 
the subsequent immigrants who came in the late 1970s. Since these immigrants 
had higher income levels, they were better able to financially support Turkish
Jewish immigrant organizations such as Itahdut Yotsei Turkia and Herzehya
)
Culture Club.^  ^The respondents said that even if they were not active members of 
these groups, they had at least heard about some of their activities and taken part 
in a few. The associations organize such activities and programs as concert and 
theater performances in Ladino and Turkish, sports and games competitions, 
fundraisers for students and other community immigrants needing community 
support, guidance for newcomers firom Turkey, celebrations of important days 
relevant to Turkish history in Israel, aid drives for Turkey in times of need such as 
after the 1999 earthquake, and publication of special pubHcations for fellow
Information on these organizations was given in Chapter I.
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Turkish immigrants. The respondents acknowledged these activities and affirmed 
affihation in these associations at least on the level of values. The immigrants who 
came in the 1970s often seemed to take positions of responsibility in these 
associations and their activities. One respondent who arrived in 1970 told about 
her membership in the Bat-Yam Culture Club as follows:
We go to the Bat-Yam Culture Club twice a week. Every year we put on a 
play, and we perform it for two or three nights. Arormd 1,800 people come 
to see it in total. In every play there’s a chorus. This year, there’s a choms 
which will sing some Turkish songs. We started the Bat-Yam with Turkish- 
language plays, but later switched to Ladino because we realized we’re the 
ordy group in Israel that can do it. Ladino is a language facing the threat of 
extinction, which is why we stage these plays. We take part in the culture 
club because it was founded by Turkish Jews and it has artistic activities. If 
we were in Tmkey, we would go to the Göztepe Culture Club. We love 
theater very much. (FRIS24, female, 1970 immigrant)
Anotber respondent who arrived in 1979 adds to the above points:
Tattend the meetings of B’nai B’rith twice a week. B’nai B’rith is a world 
organization, but a Turkish-speaking lodge was founded in Israel. My 
husband is also an active member of the Nm Masonic Lodge. When we first 
came here, we didn’t know any Hebrew. These lodges were founded for the 
Turkish speaking community in Israel. We also take part in Itahdut Yotsei 
Turkia. There was also once the Herzehya Club but after 10 years, it is 
closed down. I met a lot of new people there. It was important for us to get 
socially acclimated. (FRISl, female, 1979 immigrant)
The respondents beheved that in general, Israeh society hkes Turkey and 
its people, including the Turkish Jews in Israel. The increase in tourism between 
Israel and Turkey has contributed to the positive image of Turkey itself and 
Israel’s Turkish Jews. By the same token, most of the respondents said that they 
did not often encoimter publications or pubhc accusations directed against
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Turkey, Turkish culture or Turkish Jews in Israel. On the contrary, they frequently 
mentioned in the interviews that they came across positive sentiments, 
publications and verbal assertions about Turks and Turkey in Israel. They added 
that in the past they used to hear more often about biases agaiust Turkish people 
but that now these were very rare. The decline in accusations against Turkey was 
related hke this:
The attitude towards Turkey is very positive here. They love Turkey a lot. In 
the past, it wasn’t like that because they didn’t know much about Turkey. In 
the past, Turkey was seen as an oriental country and the Turkish people 
were even denigrated, though we would speak up and protest such talk. 
After tourism between our two countries developed, they started to get to 
know Turkey and they liked what they saw. Today, every Israeh has visited 
Turkey and they tell us, ‘Tfou have a beautiful country.” They like its nature 
and its people. Turks are famous for their hospitality. (FRIS32, female, 1951 
immigrant)
In the few cases where they came across negative claims about Turkish 
people or Turkey itself, the respondents said that they countered these arguments 
by explaining about Turkey and the Turks to those who voiced such claims. These 
verbal explanations can be interpreted as civic virtue as performance in the 
communal domain. One of the respondents told about how they react to negative 
talk about the Turkish people as follows:
When we first came, the Turkish Jews were looked down upon as being 
lower class. Now that view has changed. They think that the Turks are very 
kind people. Tourism played an important role in this. The change in the 
view towards Turkey has positively influenced the image of Turkish Jews. 
(FRIS27, female, 1969 immigrant)
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The iinmigrant associations also take collective actions to counter 
arguments raised against Turkey. In the post-1980 context, these immigrant 
organizations contributed to good relations between Israel and Turkey and 
moreover served as lobbying groups on Ankara’s behalf io. Israel. Especially 
immigraats who came in the late ‘70s took active part in these associations and 
led their associations to take on this lobbying role. The major lobbying issue 
seems to be claims that Turkey perpetrated genocide of Armenians during World 
War I. For iostance, some Armenian groups and immigrants hving in Israel 
periodically try to bring up the issue in IsraeU newspapers, national ceremonies or 
places commemorating the Holocaust. In response, associations founded by 
Turkish Jews try to prevent these claims from being aired iu pubhc and attracting 
attention includiag means of indirect cencorship, as these accounte show:
Once the movie M idni^t Express [a controversial 1978 dramatized account 
of conditions in Turkish jails] was going to be shown on TV, but the Itahdut 
Yotsei Turkia intervened and called the station and the movie wasn’t shown. 
Also, every year there is this Aimenian Memorial Day in Jerusalem where 
they also mention the ‘Armenian genocide’ in Turkey. The Itahdut also 
blocked the ceremony from being broadcast on television. (FRIS4, female, 
1979 immigrant)
In the Itahdut and the Herzehya Culture Club, we try to stop the airing of 
accusations against Turkey in the public or media. Actually, there aren’t too 
many cases but we still resist them. For example, recently there was the case 
of an Aimenian nurse who wanted to tight a candle during a ceremony in 
Jerusalem to protest the ‘Armenian genocide’ in Turkey. The Tmkish 
Embassy in Jerusalem, the leader of the Jewish community in Turkey, the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Itahdut Yotsei Turkia joined 
forces to stop this from happening. We contacted the Intelligence 
Directorate of Israel’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, and that young nurse 
wasn’t allowed to tight the candle to publicize the genocide claims. 
(FRISIO, male, 1980 immigrant)
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Though the respondents told how biased pubhcations and public speech 
against Turkey or the Turkish people were seen infrequently in Israel, yet in 
contrast they did encounter Turkish sources slanted against Israel and the Jewish 
people. Most respondents attribute this to a lack of information among Turks 
about Israel and a lack of understanding of the roots of Israeli foreign policy 
towards Palestine or the Palestinian question itself They also say that they don’t 
take action either individually or collectively to correct these views but rather 
mostly maintain their silence and inaction about such slanted accoxmts:
I haven’t come across such anti-Turkish, anti-Turk talk [in Israel], but I’ve 
very frequently seen the reverse, I mean I’ve seen a lot of writings in the 
Turkish media against Israel and the Jews. Despite the warm feelings that 
Israelis and even American Jewry have towards Turkey, people in Turkey 
don’t seem to appreciate these kind feelings. They aren’t very interested in 
Israel or the terror that is going on here. What’s more, there are some people 
who bum the Israeli flag in Turkey. This means to me that the Turkish 
people don’t understand the affinity that Israehs feel towards Turks. 
(FRIS31, male, 1949 immigrant)
I’ve come across cases of the reverse. For example, on Turkish TV 
channels, there’s anti-Israeli news. It seems that the Turkish media takes 
sides with Palestine. This isn’t anti-Semitism because that doesn’t exist in 
Turkey, but ordy editoriahzing on behalf of Palestine. (FRIS33, male, 1970 
immigrant)
In the societal domain, immigrants from Turkey in Israel show httle sign 
of involvement in non-govemmental organizations founded at the national level or 
in addressing society in general. In other words, one could contend that their 
membership in organizations working for the general interest or open to 
everybody is lower than their membership in immigrant associations foxmded by 
Turkish Jews. The respondents mainly preferred organizations related to their
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professions, such as bar associations for lawyers and medical associations for 
doctors. Although most of the respondents expressed a belief in the importance of 
collective action and organizations, such abstract praise did not correspond 
directly to high levels of membership in organizations at the national level.
A similar tendency can be seen in. political participation among Turkish 
Jews. Most of the respondents said that they placed importance on voting, with 
some even citing the desire to vote as the mam reason for their choosing dual 
citizenship after hving in Israel for several years. Apparently none of the 
respondents were involved in social movements, nor did any cast votes for 
extremist parties espousing extreme leftist or rightist ideologies. By the same 
token, none of the respondents voted for religious parties but rather stood strongly 
for secularism ia Israel, by their account. Rather, centrist parties — social democrat 
or liberal -  were preferred. Although voting as a poHtical act got overwhehning 
acknowledgement, membership in political parties or pursuing pohtical careers in
I
those parties faced a contrasting lack of interest or favor. These points seem to 
support the invisible quality of Turkish Jews, the roots of which may extend into 
both Turkey’s political culture, as membership in organizations in Turkey is also 
very low, and into the invisibihty of Jews on Turkish soil. It should be noted, 
however, that there were a few respondents who had taken active part in Israeli 
political parties. They said that they had not stood as candidates themselves but 
rather hoped to attract the votes of Turkish Jews to their parties. However they felt 
unsuccessful in their attempts and so with disappointment quit active politics.
When the respondents were asked what they see as Israel’s most pressing 
socio-political problem, all focused on the IsraeH-Palestinian conflict. The conflict
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was generally considered to be a problem of terrorism, an issue of peace and war, 
a conflict over territory, or the product of reckless Palestinian hatred of the Jews. 
They found the half-century-plus persistence of the conflict unexpected, and most 
felt pessimistic about a solution being reached. Almost all of the respondents 
beheve that individuals are powerless to resolve the conflict, which should be 
dealt with by governments at the state level. Most of the respondents also were of 
the idea that the Palestinian government needed to take steps towards peace. The 
below quotations are illustrative of these opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and the futihty of individual efforts for its resolution:
It’s the Palestine issue. Nobody can do anything. The state officials aren’t 
working on the question. This problem is nothing new, but in fact dates back 
centuries. We know what a problem this is. We give everything to them, but 
they continue the terrorism. This is actually a problem of terror. (FRIS18, 
male, 1967 immigrant)
The biggest problem is the one between Israel and Palestine. Individuals 
can’t do anything about it. It’s a very comphcated problem. Even the state 
authorities can’t do anything, what can individuals do? It’s very hard to hve 
in this environment. Security is the biggest problem in Israel. (FRIS4, 
female, 1979 immigrant)
Some of the respondents added that since Palestinian children were taught 
to hate Jews hi schools or by their families, the conflict would not be solved in the 
near future. The following quotations reflect this pessimism:
The basic problem is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For this conflict to be 
resolved, both sides need to compromise. It’s not a problem that can be 
solved in just a day. The Palestinian children are raised with hatred against 
the Jews. They should stop this. Children shouldn’t be taught hatred. 
(FRIS23, male, 1970 immigrant)
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It’s the question of Palestine. If this is resolved then every other problem, 
our economic problems will be solved, too. There’s nothing that can be done 
on die individual level. I wish there were, but I have no hope. This is 
completely an issue that needs to be tackled on the state level. In schools, 
Palestinian children are taught hatred and wrath against the Jews. This 
shouldn’t be allowed. As I said, it’s a matter of the states only, not 
individuals. (FRIS3, male, 1979 immigrant)
Besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, some of the respondents also 
pointed to economic issues or environmental problems as pressing problems for 
Israel. For the unemployment problem, the respondents consider it the state’s 
primary duty to resolve it. Although individuals are thought to have some role in 
protecting the environment, the respondents again think that the state should 
educate the masses to be environmentally aware and act responsibly. What two of 
the respondents said here sums up the common view about the state’s duty 
towards the environment:
The biggest problem, in my opinion, is the economy. Individuals go on 
strike to solve the problem but I never joined in. But the strikes didn’t help 
our economic problems. I think the state’s welfare benefits, like 
unemployment payments, make people lazy. I think the state shouldn’t help 
people that much. There’s a lot of work out there but nobody is taking the 
jobs. (FRIS32, female, 1951 immigrant)
Environmental pollution has begun. In school they should teach children to 
be aware of the environment. They should start firom the beginning. 
(FRIS27, female, 1969 immigrant)
When asked to evaluate general civic virtue in Israeli society, the 
respondents argued that Israel was similar to other countries in the sense that there 
was a wide range of people, both respectful of others and not, within the society. 
Furthermore, the respondents seemed to contrast Turkish culture with Israel’s in
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order to illustrate how Israelis treat others with disrespect whereas in Turkey 
people are kind, caring and respectful. As one of the respondents described Israeli 
society in terms of civic virtue:
I think society here doesn’t apply the rules strictly. Of course there’s bribery 
and nepotism in Israel. Israelis don’t wait for their turn in the queue. People 
in Israel are generally impatient. They ignore the traffic rules. The 
punishments are very hght. People don’t respect each other. The children 
axe raised along similar lines. They are selfish and disrespectful. They are 
very open-minded, though. They aren’t like children in Turkey in terms of 
discipline. Maybe this way is better because in Israel there’s a struggle 
every which way you turn, and so people don’t behave pohtely towards each 
other. (FRIS32, female, 1951 immigrant)
However, the respondents also said that participation in social matters and 
active citizenship was better established in Israeli society than in Turkish society. 
For instance, Israelis, according to the respondents, have a better idea about social 
problems in Israel and cooperating with public officials to help overcome them. In 
one respondent’s words:
They are very good citizens. For example, we have a fiiend who was bom 
here. She phones the mayor’s office at city hall when she sees a garden 
without flowers, and they send some workers to flower up the garden. The 
people frequently write complaints to the authorities. You may come to the 
conclusion that everybody in Israel is a politician because they are very 
interested in all of society’s problems. They have a view on every issue and 
when they see a problem, they try to do something. (FRIS17, female, 1980 
immigrant)
In the interviews, it appeared that the basic obstacle to the full 
performance of virtuous citizenship was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most of 
the respondents believe that the war, insecurity and terror environment hanging
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over Israel have put Israeli citizens into stress and hence led them to be harsh and 
rude to others. What a female respondent observed about Israeli society reflects 
the impact of terror in Israeli daily hfe:
There are laws and if they disobey them, there are punishments. Like every 
other country, there are good and bad citizens in Israel. The new generations 
in Israel see hfe differently. For example, they may get on a bus and one of 
their friends may get killed by a bomb attack on the bus. This has had a 
huge effect on the younger generations. War is changing them. Actually this 
is not war but terrorism. And terrorism changes people dramatically. This is 
why they become selfish and shortsighted. When you ask a boy on the street 
why he’s acting rudely, he says, “Life is short. How do I know how long 
Fm going to hve? So I’ll do whatever I hke.” In the past, things weren’t like 
this. People have changed. (FRIS7, male, 1948 immigrant)
The respondents, as members of the first generation of immigrants ia 
Israel, identified themselves more with Turkish culture than Israeli in terms of 
civic virtue. They argued that Turkish Jews in Israel, especially the first 
generation of immigrants, mauitained the characteristics of Turkish culture with 
respect to civic virtue. According to them, the virtues inherent in Turkish culture 
are: respecting others, honoring the elderly, loving children, helping out those in 
need, acting pohtely, speaking and communicating politely, not calling others 
using their ‘bare’ names only but using such titles as Ms. or Mr., doing what 
teachers say and respecting them, obeying the rules, etc. The following quotation 
provides an example of how the respondents see the influence of Turkish culture 
on virtuous citizenship among Turkish Jews in Israel:
The people who came from Turkey are serious citizens. Turkishness means 
the mentahty and discipline, cultivated in Turkey. When I say Turkish 
discipline, I mean Ottoman discipline like respecting one’s parents. In the
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past, nobody would smoke in front of their parents. This was a sign of 
respect for them. Here, every child can do whatever they want in front of 
their parents. When I first came here, I wanted to hit my son when he did 
something wrong but they warned me not to do. In Israel, if you hit your 
child they can take you to the police. Beating is prohibited in Israel, but not 
so in Turkey. We even have a saying in Turkish, “Beating is from Heaven.” 
This is the culture we were brought up with. For example, you give your 
seat to the elderly on pubhc busses. The way you talk, respecting others, 
these are all components of Turkish culture. You ask people how they are 
every time you meet them. Here nobody respects others and they don’t care 
how you are. Everybody is selfish. It’s like Europe. In Europe, everybody is 
selfish. (FRIS8, male, 1971 immigrant)
The respondents also pointed to the low levels of political participation 
among Turkish Jews. They stated that the Turkish Jews were generally apoHtical 
and so decline to take part in political movements or public protests. Generally, 
Turkish Jews are seen as mute and inactive iu Israeh politics. They have not 
formed pohtical parties in order to attract the votes of Turkish Jews, nor would 
they vote for candidates based on their Turkish Jewish heritage. By and large, the 
Turkish Jews exemplify an invisible group of immigrants who are well integrated 
into general Israeli society and who do not exploit their differences in terms of 
cultural background for political purposes, but rather conform to the mainstream 
rules and norms of Israeli society. The following quotations are taken from the 
interviews to illustrate the political passivity of the Turkish Jews:
People of Turkish origin aren’t involved in pohtics. They aren’t interested. 
This is. the first point about Turkish Jews in Israel. Secondly, they don’t 
cause problems. You won’t see a Turkish Jew arguing on the streets as you 
can see people from other coxmtries do. People from other countries hold 
meetings and demonstrations on the street, but you won’t see Turkish Jews 
among them. Those who come from Turkey aren’t interested in protests, and 
they aren’t politically active. (FRIS28, male, 1951 immigrant)
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The people who come from Turkey have been living like in a closed box in 
Turkey for more than 500 years. They’ve hved a socially and politically 
passive life. Among them, there were some who didn’t know Turkish. They 
didn’t get into politics. They were generally a silent community. Because of 
this, you can’t expect them to become active when they come to Israel. It’s 
impossible. Turkish Jewry just don’t act like this. This is why we’re not as 
active as other communities in Israel. For example, here you can see a 
volunteer night watch program, but you won’t see any Tmks among the 
volunteers. The Itahdut Yotsei Turkia has a number of activities, but they 
are maioly for Turkish Jews. For example, you won’t see a Turkish origin 
person doing volimteer work in an Israeh hospital. (FRIS3, male, 1979 
immigrant)
One of the crucial findings in the interviews about civic virtue among 
Turkish Jews is an apparent notably low level of lawbreaking. In other words, 
Turkish Jews are portrayed by the respondents as generally obeying the law and 
rules and refraining from getting involved in criminal deeds or acts of 
disobedience. For instance, the respondents said that they were very dutiful in 
paying their taxes. They also remarked that you didn’t see murders or other fatal 
criminal acts committed by Turkish Jews, The following quotations are examples
i
of the respondents’ sensitivity to conforming to their adopted homeland’s laws 
and rules;
We don’t want to fight the law. We place importance on paying our taxes 
and we check whether or not our accoimtant adds up our fair share and does 
his/her job. Those who come from Turkey are generally good citizens. God 
bless us, there’s no wickedness among us. There are people coming from 
other coimtries, the Russians, for example, they kill somebody everyday. 
(FRIS15, female, 1949 immigrant)
We follow the rules more. Because of the discipline we learned in Turkey, 
we don’t oppose. We try to cooperate. The crime rate among Turkish 
immigrants is very low. We’re hard working, disciplined, polite and 
respectful. Yes, this is generally how we are. (FRIS24, female, 1970 
immigrant)
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Those who come from Turkey hsten to orders and follow the rules. We’re a 
bit more disciplined and decent. For example, if somebody tells me not to 
do something, I would never make that person say it twice. If somebody 
says something to me and teaches me something, I listen to it. I would never 
make somebody have to come to me to tell me again. (FRISl 1, female, 1978 
immigrant)
They also frequently mentioned that Turkish Jews respect the state as the 
ultimate authority and therefore refrain from breaking its rules. They argue that in 
Turkey, people learn to respect and even fear the state, and that Turkish Jews 
brought this characteristic over when they migrated to Israel. Acknowledgement 
of the state as the ultimate authority is claimed as one of the defining 
characteristics of Turkish Jews. In the interviews, the class or gender of the 
respondents seemed not to be matter in these commonly expressed views. The 
following excerpts from interviews are examples of the commonality of this view:
People with Turkish origin are better citizens. They are more careful. Here, 
the Israelis are sympathetic to the Turkish Jews. Most of the'Turkish Jews 
here are silent. They don’t raise a ruckus. They don’t defend their rights too 
much. This is because of the discipline and decency that they learned in 
Turkey. We were trained hke that and it continues within us. Turkish Jews 
haven’t broken out of this social climate. Today, they are still like this. 
We’re not problem causers. We generally conform to the envirorunent. 
Others may be shrewd or may violate the rules, but I wouldn’t. I think to 
myself, if I do things properly. I’ll avoid future headaches and possible 
conflicts. In Turkey, the state is both respected and feared. In Israel, the 
Israelis don’t fear the state, but people from Turkey shy away from the state. 
They don’t want to be a party to problems. Actually, this characteristic of 
Turkish-origin Jews changed over time. The Ashkenazim here came here 
because of the Holocaust, but we Turkish Jews come from a different 
environment. This is Turkish culture. There was no problem in Turkey. We, 
the Jews, were very comfortable there. That’s why we’re low profile here. 
You’ll see us in every sort of profession. We settle in any district of Israel. 
We’re not interested in politics. We mainly think, “Take it easy, relax and 
try to get along.” This is what we generally try to do. (FRIS22, male, 1964 
immigrant)
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Those who come from Turkey -  us, I mean -  fear the state. This is inherent 
in us. We try to do everythiag accordiug to the law. This must have been 
drilled into us during our childhood ia Turkey. If the law orders something, 
we do it without question. For example, there’s this new tax imposed by city 
hall to provide for security, but most people don’t want to pay it. But I paid 
it immediately because I don’t want to oppose the law. I think this is an 
important distinction that differentiates us from the others. Whatever the law 
is, we’re loyal to it. (FRIS18, male, 1967 immigrant)
It is interesting that although most of the respondents recognized the 
cultural characteristics that they inherited in Turkey and maintained after arrival in 
Israel, none pointed to a relation between their minority status and their respect 
for state authority when they were in Turkey. In other words, they did not regard 
their minority status in Turkey as a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the state. Rather, 
they characterized their obedience to the law and rules in affirmative terms, and 
evaluated carrying this trait within themselves to Israel as an asset. They generally 
believed that respecting the state, obeying the law and keeping a low profile in 
Israeli society were the values that Turkish Jews were proud to inherit and 
maintain. The following is illustrative of their pride in such values:
Turkish Jews are more moderate and sincere. They aren’t aggressive. They 
don’t have huge ambitions. They are passive in pohtics and the mihtary. In 
Israel, they are the same. What they learned in Turkey, they kept up in Israel 
as well. Turkish Jews in Israel aren’t ambitious and don’t aspire to high 
positions. They aren’t like the other Israeli Jews. This is why recently they 
turned out to be the community most liked by others. Those who come from 
Turkey are better citizens. This is the main difference between the other 
Jews and us. We’re more moderate and we obey the law. We don’t push to 
the extremes. We leave everything within its hmits. We don’t hke to be 
stand out. We’re moderate. (FRISIO, male, 1980 imonigrant)
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5.5 Concluding Remarks
The research indicated that the respondents’ views and experiences 
differentiated according to their year of arrival in Israel. The immigrants who 
arrived in Israel in the great wave of 1948-51 were not only different in profile 
than the immigrants who arrived in subsequent years up until 1980, but were also 
distinguished in their views about citizenship as well as their experiences 
regarding immigration. Therefore, our discussion of the research findiugs has put 
special focus on immigrants by their immigration periods, as broken down into 
those who came in the great wave, then in the early 1970s and finally the late 
‘70s.
The results of the field research in Israel also revealed that the subjects 
involved in international migration - sending country, immigrants and receiving 
country -  aU shape up citizenship and play determining role on the three aspects 
of citizenship. Turkey’s pohcies toward citizenship both with respect to internal 
affairs and to international migration seemed to determine immigrants’ citizenship 
in the receiving country. Although Israel was ready for naturahzation of Jews 
coming firom Turkey, the immigrants did not end up their ties with Turkey 
voluntarily and some of them preferred to become denizens in order to be able to 
maintain their Turkish citizenship.
In addition, the immigrants were still under the influence of pohtical 
culture cultivated in Turkey, though the receiving country — Israel — had different 
roots to its pohtical culture. An essential component of the pohtical culture 
cultivated in Turkey seemed to be immigrants’ former minority status. As
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discussed-above, since the immigrants were members of Turkey’s Jewish 
community before migration, perceptions regarding citizenship covered certain 
experiences related to their former minority status. This does not however mean 
that immigrants were not exposed to any change. On the contrary, the socio­
political conjecture in Israel, and basic principles of state formation and nation­
building had reflections on the Turkish Jews in Israel as well. Citizenship 
perceived and experienced on the individual level designated that state was read 
by first generation of Turkish Jews as an supreme authority figure but such an 
abstraction covered not only Israeli State but Turkish state as well.
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CHAPTER VI
CITIZENSHIP, MINORITIES AND IMMIGRANTS: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters of the thesis, a theoretical and empirical viewpoint 
was expanded on the layers of a) citizenship and minority, and b) citizenship and 
mtemational migration. In this chapter, these two layers will be linked to each 
other in a discussion that utihzes the elements of legal status, identity and legal 
status aspects of citizenship. Thus, a comparative outlook will be instigated. The 
flow of tile discussion leans on four parts. Firstly, the layer of citizenship and 
minority, and the interaction between the aspects of citizenship are scrutinized in 
the case of the Jewish minority in Tmkey.^ In this part, the empirical evidence 
obtained in the field work in Turkey composes the center of attention. Secondly, 
the discussion elaborates the layer of citizenship and mtemational migration, and 
the interaction between three aspects in the case of Turkish Jews in Israel.^ The
 ^As was stated in Chapter I, in this study the Jewish roinority iu Turkey is generally referred to as 
“Jews iu Turkey"’ or ‘Turkey’s Jews” for simplification iu wording.
 ^ In this study, Jews who were bom in Turkey, later emigrated to Israel, and currently Hviug in 
Israel are simply called ‘Turkish Jews” in order to prevent any confusion with Turkey’s Jews who 
currently live in Turkey.
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field study in Israel is highlighted in the discussion. Thirdly, after having 
elaborated the cases of minority and immigrant groups, a comparison of the two 
groups is made that reflects on the similarities as well as the differences between 
them in terms of their experiences and perceptions on citizenship. Fourthly, the 
discussion puts the immigrant and minority groups under the same rubric of 
citizenship and links the empirical framework to the theoretical one. The 
comparison built between these two groups serves an abstraction to be made on 
the three aspects and their relationships; hence, a close-up on citizenship is 
presented.
6.2 Citizenship and Minority: Turkey’s Jewish Minority
As was mentioned in Chapter IV, citizenship as legal status mainly 
referred to an equal formal framework in Tmkey. The research pointed out that 
individuals adopted the norms of the existing legal framework. On the aspect of 
legal status, the research indicated that the respondents refused any special 
treatment and were satisfied with the universal framework of Turkish citizenship, 
one covering all citizens regardless of any difference in ethnic or rehgious origin. 
Most of the respondents emphasized that equahty was a right and that Turkish 
citizenship safeguarded the constitutional and legal equahty between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. Similarly, they rejected any difference regulated by legislation. The 
respondents thought that any group rights granted to Jews would make them 
conspicuous in society and would consequently provoke anti-Semitic propaganda 
or action at the hand of certain groups such as extreme nationalists or Islamists.
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The subjects’ views on recruitment to state offices and democratic 
institutions mark the generational differences. The prevalence of the assumption 
that legal provisions exist that restrict Jews from recruitment to state offices or 
democratic institutions shows a decline in the younger generations. However, 
even the behef that there are social barriers to the Jews also seems to have less of 
a hold on the younger generations. The perception of citizenship more in terms of 
its responsibilities than its rights also pointed to the different generational views 
on citizenship as well. Paying taxes and fulfilling one’s mihtaxy service (for men) 
were argued to be the basic duty of every Turkish citizen by nearly every 
respondent. A passive understanding of citizenship was apparently prevalent 
among the respondents, though with the younger generations, a more active idea 
of citizenship with notions of welfare seemed to be gaining ground.
On the aspect of identity, the research uncovered a process of integration 
which is less mtemalized by the older generations hut more so by the younger 
ones, with the middle-aged being a transitional generation. For instance, over time 
Ladino and French seemed to be displaced by Turkish as the mother tongue. 
Turkish is generally accepted as the normative and dominant language of the 
pubhc sphere. The interaction between Turkish and Jewish identities also 
provided clues to the success of integration within the Turkish society and nation. 
The older generations seemed to stress their Jewish identity; with the middle- 
aged, the existence of dual identities became apparent; and with the young, 
Turkish identity started to be emphasized more strongly, yet Jewish identity 
seemed to be prevalent at least in the form of a secular understanding of religious 
identity.
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By the same token, secularism, another arena of the interaction between 
Turkish and Jewish identities, seemed to provide a tool for the Jewish community 
to have access to the definition of a Turkish nation. The respondents believe that 
secularism safeguards Turkey’s Jews by making an Islamist regime imlikely to 
come to power. However, the same secularism seems to be contributing to the 
community’s assimilation. As the numbers of the Jews fell over time, 
intermarriage emerges as one of the major threats to the Jewish population figures 
in Tmkey. In other words, assiooilation brings by increase in iutermarriage which 
in return threatens Jewish identity. All of the respondents seemed to be aware of 
this threat thou^  the younger generations, especially the young women, 
emphasized the pressure they felt not to marry non-Jews.
On the aspect of civic virtue, research focusing on the case of Turkey’s 
Jewish minority necessitated that a distinction be made between, on the one hand, 
civic virtue as attitude and on the other, actual behavior in the communal and 
societal domaias. In their communal domain, the research found that civic virtue 
both as attitude and as behavior developed on the basis of Jewish identity was 
high. More specifically, the level of membership and participation in Jewish 
organizations was remarkable, though the older interview subjects’ involvement 
seemed to focus on religious activities, that of the middle-aged focus on social and 
communal activities, whereas the young subjects’ involvement in associations 
remained limited and largely took place while they were stiU under 18. Although 
most of the respondents said that they place importance on the good esteem of the 
Jewish community in the general pubhc’s eyes and the need to not tolerate anti- 
Semitic rhetoric, acts towards these ends were not taken at the individual level but
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rather performed by community leaders. One of the significant reasons for this 
discrepancy between attitude and actual behavior seemed to lie in the minority 
psychology and distrust felt towards general society.
In the societal domain of civic virtue which is related to universal norms of 
Turkish citizenship, it seemed that membership and participation in non-Jewish 
associations at the national level, if any at all, was very low. The research found 
that most of the respondents, especially the younger ones, seemed to give weight 
to liberal-democratic values in state-society relations. However, the actual 
performance of virtuous citizenship remained limited, as most of the respondents 
said that Turkey’s Jews generally refrained from taking an active stance due to 
anxiety over being picked out and condemned by general society as Jews.
Regarding the interaction between the legal status, identity and civic virtue 
aspects of citizenship, several points emerged in the course of the research. For 
the interaction between legal status and identity aspects o f citizenship, the 
interviews pointed to the insistence of preserving ethno-religious difference, 
which was strongly resisted in the ideas developed on the aspect of legal status. 
The equality which was strongly emphasized in relation to the legal status of 
Turkish citizenship referred to equality in the public sphere. The identity aspect of 
citizenship, however, was conceived by difference. The difference in ethno­
religious identity refers to a difference secured by secularism, one meaning the 
right to preserve and practice religious beliefs and transmit them to future 
generations.
It can be argued that the Jewish and Turkish identities co-existed but that 
with the younger interview subjects, the affiliation with Turkish identity was
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prioritized more and came to supersede Jewish identity. Jewish identity seemed to 
refer to an identity confined to the private sphere, and Turkish identity referred 
more to a societal and pubhc identity. However, the respondents seemed to suffer 
from a conflict between the will to equahty and the will to difference. Although 
the will to equahty referred to an issue of the pubhc sphere and the will to 
difference to an issue of the private, the boundaries between the two spheres seem 
to be fluid and ambiguous. The Jewish community has many institutions present 
in the pubhc sphere founded with the aim of maintaining Jewish identity and 
culture. All these institutions are positioned in the pubhc sphere but since they are 
restricted to Jews ordy, this Jewish-experienced pubhc sphere seems to be smaller 
in scope than the pubhc sphere designated for all of society at the national level.
The conflict between the wiU to equahty and the will to difference felt by 
the respondents seems to be connected with integration and assimilation. On tbe 
one hand, the subjects support the unitary and homogenized conceptualization of 
Turkish citizenship but on the other, they resist this homogenization for reasons of 
religion and culture. The respondents tried to amehorate the effects of this 
dilemma through two main strategies. The first is the strategy of calling attention 
to the historical loyalty of the Jewish minority to the Turkish state. Most of the 
respondents emphasized the importance of being loyal to the state and the need to 
frequently demonstrate this loyalty so that their will to difference avoided any 
connotation of threatening the integrity of the Turkish Repubhc or its basic norms. 
The Jewish minority’s claim as the most loyal and dependable non-Muslim group 
throughout Turkey’s history is also frequently cited in the Jewish community’s 
pubHcations and declarations by the community ehte. For that reason, the
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respondents stress equality in legal status and perceive it not only as sufficient to 
protect their rninority position but also as a natural outcome of their historical 
attitude as a community towards the integrity of the Turkish state.
The second strategy that the respondents frequently used to soften the 
conflict between equality and difference is that of invisibihty in the public sphere. 
Most of the respondents thou^t that their difference lay in their rehgion, a matter 
which had already been dealt with by the donunance of secular principles iu the 
public sphere. Therefore, any form of pubhc visibihty such as frequent emphasis 
put on Judaism or Jewish identity in public intercourse with non-Muslims is 
somethiug to be avoided. The respondents seemed to resist any form of action -  
either verbal or written — that could serve to identify them in the pubhc eye as 
Jews. In other words, they seemed to refrain from acting or spealting in the pubhc 
sphere in any way that uses claims of identity or difference.
These two strategies -  loyalty and invisibihty — correspond to the 
interviewees’ contempt for special group rights and contentment with the basic 
individual rights granted by the universal legal framework. In this regard, it can be 
argued that the research showed the legal status and identity aspects of Turkish 
citizenship for the nation’s Jews were not complementary but rather undermined 
each other. The findings suggested that legal status denoted a universal framework 
of basic rights and responsibilities in the pubhc sphere, and identity denoted a 
difference to be confined to the private sphere. The wiUs to equality and 
difference were accompanied by the will to loyalty and invisibihty towards tbe 
aim of integration to society at large. Such an integration process, one more
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evident among the younger respondents, serves to hinder the claims for identity 
and special legislation on the basis of a distinct category of minority.
For the interaction between civic virtue and the aspects o f legal status and 
identity, it must be mentioned at the outset that although the legal status aspect 
supports the civic virtue aspect, the identity aspect hinders it. Most of the 
respondents said that they rejected any special status for Jews but approved the 
universahstic appropriation in Turkish citizenship. If the views of legal status 
were reproduced in the aspect of civic virtue, it could be easily assumed that upon 
the derivation from universalistic norms of citizenship, the respondents would not 
be hindered from developuig or realizing civic virtue expressed through ideas and 
deeds. However the findiags showed that they refrained from performing civic 
virtue to the full extent. This may be due to the intervention of the identity aspect 
of citizenship on the civic virtue aspect. Consciousness of Jewish identity and 
insecurity felt towards general society for exploiting this identity for the purposes 
of anti-Semitic propaganda or other discourse biased against the Jews seems to 
discourage the respondents from performing acts of civic virtue.
The intention to stay invisible was also vahd in the relation between 
Jewish identity and civic virtue. Most of the respondents said that in cases where 
visibility of Jewish identity was a necessity -  such as countering anti-Semitic 
accusations, clarifying certain issues of Jewish culture or correcting 
misinformation about the Jewish community in Turkey — the Jewish elites 
represented their community in the public sphere and took on visibility on behalf 
of its members. The transformation of values into actions at the individual level, 
however, remained limited as the respondents avoided taking active positions due
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to their minority status. In other words, the subjects did not take actions in daily 
life in accordance with their values on civic virtue since they feared society would 
react negatively by highlighting their minority status. The strategy of invisibility, 
in this regard, can be argued to be the major determiaant of the hiteraction 
between civic virtue and the aspects of legal status and identity. It seems that the 
universal, monohthic framework of Turkish citizenship provides Turkey’s Jews a 
tool for invisibility, one so they are equal and no difference can be picked out to 
differentiate or distinguish them from society at large. These views of legal status 
and civic virtue highlight that Turkey’s Jews mainly fulfill the basic 
responsibilities of citizenship but avoid taking part in active citizenship or civic 
virtue to a full extent.
To sum up, it can be argued that the experience of Turkish citizenship at 
the individual level is closely related to the minority status of the respondents. In a 
society where the population is overwhelmingly Muslim, being a non-Muslim 
minority plays a significant role in: a) the appropriation of the monist and 
universal conceptualization of citizenship in the legal status aspect; b) the 
endeavor to maintain Jewish identity despite the inevitable consequences of 
integration and assunilation in the identity aspect; and c) the discrepancy between 
values and actions in the civic virtue aspect.
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6.3 Citizenship and International Migration: Turkish-Jewish Immigrants in 
Israel
In Chapter V, the discussion elaborated the perceptions and experiences of 
Turkish Jews in Israel concerning citizenship. Accordingly, on the aspect of legal 
status regarding their former lives in Turkey, the inunigrants said that their 
minority status had not resulted m inequality or discrimination against them. For 
citizenship in Israel, respondents from across all migration periods strongly 
emphasized the just and equal legal framework in Israeh democracy, though they 
accepted that sometimes for security reasons there might be one set of policies for 
minorities and another for the nation’s Jewish majority. Also they apparently had 
adequate information on the rules, legislation and pohcies affecting them.
When the respondents compared citizenship in Israel to that in Turkey, the 
common theme that emerged was that they preferred dual citizenship. Almost all
i
of the respondents said that Israel’s social welfare system, human rights situation, 
and the value placed on its citizens were all better than ia Turkey. In comparison, 
Turkey was seen as a safer country for its residents than Israel. Most of the 
respondents believed that the micorities of any country, be it Israel or Turkey, 
should not hold positions of high power, leaving rather individuals from the 
majority group should do so. It was seen as “normal” and “rational” that neither 
Jews from Turkey nor Arabs living in Israel were recruited to top state or military 
offices.
On the aspect of identity, the research covered various components of 
identity formation and its re-formation. The respondents mainly identified
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themselves as Jews of Turkish origin. Those who arrived, after 1951 underlined 
their Turkish origin strongly and more frequently. There were also some who 
recalled that after they arrived in Israel, they realized that there was a distinction 
between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jewry and that they belonged actually to the 
former. The immigrant organizations founded by Turkish Jews seemed to have 
become active after the ‘70s with the arrival of newcomers. These newcomers also 
contributed to tbe positive image of Turkish Jews, as did tourism between Israel 
and Turkey, which leapt after the 1980s. Good relations between the two countries 
contributed to the positive image of both Turks and Turkish Jews. The immigrant 
associations also took active roles in promoting Turkey and Turkish Jews to 
Israeh society and sometimes scored points by lobbying on issues such as 
resisting the Armenian genocide claims.
As to attitudes towards intermarriage, as the Jews are the majority in 
Israel, most of the respondents seemed not to feel any threat of the extinction of 
Jewry. The immigrants mentioned that they would prefer that their children form 
unions among Israel’s community of Turkish Jews if possible, and if not, to do so 
among Turkey’s Jews or Israel’s culturally shnilar Sephardic Jews. In this regard, 
migration can be said to have changed the meaning of intermarriage. Secularism 
also emerged as an issue on which great stress is placed. Both the rise of Islamism 
in Turkey after the 1980s and Israel’s fundamentalist Jews seemed to trouble the 
immigrants. The respondents also told how their degree of religious observance 
declined after their arrival in Israel.
On the aspect of civic virtue, two categories emerged, namely civic virtue 
as attitude and behavior in the communal or societal domains. For civic virtue in
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the communal domain, which is related to the immigrant identity of the Turkish 
Jews, all of the respondents beheved that immigrants associations perform 
constructive roles in both raising community aid and supporting group identity, 
especially as the immigrants who arrived after the ‘70s took on more 
responsibility and turned this attitudinal value into actual behavior in this regard. 
Most of the respondents from all waves said that they came across verbal 
accusations or publications in the public sphere directed against Tmkish Jews or 
Turkey rarely.
For civic virtue in the societal domain, Turkish Jews had Httle apparent 
involvement in social movements or in non-govemmental organizations founded 
by other groups in Israeh society. They also saw the Israeh-Palestinian conflict as 
a hindrance to actively realizing civic virtue because it took precedence over 
every other social issue in Israel. They considered the resolution of pohtical 
problems to be beyond the capacities of individuals or civil society but rather 
were the exclusive purview of the state. The common theme that arose with 
respect to other crucial problems in Israel was that the state, as the supreme 
power-wielding authority, was the only body accoxmtable to overcome these 
problems, yet at the same time Israeli society was considered more pohtical and 
participatory in social matters than Turkish society. The influence of Turkish 
culture among the Turkish Jews also came up frequently in the sense that they 
were inactive in politics and instead generally accepted and conformed to the 
existing rules and norms of Israel’s society, state and pohtical order.
With regards to the interaction between the legal status, identity and civic 
virtue aspects of citizenship, several points emerged in the course of the research.
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For the interaction between the legal status and identity aspects o f citizenship, the 
findings pointed to how the immigration experience was a deterroining factor in 
shaping the views related to both of the aspects, both separately and indeed in 
interaction between them. The immigrants seemed to be developing a 
comparative perspective in evaluatiag their legal status and identity throu^ the 
process of immigration. The immigrants seemed to not only compare Turkey and 
Israel and hence their life iu both countries, but also to compare themselves as 
Turkish Jews with other Israehs firom various countries.
These comparisons shaped the perceptions of the aspects of legal status 
and identity. For the pre-immigration period when the immigrants were still 
members of the Jewish community in Turkey, it seems that inteiplay of forgetting 
and remembrance is in play. That is, the respondents see their past in Turkey 
through a nostalgic lens m which historical incidents against non-Muslims or 
other daily incidents that might have raised questions of discrimination or anti- 
Semitism are subject to active forgetting or else are remembered using optimistic 
retrospection. Therefore, even immigrants who experienced some negative aspects 
of the Turkification process in the Early Republican Period interpret their legal 
status in Turkey as being on equal terms with other citizens.
One of the major reasons for this selective remembrance and forgetting as 
well as optimistic retrospection is the comparative perspective that the immigrants 
developed in Israel. The respondents frequently mentioned that many Jews in 
Israel have harsh, bitter memories' such as living through the Holocaust or 
expulsion from their home coxmtries. However, they themselves never faced such 
tragic experiences. They compare themselves with these other Jews, and thus the
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good relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and equality in Turkey emerge 
as the dominant theme as the result of this optimistic retrospection, thus tending to 
overshadow any instances of discrimuiation. For the period after immigration, it 
must be emphasized that the respondents seemed to have acquired sufficient 
ioformation on the procedures and policies that affected them. The respondents 
compare themselves with other Jews in Israel and know about the difference in 
absorption pohcies once applied to unmigrants by country of origin. Migration, as 
a process, can be argued to have had an instructive effect on the immigrants.
As the result of this comparative perspective developed towards their 
previous fife in Turkey and current hfe m Israel, it can be argued that the Turkish 
Jews in Israel have come to retrospectively tolerate problems pertaining to 
citizenship in Turkey (e.g. the lack of welfare programs, the Capital Tax and 
discrimination in state dormitories) parallel with their nostalgia felt towards life in 
Turkey. Jewish identity in Turkey is not problematized -  that is, generally the 
respondents seem to ignore their difference in identity, and Turkey’s equal legal 
framework supports this perception. Citizenship in Israel is generally regarded as 
more advanced than Turkey in terms of its welfare policies, immigrant absorption 
pohcies and wide range of rights and freedoms in the legal framework. Claims for 
identity in Israeli citizenship can be easily raised iu the pubhc. As the result of this 
comparative perspective, the respondents perceive themselves as being different 
from other Israelis and identify themselves more with Turkish culture than Israeh. 
Israel’s democracy is also perceived as being more advanced than Turkey’s, but 
secularism seems to be the main hindrance to the quahty of democracy in Israel, 
in the respondents’ eyes.
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Tlirkish Jews experienced a change of status with their immigration to 
Israel, a reversal from minority status to majority status. The former members of 
Turkey’s Jewish community were members of a minority group there. After they 
immigrated to Israel, they became members of the majority group, Jews hi Israel. 
Such a change seems to have impacted their perception of citizenship and the 
interaction between legal status and identity. Although the legal statuses hi both 
Israel and Turkey are generally defined as equal, the identity aspect in both 
countries is evaluated generally within majoritarian norms. In other words, the 
respondents seemed to voice the norms of the majority hi both countries. This is 
evident in the remarks of the respondents expressing tolerance for problematic 
issues of both Turkish citizenship and Israeh citizenship. The best example would 
be that most of the respondents argued that only members of the majority group in 
both of the countries (Muslims in Turkey, Jews in Israel) should be recruited to 
high state offices.
j
For ihe interaction between civic virtue and the aspects o f legal status and 
identity in Israel, it can be argued the legal status dimension supports the civic 
virtue dimension. Israeli democracy entails a broad range of rights and freedoms 
in the legal framework. Furthermore, in Israel, a country of immigrants, there is 
tolerance for different identity claims by Jews. In other words, difference in 
identity in terms of country of origin among Israel’s Jewish majority is not only 
unavoidable, but also accepted. Jews are free to set up associations pertaining to 
the culture of their former home cormfiy. They may maintain their cultural 
backgroimds and languages, though the dominant language of the public is 
Hebrew. The Turkish Jews, therefore, feel themselves in a hberal environment for
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perfomiing civic virtue. They believe that Israel’s state structure and democracy 
provide the conditions for encomraging civic virtue. The Turkish Jews perform 
civic virtue partially. However, despite the opportunities provided in the legal 
framework, the respondents seem to shrink from performing civic virtue to its frill 
extent, which is related to the interaction between the aspects of identity and civic 
virtue.
The impact of identity aspect on civic virtue is twofold. On the one hand, 
the Turkish Jews’ identification with Turkish culture seems to influence their 
civic virtue positively. Characteristics attributed to Turkish culture such as 
respecting others, honoring the elderly, loving children, and acting and speaking 
pohtely can be considered examples of cultural virtues. In this respect, these 
cultural virtues pertaining to Turkish Jews seem to promote the civic virtue of 
citizenship. No matter how tempting it might be to make a generalization on these 
two types of virtues, though, one should be waiy of reaching overly hasty 
conclusions. Although they may sometimes overlap with each other at an abstract 
level, civic virtue and cultural virtue are two distinct categories. There may be 
counter-cases where cultural virtues do not promote civic virtue and even 
sometimes hinder it. In the case of Turkish Jews, however, the identification with 
Turkish culture and the characteristics attributed to it seemed to support civic 
virtue.
On the other hand, as Weiker (1988) found in his own study of Jews from 
Turkey in Israel, the respondents in this study also seem to prefer to be unseen. 
They do not want to raise their voice or question existing poHcies. They are tittle 
involved in non-immigrant associations and political parties. They are not
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interested in social movements and do not show their political will on extra- 
electoral platforms. They seem to be content with the general structure of state- 
society relations. The state is an authority figure in the eyes of the immigrants and 
therefore, individual or group contributions to democracy find little favor. The 
immigrants seem to be “very Turkish” not only ha the sense of identity but also in 
the sense of civic virtue as they pay continued obeisance to a more traditional 
state-citizen hierarchy.^ This may be due to the dominant political culture in 
Turkey through which the respondents were sociahzed in their pre-migration 
fives. In other words, the underdeveloped nature of civil society and low level of 
political participation in Turkey may have influenced the respondents, just as 
other Turkish citizens were so influenced. So as they were steeped ha Turkey’s 
political culture, in Israel the respondents may then have preferred to fiilfill only 
their basic responsibilities and duties but not push their civic virtues assertively. 
There may be other reasons as well. Marshalling the findings of the field research 
in Turkey, one could think that the root cause of being unseen and performing 
limited civic virtue is the preservation of the Turkish-cultivated strategy of 
invisibility in Israel even after migration. Turkey’s Jews wanted to be invisible ha 
the public sphere and so have refrained from performing active civic virtue since 
they feared society would react negatively by highlighting their minority status. In 
a similar vein, Turkish Jews in Israel may have internalized these concerns and
 ^ Israel’s unstable security environment, including the ongoing terrorism, seems to have 
contributed to the understanding o f the state as the ultimate authority to which individuals transfer 
their sovereignty ia exchange for security.
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carried them to Israel, even while the original justification for such a strategy was 
left behind in their former homeland.
To sum up, the interviews conducted with Jews firom Turkey in Israel 
pointed out that despite long years of residence in Israel, the immigrants have 
preserved the political sensibihty they grew up with and learned when they were 
in Turkey. However, moving into a country where they became members of the 
majority group seems to have impacted their perceptions and experiences 
regarding citizenship and played roles m; a) the appropriation of democratic 
norms defined by majoritarian terms in the legal status aspect; b) efforts to 
maintain their Turkish identity in cosmopolitan Jewish-Israeh society in the 
identity aspect; and c) the preference for complying with the general norms of 
Jewish-Israeli society and conversely excluding a proactive understanding of 
virtuous citizenship.
6.4 Citizenship on the Individual Level: A Comparison from Turkey’s Jewish 
Minority and Turkish-Jewish Immigrants in Israel
Having discussed the nexus of citizenship-minority and citizenship- 
international migration separately, in this part a comparison of the immigrant and 
minority groups composed of Jews is made. The comparison does not cover every 
point made previously on the two groups; rather it involves only major results of 
the research and expands on some of the similarities and the differences between 
them.
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6.4.1 Individual Characteristics
The sample group composed of Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel 
is limited and generalization on both groups cannot be made methodologically. 
Nonetheless, in light of previous studies as well as the results obtained in this field 
research, one might argue that the group Jewish community in Turkey illustrates a 
more homogeneous outlook than the iromigrants in Israel. The group in Turkey is 
generally middle-class oriented and there are very few poor Jews (Liberies, 1984; 
142) whereas there is a more significant variety of class background, firom lower- 
class to upper-class, among the group in Israel.
The same variety is also vahd for employment status. In the Israeli group, 
the occupations that the respondents, either currently employed or unemployed, 
hold indicate a range firom workers, to state officials, to mihtary officers and to 
business men in the pubhc and private sectors. Turkey’s Jews however were 
mainly involved in private sectors and there were no military officers among 
them. There was only one state official who was working as an academician in a 
Turkish state university. Another marking difference between the two groups was 
the employment of women respondents. The Jewish women in Turkey were 
mainly housewives, yet there were some women among the younger generation 
who either worked or wanted to work at some point in their lives.^ However, *
* For the profile o f the sarnple groups in Turkey and in Israel, see Table 1 and 2 in Appendix D.
 ^According to one estimate only in 1966, 95% o f the Jevrish work force was en^loyed and only 
10% o f that work force was composed o f women. Majority o f Jewish men were salesmen, 
merchants or held administrative or managerial positions whereas Jewish women were involved in 
secretarial and clerical fields (Liberies, 1984: 142).
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among the immigrant group, there were more women working outside their home 
despite their middle ages.
The main reasons for these differences in occupational and class variety as 
well as women’s employment seemed to be related to minority and international 
migration. As was mentioned in Chapter IH, after migration of huge numbers 
from Turkey to Israel composed mainly of the uneducated and/or the poor, the 
remaining Jews illustrated a more homogeneous portrait, mainly of middle-class. 
Furthermore, Turkey’s Jews had not hold positions in state bureaucracy or 
professional mihtary. The research revealed that positions in state and military 
offices were not preferred by the Jews either because they were thought to be 
closed to the Jews with invisible social barriers or the salary rate of these positions 
were not found to be attractive. The change in women’s profile in terms of 
employment seems to be related directly to the experience of international 
migration. The women who were housewives or who did not have any plan to 
work when they were in Turkey started working after they migrated to Israel. This 
niay be due to the hard conditions of life in a country that was suffering pains of 
birth in a geographical environment that needed enormous human labor. 
Furthermore, the strong collectivist tradition and highly solidaristic citizenship 
ideology in Israel (Abraham, 2002), might have encouraged women’s working. 
Last but not least, the work ethic and the strong labor movement in Israel 
(Histadrut movement) might have played role in changing the gender ideology 
and the value attributed to work among Turkish Jews in the course of migration.
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6.4.2 Integration and Assimilation
Another similarity between Turkish Jews in Israel and Jews in Turkey is 
their experience in modes of integration/assimilation showing similar historical 
trends in nation-building process in both countries. In the Israeli case, the Zionist 
vision of “melting pof ’ in which various Jewish identities from different sources 
of countries would be transformed into an Israeli one, over time, left its place for a 
more limited insistence on Hebrew as the common language and for a more 
pluralistic vision of Israeli culture and society (Baubock, 2001; Ichilov, 2002: 6). 
This shift is actually the transformation from an assimilatiomst to a multicultural 
regime of integration that started in 1970s and speeded up after 1980s.
A similar nation-building process has occurred in Turkey. Since its 
estabhshment, the official ideology rested on a unifying concept of Turkishness 
by which diversity among the society in terns of ethnicity, religion or language or 
existence of minority groups was ignored persistently. Assimilation of sub-groups 
were directed “from above” which turned into pressures from time to time. With 
regards to the Jewish minority, although they were acknowledged formal 
recognition, their assimilation was also promoted taking sometimes obligatory 
faces by campaigns like “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” Even the term “Musevi” was 
commonly used instead of “Yahudi” to refer only to rehgious difference and to 
deny any national connotation. After 1980s, multiculturalism started to be 
pronounced and it started to be identified as an asset of Turkey after the 1990s. 
General society became interested in non-Muslims and Jews in return started to 
articulate their Jewish identity more easily in the public when compared to
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previous decades. An interest in Ladino as a language to be protected has gained 
weight among the Jewish community. Discussions ' on past record of policies 
towards non-Muslims in Turkey attracted wide attention evidenced by the 
proliferation of pubhcations on them. Intermarriage speeded up and conversion to 
Islam no more occurs as it had been in intermarriages before 1980s. Now, spouses 
maintain their own religion after marriage.
It must be noted that there are other factors in the mode of integration of 
Jews over time. The Jewish population of Turkey has diminished to a great extent 
especially after mass migration to Israel. Furthermore, Jews were acculturated 
already when it came to 1980s and the gap in difference betweên “Turkish” 
majority and Jewish minority had become minimal. Furthermore, there were 
pressures that the European Union accession process put on Turkey.
In the research, there arose a difference in values regarding recruitment of 
minorities to pohtics and state administration between the immigrant and minority 
groups. Both of the groups mainly argued that individuals had the right to become 
members of the parhament or cabinet irrespective of their majority/minority 
backgrounds. However, when the discussion came to hold of high positions in the 
state, i.e. president or chief of general staff, Turkish Jews in Israel seemed to 
resist, more than Turkey’s Jews, to the idea of an individual from a minority 
group holding such a position. The group in Turkey was generally of the idea that 
there would be hidden barriers in front of minorities for high positions in the state 
but it did not try to legitimate Muslims occupying those positions as requirement 
of democracy. In contrast, the group in Israel played with the idea of majoritarian
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democracy and set the majority group ruling aud protecting the country as the
norm.
6.4.3 Construction of Identities
Identity seems to be a detemiining factor in defining the boundaries of 
minority and immigrant groups. Turkey’s Jews seemed to identify themselves 
with being “Jewish” and ‘Turkish”. Turkish Jews in Israel has a more variety of 
sources of identification - one that varies from “Jewish”, “Turkish”, “Israeli” to 
“Sephardim”. The Jewish community in Turkey seems to be fighting for survival, 
and its rehgious fife is diniinishing while intermarriage and assimilation are 
increasing (Liberies, 1984: 127, 169). In order to preserve the Jewish identity, 
several measures are taken on the community level, yet the forces of assimilation 
and the domination of supra-Turkish culture compose pressure for inclusion, 
which especially for the younger generations gets hard to resist.
The endeavor of preserving Jewish identity seems to be replaced by the 
Turkish identity in the group of immigrants in Israel. Even the level of religious 
observance seemed to decrease among Turkish Jews with migration to Israel. As 
Bhatia (2002: 56) sets forth regarding several cases in intemational migration, the 
immigrants, rather moving from culture of the home country into the culture of 
the host country mix cultures in the process of moving. Furthermore, over time, 
many immigrant groups develop cultural hybridism - that is mixing the culture of 
their home countries with the ones adopted from the host culture (Remennick, 
2002). Similarly, with the experience of migration, the Turkish Jews in Israel
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seem to combine the culture inherited in the home country with the one adopted in 
the host country.
The research illustrated that Turkish Jews in Israel experienced an identity 
crisis which can be correlated to the one that Turkey has been experiencing. 
Turkey is neither oriental nor western; neither developed nor underdeveloped; 
neither European nor Middle Eastern. By the same token, first generation of 
Turkish Jews in Israel cannot identify themselves fully with other immigrant 
groups in Israel. They see themselves neither belonging to the Ashkenazim Jewry 
nor to the Oriental Jewry; neither showing characteristics of upper stratum of 
Israeli society nor of lower stratum; and neither having European origin nor 
Middle Eastern origin. They see themselves “in between” of these categories, yet 
they mentioned that the Israeli society in general had false perception on Turkish 
Jews and saw them belonging to the latter set of categories: Oriental, lower 
stratum and Middle Eastern. Since all the immigrants without Ashkenazic origin 
are put under the same category, the diversity among the group called the 
Orientalsephardic/Mizrahi is often neglected (Bernstein, 1980). This study, in 
this sense, challenges the conventional generalization.®
Both the groups defined themselves as Turkish. Turkishness, for them, 
resulted primarily firom being bom in Turkish lands first of all. In addition to this 
territorial definition, the respondents in Israel and Turkey suggested that the title 
“Turkish” enclosed a distinguished culture having various features that include 
way of looking at life, manners, values, preference in aesthetics, styles of raising
 ^ It must also be noted that according to socio-economic indicators the non-Ashkenazic Jewry is 
overcoming the gap with the Ashkenazim (Sheffer, 1997b: 121).
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children, food, songs, etc. which were identifiable with respect to other countries’ 
cultures. Even some religious habits of fasting or not eating pork are attributed as 
a commonality in Islam and Judaism. The minority group also emphasizes sharing 
the same history as a determinant of Turkishness, which is not very much recalled 
by the immigrant group, yet they emphasize socialization in young ages to 
become a Turk. Both of the groups admit that majority of the Turks are Muslims 
but add that not every Muslim was a Turk nor every Turk was a Muslim. They 
make a distinction in Islamic world between Arabs and Turks and argue that real 
Islam, a holy religion, is that of Turks and not of Arabs. The “extreme Islamists” 
in Turkey are exemphfied as people who are under the influence of dogmatic 
Islam exercised in the Middle East. Mushm Turks, in their opinion, are people 
who interpreted Islam according to the needs of contemporary age.
Secularism emerged as a common theme for respondents in Turkey and 
Israel. Almost aU of the respondents strongly advocated secularism and defined it 
as a major democratic principle. The respondents seemed not to be satisfied about 
secularism in the countries that they live. The minority group mentioned that they 
were contempt the rise of Islamism in Turkey and added that they did not want to 
have worries about secularism after change of governments in every election. The 
immigrant group, on the other hand, considered Turkey as a country where 
secularism is estabhshed firmly with strong roots and rose questions· about 
secularism in Israel. Most of the respondents in Israel mentioned that they felt 
rmeasy with the rise of Jewish fundamentalists in Israel.
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6.4.4 Invisibility
Invisibility emerged as one of the common problématiques in both groups. 
The Jewish minority avoid attracting attention from the general society. 
Respondents claim that they are Turkish in terms of being bom in the Turkish 
lands, culture, history and language. They reject that they compose a ininority 
group and assert that the only difference is in religion. Jews seemed to be annoyed 
with individual responses which recall their differences. They do not want to be 
picked out and illustrate a tendency to conform to the general norms of the larger 
society. They refrain from getting involved in pohtics, civil society organizations 
or state administration with the fear that their Jewishness would be abused or 
disrespected. Their loyalty to Turkish state is under constant questioning and 
therefore, they fear that their affihation to Israel would be made an issue by 
others. In result of this hesitation and lack of full thrust toward the society, they 
drawback their difference from the gaze of the pubhc and try to make themselves 
unseen.
Such a result obtained in the research confirms other studies on Jewish 
community which set forth invisibility as one of the important characteristics of 
Jews in Turkey. Yumul (2001) argues that Turkey’s Jews bring up their children 
with values like not complaining, not demanding from the society, and tolerating 
injustice rather than opposing it. The Jewish community in Turkey is generally 
acknowledged as a apolitical community, one which does not criticize nor take 
sides (Bali, 2001b: 125). Liberies (1984) adds the Jewish community in Turkey 
does not want to pubhcize its activities and the consensus is that the shghtest
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publicity might endanger the status quo. Meetings are closed to the public and no 
membership cards, certificates or other symbols are distributed. Conversion to 
Judaism is still not handled by the Chief Rabbinate in Turkey (Liberies, 1984: 
146, 149). It must also be noted that only recently the Jewish community in 
Turkey started to open its doors to media and researchers for interviewing.
The research in Israel points to Turkish Jews sharing a similar political 
culture with that of their cormterparts in Turkey. Although the pohtical culture of 
Israel has been characterized by a high level of pubHc involvement (Hacohen, 
2002), Turkish Jews in Israel do not illustrate a tendency alike despite their well- 
iategrated appearance. There is marked decline in membership to pohtical parties, 
national and communal organizations such as government bureaucracy, labor 
movement, kibbutz and moshav movements in 1990s Israel (Sheffer, 1997b: 123). 
Turkish Jews were aheady less involved hi these activities when compared 
especially to veteran groups. Remennick (2002) in her research on Soviet Jews in
7
Israel observes that the development of active citizenship and other features of 
civil society among former Soviets in Israel are rather slow due to pohtical and 
mental legacy that attained in their home countries. One might argue in the same 
way that Turkish Jews hi Israel inherited the legacy of the pohtical culture of 
Jewish community hi Turkey which rests on invisibihty. As the field research 
highlighted, citizenship seems to be still a sphere of the state rather than the 
individuals and citizenship in Turkey was perceived generally as set of 
responsibilities whereas citizenship in Israel as set of rights. However, one must 
note that shice the majority is composed of Jews in Israel, Turkish Jews became 
members of the majority group with migration. Therefore, their “unseen”
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characteristic, using Weiker’s (1988) term, might not be in the same level and 
degree with that of Jewish minority in Turkey.
Concerns on security also seem to have a relationship with invisibility. 
Previously, the link between invisibility and civic virtue was discussed. There also 
seems to be a link between insecurity and invisibility. The research highlighted 
that having experienced attacks on synagogues, one in 1984 and another in 2003 
and due to frequent anti-Semitic themes iu extreme rightist and Islamist circles, 
Turkey’s Jews refrain from performing actions that would put them in an 
outstanding position in the society. Even some of the respondents presumed the 
possibiHty of such events like 6-7 September or the Capital Tax reoccuixing in the 
future. Similarly, the immigrant group of Turkish Jews in Israel frequently 
mentioned the threat of terrorism in pubhc life and order and emphasized state’s 
role in resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. Security, as an arena still under 
the sovereignty of states, seems to impact both the performance and quality of 
civic virtue on the individual level. Thus, insecurity environment leaves little 
room for individuals to perform civic virtue.
6.4.5 Loyalty and Dual Loyalty
The minority group refrained from professing their interest in Israel openly 
in the interviews. When asked directly about feelings towards Israel, most of them 
mentioned that because they had relatives there, they had good will on Israel. 
Some of them also pointed to Israel being a safe land for the entire world Jewry. 
In light of the past experiences in World War II, the respondents strongly
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underlined the protectionist role of Israel for Jewry. They had information about 
Israel obtained either through visits or relatives hving there. They believed that 
Israel was a better democracy in terms of social, political and civic rights when 
compared to Turkey. Yet, when it came to loyalty felt for Israel, the respondents 
seemed to emphasize Turkification of the Jews in Turkey and they were loyal to 
the Turkish state. Feeling loyalty only to Israel was completely ignored or refdsed 
but the possibihty of dual loyalty was not. Most of the respondents in the miaority 
group admitted the prevalence of dual loyalty that is felt for both Turkey and 
Israel. They were of the idea that since Israel and Turkey had good relations and 
mutual interests, dual loyalty would not be under strain. Further examples of dual 
loyalty were provided on Turkish workers in Germany and Turkish Jews in Israel.
The immigrant group expressed their affihation and loyalty to Turkey 
more openly and more vigorously. They emphasized their strong psychological, 
cultural and social ties with their home country. Even more, they seemed to be
j
proud of having roots in Turkey. They thought the same with that of the minority 
group and argued for the possibility of dual loyalty. They explained that they 
voted for Turkey in the Eurovision music contest and when the Turkish singer 
won the first place, they were proud of Turkey once more and even some of them 
received congratulation phone calls from their Israeh friends. Some of them added 
they maintained Turkish citizenship or applied for dual citizenship in order to 
preserve their Turkish origin.
Loyalty to state is not only a part of state tradition in Turkey but in Israel 
as well. Although it is argued that there is reduction in loyalty to Israeli state and 
its various organizations due to growing individuation, the norms of Jewish state
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are still in force (Sheffer, 1997a: 114; Sheffer, 1997b: 137). Furtheimore, under 
globalization, international migrants are becoming transmigrants and loyalty to 
one country and one culture is no longer self-evident (Remennnick, 2002). Since 
Israel is country of immigration, loyalty to both home and host coimtries does not 
seem to cause tension on Turkish Jews in Israel. However, minorities who seek to 
preserve their distinct ethnic identities in nation-states are expected to perform 
their civil obhgations and exercise civil rights as well as to show loyalty to the 
state. Yet, they still remain marginal to the pohtical community and their loyalty 
remains suspect (Cohen, 1989). In tight of this, the respondents in Turkey might 
not have found it easy to profess their dual loyalty for both Israel and Turkey 
without stressing and prioritizing their loyalty to Turkey.
6.5 Citizenship at the Nexus of International Migration and Minority Issues
Generally, across the globe, rules for formal access to citizenship derive 
mainly from two principles: jus sanguinis (law of the blood) based on descent 
from a national of the country concerned and jus soli (law of the soil) based on 
birth in the territory of the country. In practice, most countries have citizenship 
rules based on a combination of these two principles. However, citizenship is an 
issue beyond formal accession that brings the individuals into the same set of 
formal rights and responsibilities of a state concerned. Furthermore, it is the entire 
mode of incorporation of individuals and groups into the society (Shafir and 
Peled, 1998). Citizenship, in this regard, pinpoints participation in the political 
community. It concerns the learning of a capacity for action and for responsibility
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as well as the perforaiance of that capacity. Therefore, passive and active 
dimensions of citizenship are inherent to citizenship (Turner, 1992). Passive 
citizenship is the acceptance of a certaui order which in return leaves a broader 
space for the involvement of the state. Active citizenship, which is closely related 
to civil society, is poHtical membership by which citizens get involved in public 
affairs with a sense of moral obligation and commitment to society and 
reproduces them through institutions and individual behavior (Migdal, 1993).
The iacoiporation of individuals and groups into the society within the 
medium of democracy poses difficulties especially with regards to two distinct 
ethno-cultural groups: ethnic unmigrants and national minorities. Ethnic 
immigrants become citizens of hberal states through immigration but lack the 
capacity to create the institutions of social, political and economic life. National 
minorities are however collectively incorporated (Choudhry, 2002: 55). 
Furthermore, from the viewpoint of cultural citizenship, national minorities posses 
and are capable of possessing societal cultures whereas ethnic immigrants possess 
their own societal cultures in their countries of origin (Delanty, 2002).
Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel do not illustrate perfect 
examples for national minorities and ethnic immigrants and they cannot be 
regarded as pure cases in the discussions on citizenship and the incorporation of 
these two distinct ethno-cultural groups. The Jewish community in Tiukey does 
not correspond to a national minority as its number is very low. Furthermore, its 
group boundary, either from the perspective of the state with regards to the 
principles of officially recognized minorities according to Lausarme Treaty or 
from the perspective of the community itself, as this research indicated, is strictly
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defined in terms of religion excluding any national connotation. Likewise, Turkish 
Jews in Israel do not compose a refined ethnic immigrant group simply because 
being a Jewish state is still one of the fundamentals of Israel and majority of its 
population is stiU Jewish. For these reasons, the immediate use of the term 
“ethnic” for Turkish Jews m Israel is complicated.
However, the cases of the Jews in Turkey and in Israel are significant for 
discussions on citizenship’s role in. iacorporating minorities and immigrants. 
Although Turkey’s Jews do not compose a national minority, they are at the 
periphery of national majority - that of “Muslim Turks” - regardless of the 
changes in its definitional construction from time to time. They are susceptible to 
the discourses and maneuvers of exclusion and/or inclusion. Their loyalty to 
Turkish state and their membership to the Turkish nation are questioned. In 
addition, as Cohen (1989: 67) puts forth, substantial participation of minority in 
the pohtical community is limited to the condition of its members joining to the 
majority by changing their ethno-religious identity. In view of that, although the 
status of Jews in Turkey are contained in the universal and equal legal framework, 
their identity risks assimilation and their civic virtue confronts setback. All in all, 
minority status of Turkey’s Jews feeds the passive dimension of citizenship 
leaving more places for state action on matters of citizenship. In continuum with 
statist tradition of political culture in Turkey, citizenship becomes a sphere 
dominated more by the state and the involvement of citizens gets limited.
Turkish Jews in Israel do not compose a Weberian ideal case for an ethnic 
immigrant group. However, as this research signified, first generation immigrants 
reformulated their identities as Turkish after their arrival in Israel. Using
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Kastoryano’s formulation (2000), international migration turned the Jewish 
immigrants from Turkey into a transnational community; Turkey became a source 
of identity and Israel a source of rights for them; and the emerging space of 
political action combined Turkey and Israel. This is not a unique situation for 
Turkish Jews. Previous research has shown that the modes of behavior and value 
relations of each of the groups that compose Israeli society were mostly imported 
from the immigrants’ country of origiu (Hacohen, 2002; Ichilov 2002). Turkish 
Jews became part of the dichotomy of Oriental-Sephardic-Mizrahi versus 
Ashkenazim Jewry in Israeli society. If integration is understood as the inclusion 
of newcomers as well as the internal cohesion of societies and pohtical 
communities that are transformed by immigration (Baubock, 2001), the 
identification of immigrants from Turkey as “Turkish Jews” and “Sephardim 
Jewry” illustrate the significance of the difiticulty of integration for Israel. Israel
has directed its absorption policies more for a type of “multiculturahsm” and
)
encourages cultural activities through migrants’ associations where identities are 
organized and redefined but internal cohesion is under question. Israel society is 
considered to be deeply spht along rehgious and ethnic lines (Baubock, 2001; 
Hacohen, 2002). Therefore, although Turkish Jews has become part of majority 
and enjoys the majoritarian norms of the “ethnic democracy” in Israel (Smooha, 
1997), they still have close identity ties with Turkey and they are not proactive in 
the field of citizenship.
The research on Jews in Turkey and in Israel also indicated that citizenship 
mainly involved two main actors - citizens and states - but the general framework 
of citizenship was generally drawn by the states rather than the citizens.
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Individuals were in receptive position vis-à-vis the policies on citizenship which 
were primarily shaped and dominated by the states. It must also be noted that an 
individual being an immigrant or a minority plays a role in being responsive to the 
policies on citizenship governed by the states. In other words, individuals are not 
neutral subjects who only earn the designation of citizen in their relations with the 
state and in the medium of citizenship. Their status, identity as well as their civic 
virtue characterizes the scope of relations with the state. Immigrauts and 
minorities are groups vulnerable to states’ authority and power. For that reason, 
they are more permissive to the actions taken by the state and furthermore, they 
are more passive in shaping up the policies with respect to citizenship and in 
participating in the pohtical community.
The research also noted reading citizenship on the individual level 
necessitated imderstanding the dominant citizenship paradigms within a given 
country. Israel and Turkey, both being new states founded in the 20* century in 
the Middle East dominated by statist tradition, possess different roots to 
citizenship. Below, the dominant paradigms of in citizenization process m Israel 
and Turkey are reviewed.
Israel is generally accepted as a case by itself and therefore omitted in 
comparative studies. Israel has been suggested to be an example for an ethnic 
democracy (Smooha, 1997), yet such modeling has not been left without 
criticisms (Jamal, 2002). Still, two characteristics of Israel are prominent in 
shaping up the state structure, democracy and citizenship in Israel. First is Israel 
being a Jewish state. The concept pohtical community in Israel is also ethnic 
(Joppke and Roshenhek, 2001). Even, pohtical parties that deny the Jewish
327
character of the state are disqualified to run in elections. Such a constnictioti 
brings various internal and international challenges to the sovereignty of the state. 
In addition to the pressures of globalization, Post-Zionists who advocates Israel 
to be a democracy in liberal norms, Haredi Jews who are dominated by messianic 
belief and religious fundamentalism, and Israeli Palestinians who demand de- 
ethnicization of the state, challenge the sovereignty of Israel internally (Sheffer, 
1997b: 125-132). These challenges are reflection of the decrease in loyalty to the 
state and its various organizations (Sheffer, 1997b: 137). Due to the growing 
individuation among Israeli society, there is also a reduction in solidaristic 
citizenship ideology (Abraham, 2002). Therefore, the state encounters difficulties 
in imposing its policies on the citizens and it is becoming less effective in its 
ability to perform its traditional functions (Sheffer, 1997a: 114; Sheffer, 1997b: 
141).
The second prominent characteristic of Israel, which is closely related to 
the first one, is the importance of security and military. Since Israel has gone 
through various wars since its establishment and due to the conflict over Palestine, 
participation in war and military service serve as the major signifier of full 
membership in the Israeli political community. Hence, there is close linkage 
between civic and military virtues (Helman, 1999; Shafir and Peled, 1998). The 
notion of “good citizen” in Israel exceeds beyond basic duties of tax payment, 
voting and military service and include the virtue of contribute to state goals such 
as strengthening of national security, the increase of Jewish majority, the 
geographical dispersion of the Jewish settlement, the development of Jewish 
culture, advancement of economic independence, etc. (Smooha, 1997). Citizens
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are expected to be active rather than passive in pursuing their rights and 
performing their duties (Sheffer, 1997b).
In view of the above characteristics, citizenship conception in Israel is 
eclectic. It demonstrates a combination of liberal, republican and ethno-nationalist 
conceptions of citizenship in Western political thought. The strong affiliation to 
democratic norms signifies the liberal discourse; the dominancy of Zionism 
represent the “pioneering” civic virtue of the republican discourse; and the 
identity based on Jewish descent is part of ethno-nationalist discourse (Shafir and 
Peled, 1998). Such a assorted understanding of citizenship serve to further the 
cleavages in Israel between citizens and non-citizens, between Jews and non- 
Jews, between men and women, and between Ashkenazim and Mizrahi (Shafir 
and Peled, 1998). Even more, it causes tensions between secular norms of nation- 
building and religiously grounded definition of membership (Baubock, 2001) and 
causes controversies on whether Jew is race, nation or religion (Joppke and 
Roshenhek, 2001).^
Citizenship in Turkey, however, was officially taken a major element of 
successful nation-building from the very start (l9 duygu et al. 1999). State played 
the determinant role not only in. nation-building but also in the development of 
citizenship. Therefore, the notion of citizenship implied belonging directly to a 
national community based on loyalty to the state (i9 duygu et al. 1999). Two 
characteristics of Turkey are significant in shaping up the state structure.
 ^ The Law o f Return, in the amendment o f 1970, widened the scope o f membership to Jewish 
nation and permitted the right to immigrate to Israel for the close relatives o f Jews despite dieir 
rehgion. The widening in the definition o f Jew did not create debate until 1990s with the massive 
Russian aliya.
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democracy and citizenship. First is Turkey being a secular state. Secularism is one 
of the basic paradigms in Turkey which is constitutionally secured. The political 
parties that advocate religious fundamentalism or disrupt the essentials of the 
Republic including the notion of secularism are banned from politics. Secularism 
generally targets the Muslims in the society which composes the majority. This 
has been mainly due to the othering process in the nation-building process. As 
Bora (1998) puts forth, the other in nation-building is the Ottoman past. With the 
establishment of modem Turkey, secularism served as a justification for a new 
Turkish identity. Religion, which had been traditionally a source of identity for 
the Muslims as well as the non-Muslims, was perceived detrimental to modernity. 
In this regard, non-Muslims were also put on equal footing with Muslims. Second, 
in the establishment of the norms of the Republic, the principle of universalism 
dominated the framework of state-society relations. The term “Turk” has referred 
to subjects who were attached to Turkey with citizenship bonds. Any legal 
definition or mention of racial, ethnic, class, gender or religious affiliation was 
omitted. Such a imiversalistic conceptualization excluded group rights or claims 
for difference.
Although secularism and universalism were set as basic paradigms of 
democracy, state and citizenship in Turkey, they contradicted other paradigms 
which surfaced from time to time. For instance, although the political community 
is strictly defined in secular terms, it is generally the membership of the secular 
Muslims which is at stake. Furthermore, the influx of Islam in the public sphere 
was permitted to a certain level as was in the case of Turkish-Islamic synthesis in 
the aftermath of 1980 military takeover to deactivate other perceived threats such
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as comimmism or racism. Similarly, the principle of imiversalism was questioned 
by various groups of different identity categories within the society.
Despite their different roots to citizenship, Turkey and Israel both have 
membership and belonging to the political community as one of the themes in 
citizenship construction. How citizens perceive and experience citizenship is 
related to not only who those citizens are (i.e. whether they were native bom 
citizens or immigrants and belonged to the majority or minority groups) but also 
how these citizens establish attachment to citizenship predominantly shaped by 
others let it be the states or other individuals and groups. The degree of 
attachment to citizenship is directly related to definitions of membership in the 
political community. Citizenship of Turkish Jews in Israel and Jews in Turkey is 
closely linked to their acceptance as fiall members of the political communities 
respectively. The discussions on whether a Turk by definition is Muslim or not, 
and in a similar vein, whether an Israeli by definition is Jewish or not, are 
reflections of the centrality of membership and belonging to the question of 
citizenship. Even more, they highlight the paradox of citizenship inherent in both 
countries.
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CHAPTER V n  
CONCLUSION
Citizenship is one of the core concepts in political science. It is an essential 
component of state-society relations as it sets formal rights and responsibilities, 
incorporates the individuals and groups into the society and regulates the 
bormdaries of pohtical community and accession to it (Shafir and Peled, 1998). 
Participation in the political community and its objective as "well as subjective 
norms which vary across different settings and historical contexts are intrinsic to 
citizenship. In this regard, it is evident that citizenship is one of the vital concerns 
in democratic theory and any question relevant to citizenship inevitably instigates 
further questions on the quahty of democracy.
Citizenship underscores two major principles for modem nation-states 
(Cohen, 1989). One is citizenship in the state that points to the formal and equal 
participation in the political community. This refers more to the universal 
frarnework of rights and responsibihties in citizenship. The other principle is 
membership of the nation by which substantive participation in the political 
community is open to a full extent for certain groups within the society and 
limited to for some other groups hke minorities who are different from the 
majority group in various respects. In this regard, it can be argued that citizenship 
is not merely about legal status determined vis-a-vis the state but covers also other 
aspects that shape up the boundaries of membership and participation in the
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political commimity. Individuals are not neutral subjects who only earn the 
designation of citizen in their relations with the state and in the medium of 
citizenship. Their legal status, identity as well as their civic virtue and even more 
the interaction between these aspects characterize the scope of relations with the 
state.
As globahzation puts nation-states under strain, citizenship becomes more 
exposed to questions of international migration and minority issues. The increase 
in the claims for recognition of identities and changes in mtemational migratory 
flows on the global level introduce additional tensions on the incorporation of 
citizens in the poHtical community. Accordingly, the incorporation of the 
minorities and. immigrants become central to question of citizenship. However, 
these two groups have distinct characteristics of their own (Choudhry, 2002). In 
cultural terms, national minorities posses societal cultures whereas ethnic 
immigrants posses their own societal cultures in their countries of origin 
(Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). Therefore, the studies on the citizenship of 
minorities and of immigrants generally treat these groups separately.
The studies on citizenship of minority groups usually deal with individual 
rights within a broader range of human rights and discuss certain needs and rights 
pertaining to minority groups. They point to the tension between group rights and 
individual rights. In a similar vein, the question of whether individual rights are 
capable of covering certain needs of minorities or group rights inhibit integrity 
and have the potential for secession dominates the discussion on citizenship of 
minorities (Soner, 2004). On the other hand, the studies on citizenship of 
immigrants by and large focus on the incorporation of ethnic immigrants and the
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naturalization processes. The impact of migration on the sending countries, 
receiving cormtries and the immigrants themselves is central to the discussions on 
the triangle of citizenship, nation-state' and international migration (ipduygu, 
1996a).
This study combined minorities and immigrants in one analytical skeleton 
and made a comparative investigation on citizenship of a specific minority group 
in Turkey — the Jewish minority, and a particular group of immigrants - first 
generation of Turkish Jews from Turkey in Israel. The three aspects of citizenship 
— legal status, identity and civic virtue — and the interaction between them were 
explored empirically and analyzed on the individual level with use of this 
comparative case study. The research highlighted certain key points with regard to 
citizenship in Turkey and in Israel.
Citizenship in Turkey is one of the major instruments of nation-building in 
Turkey and the state had been the main determinant and actor in the development 
of citizenship (l9duygu et al. 1999). Inheriting the multicultural structure of the 
Ottoman Empire, Turkey had regarded citizenship as a regulatory tool of the 
relations between newly formded state and the cosmopohtan society, fri addition 
to the complimentary role to nation-building, citizenship served as an instrument 
in modernization and estabhshment of modem roots to democracy, secular 
governance and integrated society despite its multicultural components. 
Therefore, studying citizenship of Turkey’s Jews who were officially recognized 
as a minority group besides the Armenians and the Greeks provided significant 
highlights not only on citizenship on the individual level but also on the
n ' l A
boundaries of universal citizenship discourse commonly assiuned to be covering 
all groups within the society.
Turkey’s Jews can also be considered significant in the sense that despite 
their profound history in Turkey they have been subjected to exclusion from the 
definition of Turkish nation from time to time due to their difference in rehgion. 
Even with a recent example, the terrorist attacks in November 2003 that can be 
considered as Turkey’s September 11 events were directed against synagogues. In 
the case of these attacks, we witness discussions on Jews’ citizenship in Turkey. 
By the same token, not only for Jews but for all non-Muslim minorities, file 
relationship between citizenship and minorities which is not compatible with the 
European Union norms is frequently questioned. The European Union accession 
process requires Turkey to adapt multicultural pohcies with respect to its 
minorities. In light of these issues, one can argue that citizenship of non-Muslims 
and specifically Jews is noteworthy in understanding the place of Islam and the 
impact of secularism in nation-building and hence Turkish citizenship.
Citizenship in Israel is central to discussions on democracy. Although 
Israel has been founded foremost as a Jewish state, a principle that maintaias its 
validity until today, there have been rising questions on the ethnic nature of the 
state. On the one hand, there are arguments for Israel being an archetype for 
ethnic democracy (Smooha, 1997). On the other hand, norms of ethnic democracy 
are challenged on the ground of hberal democratic criteria (Jamal, 2002). 
Citizenship in Israel deals not only with the majority-ininority question and 
security issues posed by terrorism and wars but also faces challenges by 
international migration. Israel is a traditional immigration country and receives
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Jewish immigrants regularly and most of the time in big waves, incorporation of 
these new immigrants to the Israeli society poses questions to Israeli citizenship. 
Migratory flows signify the multicultural variation among the Jewish majority as 
well evidenced by various dichotomies, i.e. between Ashkenazim and 
Sephardim/Mizrahim/Oriental Jewry; between men and women; between 
religious fundamentahsts and secularists; between Jews and non-Jews; and 
between citizens and non-citizens. Therefore, studying Turkish Jews in Israel 
highlights the dynamics of nation-building, migration and citizenship in Israel.
Research on the comparative case of Turkey’s Jews and Turkish Jews in 
Israel rested on field work conducted in Turkey and in Israel which combined 
various quahtative techniques in a semi-anthropological approach. In order to 
attach a closer focus, contacts were estabhshed with both of the communities in 
Turkey and in Israel respectively. In-depth, imstructured interviews were 
conducted with key informants. Participant observation complimented the key 
informant interviews during visits to communities’ institutions. The analysis, 
however, rested mainly on survey interviews with the sample group composed of 
members of Jewish minority in Turkey and immigrants fi'om Turkey in Israel. In 
addition to a questionnaire, ad-hoc questions were addressed to the respondents 
and in total 65 in-depth interviews (31 in Turkey and 34 in Israel) were 
conducted. Since the results of the research have been discussed in-depth in the 
previous chapters, only some essential points are summarized below.
The in-depth interviews with the sample group composed of Turkey’s 
Jews first and foremost indicated that the experience of Turkish citizenship was 
associated with the respondents’ minority status. Being a non-Muslim minority in
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a Muslim dominated society seemed to have resulted in the acknowledgement of 
universal conceptualization of Turkish citizenship in the legal status. However, 
paradoxically, despite the will to equality in terms of rights and responsibihties in 
the legal framework that woxüd exclude any group rights, the respondents had will 
to difference - that is the motivation to maintain and reproduce their ethno­
religious group boundaries and cultural identity. The civic virtue aspect was 
related to minority status as well. The respondents refraiaed from taking leading 
roles in performing civic virtue though they valued virtuous citizenship. They 
feared to attract negative responses from the society and to be reminded of their 
minority status. Kymlicka and Norman (2000) argues that minorities, who have 
seemed public recognition and support for their ethnic identity, have the 
confidence to interact with others in an open way where as those who do not, tend 
to be more defensive about their culture. Jewish minority in Turkey seems to be 
falling into the first group of minorities. This does not however mean that they do 
not face assimilation or integration felt more with younger generations. 
Secularism seemed to contribute to assimilation, a point that also emerged among 
the respondents in Israel with respect to integration into Israeh society.
The in-depth interviews with the first generation of immigrants from 
Turkey in Israel indicated that the respondents generally preserved culture as well 
as the pohtical socialization that they obtained in Turkey. The Turkish Jews show 
differences in identification across year of arrival in Israel. Stül, Turkish Jews in 
Israel compose a specific immigrant group that has ties with Txnkey not only in 
terms of citizenship or familial attachments but also in terms of Turkish culture. 
However, the experience of moving from a country where they were minority into
another one where they became majority seemed to affect the respondents’ views 
on citizenship. The respondents emphasized democratic norms in the legal status, 
yet they seemed to define these norms more according to majoritarian terms. On 
the identity aspect, they were affiliated more with the culture of country of origin 
-  Turkey. Although there are variances in self-perception across year of arrival in 
Israel, the respondents mentioned that other Israelis regarded Turkish Jews more 
as Oriental Jews. On the civic virtue aspect, similar to Turkey’s Jews, immigrants 
firom Turkey in Israel generally refirained firom proactive illustration of civic virtue 
and complied with the general political norms in Israel.
The research investigated the perceptions and experiences of Turkey’s 
Jews and Turkish Jews in Israel on the individual level. However, it was found 
that citizenship was perceived to be falling in states’ sphere of influence. The idea 
of state being dominant in deterniining the general firamework of citizenship was 
dominant in both of the communities in Israel and in Turkey. The openness to 
multiculturahsm, as in the case of Israel as a traditional immigration country, and 
hegemonic norms of unified citizenship and Repubhcanism as in the case of 
Turkey, seemed to have reflections on the respondents’ views with regard to 
citizenship. It must also be noted that such priority given to states in matters of 
citizenship does not mean that citizenship, which was perceived to be defined and 
exerted by states in the eyes of the respondents, converts autonomous individuals 
to citizens. To put it more clearly, individuals’ affihation to groups, in this 
research to immigrant and minority groups, impact on the perceptions and 
experiences with regards to citizenship. In this regard, it can be suggested that 
individuals’ status -  immigrant or minority -  affect the citizenship link built
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between the states and citizens. By the same token, the legal status, identity and 
civic virtue aspects of citizenship are contingent on individuals’ group 
membership. These aspects are subject to change by experience of international 
migration and by minority status, as evidenced by the research results.
The study conducted on citizenship of Jewish minority in Turkey and 
irmnigrants from Turkey in Israel has implications for individuals, cormnunities 
and states associated with the subject matter of the research. For individuals, the 
research indicated that despite their common perception on citizenship as an issue 
under the influence of state(s), citizenship implied a combination of aspects above 
and beyond the legal status, fri other words, citizenship is more than formal rights 
and responsibihties whether defined in universal framework as in Turkey or 
defined in ethnic democratic norms as in Israel. It covers the identities of the 
citizens as well, not to mention the civic virtue aspect which is closely related to 
aspects of legal status and identity. The experiences of citizenship are subject to 
change by different positions taken in the society such as membership to a 
minority group or an immigrant group.
For communities, both in Israel and in Turkey, the research indicated that 
integration and assimilation posed significant questions for group identities. For 
the Jewish community in Turkey, although integration is highly acknowledged 
and any recall of the difference of Jews from the general society is met with 
suspicion, assimilation endangers the prolongation of Jewish identity and 
community. Similarly, although first generation of immigrants acknowledge the 
well-integrated outlook of the Turkish Jews hr Israel, they at the same time try to 
maintain Turkish culture. The research also indicated that there are differences in
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individual characteristics and perceptions and experiences with regards to 
citizenship between and among the members of the communities. For example, 
the profile of Turkey’s Jews seemed to change significantly across generations 
whereas the immigrants’ profile seemed to vary across years of arrival in Israel. 
Therefore, inner-group differences and dynamics that play role in perceptions on 
citizenship should be watched closely. In addition, the research revealed that the 
concept of invisibihty and the question of loyalty were noteworhty issues for both 
of the communities as well as for both of the states in focus -  Israel and Turkey.
For the states in focus, the research revealed that citizens are neither 
neutral nor autonomous m their relationship with the state. The group identities of 
the citizens challenge universal conceptualizations of citizenship or homogeneous 
defixations set by nation-states. It seems that universal and uniform firamework 
designed for citizenship becomes short of grasping all the citizens. In addition, as 
nation-states are challenged by the forces of globalization such as hitemational 
migration and minority issues, the states need to focus on new governance 
strategies in citizenship that would question conventional definitions of loyalty 
(loyalty to nation and/or state or multiple loyalties covering more than one 
country), and political community (enlargement of political community, 
emergence of transnational communities). Last but not least, the research also 
highlighted that security, a primary responsibility of file states, is a major concern 
in citizenship. The respondents in Turkey did not want to demonstrate theh 
difference and their participation in the pubhc remaiaed limited. They did not 
want to be picked out by the society at large. The respondents in Israel also had
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concerns for security and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict that frequently 
take violent forms seemed to be a determinant of citizenship.
The current study contributes to the fleld of social science in mtny 
respects. With regards to research methodology, the study investigated citizenship 
from the perspective of citizens themselves with an individual-level analysis. 
Citizenship is generally perceived to be an issue of governance, hence falliug into 
the domain of states. This current study, however, tempted to question state­
centric approach prevalent in most studies by adding a citizen-centric approach. 
Such an approach did not put all the research subjects into a single category of 
“citizens” but intensified them with their group membership - that is the variety 
within the category of citizen was taken into consideration in the study. By the 
same token, the subject group of Jewish minority in Turkey and first generation of 
Turkish-Jewish immigrants in Israel was explored with an eye on their multiple 
identities, loyalties and characteristics. Furthermore, the methodology assisted a 
deeper focus to be attached on citizenship. It did not treat citizenship as one 
homogeneous unity but embraced its aspects -  legal status, identity and civic 
virtue -  hence making a profound examination of citizenship possible. The 
research methodology was also distinctive with the techniques used. Although the 
primary source of data rested on the survey interviews consisting of questionnaire 
and in-depth interviews conducted with the sample group, in-depth interviews 
with key informants as well as participant observation complimented the research 
and provided a multifaceted profile of the commurdties in focus.
The current study is also significant with its subject matter. It combined 
two groups — minority and immigrant - in one analytical framework. As was
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discussed before, the citizenship studies generally deal with minorities and 
immigrants separately but this study adjoined them which made comparative 
analysis possible. Regarding Jewish minority in Turkey and Jewish immigrants 
from Turkey in Israel, this study is the first one in the field that unites both 
groups. Although there have been studies on them disjointedly, there have been no 
research on both of the groups that treated them as one analytical category in one 
research scheme until this current study.
Another asset of the study with regards to subject matter is its focus on the 
contemporary era. Turkey’s Jews have attracted interest by the researchers only 
recently. Yet, most of the studies concentrate on the Ottoman or the Early 
Republican Period and only a few rests on empirical verification or field research. 
Likewise, Turkish Jews in Israel or migration from Turkey to Israel point to 
research areas which are even less studied in contrast to detailed social scientific 
research on emigration from Turkey or Turkish immigrant communities in many 
countries like Germany, France or Australia. As was discussed previously, the 
existing studies either reflected on the great wave with use of archival research 
(i.e. Bali, 2003) or were conducted in 1980s (i.e. Weiker, 1988). In this regard, 
this study contributes to existiug hterature by providing new empirical evidence 
and by highlighting on the contemporary era.
Naturally, this study contains certain weaknesses and shortcomings 
besides its strengths. The field research hi Turkey mainly covered Jews hviag in 
Istanbul. Therefore, key ioformant interviews, participant observation and sample 
group interviews covered respondents or community institutions hi Istanbul. 
Although some of the respondents hi the sample group interviews were bom in
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İzmir, Edime or Çanakkale, all of them has moved to Istanbul at some point in 
their lives and were hving there at the time of the interviews. Istanbul is the main 
site of living for majority of Turkey’s Jews. However, there are other 
conomunities, yet smaller, in other cities like İzmir, Antakya, Ankara, Adana, 
Antakya, Bursa, Çanakkale and Şanlıurfa. These smaller communities might have 
different group characteristics than that of Istanbul. In view of that, it can be 
suggested that field research on Jewish communities dispersed all over Turkey 
would have made research on contemporary Turkey’s Jews more unyielding since 
variety of sources and hence variety of information would have had increased.
Another weakness by location of the field research ia Turkey is that the 
researcher herself resided in Ankara but most of the study has taken place in 
Istanbul. Therefore, establishing contacts with the respondents and community 
institutions took greater effort and what’s more, it became impossible to follow 
every social, religious or cultural activity that the community institutions held. 
The same was true for the field research in Israel. If it would have been possible 
to allocate more time for Israel, the contacts with the immigrants would have been 
more intense. Furthermore, the study m Israel covered only first génération of 
immigrants who arrived in Israel between 1948-1980. The immigrants who 
arrived before or after these dates were omitted. In addition, the second and third 
generations are excluded firom the study. For that reason, the term “Turkish Jews 
in Israel” used in the dissertation does not embrace the second and third 
generation immigrants, which is a weakness of the study.
An additional weakness of the study arose due to the “minority” identity of 
the respondents. The respondents, either in Turkey or in Israel, were not very
much eager to illustrate critical perspective against Turkey or Turkish people. 
Therefore, the interviews with the sample group needed several additional 
questions for further elaboration and inspection of the consistency in respondents’ 
ideas, values and even sometimes memories. In order to cross check and ensure 
reliability, same questions or similar ones by rewording of already asked 
questions were addressed to the respondents at different instances in the 
interviews. These testing questions most of the time disrupted the flow of the 
interviewing process and additionally tired both the interviewer and the 
interviewee.
The strengths and weaknesses of this study may provide helpful points for 
future studies in the field. The current research questioned citizenship on the 
layers of international migration and minority issues in the comparison case of 
Jewish minority in Turkey and Jewish immigrants from Turkey in Israel. It would 
be contributory of future research to contemplate on citizenship by building up 
other comparisons. For instance, comparing young generation among Jewish 
minority in Turkey with second/third generations of Jews from Turkey in Israel 
would filter tile relationship between citizenship and assimilation on the layer of 
minority; and the relationship between citizenship and integration on the layer of 
international migration.
As a matter of fact, emigration of Turkey’s Jews is a fruitful exploration 
site on its own. Israel is the primary receiving coimtry but Turkey’s Jews had 
other destinations as well. However, there is nearly no study conducted on them 
but only minor comments. For instance, an observer of Turkish community in 
Germany itifonns that the Muslim immigrants from Turkey had various
associations in Germany founded on the basis of Turkish identity whereas their 
non-Muslim counterparts such as the Turkish Armenians, Greeks and Jews did not 
have any (Şen, 1997: 246). The non-Muslim immigrants from Turkey in Germany 
instead preferred communal actions iu synagogues or churches on the basis of 
their religious identity. Beyond these comments, studies exclusively on Jewish 
immigrants from Turkey in countries other than Israel (i.e. France, Germany, Italy 
and/or Switzerland) would contribute to literature to a great extent. Comparing 
these communities with the one in Israel would help further elaboration of the 
distinctive characteristics of Turkish Jews in Israel.
^4^
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE INTERVIEWS 
WITH THE SAMPLE GROUP OF JEWS IN TURKEY
Interview No:
Respondent’s:
Name:
Date of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Citizenship:
Gender:
Marital Status:
Jewish Origin (Sephardim/Ashkenazim):
Education:
Occupation:
Work Place:
Occupation of the Parents:
Mother Tongue:
Foreign Language:
Contact Information:
Date of the Interview:
Place of the Interview:
Duration of the Interview:
General Environment during the Interview and Comments:
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1) I would like to start with general questions. What is your 
social/cultural/religious background? How do you perceive and define yourself?
2) How do you see Musevilik and Yahudilik^ Do you see any difference between 
them?
3) Is your name Turkish or Jewish? Do you have any nick names that you use 
among the Muslims? When you tell your name, do you receive any responses that 
your name is not understood? If you do, how do you feel?
4) When did you understand that your religion is different from the majority? 
How did your family explain it?
5) Where did you earn your religious knowledge and values from other than 
family, i.e. For example, Jewish schools, youth clubs, vacation centers or 
associations?
6) Do you think you are a religious person? Do you go to synagogues? How 
often? Do you practice your religion?
7) Do you think that the Jews in Turkey face any legal or social barrier when 
practicing their religion?
8) How do you see secularism in Turkey in laws and in practice? Do you think it 
of it as a guarantee for your rehgious rights?
9) Did you experience any discriinination or oppression for being a Jew in 
Turkey? If you did, how did you respond?
10) Does your Jewish identity affect your work life in Turkey?
11) Have you experienced any discriorination during conscription in the irdlitary?
12) Do you follow Jewish publications such as Şalom weekly, books on Jews, 
Göztepe Culture Journal or Tiryaki Journal?
13) On what levels do you have relations with the Jewish community in Turkey? 
For instance, do you attend meetings or activities? Do you participate in the 
activities of the Jewish community? What do you think is the biggest problem that 
the Jewish community in Turkey is facing?
14) How are your relations with the Muslims or Christians in Turkey?
15) Now, I would like to ask you a question about the trust that you feel for the 
other people. Do you trust your friends who are not Jews? Did your fiiends 
change their behaviors when they learned that you were a Jew?
372
16) If you were given a chance to live your life again, where would you like to 
bom in? Would you prefer to reborn as a diaspora Jew, for instance in Turkey, or 
would you like to reborn as a Jew ia Israel or would you think it would not have 
had mattered? Why?
17) Now I am going to ask you questions on marriage and intimate relations. 
Have you had any ghrl/boy friend of different religious origin before? How did it 
affect your relationship? How did your family respond? How would you react to 
your children marrying spouses of different religion?
18) The following questions aim to understand your relations with relatives 
abroad. Do you have any relatives who emigrated from Turkey? When and how 
did they emigrate? Do they visit you in Turkey? Do you visit them? How often?
19) Have you been to Israel? When did you visit Israel first? What are the reasons 
of your visits generally? How often do you visit and how long do you stay there?
20) For example, you visited your relatives abroad. Do you see yourself as a Jew 
or as a Turk in those countries? Could you explain how you perceive yourself 
when you axe out of Turkey?
21) Do you have any plans to emigrate, for instance to Israel or to other countries? 
What do your children think about emigration firom Turkey?
22) Do you think aH the Jews on the world are loyal to Israel?
23) Do you think the Jews in Turkey are loyal to Israel? If you think so, do you 
think that loyalty to Turkey and loyalty to Israel constrae a contradiction or 
consistency with each other?
24) Now I am going to ask you general questions on citizenship. In your opinion, 
what is the most essential eligibility criterion of citizenship, i.e. to be bom in the 
same country, to be a member of the same ethnic group, to speak the same 
language or to be subject to same sets of laws and etc?
25) What are the rights and responsibilities of citizenship for an ordinary citizen?
26) What are the rights, responsibilities, advantages and disadvantages of Turkish 
citizenship?
27) Who is a Turk in your opinion? For instance, is it a culture, a language, an 
ethnic group, a religion or a citizenship status?
28) Are the Jews in Turkey considered to be part of the Turkish nation? Do the 
Jews in Turkey see themselves as part of the Turkish nation?
29) Do you think the state treats citizens equally? Do you think there are any 
differences in the application of laws?
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30) Have you come across situations when you thought that your citizenship 
rights were being violated? How did you respond to these situations?
31) Have you ever thought of becoming a state official? Why or why no?
32) In your opinion, is it possible that a Jew in Turkey can become prime 
niinister, minister, chief of general staff, representative in the parhament or 
bureaucrat? If it is not possible, do you think the Jews should fight for it?
33) When you were in Turkey, how were you treated in state offices? Were there 
any differences in treatment by the state officials? If there were, how did you 
respond?
34) Have you ever come across any publication or broadcast against Jews in 
Turkey? What did you think about them and how did you respond?
35) If somebody close to you says something against the Jews, what would you 
do? If that person was somebody that you did not know before, would your 
behavior change?
36) In your opinion, is there any anti-Semitism in Turkey?
37) Have you heard about the historical incidents like the ‘Thracian Incidents’, 
‘Capital Tax’, ‘Campaign for Citizens Speak Turkish’ or ‘6-7 September Events’? 
What do you think about them? Do you think such event may happen again?
38) Now I am going to address to you questions on participation. Do you vote? 
Which parties do you vote for? Do the policies, programs, campaigns or 
discourses of the political parties on the Jews affect your voting behavior?
39) Other than voting, do you participate in politics? How?
40) Are you a member of any civil society organization? If you are, how often do 
you take part in the activities of those associations? Are you an active member?
41) Do you make donations to charity foundations? Which ones?
42) What do you think is the most important social problem in the society? Are 
there any actions that the citizens may take in order to solve these problems?
43) In your opinion, do the Turkish citizens perform civic virtue which is 
generally considered as active participation, fulfilling the duties of citizenship, 
contributing to the civil society and trying to solve the social problems as 
citizens? For instance, are they sensitive about not throwing garbage on the 
streets, not violating rules and laws, respecting others, obeying the traffic rules, 
warning others to conform to the rules, learning about citizenship rights and 
responsibilities and performing them.
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44) In your opinion, how are the Jewish citizens compared with the general 
society with respect to performing civic virtue? Can you give examples, please?
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APPENDIXE
PROTOCOL GUIDELINE
The Nature of the Study
This study composes the field research part of the doctorate dissertation 
entitled “Citizenship Questioned by Memational Migration and Minority Issues: 
A Comparative Study on the Jewish Minority in Turkey and the Jewish 
Immigrants from Turkey in Israel” which is conducted for degree purposes at 
Bilkent University, Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, Department of 
Political Science and Public Administration. The dissertation is conducted by Şule 
Toktaş imder the supervision of Assoc. Prof. Ahmet İçduygu in the same 
department.
Purpose of the Study
This ■ study mainly deals with citizenship and aims to contest it on the 
layers of international migration and minority issues. The three aspects of 
citizenship, which are legal status, identity and civic virtue will be covered in this 
study and will be put under investigation within the parameters of international 
migration and minority issues. In order to scrutinize the theoretical framework, a 
field research highli^ting empirical findings is conducted. In due course, in- 
depth interviews will be carried out with the Jews in Turkey and the Jews 
emigrated from Turkey to Israel. The findings gathered by the interviews in
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Turkey and in Israel will be evaluated according to the theoretical framework on 
citizenship. All of this research process will construe the main subject and content 
of the doctorate dissertation.
Procedures to be Followed
The people drawn from the above mentioned population groups will 
construe the sample group. Using quahtative research technique, an estimated 
number of 80-100 questions will be directed to the respondents in a time period of 
approximately one or two hours. The interviews will serve to understand the 
perceptions of the respondents towards citizenship with respect to their minority 
and/or migrant status as well as their individual experiences and interpretations 
regarding international migration and minority issues. The research in Turkey and 
in Israel will be finished in about two years.
Confidentiality
Since this study collects and accumulates data using qualitative research 
technique, the findings will be limited to the sample group. Therefore, the 
generalization of the data to broader communities beyond the limitation of a small 
representative sample group is not viable. In addition, the findings will be used 
only for scientific purposes and will only be utilized in the doctorate dissertation 
and the related academic publications/presentations. Furthermore, the identities of 
the respondents will remain confidential. In other words, the knowledge obtained 
in the study will be transmitted only in a form and style that cannot be identified
' X ' l n
with the respondents. If the respondents participating to this study have any 
questions about the research, they may contact Şule Toktaş.
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APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE INTERVIEWS 
WITH THE SAMPLE GROUP OF TURKISH JEWS IN ISRAEL
Interview No;
Respondent’s:
Name:
Date of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Citizenship:
Date of Arrival in Israel:
Origin/Destination of Migration:
Gender:
Marital Status:
Jewish Origin (Sephardim/Ashkenazim):
Education:
Occupation;
Work Place:
Occupation of the Parents:
Mother Tongue:
Foreign Language:
Contact Information:
Date of the Interview:
Place of the Interview;
Duration of the Interview;
General Environment during the Interview and Comments:
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1) I would like to start with general questions. What is your 
social/cultural/religious background? How do you perceive and define yourself?
2) How do you see Musevilik and Yahudilikl Do you see any difference between 
them?
3) Is your name Turkish or Jewish? Have there been any changes in the name that 
you use when you arrived in Israel? What kind of names you gave to your 
children in Israel?
4) Do you think you are a religious person? Do you go to synagogues? How 
often? Do you practice your rehgion?
5) If you were given a chance to live your life again, where would you like to bom 
in? Would you prefer to reborn as a diaspora Jew, for distance in Turkey, or 
would you like to reborn as a Jew in Israel or would you think it would not have 
had mattered? Why?
6) Now I am going to ask you questions on marriage and ultimate relations. Have 
you had any girl/boy fiiend of different religious orighi before? How did it affect 
your relationship? How did your family respond? How would you react to your 
children marrying spouses of different religion?
7) I would like to learn about yoxu life in Turkey before migrathig to Israel. These 
questions are more to do with your minority status. Then, I will continue with 
questions about your hfe in Israel. When you were in Turkey, have you come 
across situations in Turkey that you had thought your citizenship rights have been 
violated? If there had been such situations, how did you respond?
8) Did you experience any discrimination or oppression for being a Jew when you 
were in Turkey? If you did, how did you respond?
9) When you were in Turkey, how were you treated in state offices? Were there 
any differences in treatment by the state officials? If there were, how did you 
respond?
10) Did your Jewish identity affect your work life in Turkey?
11) When you were in Turkey, have you ever thought of becoming a state 
official? Why?
12) In your opinion, is it possible that a Jew in Turkey can become prime 
minister, minister, chief of general staff, representative in the parliament or 
bureaucrat? If it is not possible, do you think the Jews should fight for it?
13) Have you experienced any discrimination during conscription in the Turkish 
military?
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14) Have you heard about the historical incidents like the ‘Thracian Incidents 
‘Capital Tax’, ‘Campaign for Citizens Speak Turkish’ or ‘6-7 September Events’? 
What do you think about them? Do you think such event may or may not happen 
again?
15) In your opinion, is there any anti-Semitism in Turkey?
16) I would like to hear about your migration story. When and how did you 
migrate from Turkey to Israel? What were the reasons? How did you decide to 
migrate? Did you have any relatives or friends in Israel? Could you tell about how 
those years were like and yoiu: migration history?
17) Whdt did you hear about Israel when you decided to migrate to Israel? Do you 
think the information you gathered about Israel turned out to be true? What were 
your expectations? Were they realized after migration to Israel?
18) Was Israel the country that you wanted to migrate most? What were the other 
countries that you thought about migration and why?
19) When you arrived in Israel, what did you notice first in terms of citizenship?
20) Did you have any intention to return to Turkey? Under what circumstances 
would you return?
21) After you migrated to Israel, did you think about migrating to other countries 
from Israel? Why?
22) Did you stay in the first place in Israel that you migrated? Where did you 
move to and what were to reasons? How long did you stay in these settlements? 
Did you receive any help when changing settlements?
23) What was your job in Turkey? Did you change your job after migration? Who 
helped you?
24) After you migrated, did you presume your relationship with Turkey and in 
what terms?
25) When did you first visit Turkey after migrating to Israel? How often do you 
visit and how long do you stay? What were the main reasons in your visits?
26) Would you recommend your relatives in Turkey to migrate to Israel in terms 
of citizenship rights?
27) Do you have any relatives in countries other than Turkey? Do you see each 
other and how often?
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28) For example, you visited your relatives abroad. Do you see yourself as a Jew, 
a Turk or an Israeli in those cormtries? Could you explain how you perceive 
yourself when you are out of Israel?
29) Do you have any plans to emigrate from Israel, for instance to Turkey or other 
countries? What do your children think about migration from Israel?
30) fri terms of citizenship, is your life in Israel or in Turkey better? Why?
31) When you compare you migration history with other immigrants in Israel, 
what would you say? Did you experience the same things with other Israelis who 
came from other countries? What were the differences? How would you evaluate?
32) As you know, there are four groups of people m Israel. They are the Jews who 
came from Turkey, the Jews who came from other countries, the Jews who were 
bom in Israel and the non-Jews. How are your social relations with these four 
groups?
33) Do you follow what happens in Turkey? Are you subscribed to any 
newspapers, journals or TV channels ixi Turkey?
34) Are you a member of an immigrant association? Are you involved in the 
activities of the Jews from Turkey in Israel? How often do you take place in these 
activities?
35) Do you continue your relations with your friends or relatives who returned to 
Turkey?
36) Have you come across any publication or broadcast against Turkey in Israel? 
If you have had, what did you think about them and how did you respond?
37) Now I am goiag to ask you general questions on citizenship. In your opinion, 
what is the most essential eligibility criterion of citizenship, i.e. to be bom in the 
same country, to be a member of the same ethnic group, to speak the same 
language or to be subject to same sets of laws?
38) What are the rights, responsibilities, advantages and disadvantages of Israeli 
citizenship?
39) Do you think the State of Israel treat its citizens equally?
40) Do you think there are any differences in the application of laws?
41) Have you come across situations when you thought that your citizenship 
rights were being violated? How did you respond to these situations?
42) Do you think being an Israeli means being a Jew or being an Israeh citizen?
382
43) Do you thini; all the Jews on the world are loyal to the State of Israel?
44) Now, I would like you to compare and contrast Israeli and Turkish 
citizenship. According to your own experiences, what are the similarities and 
differences?
45) Do you think the laws in Turkey are equal? Are there any differences in the 
application of the laws?
46) Do you think dual citizens may feel loyalty to two states?
47) Do you think the Jews from Turkey in Israel are loyal to Turkey? If you think 
so, do you think it is a contradiction or consistency?
48) Now I am going to address to you questions on participation. Do you vote in 
Israel? Which parties do you vote for?
49) If you are a dual citizen, do you vote in both of the countries?
50) Other than voting, do you participate in pohtics? How?
51) Are you a member of any civil society association? What kind of associations 
are they? How often do you take part in the activities of those associations? Are 
you an active member?
52) What do you think it is the most important social problem in the society in 
Israel? Which social issues are you sensitive to? Are there any actions that the 
citizens may take in order to solve these problems?
53) In your opinion, do the Israeli citizens perform civic virtue which is generally 
considered as active participation, fulfilling the duties of citizenship, contributiag 
to the civil society and trying to solve the social problems as citizens? For 
instance, are they sensitive about not throwing garbage on the streets, not 
violating rules and laws, respecting others, obeying the traffic rules, warning 
others to conform to the rules, learning about citizenship rights and 
responsibilities and performing them.
54) hr your opinion, how are the Jews from Turkey in Israel compared with other 
immigrant groups and the general society with respect to performing civic virtue? 
Can you give examples, please?
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE GROUP OF JEWS IN TURKEY: 
PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS
Code Age Gender
Marital
Status
Birth Place
Mother
Tongue
Education Employment Status
FRITl 35 Male Bachelor Istanbul Turkish University Working/Self Employed
FRIT2 32 Male Married iTTHir Turkish Master
W orking/Employed/ 
White color
FRIT3 27 Female Bachelor Istanbul Turkish University
W orking/Employed/ 
White color
FRIT4 23 Female Bachelor Istanbul Turkish
High
School
Not working/Student
FFIT5 52 Female Married Istanbul Ladino
Junior High 
School
Not working/Housevrife
FRIT6 89 Male Married Istanbul Ladino
Elementary
School
Not working/Retired/ 
Blue color
FRIT? S3 Female Bachelor Istanbul Ladino None Not working/Housewife
FRITS 83 Male Widowed Istanbul Ladino
Elementary
School
Not working/Retired/ 
Blue color
FRIT9 79 Male Widowed Istanbul Ladino None
Not working/Retired/ 
Blue color
FRITIO 49 Female Married Istanbul Turkish
High
School
Not working/Housewife
FRITH 52 Male Married Istanbul French University Working/Self Emplyoed
FRITH 45 Male Married Istanbul Turkish University
Working/Employed/ 
White color
FRITIS 48 Male Divorced Istanbul Ladino University
Not working/ 
Unemployed
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Code Age Gender
Marital
Status
Birth Place
Mother
Tongue
Education Employment Status
FRIT14 50 Male Married Istanbul Turkish Master W orking/Self Employed
FRIT15 28 Male Married Izmir Turkish Master
W orking/Employed/ 
White color
FRIT16 57 Male Married Istanbul Ladino Doctorate
W orking/Employed/ 
White color
FRIT17 23 Male Bachelor Istanbul Turkish
High
School
Not working/Student
FRIT18 57 Female Married Istanbul Turkish
Junior High 
School
Not working/Housewife
FRIT19 67 Female Mamed Istanbul Ladino Master Not working/Housewife
FRIT20 31 Female Divorced Izmir Turkish
High
School
Not working/Housewife
FRIT21 77 Male Bachelor Istanbul Ladino
High
School
Not working/Retixed/ 
White color
FRIT22 23 Female Bachelor Istanbul Turkish
High
School
W orking/Employed/ 
White color
FRIT23 77 Female Married Çanakkale Ladino
High
School
Not working/Housewife
FRIT24 20 Female Bachelor Istanbul Turkish
High , 
School
Not working/Student
FRIT25 71 Male Married Istanbul Ladino College
Not working/Retired/ 
Blue color
FRIT26 43 Female Married Istanbul Ladino
High
School
Not working/Housewife
FRIT27 65 Female Married Istanbul French
Junior High 
School
Not working/Housewife
FRIT28 86 Male Married Edime Ladino
High
School
Not working/Retired/ 
Blue color
FRIT29 81 Female Married Edime Ladino
High
School
Not working/Housewife
FRIT30 45 Female Married Istanbul Ladino
High
School
Not working/Housewife
FRIT31 26 Male Bachelor Istanbul Turkish University Not working/Drafted
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APPENDIX E
SAMPLE GROUP OF TURiaSH  JEW IN ISRAEL: 
PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS
Code
Year of 
Migration
Age Gender
Marital
Status
Birth Place
Mother
Tongue
Education
Employment
Status
FRIS1 1979 51 Female Married Istanbul French University
Not Working/ 
Housewife
FRIS2 1979 46 Female Married Istanbul Turkish College
Not Working/ 
Housewife
FRIS3 1979 46 Male Married Istanbul Turkish High School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS4 1979 63 Female Married Izmir Ladino High School
Not Working/ 
Housewife
FRIS5 1979 58 Male Married Istanbul Ladino High School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FEJS6 1948 73 Female Married Izmir Ladino
Elementary
School
Not Working/ 
Housewife
FRIS7 1948 73 Male Married Izmir Ladino High School
Not Working/ 
Retired/ 
White Color
FRIS8 1971 67 Male Married Istanbul Ladino High School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS9 1951 73 Male Married Kmklareli French Master
Not Working/ 
Retired/ 
White Color
FRIS 10 1980 58 Male Married Istanbul Turkish High School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS 11 1978 58 Female Married Istanbul Ladino
Junior High 
School
Not Working/ 
Unemployed
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Code
Year of 
Migration
Age Gender
Marital
Status
Birth Place
Mother
Tongue
Education
Employment
Status
FRIS 12 1948 73 Female Widowed Izmir Ladino
Elementary
School
Not Working/ 
Retired/ 
Blue Color
FRIS 13 1973 45 Male Married Menemen Turkish
Junior High 
School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS 14 1951 75 Female Married Istanbul Ladino
Elementary
School
Not Working/ 
Housewife
FRIS15 1949 65 Female Married Bergama Ladino None
Not Working/ 
Housewife
FRIS16 1980 60 Male Married Israel Ladino
Jurhor High 
School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS 17 1980 55 Female Married Izmir Ladino
Junior High 
School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS 18 1967 50 Male Married Izmir Turkish High School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS 19 1961 58 Male Married Izmir Turkish High School
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS20 1965 56 Female Married ■ iTmir Ladino
Junior High 
School
Not Working/ 
Unemployed
FRIS21 1974 51 Female Married Izmir Turkish High School
Not Working/ 
Housewife
FRIS22 1964 54 Male Married Izmir Turkish College
Working/ 
Employed/ 
Blue Color
FRIS23 1970 60 Male Married Izmir Ladino High School
Working/ 
Employed/ 
White Color
FRIS24 1970 52 Female Married Istanbul Ladino High School
Working/ 
Employed/ 
White color
FRIS25 1970 60 Male Married Istanbul Ladino
Junior High 
School
Not Working/ 
Retired/ 
Blue Color
387
’ Code
Year of 
Migration
Age Gender
Marital
Status
Birth Place
Mother
Tongue
Education
Employment
Status
FRIS26 1970 57 Female Married Istanbul Ladino High School
Working/ 
Employed/ 
White Color
FRIS27 1969 51 Female Married Edime Turkish College
Working/ 
Employed/ 
White Color
f :m s 28 1951 79 Male Divorced Edime Ladino University
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS29 1950 79 Male Married Izmir Ladino University
Not Working/ 
Retired/ 
White Color
FRIS30 1951 77 Female Married Izmir Ladino University
Not Working/ 
Retired/ 
White Color
FRIS31 1949 79 Male Married Istanbul Ladino University
Working/ 
Self Employed
FRIS32 1951 69 Female Married Istanbul Turkish University
Not Working/ 
Retired/ 
White Color
FRIS33 -1970 60 Male Divorced Istanbul Turkish Doctorate
Working/ 
Employed/ 
White Color
FRIS34 1979 55 Female Married Istanbul Turkish High School
Working/ 
Self Employed
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